1611161 (Refugee)

[2019] AATA 5269

1611161 (Refugee) [2019] AATA 5269 (26 November 2019)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1611161

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Venezuela

MEMBER:Gabrielle Cullen

DATE:26 November 2019

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a)

Statement made on 26 November 2019 at 12:24pm

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Venezuela – political opinion – member of Primera Justicia – anti-Maduro regime – listed on the Tascon list – involvement in protests against the Venezuelan government – credible evidence – unreasonable modification to behaviour – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES
Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 15 July 2016 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant who is a citizen of Venezuela claims to fear return because of widespread violence, because of his and his family’s political opinion and as he has been involved in anti-government protests. He also claims he has been unable to obtain a passport from the Venezuelan Embassy in Australia.

3. Movement records indicate the applicant arrived in Australia on a student visa [in] June 2011 and was granted further student visas to 13 March 2016. He has not departed since his arrival. He applied for a protection visa on 11 March 2015.

4. The applicant was invited by the Department to an interview on 14 July 2016 but did not attend. In its decision dated 15 July 2016 while the delegate accepted that the applicant was a casual attendee at political demonstrations she did not accept he has a profile which will draw adverse attention in Venezuela.

5. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Department decision on 22 July 2016 and attached the decision of the Department.

6. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 25 November 2019 to give evidence and present arguments and where relevant the evidence from that hearing appears in this decision.

7. The issues to be considered in this case are as follows.

   ·Is the applicant credible as to her country of citizenship?

   ·Does she have a right to enter and reside in any other country?

   ·Is the applicant credible as to her claims?

   ·Does the applicant have a well-founded fear of persecution in relation to Venezuela and meet the refugee protection provisions of the Act?

   ·Does the applicant meet the protection obligations under the complementary protection provisions of the Act?

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

8. The relevant criteria for a protection visa are outlined in the Appendix.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

9. The Tribunal has before it the Department’s file relating to the applicant. The Tribunal also has had regard to the material referred to in the delegate’s decision and other material available to it from a range of sources. This includes, but is not limited to, the following.

   ·The applicant’s protection visa application of 11 March 2015, including identity documents and an attached statement outlining his claims for protection. He also provided evidence of membership of Primera Justicia.

   ·Emails dated 27 February 2019 and 3 March 2019 in relation to the situation Venezuela. He provided a link to [social media]. ([URL])

   ·Email dated 3 March 2019 regarding the situation of his mother and brother in Venezuela.

   ·Oral evidence provided at the Tribunal hearing held on 25 November 2019.

   ·Statutory declaration dated 15 November 2019

   ·Document named Lista de Tascon by Dr Francisco Carrasquero regarding a database of people who are in opposition to the Government which is utilised to deny passports, contracts, IDs, employment and benefits. The applicant claims he and his brother are on the list.

   ·Evidence from the above-mentioned database

   ·Evidence of the applicant’s membership of Primero Justicia.

   ·Department of Immigration – PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian – Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian – Refugee Law Guidelines.

10. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

    Is the applicant credible as to his country of citizenship?

11. On the basis of the applicant’s identity documents, and evidence provided at hearing the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a national of Venezuela. Therefore for the purposes of s.36(2)(a) the Tribunal accepts that Venezuela is the country of nationality and for the purposes of s.36(2)(aa) the Tribunal accepts that Venezuela is the receiving country.

    Does he have a right to enter and reside in any other country?

12. As there is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant has lived in another country or has any connection to another country other than Australia, the Tribunal finds that he does not have a right to enter and reside in any other country in terms of s.36(3) – (5) of the Migration Act, other than Venezuela.

    Is the applicant credible as to his claims?

13. The applicant claims in his protection visa application dated 11 March 2015 that he fears return as there is political conflict as well conflict surrounding issues such as constitution, security, and the survival of every day citizens. He claims his basic rights are affected while the fear of losing the product of life, common crime and conflicting politics is the order of the day. He claims the government believes his family to be an enemy due to participating in the revolution against no employment. He claims he is in danger of being assaulted as a result of violence and political crime.

