1703103 (Refugee)
[2020] AATA 4686
•20 October 2020
1703103 (Refugee) [2020] AATA 4686 (20 October 2020)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1703103
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Ethiopia
MEMBER:Sean Baker
DATE:20 October 2020
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Statement made on 20 October 2020 at 3:07pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection visa – Ethiopia – race - Amhara – actual and imputed political opinion – association with high profile anti-government dissident Dr Eshetu – supporter and supplier of confidential information to the Ethiopian National Transitional Council – low level member or supporter of the ENTC – delay in lodging protection application – credibility concerns –decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 424A, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa on 18 July 2014 and the delegate refused to grant the visa on 7 February 2017. The applicant provided a copy of the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 5 March 2020 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Amharic and English languages. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent.
Because of changes to the country information, the applicant’s representative has provided a number of post hearing submissions and country information update. With the publication of the most recent DFAT country report, I provided an opportunity to respond to information in that report to the applicant and his representative.
This case was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This has regrettably meant the case has taken longer to be finalised than it should. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was given a fair opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, including through seeking comment on the most recent DFAT report and allowing multiple post hearing submissions.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
The issue in this case is whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Ethiopia or, if not, there is a real risk of significant harm. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Claims
According to his protection application the applicant is a single male of the Amhara ethnicity and Protestant religion, born in Addis Ababa and he speaks English and Amharic. He travelled to Australia as a student in January 2014. He has previously travelled to [various countries]. He has obtained qualifications in information technology in Ethiopia, [Country 1] and Australia.
·He is an Ethiopian citizen of Amhara ethnicity from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and is a Christian (Protestant).
·His parents and [a number] of his brothers reside in Addis Ababa while one brother resides in [another location].
·He is a Computer Programmer/Software Engineer and before travelling to Australia, he worked on several IT projects for various government organisations been developing software in accordance to their needs. He also worked with private organisations in Ethiopia.
·He, along with a few others had worked for a company named [Company 1] that took on contract work to develop computer software. He is also a partner and holds [a percentage] of the shares.
·He is seeking protection in Australia as he fears returning to Ethiopia.
·He fears being detained, tortured, and/or killed by the Ethiopian authorities as he has links with an opposition party, the Ethiopian National Transitional Council (ENTC).
·His links to the ENTC stem from his association with Dr Fisseha Eshetu who established the ENTC that is regarded as a threat for the Ethiopian government.
·He has led an IT project for Dr Eshetu. This coupled with his access to the Addis Ababa [government agency 1] and [government agency 2] data has placed his life at risk.
·Dr Eshetu left Ethiopia in 2012, however, he has remained in contact with him.
·After Dr Eshetu left the country, he was very scared as he was "almost Dr Eshetu’s main contact." To stay safe, he kept changing his place of residence.
·As part of his work with Dr Eshetu, he and his colleagues/partners created an 'on-line' election platform that provided a list of candidates. This 'on-line' election platform was to include Ethiopians living abroad.
·This was along the lines of a competition platform that his team had created for music and fashion that was a global forum and essentially created for fund raising.
·Before he left his country to travel to Australia, around July or August 2013, [Mr A] — the person who used to pay him and his colleagues while they were working with Dr Eshetu was imprisoned. After this he was even more scared. Lately, he has learnt from Dr Eshetu, that no one knows [Mr A]'s current whereabouts.
·His friend and business partner — a fellow IT consultant named [Mr B] was arrested by the police in February 2014, beaten and questioned. He leaked information about 'the company' and people working in it.
·The police visited his house and handed a letter to his brother in February or March 2014. This letter reported that people associated with Dr Eshetu were under scrutiny and named the applicant along with [Mr B] and [a] fellow IT consultant and business partner. His brother sent this letter to the applicant.
During the interview the applicant's agent submitted that the applicant will be targeted for harm due to his ethnicity (Amhara) and his anti-government views.
To the Department the applicant provided documents:
·The English translation of a letter of employment from the Addis Ababa [government agency 1] dated [August] 1998 (folio 51); (
·Receipts of money [transfers] (folios 52-53);
·A letter of employment from [Company 1] (folios 56-58);
·A letter of reference from the General Manager of [Company 1] dated 25 October 2012 (folio 59);
·Several certificates of achievement and educational qualifications attained by the applicant (folios 60-68);
·His detailed resume (folios 70-70(c));
·A document titled, Memorandum of Association with [Company 1] (folios 71-71(e));
·A document titled, Consultancy Agreement dated 14 January 2011 as evidence of the agreement between the applicant and his fellow consultants based in Addis [Ababa] (folios 72-72(f));
·A Police Clearance Certificate dated 17 October 2012 (folio 73);
·A letter signed by Dr Eshetu dated 15 July 2014 attesting to the applicant’s association with the ENTC (folio 109);
·A letter on Addis Ababa [government agency 1] letter head with reference number [deleted] dated [February] 2006 (folio 50) and English translation of the same (folio 110). The subject of this letter reads: "Conducting High Scrutiny on Dr Fisha (sic) Eshetu and persons affiliated with him";
·A personal employment reference for the applicant dated 10 July 2015 and signed by the Business Development Manager, [Bank 1] (folio 111);
·A character reference for the applicant dated 16 August 2015 and signed by [a minister of specified church] (folio 112); and
·A few articles from the Internet attesting to clashes between ethnic Amhara and the police in Ethiopia; the criminalising of mass email and spamming in Ethiopia and TPLF sentencing nine people for giving Ethiopia's military secrets to Eritrea (folios 115-119).
To the Tribunal, the applicant provided a copy of the delegate’s decision. He also made a statutory declaration on 3 March 2020 in which he declared:
·He reiterated his claims made before the Department, that his work in IT with [various government agencies] meant he had access to sensitive information, and his creation of the company [Company1] in which he was a shareholder and employee;
·He explained his relationship and work for Dr Eshetu and the ENTC, and his work by providing information [he] had acquired through his work with the [government agency 1], and noted that the government at that time as desperate to repress dissent such as Ginbot 7;
·As part of his work he claims to have worked on an online election platform which included a list of candidates and was to include Ethiopians living abroad in the democratic process. He also met [Mr A] who has been imprisoned and no one knows where he is;
·They had an office, but this had to be shut down. They met at Dr Eshetu’s house and later at friends’ house. Dr Eshetu increased his profile but then had to flee in 2012, causing the applicant to fear for his life and to have to move around. He stayed in contact with Dr Eshetu;
·Mr [B] worked as a contractor for [Company 1], he helped recruit members online. He was beaten, questioned and imprisoned because of his involvement with Dr Eshetu. Mr [B] leaked information about the company and people working with him because he was tortured;
·The applicant was moving from place to place. He was receiving threatening messages. People called and asked if he had a connection to Dr Eshetu. After he left the police visited his house and contacted his brother;
·He had been asked many times to be a member of the government’s political party by employees of the government;
·Dr Eshetu organised the humiliation of Zenawi during the G8 summit in the USA. The government consider Dr Eshetu their most hated enemy and wish anyone associated with him harm;
·If he returns, the applicant fears he would be harmed as [Mr A] and Mr [B] were. He is afraid of the current government and their followers as they know he has links to an opposition organisation;
·Dr Eshetu has applied for protection in the USA and still resides there. He believes his association with Dr Eshetu and the applicant’s sharing data has put his life in danger. The movement was similar to the Arabic Spring and the government uses anti-terrorism laws to destroy any development;
·People discriminate against the Amhara and he was always fearful because of his ethnicity;
·Ethnic nationalists and in particular Oromo groups are very dangerous and may Oromo groups have inflicted violence on Amhara people in Addis Ababa, many Amhara people have been killed and the situation is volatile;
·Thousands of people who fled the area last year to escape ethnic violence are languishing in refugee camps. Because he is Amhara this places him at great risk. The situation in Ethiopia is complex and volatile, the government does not allow for people to actively express their political opinion without fear;
·The changes in Ethiopia has given rise to violence and separatists movements, whilst the applicant is pro federalist;
·As a supporter and former member of a pro nationalist political party that supports a federal system and the Amhara ethnicity, he fears his life would be in danger because of his ethnicity and pro Federalist views;
·He claims Amhara are given castration medicine and are castrated in prison;
·At the interview with the delegate he had issues with the interpreter. He considers the technical information was misunderstood; and
·Contrary to the statement in the decision record, the applicant had provided the original and translated letter from the Addis Ababa [government agency 1] during the interview with the delegate.
