1721918 (Refugee)

1721918 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 2715 (17 April 2024)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1721918
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Vietnam
MEMBER:Mary Sheargold
DATE:17 April 2024
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 17 April 2024 at 11:31am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Vietnam – decision made on papers – applicant’s prior student visa and partner visa applications – eight years in Australia – family debt – threats – unable to relocate – no protection from authorities – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
ABAR15 v MIBP (No 2) (2016) 242 FCR 11
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
MIAC v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211
SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362
SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 18 August 2017 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Vietnam, applied for the visa on 22 June 2016. She has lived in Australia since [January] 2008 when she arrived to undertake tertiary study. Subsequently, she married an Australian citizen and applied for a combined Subclass 820/801 partner visa in February 2012. She appealed that visa refusal through to the Federal Court, where the Tribunal’s affirmation of the delegate’s refusal was upheld in March 2016. Three months later, she made an application for this permanent protection visa.
On 25 September 2023, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to the application but that it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicant to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing in October 2023. On 2 October 2023, the applicant returned the Tribunal’s Response to Hearing Invitation form and checked the box advising the Tribunal that she intended to attend the scheduled hearing.
However, 4 days later, on 6 October 2023, she sent the Tribunal an email stating that she was now enclosing the correct hearing response form, and in this version, she checked the box advising the Tribunal that she did not wish to give oral evidence and consented to the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable him to appear before it.
A Tribunal officer wrote to the applicant on 9 October 2023 seeking clarification and confirmation regarding her apparent change of mind with respect to attending the Tribunal hearing. She was asked to state whether she consented to a decision on the papers or whether she would appear at the Tribunal at the scheduled hearing time, which was set for 10:00am AEDT on 13 October 2023. Another Tribunal officer attempted to call the applicant on 12 October 2023 to confirm her intention not to participate in a hearing in relation to her application, but the applicant’s mobile telephone diverted to voicemail and she did not return the officer’s call. For reasons unrelated to the above, the Tribunal hearing was cancelled on the same day, 12 October 2023, and the applicant was notified of this decision in writing.
For an abundance of caution, the Tribunal sought to list the application for hearing again on 16 April 2024, the earliest available date. However, the applicant did not respond to the Tribunal’s invitation. 2 separate SMS reminders were sent prior to the hearing. She did not appear at the scheduled day and time. Having exhausted its avenues to engage the applicant in the review process, the Tribunal has decided to rely on her most recent correspondence with the Tribunal, dated 6 October 2023, where she requested a decision to be made based on the material already before the Tribunal.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in s 5J(1)(a) (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution: s 5J(4)(a). Further, the persecution must involve serious harm to the person and systematic and discriminatory conduct: ss 5J(4)(b), (c).
For the purposes of s 5J(4), s 5J(5) provides that the following are instances of serious harm: (a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty; (b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person; (d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
When a person claims to fear being persecuted for reasons of their membership of a particular social group, the existence of such a group and the person’s membership of it is to be determined in accordance with s 5L. It provides that a person is to be a treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if a characteristic, other than a fear of persecution, is shared by each member of the group and the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, that characteristic. Further, that characteristic must be innate or immutable, or must be so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience that the member should not be forced to renounce it, or it must distinguish the group from society.
Subject to s 5J(6) of the Act, a person may be a refugee in circumstances where the well-founded fear of persecution is a consequence of events that have occurred since arriving in Australia. Section 5J(6) provides that any conduct engaged in by a person in Australia must be disregarded in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unless the person satisfies the decision maker that he or she engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the claim to be a refugee.
A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country: s 5J(2). Section 5LA(1) provides that effective protection measures are available if protection against persecution could be provided to the person by either the relevant State, or a party or organisation (including an international organisation) that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of its territory, and that State, party or organisation is willing and able to offer such protection.
A relevant State, party or organisation is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if the person can access the protection, and the protection is durable and, in the case of protection by the relevant State, the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system: s 5LA(2).
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A): s 5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s 5(1) of the Act.
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s 36(2B) of the Act.
Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. In MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, the ‘real risk’ test was held to impose the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition, and that reasoning appears equally applicable to the refugee criterion in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act (see Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth), pp.170-1 at [1169], [1180]).