14. The applicant claims in 2001 he suffered electoral violence. He claims he received a black eye from the people who lost the student presidential elections in [University 1]. He claims they got their revenge and are now involved in governing Venezuela. The applicant fears if he returns to his country that he could be a victim of political violence and murder. He claims he suffered social discrimination due to his origin as a person from a middle class background. He claims Venezuela is a total chaos and if he returns and protests against the government, he will suffer from social discrimination due to his middle class background. He claims the government is not interested in his or his family’s life. The applicant claims if he goes back to Venezuela, he will lose his human right to have a safe life and choose what country he wants to live in. He claims he will live with shortage of food, employment and have no value. He claims there is no safety and security living under a criminal and unstable government. The applicant blames the government of Venezuela for violating the rights of its people and encouraging street violence. He claims the Venezuelan government is the number one enemy of the Venezuelan citizens especially the working middle class, student opposition organisations and opposition parties.

15. In his statement attached to his protection visa application the applicant claims since 1999, Venezuelans have been living through a political transformation, which has degenerated into a confrontation. He claims the final product of that is the polarisation of society with unfortunate results. He claims the situation is getting worse. He claims the effect of the unrest on him and his family members, as political opponents, is the reduction of basic human rights. For example, he refers to the Constitution of Venezuela and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which refers to ‘right to work and protection from the State for workers’.

16. He claims he and his brother were political activists with an opposition party called Primero Justicia which is the same group Enrique Capriles Randoski and Leopoldo Lopez were a part of. He claims he and his brother used to participate in [University 1’s] elections for the centre of student’s President in [Faculty 1]. He claims as volunteers they used to take care of the votes as witnesses in the voting rooms. He claims they were victims of violence from the students who represented the government. The students, who represented the government, tried to intimidate the applicant and his brother when they lost the election. The applicant received a black eye and a promise from them of getting revenge.

17. The applicant claims during 2002 and 2004, the opposition political parties called for a referendum in regards to former president Hugo Chavez. He claims he and his family signed a form that eventually became famously known as Tascon’s List, which was published on the government’s web page. Therefore he claims his family was declared as enemies of the ruling government.

18. The applicant claims when he got a job in a [business] for 3 months, he suddenly got fired without any reason at all. One month later somebody had told his employers of his opposition and as they had a commercial interest with the government his employer did not want to risk their relationship with the government by employing opposition activists. He claims in 2007 the government began a campaign of expropriation in many [businesses] in the south of the state where he was born. He claims the opportunity for employment began to die, however thanks to his brother in law’s family, he found job in a [business] until he arrived in Australia in 2011.

19. He claims that the situation has got worst. He claims some of the students who represented the government in the [University 1] elections are now in power with President Maduro. He claims political violence and crime from the government is common. He claims the government controls the justice system and many students are in gaol as a result of the February 2014 protests. He claims his brother who is a [Occupation 1], [Occupation 2] and an activist in the Primero Justicia party is hiding in his home because he is afraid of being murdered as a result of common and political crime.

20. The applicant claims if he goes back to his country, he could end up like his brother, in hiding with not a good future. He claims the authorities cannot protect a private citizen especially an opposition activist. He claims it is easy for the perpetrator to pay a gang to kill someone and make it look like a victim of common crime.

21. In his statutory declaration dated15 November 2019 the applicant claims he was born on [date] in Maracaibo, Zulia State, Venezuela. He is a Venezuelan citizen. He is of Caucasian ethnicity and his religion is Catholic. He is not married and has no children.

22. He claims he grew up in a white middle-class household which was involved in politics. He claims in Venezuela, society is very much divided along political, class and racial lines. He claims his mother’s family are professionals, [Occupation 3] and wealthy [Occupation 4]. He states that people from the middle-class would only socialise and engage with other people from within that same class. For example, if an [Occupation 3] had to engage with a labourer at work, they would speak to them as briefly as possible and not engage.

23. He claims since 1999 Venezuela has been ruled by a populist socialist regime led initially by Hugo Chavez, and now by his successor Nicolas Maduro. The applicant claims that the Chavistas, supporters of Hugo Chavez, are stuck in the past and are largely of people whose background is indigenous, mixed-race or African.  He claims they want to punish the middle-class for the sins of the past, whether real or imagined. He states that they call the middle-class "bourgeois", "oligarchs" and "colonizers". They call out the middle-class for not being loyal as they have benefited from American influence and commerce. He claims the middle-class and affiliated opposition parties are the number one enemy of the populist socialist regime. The government promotes the class divide for political gain.

24. The applicant claims when his father was younger, he was [Position 1] for a Christian social democratic party, called CopeL. Many former members of that party later formed Primero Justicia, a centre-right party in which his older brother [Brother A] and later he became involved with. He states in 1992 his brother [Brother A] began a course in [Discipline 1] at [University 2].

25. The applicant claims in September 1994 he commenced his study at [University 2]. He was studying for many years at university because he changed courses several times, and sometimes had to take a semester or two off or have a reduced study load because he could not afford the fees.

26. He states his brother [Brother A] is older than him by two years. When his brother [Brother A] completed his undergraduate studies, he was considering doing his post-graduate studies in Spain. This was in around 2001 or so. He claims his mother had friends who had been former members of CopeL. Those friends then joined Primero Justicia. These people saw that his brother was intelligent, and interested in politics, and encouraged him to remain in Venezuela and get involved in politics.

27. In 2000, Julio Borges and his supporters founded Primero Justicia as a political party, and it steadily expanded its political scope and operations in Venezuela. The applicant claims Primero Justicia is a party whose ideology is centre-right by Venezuelan standards, but is more a centre-left party in policy. The party's base is the middle-class and university educated intellectuals. They are a liberal party. He claims his brother joined Primero Justicia around December 2001, early in the party's history. After he decided to stay in Venezuela and be involved in politics, he joined Primero Justicia along with his mother's friends.The applicant claims his brother’s motivation to join an opposition party was because of the bad Venezuelan economy due to mismanagement by Chavez and discrimination against Chavez's political opponents. He felt, as the applicant claims he also did, that the Chavez government, and lots and lots of employers who were pressured by Chavez and his government, favoured Chavez's own political supporters and party members in hiring in a way that was unfair. He claims his brother was unable to find work in Venezuela for these reasons.

28. The applicant claims that [in] 2002 his brother attended a gathering in the auditorium within [Faculty 1] of [University 2] where Leopoldo Lopez was delivering a speech. Outside the auditorium a large group of Chavistas formed and protested the presence of Lopez at the university. The Chavistas eventually stormed the auditorium and one of them pointed a gun to the applicant’s brother’s chest and threatened to kill him if he did not get out of the way.

29. The applicant claims he joined Primero Justicia in September or October of 2002. He joined because the party seemed to be offering something different to the current regime, and it was something the applicant associated with. The party supported freedom of commerce, liberal and consensual democracy and Christian social democracy. Furthermore, he claims hearing about what happened to his brother, and his work for the party, also inspired the applicant to participate to try to make a difference.

30. The applicant claims after he joined, every Tuesday there would be meetings for Primero Justicia that he would attend. The meetings were at the home of the local Primero Justicia leader. He claims at the meetings, they would discuss political action, volunteer to do work for the party or to fill gaps in the government's service provision, for example, party volunteers would clean the streets of poor areas that the government had neglected, and would listen to speeches and complaints from people about Chavez and his government.

31. The applicant claims [University 2] was holding elections for the University representative body in about October of 2002. The elections were to take place on Sunday in October. He and his brother arrived at 6.30 am and set up in the second floor of [Faculty 2]. The applicant claims he was a volunteer assisting with counting the votes. The applicant claims after the count it was apparent a candidate affiliated with Primero Justicia had won the vote. Supporters of the government affiliated candidate were furious and demanded a recount because they were saying they did not accept the outcome. The government supporters stormed the counting room and started shouting "down oligarchs", "homeland", "socialism" and started destroying furniture. As people were protesting, pushing, and shoving, one guy came out of nowhere and punched the applicant in the face and left him with a black eye.