In a pre-hearing submission, it was claimed that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on return for reasons of his actual and imputed political opinion, as a member of a particular social group and as a member of the ethnic Amhara minority. The submission addressed the concerns expressed in the delegate’ decision and provided country information about the current situation in Ethiopia, which, it was argued, established that “…the loosening of authoritarian government controls in Ethiopia has been accompanied by a significant deterioration in the security situation due to a rise of inter-ethnic violence, …” the submission quotes from Hathaway’s Law of Refugee Status. The submission canvases complementary protection and, under this, relocation, state protection and generalised violence.
A large number of news reports and articles were also provided. A number of articles were provided which referred to Dr Eshetu, dated 2012 and 2013.
In a post hearing submission, it was argued that the applicant would be persecuted for reasons of:
·Actual and imputed political opinion
o as an anti-government dissident
o a supporter and supplier of confidential information to the Ethiopian National Transitional Council (ENTC) who has a long history of anti-government activities in Ethiopia and abroad
o close association with prominent high profile anti-government dissident Dr Eshetu
·As a member of the ethnic minority Amhara
It was further submitted that he was owed complementary protection.
The submission sought to further explain the applicant’s evidence at the hearing in relation to his IT skills and his positions in Ethiopia, his police clearance checks, the claimed rise in his profile post his departure, quotes extensively from an 8 March 2012 newspaper article which refers to the ENTC and Dr Eshetu, the safety of the land border crossing to Kenya, the delay in applying for protection in Australia, his visit to [Country 2] just prior to his protection application, and his current risk of harm as a person of Amhara ethnicity. The submission was accompanied by several [social media] profiles of police. Also provided was a statement from Dr Eshetu in which he outlined his role with the ENTC, his asylum in the USA, how he knew the applicant and the services the applicant provided for the ENTC, his view on whether the applicant would be at risk of harm, and his view on the current situation in Ethiopia.
A second post hearing submission was provided which largely reproduced the above submission but included a section on the merging of the ENTC party in 2019,
A number of articles were provided in relation to the violence in June and July 2020 after the death of Hachalu Hundessa, a famous Oromo singer whose songs were political and represented a voice for the Oromo ethnic group.
A response was provided on 1 September 2020 to the s.424A letter that I sent following the publication of the most recent DFAT report on Ethiopia, including a submission and further links to articles.
Consideration
The applicant’s claimed acquisition of sensitive information
The applicant claims that the chance of him being harmed stems from his role as an employee or contractor in several sensitive positions in Ethiopia. He claims that in these roles he was privy to sensitive information which he then shared with the ENTC. For the purposes of this assessment, I have also had regard to whether the Ethiopian authorities may believe or impute that he might pass on such information.
For the reasons that follow I find that the applicant has overstated his roles and the significance of the information he may have obtained in these roles.
At hearing I found the applicant to be largely unconvincing when describing the sensitive nature of the information he had access to, why it was sensitive and how it may be of concern to the current Ethiopian government.
The applicant described his work for the Addis Ababa [government agency 1] where he said he built their [systems] from scratch, as well as a [registration] system. I asked if he had kept the data after he worked there and he said he had, as they were working at home. When I asked why this data would be relevant many years later he said that people who were trained were in the [agency 1] forever, and so all the [people] would still be there. He then said he would go after this time and maintain the system as a contractor. I asked how he would have gotten data if he was just going in for the day. He said he took his laptop. I expressed some doubt that a contractor would be able to access sensitive data. He said that the [government agency 1] was very uneducated, and he had a big profile and they really trusted him, he went there without being paid, just to update the database as well.
The applicant said that whilst he was working there he was discriminated against because of his Amhara ethnicity.
He said that after this he worked for himself for a bit and then he established [Company 1] with an associate. They were the first partner company with [another company]. They got a lot of work and started working with the Ethiopian [government agency 2] around 2007 - 2008. This was a huge project and he got a big profile from this – [an organisation] was involved. They developed [a] platform and then case management. He became very experienced in these areas and built relationships with government bodies. He said that around this time he also had to go back to the [government agency 1] as everything was not fully documented so he would go back when staff changed, up until 2010, even though he had only been employed there for a year. The applicant said he worked [in] a data [centre]. While doing this work people in these agencies requested he join the government party to demonstrate his support for the authorities.
He said then, in 2010, they started using the information from the [government agency 1], they wanted to know exactly in some suburbs if there were [government agency 1 staff] in a particular area. He provided lists of names and addresses in 2010 and again in 2012 where the [registration] system was very helpful in the North. I asked why they would want to know about the [government agency 1 staff]. The applicant’s response was difficult to follow, he claimed the local community had formal employment but were hired and paid and the [government agency 1 staff] were trained and working the whole time in different suburbs, they created contacts in each suburb. I noted I had some trouble with his claim that information he had gained from his employment in 2004 – 2005 with [government agency 1] and then his claimed sporadic employment after that would give him information that was accurate or useful in 2010 or later. He said that the people who joined the [government agency 1] would not change who they are. He claimed that the data was also used in 2017 where they used the data about [government agency 1 staff].
I asked the applicant if he could point to any other sensitive information he may have had or still had. He said from the [case] management system there was some information on when people have a [meeting]. then in the future they would be able to understand that and delay the [meeting]. I asked why that would be important. He said sometimes it would be a closed [meeting] so those people could be imprisoned, and the family would not contact them. This was particularly the case for high profile opposition persons. I asked if he could give me an example of someone. He again spoke in generalities. I asked if he could give me a concrete example and he said he didn’t remember the name of the person.
In the post hearing submissions the applicant’s access to the sensitive information was asserted, without any further relevant evidence being provided, other than arguing Ethiopia is an underdeveloped country and therefore it was plausible the applicant had the access to systems he claims to have created. It was claimed that the [social media] profiles of three people identifying themselves as [agency 1 staff] established that the tenure of these government employees is lengthy.
On the basis of the information and documents the applicant has provided, I accept that the applicant is a software programmer and worked as a software programmer in Ethiopia. I accept that the applicant did some work for the Addis Ababa [government agency 1] for approximately a year and a half from November 2004 – until August 2005 (the translated letter from the [government agency 1] lists dates in 1997/1998 – I accept that these dates have been left as they were in the original and need to be adjusted between the Ethiopian and Gregorian calendars). I accept that the applicant was employed after this time by [a company] and then [Company 1] as a software engineer and manager for several years and then with [another company], according to the resume he provided to the Department.
However, I found the applicant’s evidence that he had had access to sensitive information that was useful to the Opposition, Dr Eshetu and the ENTC to be implausible. This is for several reasons. Firstly, the reference letter he provided from the [government agency 1] indicates that his employment was limited to that of a contractor for a limited period of a year and a half and involved work as a computer [programmer], there is no indication from this letter that, as a contractor, he worked on or had access to sensitive information such as [details deleted ]. I explained to the applicant that as a non-permanent employee, my understanding would be that he would not have been provided with such a level of access that he could have accessed such sensitive information. I did not find his explanations that he built the systems to be convincing.
