1612066 (Refugee)

1612066 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 5959 (8 July 2018)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1612066
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  China
MEMBER:David McCulloch
DATE:8 July 2018
PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 08 July 2019 at 9:19am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – China – fear of harm – potential harm from ex-husband – inconsistent evidence – credibility concerns – applicant divorced – suffered physical abuse or harassment – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 5K-LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39

MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Randhawa v MILGEA(1994) 52 FCR 437
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 7 July 2016 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of China, applied for the visa on 16 April 2015. The delegate refused to grant the visa.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 26 June 2019. The Tribunal was assisted with the use of an interpreter in the Mandarin language.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country: s.5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s.5H(1)(b).
Under s.5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss.5J(2)-(6) and ss.5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss.36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration – PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and relevant country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal has before it DFAT Country Report – China, 21 December 2017.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issue in this case is the credibility of the applicant and whether, on accepted claims, the criteria for protection are fulfilled. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Background and claims
The applicant legally arrived in Australia [in] March 2015 on a visitor visa. The applicant lodged a protection visa application on 16 April 2015, three days before the expiry date of her visitor visa. Prior to coming to Australia, the applicant had visited [Country 1] for [number] days in March 2013.
The following information is apparent from the application forms for the protection visa. The applicant was born on [date] in Shenyang City, in Liaoning Province, China. The applicant is of Han Chinese background. The applicant was married, but gives no date of when the marriage took place. The applicant divorced her husband sometime in December 1997. The applicant indicates that her daughter is currently living in Australia, and her mother remains in Shenyang City in China. The applicant completed Middle School in [year] at [a school]. The applicant worked as a [Occupation 1] from 1992 to 2015, at [School 1]. The applicant lists only one residence in Shenyang City, from 1985 until her arrival in Australia.
The applicant provided a written statement setting out her claims for protection as follows (not corrected for spelling or grammar):
My name is [the Applicant], [age] years old, was [employed in Occupation 1]. Because my ex-husband abused me, my life in China was in misery. In order to get money from me, my ex-husband mentally and physically tortured me. He continually practiced domestic violence against me, here is my story.
In October 1997, my husband brutally beat me three times, [details deleted]. He was fired as he did not work hard. So he released all his anger on me. He tied my hands and feet to a water pipe in the bathroom for eight hours every day, until he came back from work. Sometimes he tied me in the corridor of his work place. Many people at his workplace witnessed it. Once after drinking, he hit me with a stool, then someone blocked him. He also came to my workplace and insulted me. Because of his behavior, the leader at my work place made discussion with me and asked me to stop working, since he disrupted school order. I could not stand this, by the end of 1997, I had to divorce.
By friends' persuasion, I felt a lot better. However, my ex-husband did not stop. Because of our child, we kept in contact. In order to avoid him, in March 2013 my friends and I visited [Country 1]. I tried to relax. My ex-husband could not find me, so he went to my daughter's school and harassed her. He caused my daughter could not study. He even made her could not went to class. Every time I got my wages, he came to me for money. I was a good person, I repeatedly showed my patience to him and tried to avoid his harassment.
In early November 2014, my ex-husband came home to harass me again. He owed a lot of money to someone else from gambling, so he asked me to help him repay. I told him there was no money but he did not believe. He got angry and kicked me badly. I said, "I have no money. You and I divorced and have no relationship." He told me, "I don't believe I cannot tame you." He poured cold water onto my back and opened the windows to expose me to the -20C temperature from outside. He then brought a bowl filled with snow and stuffed the snow down my clothes before punching my chest and pulling me to the ground. I was suffering and too cold to say a word. It continued the whole night. He again opened the doors and windows to let in the below-freezing air. Also he kicked me whenever I closed eyes.
Another time, he took my arms and pulled me downstairs. My head and arms were severely injured. He ransacked my home and confiscated phones and other personal items.
I was healthy before the domestic violence. I was brutally beaten during the violence, and was subjected to various forms of torture. As result, my teeth were knocked out and my rib cage was injured. The injuries caused an inflammation of the lungs. In pain, frustration and nervous, I did not know what to do. A friend introduced me to apply for a visa to Australia. Without any other options, I left China in desperation.
Recently, I learned that on the phone, my ex-husband came to my work place for me again. I reported to the local police station many times when I was in China, but the local police station said it was the family's internal problems. They did nothing about my case. Obviously, if I go back to China, I will face the domestic violence again, and even death threats. I want to stay in Australia for a happy life. Please help me, Dear Office, please help!