32. In December 2002 the applicant claims he took part in the general Oil Strikes against Chavez and was involved in street protests. He claims Primero Justicia had helped to organise some of the marches in the strikes. The marches were led by CTV, the workers syndicate, but Primero Justicia, along with other opposition parties, supported the marches and helped to organise them. The applicant claims he was still attending regular Primero Justicia meetings around this time, and would hear about Primero Justicia organising to attend the strikes and marches. He claims he attended the marches, too. He believes he attended around 3-4 marches throughout the general strike. At one of these marches, the applicant claims they marched to the head office of an oil company. The guards at the office used tear gas to disperse the crowd. He felt afraid of this and ran away, along with the rest of the crowd who scattered. The applicant claims he was active in support of the strikes as a member of Primero Justicia and an opponent of the Venezuelan government.

33. In mid-2003 the applicant claims he volunteered as a Primero Justicia member to help collect signatures for a referendum to recall President Chavez. People from different parties were trying to get signatures, and Lopez from Primero Justicia was the leader in the operation. The applicant volunteered at a high school called [School 1] in his home city of Maracaibo. People would come to the school to sign the petition and the applicant would collect the signatures. The applicant claims while he was volunteering, he could see Chavistas in red T-Shirts and red hats watching him and the other volunteers collecting the signatures. There was no violence on the day. He claims he signed the petition too.

34. He claims in 2004 a list of all signatories to the petition was published online and came to be known as the Tascon list. The list was published supposedly to prevent fraud so that those who had not signed the list could see if they were incorrectly attributed with signing it. However, the applicant believes the list was published in order to publicly list everyone critical of the government. The applicant claims Venezuelans on the Tascon list has been fired from their jobs and harassed. The list is no longer publicly available, but he believes it is still circulated within government agencies. The applicant claims as he signed the petition, his name is on the list. He believes that this means the Venezuelan government has in the past institutionally discriminated against him for his political views, and would seek to harm him in the future as a known opponent of the Venezuelan government. T

35. The applicant claims he graduated from university in late 2004 and got a job as a [Occupation 5] through a contact at University. He claims the work was [several hours] drive outside Maracaibo and about [few] hours from the border of Columbia. The applicant states the [enterprise] was primarily a [specified business], but also [conduct other activities] and occasionally [engage in specified commercial activities]. There were around 7 employees, and his role as [Occupation 5] was to [undertake specified duties].

1. He claims the area was a little dangerous as it was close to the Columbian border and guerrillas from Columbia would try to kidnap [individuals] for ransom. He claims he had a good relationship with his employer. One day his boss had a high-ranking member of the Venezuelan Military Police attend the [business]. The MP was a friend of his boss. He claims the MP asked him whether he wanted a job working with him, and he said that he did not want to work for the government. After that interaction the applicant claims he was told by his boss that he was being let go after about 2 months on the job. The applicant asked why, given that he, the employer, was always happy with his work. The applicant was not given a direct answer. The applicant claims as he was leaving, an administrator working for his boss told him that the boss was upset with the way he had treated his friend. He, the administrator, said that the boss didn't need trouble from people critical of the government and offending his government contacts.

2. From 2005 to 2011 the applicant claims he did temporary work for [businesses]. His inability to find work that suited his qualifications was partly the result of the chronic and dreadful mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy by Chavez and his party. However, the applicant also believes that this was due significantly to his name being on the Tascon List and he was "blacklisted" for most employers and they would instead look to hire Chavistas instead of people like him.

3. The applicant claims that the other things happened throughout this time he believes were linked to his political stance and the Tascon List. He states it is difficult to prove these things and link them. He claims he was often subject to crime and harassment in Venezuela, such as damage to his and his family's cars, or people accosting him and harassing him on the street including several muggings.