But more importantly, I do not accept that the applicant had any significant role with the [government agency 1] after 2005 – his evidence on the work he did after this date was unconvincing and vague, and his resume does not indicate that he undertook any work for [them] after August 2005. Even if he did so, I find that it was sporadic and of such a limited nature that I do not access that he would have had the capacity, time, or access to be able to take in any way sensitive information such as [details deleted].
I find therefore that if the applicant did have access to any sensitive information from his work with the Addis Ababa [government agency 1], this information dates to 2004 to August 2005 only. The applicant was unconvincing in his claims of why such dated information would be relevant in 2010 when he claims to have provided it to the embryonic ENTC, or, even more implausibly, today or on his return. Submissions have sought to present the fact that three [agency 1 staff] officer shave remained in their roles for a number of years as proof of why the information would still be relevant, but I find this argument wholly unconvincing. Even if the applicant had information about whom was an [agency 1 staff] in 2004 – 2005, I do not accept that these people would remain [in that position] for five or more years in the same location – it strains belief that the Ethiopian [government agency 1] would have the resources to keep someone in the same [position] for such a period, or that they would not be found out to be [a staff] in that period. I do not find the [social media] profiles of people who identify themselves as [agency 1 staff] assists here – [reasons deleted]. Even were this the case, the applicant struggled to explain how the embryonic ENTC would have made use of this information in 2010 or at any time. The other claimed sensitive information, [would] also be outdated as people acquired or sold their [items].
The applicant’s evidence of any other sensitive information that he had access to was also implausible and undetailed. He claimed that he had access to the [specified] system and case management system when he worked at the Ethiopian [government agency 2] and this allowed them to know when certain persons would have a [meeting] and be able to delay the [meeting]. but he was unable to explain with any specificity who these people might have been or even provide a name, despite stating that it would be the case with high profile people. I do not accept, on his vague and undetailed evidence, that he had any access to, or provided to the ENTC or Opposition or anyone else, information from the Ethiopian [government agency 2] [case] management systems.
The applicant also claimed he worked [in] a data centre [but] did not provide any detail on any information he had used from this role. He has also claimed to have done some work for the [government agency 3] but did not detail any information he acquired or provided.
On the basis of the above, I do not accept that the applicant had any relevant or useful information from his limited work with the Addis Ababa [government agency 1], [government agency 2], [government agency 3] and the data centre [to] provide to the Opposition or ENTC in 2010, 2012 or 2017 or at any other time for the above reasons. Nor do I accept that his limited work for these organisations would lead the authorities, in 2010 until his departure from Ethiopia, nor now, to think that he may hold sensitive information.
Involvement with Dr Eshetu and ENTC and interest of the authorities
The applicant claims that he departed Ethiopia in January 2014, at least in part, because his political involvement meant that the situation was becoming dangerous for him.
He said after the 2005 election he, like many others, was disappointed there was no change of government and he got involved around 2007 in opposition politics. He wanted to use his skills to assist change. A friend of his introduced him to Dr Eshetu. At that time Dr Eshetu owned Unity University and was becoming famous and the government was not happy with this. He had coffee with Dr Eshetu in 2010 and they would meet after this and talk about the political situation. The applicant would help people to view websites the government had blocked; they started an organisation and opened an office where they had meetings. The applicant was almost the first contact person, he was almost leading it during that time. Around 2011 they built an election platform.
In 2012 Dr Eshetu gave a speech and this brought prominence to Dr Eshetu and to those around him, which caused Dr Eshetu to flee to the USA where he sought asylum, and, the applicant claimed, caused the applicant to move around as it was not safe for him either. He said after Dr Eshetu left it was becoming intense and they were having a lot of meetings and it was not safe. He said [Mr A], as associate of Dr Eshetu, was detained at this time.
At the hearing the applicant said that he went to the Northern part and stayed for three months, he would move back and forth because it was not safe.
I noted that it appeared that Dr Eshetu fled Ethiopia early in 2012, prior to July 2012 (indeed, a newspaper report submitted by the applicant indicates Dr Eshetu fled prior to the date of that report, 8 March 2012[1]). I asked how the applicant, if he was moving back and forth because it was not safe, how did he obtain his police clearance certificate in October 2012? The applicant said that when he had started preparing himself to leave the country, in that time he would have been in Addis Ababa, it was getting increasingly unsafe after Dr Eshetu gave the speech and he was mainly in the North in 2013, it was just starting to get a little dangerous in 2012. I noted that it seemed odd to me that a person who was moving around as it was not safe would be able to get a police clearance certificate with no apparent problems. He said that because there was no court order against him, he went and got that certificate.
[1] Nation, “Exiled Ethiopians want Zenawi out”, 8 March 2012, >
He said the political situation was getting really intense and that is why he had to leave the country, that is why he developed fear.
The applicant acknowledged that he had not been arrested or detained but that after the 2012 speech, they really started asking questions, and someone told him he needed to leave the country. He said they found Dr Eshetu’s brother and the other man, he knew it would take some time to trace the conversations he had so that was why he left the country as he would have been questioned.
Later in the hearing I put to the applicant pursuant to s.424AA information from his student visa application, including information contained in an additional police clearance certificate in his name dated [September] 2013, as well as information in letters from [Company 1], and his bank dated September/October 2013, which appeared to indicate that in September – October 2013, he appeared to feel comfortable enough to gain a police clearance certificate and other documents. I noted that at the hearing he had said that during 2012 it was just starting to get a little bit dangerous and then in 2013 he was mainly in the North.
I explained that this information might contradict what he had said at the hearing, it may indicate he was comfortable getting a police clearance certificate [in] September 2013, and other documents for his student application, it might indicate that at that time he was of no interest to the authorities and indicate he may be of no interest to the authorities or anyone else on return to Ethiopia. I explained that, with other concerns raised, it may lead me to doubt his general credibility and whether I could rely on some or all of his claims.
After an adjournment the applicant elected to respond but also to provide a response in writing, which was agreed to.
At the hearing the applicant said that the reason he got the 2013 police report was that he had to leave the country. He was 100% in fear, so he went to a police place that was not really like a big government place, there were a lot of people lining up and that is where you got this certificate, so the government people he knew, as he knew a few police members and he knew a few there. He said in addition to getting this police record, the other fear he had was leaving the country. He said when he got the certificate he was as in fear, but they gave it to him and that took him to the next step, getting the visa.
In the post hearing submission it is stated that the applicant obtained the police clearances during the period he was hiding before he left Ethiopia as part of his student visa application, and deliberately obtained these certificates at a police office at a time when he believed he would not be identified. It was argued that record keeping in Ethiopia is unlike western standards and needs to be considered in that context. Country information was provided in relation to the Kebele identity system and records in the Kebele offices, and the Documents Authentication and Registration Office in Ethiopia.
I do not find these explanations convincing. The applicant’s claims rely on the fact that the police and other authorities detained a number of Dr Eshetu’s associates, one soon after Dr Eshetu fled the country in early 2013, and he claims that because of his association with, and work for Dr Eshetu and the ENTC, he himself was in danger and hiding. I do not find it plausible that the applicant, in this situation, would not seek another means to leave the country rather than approaching the police and possibly being detained or questioned. Nor do I find it plausible that the police would not be able to detect someone who was of interest or wanted for questioning by them. I do not accept that the applicant went to a police place that was not a big place, or at a time when he believed he would not be identified (and this time or the reasons why he would have thought this were not explained), nor do I accept that him knowing a few police officer would mean those police officers would not detain him. I do not accept that record keeping in Ethiopia is so poor that police officers would not be able to identify a person who was wanted by them. The country information provided does not detail deficiencies in police document procedures and I do not accept that the deficiencies discussed in this country information would also extend to the police, given that the applicant attended, on two occasions, a police office to seek a police clearance, the purpose of which is to demonstrate the person does not have a criminal record. This would, logically, require the police, on two occasions, to have checked their records of the applicant. I find that if they did this, and the applicant was wanted or of interest to the authorities, this would have been identified and the applicant would have been detained or questioned, neither of which he says happened. I do not accept that him claiming to have done this at a police station that was not big, that he claims to have known a few people there, at a time he believed he would not be identified, nor that the state of record keeping explains why the applicant was able to obtain, on two separate occasions, police clearance certificates at a time when he claims he was under some suspicion.
