1810854 (Migration) [2018] AATA 4145 (29 August 2018)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1810854
MEMBER:Katie Malyon
DATE:29 August 2018
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision not to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.
Statement made on 29 August 2018 at 2:24 pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa – Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) – risk to the health or safety of an individual – alleged violent behaviour to a work colleague – criminal charges dismissed – two previous convictions not disclosed – credible evidence of rehabilitation – decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 116, 378
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Gong v MIBP [2016] FCCA 561
Qiao v MIAC [2008] FMCA 380
Skoljarev v Australian Fisheries Management Authority [1995] FCA 1732
Tien v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to s378 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 11 April 2018 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the secondary Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa of the applicant, Bangladeshi national [name], under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116(1)(e) of the Act on the basis that [the applicant] is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to the health or safety of an individual or individuals: in this case the delegate named a work colleague of [the applicant], [Mr A].
The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out and, if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
[The applicant] appeared before the Tribunal on 14 August 2018 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from his wife, [named]. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages. Both [the applicant] and [his wife] used the interpreter on occasions. [The applicant] was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent, who also attended the hearing.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel [the applicant’s] visa should be set aside.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Under s.116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevant to this case, these include the ground set out in s.116(1)(e) of the Act. If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.
Does the ground for cancellation…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was made out, and if so, whether the discretion to cancel the visa should be exercised. The Tribunal was required to consider the meaning of "good order of the Australian community" in the context of the visa holder's alleged conduct and assess the risk posed by his presence in Australia. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to determine whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, including evidence of rehabilitation and the impact on his family, the cancellation of the visa was the preferable decision.
The Tribunal found that while the alleged violent behaviour could potentially satisfy the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(e), it was not a mandatory cancellation. In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal considered the applicant's submission that he was presumed innocent until proven guilty, the dismissal of criminal charges, and the strong evidence of rehabilitation. This evidence included character references from his employer and medical practitioner, a statutory declaration from the applicant, and crucially, the significant support of his wife, as evidenced by her financial surety and the bail conditions requiring him to reside with her. The Tribunal also noted the applicant's long period of residence in Australia, his established family life, and the potential negative impact of his removal to Bangladesh.
Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the preferable decision was not to cancel the applicant's visa. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the delegate's decision and substituted a decision not to cancel the applicant's Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For this reason, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(e) of the Act exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3) of the Act, the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether [the applicant’s] Subclass 457 visa should be cancelled.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that are required to be considered in relation to the exercise of the discretion to cancel the visa. Where exercising a discretionary power the Tribunal is required to have regard to any relevant lawful policy, in this case, the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual PAM3 ‘General visa cancellation powers’, as a relevant consideration. However, policy is not binding on the Tribunal.[3] This was supported in Re Drake and MIEA (No 2) where Brennan J stated ‘the Tribunal ought not, indeed cannot, deprive itself of its freedom to give no weight to a Minister's policy in a particular case’. [4]Justice Brennan also stated:In point of law, the Tribunal is as free as the Minister to apply or not to apply that policy. The Tribunal’s duty is to make the correct or preferable decision in each case on the material before it, and the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all, in fulfilling its statutory function.[5] [3] See, for example, Qiao v MIAC [2008] FMCA 380 (Orchiston FM, 28 March 2008) at [29] and Skoljarev v Australian Fisheries Management Authority [1995] FCA 1732 (Davies J, 12 December 1995) [4] (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 644 [5] Ibid at 642 While policy sets out a number of factors that may be considered when deciding whether it is appropriate to cancel a visa, in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal considers it highly relevant that the 2 domestic violence incidents occurred within the space of 2 weeks more than 7 years ago and, importantly, there is overwhelming and credible evidence from [the applicant’s wife] of her husband’s rehabilitation. The Tribunal also notes the bail conditions imposed on [the applicant’s] release from detention [in] January 2018 require that, relevantly, he: forfeits cash of $4,000; resides at an address in [Suburb 4] (notably, this is the same address on [the applicant’s wife’s] Learner Driver Licence and the address where she and [the applicant] advised the Tribunal they have lived together as a family for 9 years); significantly, complies with the curfew requiring him to remain at home from [dates in] January 2018 - [February] 2018 between the hours of 11:00 pm and 5:00 am unless in the company of [the applicant’s wife] (emphasis added). Furthermore, the bail report indicates that [the applicant’s wife] has agreed to forfeit further $4,000 if her husband fails to appear before the court when required to do so. It is evident to the Tribunal that, based on the support of his wife and employer, [the applicant] was granted bail after 5 weeks of detention so that the family could resume living together from [a date in] January 2018 at their [Suburb 4] home.