An applicant will suffer significant harm if they will be subjected to torture: s 36(2A)(c). Torture is exhaustively defined in s 5(1) of the Act as an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on a person. The pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted, in the sense that there is an actual, subjective intention on the part of a person to bring about the suffering by their conduct: SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[27] and [114]. Furthermore, it must be inflicted for one of five purposes: for the purpose of obtaining from the person or a third person information or a confession; for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which they or a third person committed or is suspected of having committed; for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; for any purpose related to one of those purposes; or for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR).
However, torture does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR.
‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ for the purposes of s 36(2A)(d) is exhaustively defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on a person, or pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on a person, so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature. The pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted, in the sense that there is an actual, subjective intention on the part of a person to bring about the suffering by their conduct: SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[27] and [114].
However, ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ does not include an act or omission which is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), nor one arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The final type of significant harm listed in s 36(2A) is degrading treatment or punishment: s 36(2A)(e). Degrading treatment or punishment is exhaustively defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean an act or omission which causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, in the sense that there is an actual, subjective intention on the part of a person to bring about the suffering by their conduct: SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[27] and [114].
However, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ does not include an act or omission which is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), nor one that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Under s 36(2B)(a) of the Act, there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country if the Tribunal is satisfied that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. The Tribunal draws guidance from the judgments of the High Court in SZATV v MIAC and SZFDV v MIAC which held that whether relocation is reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation within his or her country: SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18 and SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51, per Gummow, Hayne & Crennan JJ, Callinan J agreeing.
Under s 36(2B)(b) of the Act there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. That is, the level of protection must be such to reduce the risk of the applicant being significantly harmed to something less than a ‘real risk’: MIAC v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211. The provision requires consideration of the source and nature of the harm faced, the nature and degree of protection able to be afforded by the authorities from the specific harm faced, whether that protection could be obtained, and whether, upon obtaining that protection there would still be a real risk of significant harm: ABAR15 v MIBP (No 2) (2016) 242 FCR 11 at [60]–[61].
Sections 36(2)(b) and (c) provide as an alternative criterion that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that one person is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as another if either is a member of the family unit of the other or each is a member of the family unit of a third person. Section 5(1) also provides that ‘member of the family unit’ of a person has the meaning given by the Regulations for the purposes of the definition.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
The Tribunal has considered these Guidelines along with the DFAT Country Information Report on Vietnam most recently revised and published on 11 January 2022.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Receiving country
[The applicant]’s Vietnamese nationality is not in issue. She provided a certified copy of her passport issued by the Embassy of Vietnam in Australia, that was valid from [2012] to [2022]. The Department accepted her claimed identity and nationality set out in her passport, as does the Tribunal. The Tribunal finds that Vietnam is [the applicant]’s receiving country for the purposes of assessing her protection claims.
Relevant background, claims and evidence
[The applicant] declined an offer to appear before the Tribunal to advance claims and evidence in her case, and requested the Tribunal make its decision based on the information already available to it.
The only correspondence [the applicant] has had with the Tribunal since filing her application is to address the Tribunal’s repeated requests for her to provide a complete copy of the notification and decision record she received from the Department when her visa was refused. The final instance in which [the applicant] sent an incomplete notification letter and decision record was 23 June 2020.
For completeness, the Tribunal notes that [the applicant] has never provided the Tribunal with the second page of the delegate’s decision record. That page of the decision record does not bring any controversial information to light; it is simply the page where the delegate makes findings regarding [the applicant]’s country of nationality, and where the delegate notes that a request for further information to substantiate [the applicant]’s protection claims was sent on 11 July 2017.
[The applicant] has not made any submissions setting out any claims, nor has she provided any documentary evidence to the Tribunal to support the claims she made in her original protection visa application. Based on the documentary evidence available at review, it appears that [the applicant] was not invited to interview by the delegate prior to the delegate’s decision being made.