I have had regard to the letters from Dr Eshetu. Whilst I am willing to accept that the applicant has a relationship with Dr Eshetu and has had since approximately 2010, and that the applicant had some involvement with ENTC, I do not accept that the applicant took a lead role or had any great prominence in the organisation. This is for several reasons. Firstly, as above, I have not accepted that the applicant had any relevant or useful information from his limited work with the Addis Ababa [government agency 1], [government agency 2], [government agency 3] and the data centre [which] he provided to the Opposition or ENTC in 2010, 2012 or 2017 or at any other time for these reasons. Nor have I accepted that his limited work for these organisations would lead the authorities, in 2010 until his departure from Ethiopia, nor now, to think that he may hold sensitive information.
Most significantly, I find that the applicant was able to obtain police clearance certificates in October 2012 and in September 2013 because he was not taking a lead role or of prominence in the ENTC or any other opposition group and was not of any interest to the authorities. I find that this demonstrates that he did not, and was not perceived as having, provided any sensitive information to ENTC or anyone else.
For these reasons, I also do not accept, nor does the information such as his obtaining police certificates, letters from his employer and bank demonstrate, that the applicant was in hiding or moving between the North and Addis Ababa at any time before his departure in January 2014, nor that he was receiving threatening messages at this time or any other time.
I find the applicant was a low-level opposition member and supporter of the ENTC and Dr Eshetu. I do not accept that he took a lead role or was a high level or well-known opposition leader or was perceived to be a leader by the authorities.
Because of these findings, and my findings below in relation to his credibility, even if I accept that [Mr A] or [Mr B] were arrested or detained, I do not accept that any harm will befall the applicant because of this. This is because I have found that the applicant’s claims of his involvement with the ENTC was at a lower level than he has claimed and that he did not acquire or give to the ENTC sensitive information as he has claimed. Therefore, even if these people were arrested and detained, I do not accept that they would have given information about a low level member or supporter of the ENTC who did not provide sensitive information nor do anything else which would be of note, nor that the authorities would have any interest in asking or finding out about the applicant from these people. I do not accept his claims that these people provided or leaked information about the applicant.
Departing the country
A further difficulty with the applicant’s evidence is his claim that he was fearful of being apprehended by the authorities but had no difficulties departing Ethiopia through the international airport. I noted country information which provides that
Exit and Entry Procedures
Ethiopians travelling internationally by air are subject to security and identification checks at the airport, and immigration stations at airports have photograph and fingerprinting facilities. Ethiopian passports are machine-readable and have a range of security features (see Documentation, below). Biometric security measures linked to national databases apply at formal entry and exit points across the country. NISS has primary responsibility for intelligence and border security processes.[2]
[2] DFAT, Country Information Report Ethiopia, 28 September 2017, 5.22. This information has not changed in the most recent Report.
He said he had a big fear going through the airport but confirmed he had no difficulties exiting the airport. He claimed that he had booked at a time when they changed the shift at the airport and he chose the safest time, at night. He went on to say that unless you were responsible for a really serious crime, they wanted you to leave the country and not come back. He said at the time they left he was pretty sure he didn’t have to do a fingerprint scan.
I asked the applicant, given he claimed to have had a big fear of going through the airport, why did he not cross the land border to Kenya or Eritrea and then fly from there, which I understood was a common way for dissidents to flee Ethiopia. He said that he had experience going abroad, but he had never had any information at that time that he would be able to cross the land border, and at that time the borders are protected.
In the post hearing submission, it is claimed that the applicant sought advice from his colleagues in the ENTC and he was told it was not safe to cross the land border to Kenya and he relied on this advice.
I have carefully considered the applicant’s evidence. Bole International Airport is Africa’s leading aviation hub, and I do not accept the applicant’s claim that he would be able to avoid detection by booking at a time when they changed the shift. Nor was his evidence on this detailed or compelling. Nor do I accept, given this, that he would have been advised by ENTC colleagues to travel via the airport, which contains security and immigration controls, rather than via a land border, even where there may have been safety concerns.
The following information was obtained after the hearing but is consistent with the information I put to the applicant and discussed at the hearing:
In a 19 December 2013 telephone interview with the Research Directorate, the Chairman of the Andinet North American Association of Support Organizations (ANAASO), an American organization that is affiliated with the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) [an opposition party in Ethiopia] (ANAASO 6 July 2012), provided the following information: The authorities in Ethiopia generally "encourage" high level or well-known opposition leaders to leave the country and continue their political activities abroad. However, low level opposition members whose treatment would not attract outside attention are at risk of being detained, jailed or killed in Ethiopia. Generally, most opposition members who wish to leave the country travel first to Kenya by bus or other means of ground transportation, to avoid being apprehended at the airport, and fly out of Kenya. The Ethiopian authorities have an extensive security network and monitors opposition members, even low-level ones at the village level.[3]
[3] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: Exit controls at Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, including screening procedures for those departing on international flights; treatment of members of opposition parties at the airport (February 2011-December 2013), 2 January 2017, ETH104707.E, available at: 8 October 2020]
I prefer this information, which is contemporaneous to the time of his departure from Ethiopia, as opposed to his general and vague evidence. He has claimed to have been a supporter and involved with the ENTC, an opposition group and according to this information, he would have been at risk of detention, jail or killing by travelling through the airport. Further, I find that as an opposition supporter, he, and most certainly the people he claimed to have consulted in the ENTC, would have been aware that, generally, most opposition members who wish to leave travel across the land borders to Kenya and fly from there rather than risking travelling through the airport.
I find the fact that the applicant chose to depart from the airport is highly indicative of him not, at that time, being of any interest to the authorities, and of him being aware of this. I further find the fact he was not detained at the airport but was able to travel freely also strongly indicates this. This casts further, significant, doubt on the applicant being of interest to the authorities for any reason at this time.
The police scrutiny letter
The applicant said that then, when he was already in Australia, there was a letter in relation to the police investigation of Dr Eshetu and people associated with him. He said one of the police in their area knew the applicant’s brother and so he came and told him and gave him a copy of the letter, which the applicant’s family then sent to the applicant.
I discussed the letter with the applicant. I noted that the letter appeared odd to me in several respects. First, the letter itself seemed to go into a high level of detail to explain what the ENTC was, which seemed a strange thing to do in a letter ostensibly instructing police to investigate people involved. I noted that if the purpose was to scrutinise himself and two other individuals, I was not sure such a letter would go into so much detail about what the ENTC is. I noted I also had concerns that the content of the letter was typed, but then the reference number and date were written in – and asked would not at least the date have also been typed out. The applicant said it could be on letterhead and printed out.
I noted that the description of how he had obtained the letter- he claimed his brother was given it by a police officer – this seemed very odd on two levels. Firstly, I was not sure that, if the authorities had ordered scrutiny of him, that the police officer would pass on the letter to his brother, where it would have been clear the letter would be passed on to him.
The applicant responded that the Commissioner was living close to his family and they all know the applicant and his brother, and it ended up with him, and that is how they shared this information as well.