Independent information
DFAT Country Report – China, 21 December 2017, provides the following information relating to domestic violence and women:
On 1 March 2016, a law against domestic violence came into effect. Several NGOs working on women’s issues welcomed the law but reported that implementation was inconsistent, and that authorities, including police, lacked awareness of the law. The government has opened domestic violence shelters in the municipalities of Chengdu, Dazhou, Nanjing, and Zhengzhou. According to anecdotal reports, domestic violence continues to be seen as a private household matter and a source of shame, so often goes unreported. Where cases are reported, authorities are reluctant to enforce the new law. According to data released in October 2013 (prior to the new anti-domestic violence law) by a Beijing court, Chinese courts recognise fewer than 20 per cent of domestic violence claims brought before them. Refusal to accept cases of domestic violence brought before the courts reflects difficulties in collecting and verifying evidence. Statistics from provinces such as Guangdong and Shandong indicate even lower rates, ranging from two to 15 per cent.
Overall, DFAT assesses that women in China face a low risk of official discrimination, and a moderate risk of societal discrimination. Women in China face a moderate risk of societal violence, particularly domestic or intimate partner violence.[1]
[1] DFAT Country Report – China, 21 December 2017, paras 3.95-3.96
Hearing, credibility, findings and assessment
The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is "well-founded" or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out: MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making (Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288), the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant himself or herself, in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for him or her: Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70; Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant: Randhawa v MILGEA(1994) 52 FCR 437.
In considering overall the credibility of the applicant the Tribunal is cognisant of the words of Beaumont J in Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451, in which he stated that ‘in the proof of refugeehood, a liberal attitude on the part of the decision-maker is called for…[but this should not lead to]…an uncritical acceptance of any and all allegations made by supplicants’. The Tribunal notes also the remarks of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 191 where it was said that ‘the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising’. The Tribunal has sought to adopt the liberal approach outlined in these cases.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of China and accordingly her claims will be assessed against China.
The Tribunal has the following credibility issues with the applicant’s claims.
Firstly, there is inconsistent evidence provided by the applicant as to whether she has divorced her husband.
The applicant indicated in the hearing that the ex-husband she divorced in 1997 was named [Mr A]. The applicant indicated in the hearing that she had not subsequently remarried. As noted to the applicant in the Tribunal hearing, in her visitor visa application signed on 9 February 2015 she indicated that she presently had a husband by the name [Mr A]. This was inconsistent with claims that this person was the applicant’s ex-husband who was continuing to harm and harass the applicant.
In response, the applicant indicated that all this information was put together by an agent and that it was not correct that this person was still the applicant’s husband.
The Tribunal has difficulty accepting this explanation. The Tribunal considers that it is most likely that the visitor visa application would have provided genuine information regarding the marital status and identity of the applicant’s husband.
This credibility concern is considered cumulatively together with the other credibility concerns identified.
Secondly, the applicant has provided inconsistent evidence as to when she was last physically harmed by her ex-husband. The applicant had indicated in the hearing that she had been physically harmed by her ex-husband after they separated. The Tribunal asked the applicant to indicate the year of the last occasion on which she had been physically harmed by her ex-husband. The applicant indicated that this was in 2000.
The Tribunal had asked the applicant whether she had been physically harmed by her ex-husband in the months leading up to her coming to Australia in March 2015. The applicant indicated that she had not.
The Tribunal put to the applicant that in her written claims, she had indicated an incidence of specific physical harm from her husband in November 2014, including him pouring cold water on the applicant and covering her with snow. The written claims then refer to an additional incident of being pulled downstairs by her ex-husband. The Tribunal pointed out that these written claims were inconsistent with her evidence in the hearing that the last physical attack had occurred in 2000.
In response, the applicant denied that she had told the Tribunal that the last physical attack occurred in 2000. The Tribunal is confident that it clearly asked the applicant in the hearing when the last physical attack by her husband occurred, with the applicant responding that it had last occurred in 2000.
This issue is significantly undermining of the applicant’s credibility.
Thirdly, the applicant has provided inconsistent evidence concerning her work history. In the interview with the delegate the applicant indicated that she was forced to stop her [Occupation 1] job in 2007/2008 because her ex-husband would continually visit her workplace and create a disturbance. In the Tribunal hearing the applicant indicated that it was in 2009 that she had to stop work [in Occupation 1] for these reasons. The applicant indicated that she then obtained a job in [Workplace 1] where she was working up until coming to Australia.
The Tribunal put to the applicant in the hearing that in her application for the visitor visa dated 9 February 2015 the applicant indicated that her current employment status was employed, by [School 1] Shenyang, where she had worked as [an employee] and had been employed for 22 years.