In the circumstances, in addition to the delegate’s decision, which neatly summarises the content of [the applicant]’s application, the Tribunal has considered [the applicant]’s application form submitted for her protection visa to ensure it fairly represents her claims at review. In her protection visa application form, her claims were set out as follows:
a.she left Vietnam to protect herself and family from ‘getting threaten to kill me over family debt’;
b.she believes her life will be threatened or she will be killed if she returns to Vietnam;
c.she does not believe the authorities could not or would not protect her because the threatened harm would need to be to society, not individuals, in order for the authorities to protect her;
d.she could not relocate within Vietnam because she was born and raised in ‘the town’ with her family;
[The applicant] has provided nothing more than this to either the Department or the Tribunal in support of her claims. The Tribunal notes that in the delegate’s decision there is reference to the Department requesting further information from the applicant on 11 July 2017. The delegate states that she did not provide any further information, and there is no information in the Departmental file nor the Tribunal’s file further substantiating her claims in any way.
Section 5AAA of the Act makes clear that it is the applicant’s responsibility to specify all particulars of a claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist the applicant in specifying, any particulars of her claims. Nor does the Tribunal have any responsibility or obligation to establish, or assist in establishing, the claim.
The Tribunal notes that, according to the information set out in the delegate’s decision, a copy of which [the applicant] has supplied to the Tribunal, [the applicant] has remained resident in Australia since 2008. She has utilised avenues such as a student visa and marriage to an Australian citizen to find a lawful means to live continuously in Australia. The Tribunal has no information regarding the current state of [the applicant]’s marriage, nor does it have any information relating to the state of her marriage at the time she applied for her protection visa.
In determining whether [the applicant] engages protection obligations, it is necessary to make findings of fact on relevant matters and this involves an assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s claims. The Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility states that all available evidence must be considered in order to make the correct or preferable decision. In this case, the paucity of available evidence invites a consideration of the genuineness or otherwise of [the applicant]’s claims.
The Tribunal considers it questionable that [the applicant] has waited over 8 years since her first arrival in Australia, including having been through protracted litigation in respect of her partner visa application, before raising concerns regarding her personal safety in Vietnam due to ‘family debt’. It is not possible to assess [the applicant]’s personal credibility in circumstances where she has declined to appear before the Tribunal. However, it is reasonable to question the spirit in which she has made her claims for protection where she has chosen not to engage with either the Department or the Tribunal when invited with an opportunity to expand on her claims and provide a more clear picture of her family situation in Vietnam.
The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status[1] provides some guidance as to an appropriate course for a decision maker to take when establishing the facts of an applicant’s claims. At paragraphs [203]-[204], the Handbook states that:
After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. […] it is hardly possible for a refugee to “prove” every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts.[2]
[1] Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1979 (revised 2019)
[2] Ibid, at p 44, [203]-[204].
In [the applicant]’s case, she has elected to disengage from the process of assisting the delegate and the Tribunal to check the veracity of her claimed fears. Hers is a relatively unique situation where the Tribunal is left with only a handful of sentences provided in an application form submitted over 8 years ago to consider as the totality of claims and evidence, and where opportunities to further adduce her claims have been turned down.
In these circumstances, the Tribunal is not minded to give [the applicant] the benefit of the doubt in respect of her claim to fear being killed, or threatened with death, if she returns to Vietnam on the basis of a ‘family debt’ that is not particularised. There is insufficient information available to support her claims for protection. Her bald assertions do not provide a sufficient basis for the Tribunal to be satisfied that she would, in fact, face any kind of harm if she returned to Vietnam.
Therefore, the Tribunal finds [the applicant] would not face harm that amounts to persecution for the purposes of s 5J(1) of the Act. Considering [the applicant]’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that there is not a real chance that she will suffer persecution now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if she returns to Vietnam.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Having concluded that [the applicant] does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal has had regard to the exhaustive definition of ‘significant harm’ in s 36(2A), being that the non-citizen, [deleted], will be: arbitrarily deprived of her life; subjected to the death penalty; subjected to torture; subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or subjected to degrading treatment or punishment. [the applicant] has made claims that she fears she will be killed if she returns to Vietnam due to ‘family debt’, but has not specified who she believes may wish to kill her in relation to the claimed debt.
Again, the Tribunal notes that [the applicant]’s claims are made in a total of four sentences, with no supporting evidence or elaboration made despite being offered opportunities to do so. Having considered [the applicant]’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Vietnam, there is a real risk that [the applicant] will suffer significant harm.
Therefore, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Mary Sheargold
Member

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2024] AATA 2715

17 April 2024

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Immigration

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Statutory Interpretation

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