I noted that a further difficulty was that if the police officer knew his family well then the officer would have been aware the applicant was no longer in the country, in which case the letter appeared redundant. The applicant did not respond.
I noted that these concerns might lead me to doubt that this was a genuine document, and I noted that country information established that document fraud including of official documents was present in Ethiopia.[4]
[4] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 28 September 2017, 5.39 – 5.41, in substantially the same terms as the more recent DFAT report.
The applicant said that this was not a circular, it was for the investigation, a detailed investigation.
I found the letter, and the manner in which the applicant claimed to have acquired the letter, to be highly suspect. I do not accept the applicant’s claims that, as someone who was under ‘scrutiny’ by the authorities, a police commissioner or any member of the Ethiopian authorities would provide this letter to his family. Such action would jeopardise any attempt by the authorities to scrutinise the applicant, and I do not accept his claims that the commissioner did this because he was a friend or had a connection with the applicant or his family, the applicant had not been able to establish this on his vague and scant evidence and I do not accept that a police commissioner would risk an investigation, and his standing with the authorities, to provide this to the applicant’s family. Conversely, if the Commissioner knew the family well enough to pass on the letter, he would have been aware that the applicant was no longer in the country. I also find the letter oddly expressed, it appears to contain more information on the claimed foundation and functions of the ENTC than is necessary for the scrutiny of the applicant and the other two people. I also have concerns that the date and reference number are written in when the content of the letter is typed – it appears to me that there would be no reason to write in this information after the letter had been produced and I do not see how the applicant’s suggestion that it could be on letterhead assists. I have also had regard to the country information that document fraud, including of official documents, is present in Ethiopia. I find that for the above reasons I have grave doubts that this letter is a genuine document and I find I can place no weight on this document or the information it contains. I do not accept that this letter is genuinely issued by the Ethiopian authorities, and I do not accept that the Ethiopian authorities at the date of this letter or at any other time wished to scrutinise or investigate the applicant for reasons of his relationship with the ENTC or for any other reason.
Delay
I raised with the applicant the issue of delay. I noted that he had applied for protection only three days before his student visa was due to expire, and six months after arriving in Australia. I asked why, if he was afraid to return, he had not sought protection earlier.
The applicant said that he was processing a lot of things and he was expecting Dr Eshetu to send him a support letter, so that delayed him, and he had to prepare and was not sure of the process or how to seek asylum, so it took him a bit of time, but he knew he had to submit it before his normal visa expired. I noted that I may think a person motivated to not return to their country by fear of harm might take steps to find out about protection and apply earlier than he had done. He responded that he was sure he would not return but was not certain how it would happen. He said he had had a little bit of an intention at the beginning to seek asylum, but he was not exactly sure how it works. He did have fear. He said he was afraid that one of the members was detained, that Dr Eshetu told him the police started an investigation. There were many reasons he applied late, he moved from Perth to Melbourne, after he discussed the situation at his Church, and they advised him there were a lot more Ethiopians in Melbourne. I noted that his claim was that in February 2014 his brother had been given the letter that he, the applicant, was under investigation by the authorities, and I asked why did he not seek protection at that point? The applicant said that they were in the process of going to [Country 2] for his course, there was a lot of information to gather, he was discussing with people in his Church, it was not the best time for him to apply at that point. He said they went to [Country 2] at this [time]. He said when he arrived in Australia he felt the fear was gone.
In the post hearing submission, his reasons for the six-month delay were reiterated.
I did not find the applicant’s explanations for this delay in applying for protection to be convincing. If he indeed had been provided with a genuine letter which indicated the authorities were investigating him in February 2014, I do not accept that the applicant would have delayed applying for approximately five months and only days before his student visa was due to expire. I further find that the applicant is a clearly intelligent and capable person who has travelled extensively and speaks English. I do not accept that him moving from Perth, speaking with his church, traveling to [Country 2] for his course, or the gathering of information adequately explain the delay. I find that a person motivated by fear as the applicant claims would have prioritised and taken steps to ensure his protection and an ability to remain in Australia earlier than he did. I do not accept that he was waiting from a letter from Dr Eshetu, noting that the delegate’s decision records he stated he would provide documents after that interview, indicating he was not concerned by providing documents to accompany his application. I find his delay until only three days before his student visa was due to expire strongly indicates he was not in fear of returning as he claims to be, and further weakens his claims that he was under investigation, of interest to the authorities, or that he would be of interest to anyone on return.
Dr Eshetu and the claimed rise of the applicant’s profile after his departure
The applicant wished to call Dr Eshetu to give evidence, but he was not able to be contacted on the day of the hearing. He did however provide a statement after the hearing. In this statement Dr Eshetu speaks of his role with ENTC, he confirms the evidence of the applicant about their meeting in 2010, and that the applicant was a prominent and active member of the ENTC, was involved in recruiting and creating platforms for the movement, and shared important government information and documents. The statement claims the applicant would be at risk because of his involvement with ENTC if he returned now, because of the political and ethnic situation in Ethiopia, and that if he were imprisoned this would also be at risk to other members of ENTC in Ethiopia.
The statement is vague and does not provide details, for example on the important government information and documents the applicant shared, or the ENTC people still in Ethiopia who would be harmed if the applicant were detained. Nor does it explain Dr Eshetu’s role in the ENTC, or in Ethiopian politics at all following his travel to the USA in 2012.
I have also had regard to the documents the applicant provided about Dr Eshetu and his work with the ENTC but I note these documents are all from 2012 – 2013 and that there are no more recent documents or information on Dr Eshetu’s involvement in Ethiopian politics.
I have also considered this concern in relation to the claims of the applicant that his profile rose after his departure from Ethiopia. This claim rests on his association with Dr Eshetu and an argument that Dr Eshetu and the ENTC’s profile grew after Dr Eshetu left Ethiopia, and the post hearing submission references an article mentioning the ENTC from the Nation of March 2012.[5] But as above I have considerable doubts that Dr Eshetu, or the ENTC, had any profile within our outside Ethiopia after 2012 – 2013. I note that the applicant’s claims about his profile rising after he left Ethiopia also rests on his claims that he acquired sensitive information (which I have not accepted above) and that his role and the possible mention of his name by other ENTC activists detained lead to a heightened risk for him, which for the reasons below I have rejected in my credibility findings on the applicant.
[5] Nation, “Exiled Ethiopians want Zenawi out”, 8 March 2012, >
I have carefully considered the information. I am prepared to accept that the applicant met Dr Eshetu in 2010, and that the applicant had some low-level involvement with Dr Eshetu and the ENTC after this time until the applicant departed Ethiopia in January 2014. However, given my concerns above about the applicant’s evidence of the sensitive information he claimed to have acquired from government agencies, I do not accept the claims in Dr Eshetu’s statement that the applicant provided any important government information and documents to the ENTC or anyone else, and nor do I accept that the applicant created platforms or was involved in recruiting people to the ENTC. Whilst I have had regard to Dr Eshetu’s claim that the applicant will be at risk of harm on return to Ethiopia now, I place no weight on this because I am not satisfied that Dr Eshetu has had any involvement or is aware of the situation in Ethiopia in detail since his departure in 2012 and, according to the information provided by the applicant, Dr Eshetu does not appear to have taken an active part in the Ethiopian political landscape or diaspora since 2013.
Findings on credibility
The concerns discussed above, and my findings above, lead me to have concerns with the applicant’s claims about his activities and any interest the authorities had in him. Whilst, as above, I accept on the statement from Dr Eshetu that the applicant had some involvement with him and the ENTC until Dr Eshetu fled in 2012 and then the applicant departed in January 2014, I find such involvement was limited. I have specifically found that the applicant has not been truthful in his claims that he acquired, and shared with ENTC, sensitive information from the police or anyone else. I have specifically found that the applicant has not been truthful in his claim that he was in hiding and of interest to the authorities prior to his departure from Ethiopia. I have found he has provided a police scrutiny letter that is not genuine.
My findings on these matters lead me to disbelieve key claims made by the applicant and to find that he has not been truthful in presenting his claims about what occurred in Ethiopia and the reasons why he does not wish to return.
I therefore accept:
·The applicant is an Ethiopian national of Amhara ethnicity from Addis Ababa and is a Protestant. His parents and two siblings reside in Addis Ababa;
·He has trained and worked as a Computer Programmer/Software Engineer in Ethiopia and Australia;
·As such, he worked on a limited basis for the Addis Ababa [government agency 1], [government agency 2], [government agency 3] and the data [centre], as well as working for [Company 1];
·He met and befriended Dr Eshetu in 2010 and was a supporter of Dr Eshetu and the ENTC until Dr Eshetu went to the USA in 2012 and the applicant travelled to Australia in January 2014;
·That he may have done some low-level work for the ENTC and Dr Eshetu such as meetings and IT projects, but not, as claimed, an online election platform. I accept that he supports a pro-nationalist party and is pro-Federalist;
·I am willing to accept that if he returns he may be involved in opposition politics in the same low-level way as previously. To be clear, on the basis of my credibility findings, I do not accept that the applicant in the past restricted his political activism to a low level because of any fear of harm, nor do I accept that he would choose to be involved above a low level.
I do not accept:
·That the applicant had any relevant or useful information from his limited work with the Addis Ababa [government agency 1], [government agency 2], [government agency 3] and the data [centre], or working for [Company 1], and therefore I do not accept that he shared such information with the ENTC or Dr Eshetu;
·On this basis I also do not accept that the applicant would have been or would now be perceived by the authorities or anyone else to have acquired sensitive information from his time working with these organisations;
·That while doing this work for the [government agency 1] and other agencies, that people in these agencies requested he join the government party to demonstrate his support for the authorities;
·That he created an 'on-line' election platform that provided a list of candidates;
·That the applicant was almost Dr Eshetu’s main contact;
·That he was moving from place to place, in hiding or changing his place of residence after Dr Eshetu left Ethiopia or at any time, nor that he was receiving threatening messages;
·Even if [Mr A] or [Mr B] were arrested or detained because of their association with the ENTC, because I have found that the applicant’s claims of his involvement with the ENTC and his giving of sensitive information is not credible, I do not accept his claims that these people provided or leaked information about the applicant;
·That the police or a police commissioner provided a letter to the applicant’s brother in February/March 2014 which indicates that the applicant was to be scrutinised along with other people associated with the ENTC;
·That the applicant was at any time of interest to the authorities in Ethiopia;
·That he would have any greater involvement in politics on return now, even though the political landscape has opened up – this was not the applicants evidence and given my credibility concerns I do not accept that he will or would wish to have any greater involvement than he has in the past;
·I do not accept, on my credibility concerns, his claim that his family home in Addis is in an area between ethnic groups;
·I do not accept that Amhara are given castration medicine and are castrated in prison, the country information does not support this baseless assertion.
On the basis of what I have accepted of the applicant’s claims as above, I have assessed what will happen to him on return to Ethiopia now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Political opinion
At the hearing I discussed with the applicant the changed political landscape in Ethiopia since he had departed and noted that the situation had changed dramatically since he made his claims.
According to the UK Home Office fact finding mission of September 2019:
On 2 April 2018 Dr Abiy Ahmed Ali became prime minister of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. During his first few months as prime minister, he introduced a number of fundamental reforms which included: the de-proscription and return of exiled terrorist organisations – notably the Patriotic Ginbot 7 (PG7), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) – and the pardoning and release of thousands of political prisoners. Reforms to the security sector were announced, including a commitment to end torture and the arbitrary use of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP).
The widening of the political space included revision of the media and civil society organisation laws, and the enacting of the electoral reform law to enable free and open national elections in 2020. Corruption and allegations of human rights abuse have been investigated, and some high-level officials have been replaced and prosecuted for past abuses. The process of holding those accountable and bringing them to justice is ongoing.
Since the initial wave of reforms and actions of Dr Abiy, the country has entered a transition period and slow-down in the reform process. This has been met with impatience and criticism by some groups. In June 2019 there was an alleged attempted coup to which the government, taken by surprise, reacted swiftly and forcefully. The ATP was used to arrest and detain hundreds of individuals, including journalists and those associated with, and members of, a range of opposition groups. While some remain in detention, many have subsequently been released.[6]
[6] UK Home Office, Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission - Ethiopia: The political situation, Conducted 16 September 2019 to 20 September 2019, Published 10 February 2020,
According to Human Rights Watch in their World Report 2020:
Human rights reforms implemented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during his first year in office were threatened in 2019 by communal, including ethnic, conflict and breakdowns in law and order.
The June 22 assassinations of several high-level government officials, which the government linked to an alleged coup attempt in the Amhara region—as well as political unrest and communal violence in the capital, Addis Ababa, and Oromia following an incident with a popular Oromo activist and media owner, Jawar Mohammed—highlighted increasing tensions ahead of Ethiopia’s scheduled 2020 national elections.
In June, the parliament voted to postpone an already overdue but highly contentious national census, despite the importance of the exercise ahead of the 2020 elections.
Institutional reforms, notably around judicial independence and concrete measures to ensure truth, reconciliation, and accountability—all of which are key to dealing with heightened political and ethnic tensions—were limited.[7]
[7] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020 – Ethiopia, events of 2019, 14 January 2020,
The United States Department of State sets out that:
Abiy’s assumption of office was followed by positive changes in the human rights climate. The government decriminalized political movements that had been accused of treason in the past, invited opposition leaders to return to the country and resume political activities, allowed peaceful rallies and demonstrations, enabled the formation and unfettered operation of new political parties and media outlets, continued steps to release thousands of political prisoners, and undertook revisions of repressive laws. On June 5, the parliament voted to lift the SOE [State of Emergency].[8]
[8] USDOS – US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Ethiopia, 13 March 2019.
This information is consistent with other reputable sources[9] in indicating that Abiy made large scale changes such as releasing political prisoners, allowing those in exile to return without harm, de-proscribing armed groups and removing the State of Emergency. The country information indicates that this fast rate of reform has slowed somewhat in later 2019 and early 2020 but without any of these changes being wound back significantly.
[9] See ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Ethiopia: COI Compilation, November 2019, (accessed on 28 February 2020); UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, UK Home Office, 15 July 2020,
There is specific information that Opposition parties, including nationalist and Federalist parties, are able to operate in Ethiopia in a way they were unable to prior to Abiy coming to office, including the de-proscribing of many parties, their ability to operate without harassment from the authorities, and the preparations in 2019 for elections in the latter half of 2020.[10]
[10] ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Ethiopia: COI Compilation, November 2019, (accessed on 28 February 2020).
I explained to the applicant that even if it was accepted he had been part of ENTC, and had nationalist and Federalist views, given the information about the opening of the political space, I may not accept the applicant would face any real chance or real risk of harm on return for reasons of his political opinion. The applicant said that he spoke with his family there and they doubted the reform was really happening and no one knows what will happen tomorrow. He said there were still Tigrayans in charge who were against the Amhara people and there was an ethnic dimension to the problems. He said because of the information he had shared with ENTC that put him at risk.
I asked the applicant about the current situation of ENTC. He said that the organisation is not existing now, because there was no trust between Dr Eshetu and others and so it does not physically exist. I asked about whether he followed political developments in Ethiopia and he said yes and no, his interest was more about using his skills as well, at the moment he was not a media person who goes and does demonstrations, he wanted to bring change, but was aware he could not be involved, at the moment he is not, he follows to some extent by discussing it with friends.
I noted there was information that the ENTC had combined with other Opposition parties to form an umbrella opposition party named Hibir, and that this had been done at the encouragement of Abiy for Opposition parties to come together.[11] The applicant appeared not to be aware of this and said that he did not think this was the same ENTC.
[11] New Business Ethiopia, “Five Ethiopian opposition parties set to merge”, 14 May 2019,
In the post hearing submissions, it was claimed that this was not the same party as that developed by Dr Eshetu and was a different group of people within Ethiopia. There was a link to what was claimed to be the ENTC [social media] page (with on indication of any recent activity), the Hibir website, and a 2012 article which refers to ENTC as being established by Amhara individuals. None of this information indicates that the applicant has remained aware of political developments within Ethiopia.
I have carefully considered the claims of the applicant. As above, I have accepted that the applicant met and befriended Dr Eshetu in 2010 and was a supporter of Dr Eshetu and the ENTC until Dr Eshetu went to the USA in 2012 and the applicant travelled to Australia in January 2014 and may have done some low-level work for the ENTC and Dr Eshetu such as meetings and IT projects, but not, as claimed, an online election platform. As above, I have rejected that the applicant had or would be perceived as having any sensitive information nor that he passed this on, nor that he had any greater involvement with Dr Eshetu, the ENTC, and he was not of interest to the authorities at any stage and was not in hiding.
I have carefully considered the country information. As above, the situation in Ethiopia has dramatically changed since the applicant departed. Abiy has unequivocally liberalised the Ethiopian political space since 2018. Whilst there are concerning signs more recently, such as the continued detention of opposition political leaders after the murder of Hundessa, the current impasse with the Tigray region, the significant reforms referred to above have not been wound back and Abiy and the President continue to state that free and fair elections will be held before September 2021. Whilst this represents a significant departure from the agreed date of late 2020, it is acknowledged by most commentators that the deferral is largely due to the Coronavirus pandemic.
100. As above, Abiy has encouraged political dissident leaders to return from exile, released more than 10, 000 political prisoners. The government has de-proscribed opposition parties who had been defined as terrorist organisations, and these groups have returned to Ethiopia and operate as registered political parties. Political opposition groups have generally been allowed to operate freely.[12] Despite arrests following the murder of Hundessa, I assess that the political space in Ethiopia has changed dramatically post 2018, and that for the applicant, as a person who had some low level involvement with a political leader, Dr Eshetu and some low level involvement with the ENTC, and was nor is of any interest to the authorities, there is no real chance or real risk of the applicant being harmed for reasons of his actual or imputed political opinion, by the authorities or anyone else, if he returns to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
[12] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 3.33 – 3.41, consistent with information put to the applicant at hearing.
Ethnicity
101. The applicant claimed that in addition to the authorities disliking Dr Eshetu and the ENTC, Tigrayan people really didn’t like them. The applicant claimed that when he was working with the police he was mistaken for a Tigrayan and when it became clear he was Amhara he was discriminated against. He said his brother had had to move his factory closer to Addis Ababa as it was not safe further out.
102. Later he said that the main thing he feared on return was Tigrayans and they still considered he was involved with ENTC. He said he feared Tigrayans, especially those in power now. He said Tigrayans are involved in big business.
103. I discussed with the applicant country information. I acknowledged that ethnic tensions had come to the surface with the opening up of political space since 2018 but noted that the country information appeared to indicate to me that any ethnically motivated violence was sporadic in nature, that such violence largely occurred in rural areas (particularly where a person was in the minority ethnicity in an area) rather than his home area of Addis Ababa,[13] and that there may not be a real risk or real chance of harm.
[13] ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Ethiopia: COI Compilation, November 2019, (accessed on 28 February 2020).
104. The applicant responded that in Addis Ababa his family lived between the Oromia and Amhara people, and there were still a lot of people killed in Addis. He said his family had a real fear that there would be more ethnic violence. He said in addition the reforms were not real and the Tigrayans were at the back.
105. At the end of the hearing the applicant’s representative made submissions which reproduced those made in the post-hearing legal submissions summarised.
106. In the post hearing submissions, it was claimed that the applicant’s persecution on his Amhara ethnicity was one of the most significant aspects of the case. It was argued that country information supported a view that he was at risk of harm from the majority Oromo and that Ethiopia had been ranked as in the top three conflicts in the world to watch in 2020. It was argued that this was a significant finding and needed to be given significant weight. This was referenced to a United States regional newspaper website,[14] but appears to be a reference to the International Crisis Group publication of 27 December 2019 ’10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020’.[15] The submission went on to argue that the tensions which have exacerbated ethnic violence cannot be viewed as sporadic violence, and argues that there is over 50 pages of credible country information. The submission goes on to quote form country information and to note that in a recent visitor visa application the Tribunal decided that there were significant non return factors. The decision goes on to discuss and selectively quote a protection decision in which the situation and what was accepted is very different.
[14]
[15] Malley, R., “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020”, 27 December 2019, International Crisis Group,
107. A series of emails with further country information was provided in July and August 2020, particularly in relation to the violence immediately following the murder on 29 June 2020 of Hundessa.
108. In August 2020, DFAT released a country assessment report. I assessed that much of the information and conclusions drawn in the report were consistent with the country information put at the hearing, but I provided the applicant an opportunity in writing to respond to several parts of the report. These parts of the report related specifically to the applicants claims that he would face harm on the basis of his race/ethnicity.
109. The DFAT report notes that traditionally, ethnically motivated societal violence has been rare but has increased since 2018. The report notes that most ethnic groups are indistinguishable by their physical appearance. It notes that Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights and represented in the Federal government and bureaucracy. DFAT ‘assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare.’ The report also notes that societal discrimination tends to be positive in favour of a particular ethnic group.[16]
[16] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020.
110. With specific reference to the situation in Addis Ababa, and in line with the information I put to the applicant at the hearing, the report states that:
Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Interethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.[17]
[17] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 3.3.
111. The DFAT report sets out information on the Amhara people. It notes that they are the single largest ethnic group in the capital and considers that arrest of Amhara in the 2014 – 2018 anti-government protests were not ethnically motivated. DFAT assesses that ‘Amhara face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. The Amhara have been the subject of ethnic-based attacks in states where they do not constitute a majority, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz. DFAT assesses that, like most other groups, Amharas face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they are a minority.’[18]
[18] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 3.10.
112. Following the murder of Hundessa and the violence and arrests that occurred, ‘the Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that, ‘contrary to erroneous reporting’, calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.’[19]
[19] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 2.53.
113. Relevantly:
DFAT assesses that, outside of national and state border areas, the government controls the security situation, and Ethiopia tends to be safer than most of its neighbours. DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities. Nevertheless, the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group. The situation along regional state borders can be particularly unstable. DFAT assesses that, with Ethiopia’s democratic opening presenting opportunities for the expression of previously-suppressed historical grievances and ethnic-based clashes increasing across the country, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. This risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest.[20]
[20] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 2.59.
114. The applicant responded to the invitation to comment. In the response, it is argued that the applicant would be at risk of harm because of his ethnicity, his activities in Ethiopia and his former support of the ENTC party, and that the chance of harm was not remote. The submission quoted from country information about the situation in Ethiopia and in Addis Ababa in particular and asserted that the country information indicated there was ethnic violence against Amhara and the current security situation indicated that there was a high chance of ethnic and general violence.
115. I do not accept the assertions of the applicant and representative. In relation to the claims of the applicant that he faced discrimination in his employment when it was discovered he was Amhara, I do not accept this assertion, noting that the applicant has claimed to have been employed in a series of positions for government agencies.
116. The submissions have provided copious country information. However, for the following reasons I do not believe that this accurately represents the situation the applicant would find himself in.
117. I have had regard to the statement made by the representative, repeated several times, that Ethiopia was listed as in the top three conflicts to watch in 2020. This appears to be a slight misreading of the ICG report that this is based on, which simply listed 10 countries of concern that the ICG said they would be watching in 2020.[21] I note also that this analysis by the ICG was published in December 2019, some time ago, is fairly brief, and is not terribly detailed. For these reasons I am not convinced to give this analysis significant weight.
[21] Malley, R., “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020”, 27 December 2019, International Crisis Group, I have had regard to the arguments in submissions that the political situation has exacerbated ethnic violence and that the risk of the applicant, as an Amharic person with his claimed past activities in Ethiopia, and his former support of the ENTC party, would face more than a remote risk of harm. Firstly, as above, I have not accepted that the applicant engaged in all of the claimed past activities nor that he was more than a low level former supporter of ENTC, nor that he would engage in politics more than at the low level he had in the past. Secondly, I do not accept that the country information, when carefully considered, does indicate that people of the Amharic ethnicity from Addis Ababa are at more than a remote risk of harm.
119. I have considered the country information in submissions and emails. What they demonstrate is that there are reports of insecurity and violence, but that these are sporadic. It does indicate that there have been ethnic clashes, but these have been largely in regional areas rather than in Addis Ababa. It also indicates that those arrested were primarily Oromo, such as Jawar Mohammed, from Oromo based political parties. There appears no other support for the controversial contention by Copley, quoted extensively in the submission, that Oromo, historically some of the more oppressed people in Ethiopia,[22] are undertaking a genocidal campaign against Amhara people and I do not accept Copley’s contentious views. I have had regard to the decisions of the Tribunal raised in earlier submissions but do not find these helpful as they do not present the same factual situation as that of the applicant and what I have accepted of his claims above.
[22] See Minority Rights Group International, Peoples under120. I have considered that the applicant is of the Amhara ethnicity, that he has lived and would return to Addis Ababa. I find that in Addis Ababa, Amhara make up a majority of the population (in Addis Ababa, not, as argued in the submission, in the country as a whole, where they are the second largest ethnic group), and Amharic is spoken by a large majority of the city’s population.[23] I further find that official discrimination against Amhara is rare and does not reach the level of a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm.[24] Despite ethnic tensions and violence rising, the country information indicates that this has largely, but not exclusively, taken place in the regional areas,[25] and that in Addis Ababa ethnic groups have co-existed and violence based on ethnicity is not common.[26] I note also that Amharic being the official national language allows Amhara greater freedom of movement than other groups.[27] I find that this credible, contemporary country information strongly supports a conclusion that Amhara are not harmed or discriminated against. I find that this country information supports the contemporary assessment of DFAT that Amhara face a low risk of official discrimination and have been the subject of ethnic based attacks in areas where they do not form the majority. [28] These findings also lead me to reject the claims of the applicant that he was in the past, or would in the future, be discriminated against by Tigrayans, either officially or in any other way, or Oromo groups or Oromo, on return to Addis Ababa now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
[23] UK Home Office Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Background information, including internal relocation, September 2020, World Population Review: Addis Ababa,
[24] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020.
[25] See United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 – Ethiopia, USDOS, 11 March 2020.
[26] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 3.3.
[27] UK Home Office Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Background information, including internal relocation, September 2020, DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 3.10.
121. I find that country information supports a conclusion that in Addis Ababa, the chance of harm to a person of the Amhara ethnicity is remote. I have carefully considered the situation of the applicant specifically. He is a male of the Amhara ethnicity who has family in Addis Ababa. I have accepted that he had a friendship with Dr Eshetu, and low-level involvement with the ENTC, that he worked as a software developer. If he returned I find that he would do this work again, and that he may choose to be involved, at the same low level, in opposition politics. On the country information and my findings above, I find that there is no real chance, that is, one that is remote, that the applicant will suffer serious harm amounting to persecution for reasons of his Amhara ethnicity or any reason connected to his ethnicity if he returns to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Current and security situation
122. As discussed with the applicant, the situation in Ethiopia has changed markedly. as is noted in country information, there is a possibility that Ethiopia will face widespread and serious unrest and violence which would lead to the applicant suffering harm in the foreseeable future. I note that general violence and unrest in Ethiopia would be a risk faced by the population generally and not just personally by the applicant: (s.36(2B)(c)).But for the following reasons I do not think that this is a foreseeable and real, as opposed to a remote, chance.
123. The violence after the murder of Hundessa, or more regional violence such as after the failed coup on Amhara state in June, is sporadic and largely, but not exclusively confined to regional areas. Whilst there has been instances of violence and unrest in Addis Ababa, such as after Hundessa’s murder, I do not assess this as likely to occur in the future, nor that if it was to occur, there would be a real chance or real risk of the applicant being harmed. This is because I accept the DFAT assessment that, in Addis Ababa, the government controls the security situation and is particularly stable.[29]
[29] DFAT Country Information Report Ethiopia, 12 August 2020, 2.59.
124. I find that there is no real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm o the basis of the current security situation if he returns to Addis Ababa, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Cumulative basis
125. I have carefully assessed what I have accepted of the applicant’s claims. I accept that he is an Ethiopian national of Amhara ethnicity from Addis Ababa and is a Protestant. I accept that he has family in Addis Ababa and would return there and was a Computer Programmer/Software Engineer and would return to this work. I accept that he worked on a limited basis for a number of government authorities. I accept that he was a friend of Dr Eshetu, and a supporter of ENTC and did some low-level work for Dr Eshetu and the ENTC. I accept that he may wish to be involved at the same low level in opposition politics if he returns.
126. Taking into account all that I have accepted, and considering my assessment of the country information above, I find that there is no real chance the applicant will suffer serious harm amounting to persecution for reasons of his ethnicity, his actual or imputed political opinion, his membership of any particular social group or for any other reason on his return to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Complementary protection
127. At the hearing I asked the applicant if there was any other reason or basis on which he would be harmed on return. He did not indicate there was but reiterated the above.
128. Having considered what I have accepted of his claims, being that he is an Ethiopian national of Amhara ethnicity from Addis Ababa and is a Protestant. I accept that he has family in Addis Ababa and would return there and was a Computer Programmer/Software Engineer and would return to this work. I accept that he worked on a limited basis for a number of government authorities. I accept that he was a friend of Dr Eshetu, and a supporter of ENTC and did some low-level work for Dr Eshetu and the ENTC. I accept that he may wish to be involved at the same low level in opposition politics if he returns. I have rejected his claims that he acquired and shared sensitive information, that he had a greater involvement with Dr Eshetu or the ENTC than he did, that he was in hiding or of any interest to the authorities at any time, nor that he will be involved in opposition politics above the former low level he was involved, nor that his family home is between ethnic areas in Addis Ababa.
129. As above, I have assessed the country information as indicating that for the above reasons there is no real chance of the applicant being harmed on return, accepting the above characteristics and profile of the applicant.
130. I have considered whether there is a real risk of the applicant suffering significant harm on return. I do not accept that there is. Because of the changes to the country as discussed above, and despite recent concerning events, I do not accept that the applicant will be harmed for the reasons he has claimed, or on any other basis discernible if he returns to Addis Ababa. Taking into account all that I accept of the applicant’s claims, and his profile, and having regard to the country information as above, I find that there is no real risk of the applicant being significantly harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia from Australia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Conclusions
131. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
132. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
133. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
134. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Sean Baker
Member
Threat 2019, Minority Rights Group International, p. 7: UK Home Office, ‘Country Policy and Guidance Note: Ethiopia: Oromos including the ‘Oromo Protests’’, UK Home Office, 27 November 2017.
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