In response to this inconsistency the applicant indicated that even though she worked for the [Workplace 1] she was still being paid by [School 1] and that this sort of arrangement was common in China.
The Tribunal does not accept this explanation as plausible or credible. The Tribunal notes that in the application form for the protection visa the applicant also claimed that she had worked in [School 1] up until 2015.
This evidence casts significant doubt as to contextual claims made by the applicant that she had to quit her job [in Occupation 1] because of harassment from her husband. The evidence is undermining of the applicant’s credibility.
Fourthly, the applicant has provided inconsistent evidence as to the knowledge of her ex-husband regarding their daughter travelling to Australia to study and whether he had contributed towards her study and travel expenses. In the interview with the delegate the applicant gave evidence that her ex-husband knew that her daughter was studying in Australia because he had made a contribution towards her expenses.
In contrast, in the Tribunal hearing the applicant indicated that her ex-husband did not know that their daughter was studying in Australia and that he had not contributed towards this study.
When the inconsistent prior evidence was put to the applicant in the hearing she denied that she had told the delegate that her husband had contributed towards her daughter’s study in Australia or knew of this.
The Tribunal has listened to the recording of the interview with the delegate of the Minister and is confident that the applicant gave clear evidence that her husband had been asked to contribute towards their daughter’s study in Australia and that therefore he knew of her intention in this respect.
Whilst this is a contextual and tangential issue of peripheral relevance to the substance of the applicant’s claims it is nevertheless telling as to the truthfulness and credibility of the applicant. This evidence is undermining of the applicant’s overall credibility.
The Tribunal considers cumulatively these four credibility concerns. A number of the concerns are on issues central to the applicant’s claims. Cumulatively considered they are seriously undermining of the credibility of the applicant and her claims. The Tribunal finds that the applicant is not a truthful or credible witness.
The Tribunal is not satisfied as to any of the applicant’s substantive claims. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant divorced her husband. The Tribunal considers that the evidence suggests that the person that she claims to have been her husband, and to have separated from, has in fact remained her husband up until the applicant came to Australia in early 2015.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant suffered physical abuse or harassment from the man who is her husband or ex-husband. The Tribunal is not satisfied with the accounts of physical abuse as set out in the applicant’s written claims or given in oral evidence to the delegate or to the Tribunal. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimed ex-husband visited the workplace of the applicant or their daughter’s school seeking to harass and harm the applicant. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant reported her ex-husband to police.

The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant’s husband or ex-husband has an ongoing intention to harass or physically harm the applicant.
Given those findings the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious or significant harm from her ex-husband or anyone with whom she has been or is in a relationship.
In the hearing the applicant confirmed that the sole basis on which she claims to fear harm in returning to China is potential harm from her ex-husband.
In summary, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a refugee criterion reason for any of the reasons claimed. The Tribunal is also not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to China, there is a real risk that she will suffer significant harm for the reasons claimed.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a).
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
David McCulloch
Member

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)    the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)    there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)    the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)    conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)    conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)    without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in them practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)    that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)    the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)    the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)    a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)    significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)    significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)    significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)    denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)    disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)    disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)    a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)    the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)    any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)    the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)    protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)    the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)    the person can access the protection; and
(b)    the protection is durable; and
(c)    in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
..
36Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)   the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)   the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)   it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)   the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)   the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2018] AATA 5959

8 July 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction