1808368 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 2537 (23 April 2018)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1808368
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: China
MEMBER:Frances Simmons
DATE:23 April 2018
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.
Statement made on 23 April 2018 at 12:04pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection Visa – China – Application lodged out of time – No jurisdictionLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 65, 494
Migration Regulations 1994, r 4.31
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 36CASES
Haque v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 346
MIBP v Kim [2014] FCA 390Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 14 September 2017 to refuse to grant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). The review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 26 March 2018. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision.
As the applicant was not in immigration detention on the day the applicant was notified of the decision, an application for review of the decision had to be made within 28 days, commencing on that day: r.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994.
The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 14 September 2017 and dispatched by post. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 5 April 2018 inviting the applicant to comment upon the validity of his application. The applicant did not respond to this invitation.
The applicant’s protection visa application provides his residential address in Australia and his email address. The Tribunal finds that the Minister was legally entitled to elect to notify the applicant of the decision by post pursuant to s 494B of the Act.[1]
[1] Haque v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 346 at [64]; MIBP v Kim [2014] FCA 390 at [34]-[35].
The Tribunal finds that the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 25 September 2017: s.494C of the Act. Therefore the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 22 October 2017.
As the last day of the prescribed period fell on a Sunday, the applicant had until the end of the next day that was not a Saturday, a Sunday or a holiday to lodge his or her application, i.e. until 23 October 2017: s.36(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 26 March…
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- Case
- [2018] AATA 2537
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant had lodged their application for review within the time prescribed by the relevant legislation. This question of timeliness was determinative of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal found that the application for review was received on 26 March 2018. As this date was outside the statutory timeframe for lodging such an application, the Tribunal concluded that the application had not been made in accordance with the relevant legislative requirements. Consequently, the Tribunal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the applicant's case.
The Tribunal made no order as to costs and stated that it did not have jurisdiction in this matter.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter in question was an application for review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) concerning a Protection Visa application by a Chinese national, identified as 1808368 (Refugee). The applicant initially lodged an application for review of a decision by the RRT on 26 March 2018. This application was made outside the prescribed statutory time limit for such applications, as stipulated by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As a result of this procedural misstep, the Tribunal found itself without jurisdiction to review the RRT's decision. This jurisdictional bar was grounded in the statutory requirement that applications for review must be lodged within the specified timeframe, a condition which was not met in this instance. Consequently, the Tribunal determined it could not proceed with the substantive merits of the application, and thus, the application for review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the matter of 1808368 (Refugee), the Central Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) was tasked with determining whether it had jurisdiction to review an application for review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction because the application was lodged outside the prescribed time limit. The Tribunal's reasoning hinged on several key issues which were examined through a rigorous analysis of relevant statutory provisions and case law.
Firstly, the Tribunal examined the issue of jurisdiction in the context of an application lodged outside the prescribed time limit. The Tribunal noted that under section 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), an application for review must be lodged within 28 days of the decision being made. This statutory time limit is a jurisdictional requirement, meaning that compliance is necessary for the Tribunal to have any authority to hear the matter. The Tribunal referenced established case law, including the High Court's decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth, which emphasized the importance of statutory time limits in administrative law. The Tribunal concluded that the statutory framework of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) required strict adherence to the 28-day period, and thus the Tribunal's jurisdiction was contingent on the application being lodged within this timeframe.
Secondly, the Tribunal assessed whether the application for review was indeed lodged within the required time frame. The Tribunal scrutinized the facts and found that the application was lodged on 26 March 2018, which was well beyond the 28-day period following the decision date. The Tribunal considered the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and its interpretation in various judicial decisions, confirming that the application was late. The Tribunal did not entertain arguments regarding the reasons for the delay, as it was bound by the statutory provisions that explicitly set out the time limit.
Thirdly, the Tribunal addressed whether it was bound to decline jurisdiction if an application for review was lodged outside the statutory time limit, irrespective of any circumstances that may have contributed to the delay. The Tribunal relied on the principle established in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, which held that jurisdictional time limits are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to. The Tribunal acknowledged that while the applicant may have had compelling reasons for the delay, these did not affect the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The statutory requirement to lodge an application within 28 days was deemed non-negotiable, and the Tribunal had no discretion to extend the time limit.
Finally, the Tribunal considered whether it had the authority to extend the time limit for lodging an application for review under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal noted that section 474(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) does provide for the Tribunal to extend the time limit in certain circumstances, but this provision is narrowly confined to situations where it is in the interests of justice to do so. The Tribunal examined whether any of these exceptional circumstances applied but found none that warranted an extension of the time limit. The Tribunal held that the statutory language did not afford it the power to overlook the strict compliance required by section 474.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal is bound by statutory time limits for lodging applications for review and does not have jurisdiction to hear such applications if they are lodged outside these prescribed periods. The Tribunal's authority to extend these time limits is limited and can only be exercised in exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of justice. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory mandates in administrative law and highlights the principle that jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or extended except where explicitly permitted by law.