4. He states that some of this may have been random crime from Venezuela, but he thinks it is likely that he was targeted for crime because of his political views. He claims a lot of the people who mugged him said things like "you are a gringo [white person]; you should not be in Venezuela". Other people who mugged him yelled Chavista slogans or said that they were Chavistas. He claims he is white, and middle class in Venezuela and this would have identified him as a likely non-Chavista.

5. The applicant claims he stayed active in politics and would attend Primero Justicia party meetings. These meetings took place weekly in Maracaibo on a Tuesday evening and were hosted at an apartment by a Primero Justicia member called [Mr A]. There were about 12 or 15 people usually in attendance and they would talk about the situation in the country, about policy, and how to promote the party. He claims when elections were on, he would get involved and assist. He claims he attended most Primero Justicia meetings most weeks through this time, although sometimes he would miss meetings because he was looking for jobs or trying to survive. Nonetheless, he claims he was an active Primero Justicia member throughout this time. He attached a copy of his Primero Justicia membership card.

6. The applicant claims when he came to Australia in 201, he planned to settle permanently and find work as an [Occupation 3]. He claims when he left Venezuela, the economy was failing, and he knew he had to leave before the currency was devalued any further and the opportunity would be gone forever.

7. The applicant claims his uncle was a hard-left communist, a Fidelista supporting the policies of Fidel Castro, as opposed to the more populist socialism of Hugo Chavez. Before the applicant left Venezuela, he recalls his uncle saying to him that Venezuela was no longer "my country". He meant that Venezuela was no longer home for social-democrats or those critical of the socialist regime. The applicant felt at the time he left in 2011, he felt that he, his uncle, was correct. The economy was failing and the opposition to Chavez had become weak, complacent and increasingly corrupt. The applicant did not believe there would be any change for the better and the situation appeared to be getting worse.

8. The applicant claims when he initially came to Australia in 2011, he did not seek protection because he did not know such an option was available to him. He considered that with his training, skills and experience, he would be able to find skilled work and settle as a migrant. The applicant claims from 2011 until applying for a protection visa in 2015, he was on student and graduate visas. He claims when the last visa expired; he didn’t know what to do so he went to the Department of Home Affairs and was told by a Department employee to apply for protection. He claims he did not have legal assistance when applying for protection. However he understood he would be invited for an interview at some stage to give details of his claim.

9. He claims he did not include all of the details of his background because he thought that he would be given an opportunity to do so at an interview. He did not realise that it might be helpful for him to prepare a detailed statement. He claims he never received a letter to attend the interview, so he did not attend. He claims he checked his electronic mail as well as his post, but he never received any letter inviting him to attend an interview.

10. He claims in July 2016 he received a letter from the Department informing him that his application for protection had been refused because he did not attend the interview. He was shocked by this, and unhappy that he never got a chance to put his claims forward.

11. The applicant claims that he is worried that if he returns, he would be seen as a betrayer. The applicant claims he renewed his passport a few times. He claims his initial passport was from 2007 to 2012. He renewed it in 2012 for one year. In 2013 he wanted to renew his passport so he applied to renew it online. He claims after he applied online, the Venezuelan Embassy mailed him a form to fill out. He states the form was basically a survey, asking a series of questions concerning why he was in Australia, how long he intended to stay, whether he intended to stay permanently, and what kind of visa he was on. He was to fill in this survey, and mail it back to the Embassy along with his current passport to renew it.

12. The applicant claims he received a further one year renewed passport after applying online. However, he was concerned that this was a way of the Venezuelan Embassy monitoring him and other Venezuelans in Australia. He claims President Maduro has said that people studying overseas are betrayers, parasites, and that they don't love their country, that they are whites, colonizers, bourgeois and oligarchs.

13. In 2014 the applicant tried to renew his Venezuelan passport a fourth time before it expired. One month before it expired, he completed the passport renewal form and posted it to the Venezuelan embassy with his passport. However, the Venezuelan Embassy posted his passport back to him and said they could not renew it. He claims he received a call from the Venezuelan embassy in Canberra and spoke with an embassy clerk. The clerk told him that they would not renew his passport any more.

14. The applicant claims they gave him excuses saying, “We cannot renew your passport any more times but would need to make a new passport, but we do not have materials to make new passports." The applicant thinks this is a ridiculous reason, as they could have easily obtained new materials for a new passport. The applicant believes that they did not give him a new passport because they had reviewed his answers in the survey, as well as matching him up to his previous profile as a Primero Justicia member, and had decided that he was an enemy of the government.

15. The applicant claims Venezuela is divided on social, political and class lines. President Maduro has been increasing his rhetoric against the "oligarchs" and "colonizers" to try to stay in power. The applicant fears that if he returns to Venezuela he would be targeted for kidnapping or violence on the basis that he is easily identified as a white person and would be seen as an oligarch.

16. The applicant states the government and opposition have both become increasingly radical and there is a high level of hate and animosity on both government and anti-government sides. He believes a civil war may break out.

17. He claims should he return he would remain critical of President Maduro. He claims it is essentially illegal to criticise Maduro, not officially but unofficially it is very dangerous. Political dissidents are tortured and killed. The leader of Action Democratic was sent to jail and only released after making a deal with the socialist regime. The applicant claims real opposition to the government is punished, and the only opposition allowed to exist is the "show" opposition allowed to be there to keep up the appearance of democracy.

18. The applicant claims he has not been involved in Primero Justicia since coming to Australia as he has come to now believe they are corrupt, defeatist and a "show" opposition. The applicant states that unfortunately, while he is affectionate towards many people who were in Primero Justicia and think they were principled political activists, he thinks that the party structure itself is ineffective and corrupt now and fails to oppose Maduro in full. The applicant states while he remains critical of the socialist regime, he is saddened and disillusioned at the possibility of change from within the Venezuelan political system.

19. The applicant claims his brother remains in Venezuela and continues to have a lot of difficulties. Despite being a [Occupation 1], a philosopher and politician he has struggled to find employment because of his political views in opposition to the socialist government. The applicant claims if he were to return to Venezuela, he would feel motivated to protest against the government in any way that he could. Although he states he is disillusioned with the organised opposition and Venezuelan political parties. He thinks that the situation in Venezuela is so dire that he would be in such a danger for his views that he would have no choice but to fight against the government and protest. He claims he would only refrain from protesting against the government due to his fear of harm and persecution for expressing his views.

20. He claims he fears that he would be harmed in Venezuela by the Venezuelan government, including being arrested, tortured, and killed and subject to violence by military, paramilitary and
    mob groups supportive of the government because of my political views. He claims he would be at risk of this because of his past political actions as an active member of PJ, his listing on the Tascon List, and his involvement in various protests against the Venezuelan government. The applicant claims the Tascon list has been taken down from public access, but he believes the list is still circulated within the government and his name is on that list.

21. The applicant claims he would also be at further risk because of the opposition activities he would feel obligated by his political philosophy to engage in if he were to return to Venezuela. He claims he considers he would be readily identified as an opponent of the government because he is white-skinned and he is a "gringo", associated with the "bourgeoisie" and opposition to socialism. He claims being white in Venezuela is currently associated with an imputed political opinion of being anti-Maduro.

22. Additionally he claims that he is easily marked out as an educated person who has attended university, and whose family and relatives are "middle-class" even though they are economically struggling nowadays. He claims this is also likely to make him a particular target of crime, and make him more likely to be seen as an opponent of the Venezuelan government.

23. The applicant claims the lengthy time he has spent in Australia is also viewed as expressing an implicit opposition to the Venezuelan government. As set out above, it is seen as inherently suspicious to have spent a long time overseas; this is considered to be a statement against Maduro and his government, and is likely to amplify the sense held by the authorities that he is anti-government.

24. Furthermore, the applicant claims that many of the above factors make him more likely to be targeted for very serious generalised violence and crime in Venezuela. While all people in Venezuela are in serious danger due to the situation in the country, he would be particularly targeted for crime as a "gringo", as an educated person, and as somebody who has spent many years in Australia. The applicant claims he will be more likely to be seen as wealthy and likely to be targeted for crime. He will also be more likely to be targeted by gangs and criminals who may view him as a "class enemy" or opponent of socialism, and may feel more motivated to target him for crime for that reason. The applicant claims each of the above matters would pose a serious danger to him throughout Venezuela. The political situation and reach of the authorities, along with the violence perpetrated by gangs and criminals, is the same in all parts of Venezuela.

25. The applicant states the authorities are among those who he fears, so they could not protect him. He claims additionally, that the authorities would be likely to systematically withhold protection from him from more general violence in society because they view him as an enemy of the government.

26. The applicant claims that more practically, he could not survive in Venezuela in a practical and material sense. The high levels of crime, and his lack of connections and relevant work experience in Venezuela, mean that he would be unable to support himself or access basic services. This would be particularly acute if he were to try to relocate within Venezuela.

27. The applicant claims he has [Medical Condition 1] and [Medical Condition 2]. He is concerned that he would not get adequate medical attention in Venezuela, and would suffer serious harm as a result of this.

28. At the Tribunal hearing held on 25 November 2019 the applicant reiterated his claim to fear return as outlined in details in his written submissions including due to his political opinion and returning to Venezuela having studied overseas. He said the Venezuelan Embassy in Australia will not give him a passport despite his recent attempts. He spoke in detail and passionately as to his political belief being in opposition to the current Government. He referred to his membership of Primero Justicia and outlined his and his brother’s political activities in Venezuela, including working for the party and attending protests. He was able to give evidence consistent with independent information as the current political climate in Venezuela and leadership of Primer Justicia. He spoke scathingly of President Maduro.

29. He said his brother, who was a [Occupation 6] is no longer employed, as a [Occupation 6] due to his political beliefs and lives with his mother. As to why he remains in Venezuela the applicant said his brother is desperate to leave. He said in the last year he has stopped protesting and being involved due to a fear and disillusionment as to the effectiveness of the opposition and protesting.

30. The applicant referred to the difficulties faced protesting and being in opposition to the Government. He said the situation has deteriorated and there are many political prisoners, people are tortured, gas is thrown at protests and people are beaten with batons. He referred to the Colectivos, Chavistas and the involvement of Cuba. He also said as he is from the middle class, the Chavistas are opposed to him. He referred to being targeted by the military, National Guard, Chavistas and Colectivos if he returned. When asked as to how he would express his political opinion were he to return he questioned whether he would protest and referred to both a fear due to being targeted if one does and the point of it as nothing seems to change. He said he may not due to its effectiveness as Maduro is so powerful. He referred to his brother no longer being active on the streets both due to a fear of harm and questioning whether the risk is worth it, as it does not seem to be effective.

31. He referred to the need of a civil war. He spoke of the group of ex-military leaders in the US who are planning a civil war and said that is the only way Venezuela will be saved from the Madura Government. He said if that happened he would definitely go out of the streets.

32. As to how he has expressed his political opinion in Australia since arriving in 2011; he said he follows politics in Australia through the internet, talking to his brother who is closely connected and through watching [social media]. He referred to following Factoris de Poder which is a media company based in Miami and shows programs opposed to the Maduro Government. He said he also signed a petition circulated in Australia in 2016 opposing the Venezuelan Government, its human rights record and fraudulent elections. As to why he has not been further involved in Australia, he indicated he suffers from [Medical Condition 1] and [Medical Condition 2]. He said he takes medicine for his [Medical Condition 2]. He said due to his illness he is studying a [Qualification 1] as he can longer work physically. He said he completed a [Qualification 2] in Venezuela.

33. The Tribunal raised concerns as to his limited political involvement in Australia and that his brother, who is more active than he has been able to remain unharmed. He responded that his brother is disillusioned, been fired from his [job] and wants to leave. It discussed with him why he did not attend the Department interview and he said he did not receive the invitation, only the refusal.

    Assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s claims

34. The delegate accepted that the applicant was a casual attendee at political demonstrations but was not satisfied that he has a profile that will draw adverse attention in Venezuela on his return. However, on the basis of considerably more evidence that the political situation in Venezuela has deteriorated and on the applicant’s ability to provide substantially consistent and detailed evidence at the hearing about his political belief and the difficulties he will face, the Tribunal has reached a different conclusion.

35. At the Tribunal hearing held on 25 November 2019 the applicant answered questions in detail and without hesitation. The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence to be unrehearsed, detailed and responsive to the Tribunal’s questions as to his political belief, the current political situation, and his attendance at protests in Venezuela in the past, the difficulties he and his brother have faced and how he has expressed this belief while living in Australia.

36. Therefore, while the Tribunal has concerns as to aspects of the applicant’s claims, particularly as to his limited active involvement in Venezuelan politics in Australia, the Tribunal has decided to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt based on his other consistent and detailed evidence as to his political practice and belief.

37. As a consequence the Tribunal accepts the following to be true with regard to the applicant’s claims.

    ·The applicant was involved with his brother in a political party Primero Justicia which opposes the current government. As part of this involvement they were involved in assisting the party in student elections in 2002.

    ·As a member of Primero Justicia and due to his political opinion he has protested against the Government while living in Venezuela from 2002 to 2011.

    ·While in Australia, the applicant has continued to follow Venezuelan politics closely and signed an anti-government petition.

    ·The applicant genuinely holds a political opinion in opposition to the current Government and if he were to return to Venezuela he will attempt to protest publicly and will only stop due to a fear of harm from the government, Chavistas, Colectivos and armed forces.

    ·While he questions the effectiveness of protesting, this is combined with concern as to a risk of harm protesting.

    ·He is a genuine in his political belief being opposed to the Government.

    Does the applicant have a well-founded fear of persecution in relation to Venezuela and meet the refugee protection provisions of the Act?

1. Having accepted that the applicant is genuine as to his political belief being in opposition to the current Government of Venezuela, he has protested in the past, and will protest in the future and if not, will not protest because of a fear of harm the Tribunal has considered whether there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm on his return.

2. Under s.5J(1), a person has a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ if he or she fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance he or she would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person is taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss.5J(2)-(6) and ss.5K-5LA.

3. In determining whether a person has a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ s.5J(1)(a) contains a subjective requirement that an applicant, in fact, holds a fear of being persecuted. On the basis of his evidence the Tribunal accepts that the applicant has a genuine fear of being persecuted in Venezuela because of his political opinion being opposed to the Government of Venezuela. Further the Tribunal finds that his conduct in Australia, signing a petition and following the political situation on the internet was engaged in otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee as he was involved in politics and protesting against the Government in Venezuela prior to his departure for Australia in 2011. Therefore, that conduct has not been disregarded: s.5J(6). The Tribunal finds that the applicant does have the subjective fear of being harmed for reasons of his political opinion as contemplated in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.

4. Further, s.5J(1)(b) imposes an objective standard that there be a real chance the applicant will be persecuted if returned to his or her receiving country. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility.  However, a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even if the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.[1] Section 5J(4) requires that, for a fear to be well-founded, one or more of the reasons in s.5J(1)(a) must be the essential and significant reason for the persecution; it must involve serious harm, and must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

   [1] Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379.

5. The Department of Home Affairs 8 April 2019 Situation Report on Venezuela reports that the most significant human rights issues in Venezuela are extrajudicial killings by security forces including government-sponsored Colectivos, torture by security forces, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and imprisonment of political activists.[2] It notes the following:

   [2] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, p.1 Executive Summary, 20190314114120

   Members of the political opposition have been harassed, imprisoned, and otherwise impeded from participating in the political process in Venezuela.[3] IACHR in December 2017 reported, not isolated acts, but ‘a pattern of very serious violations of the human rights of persons who demonstrate or publicly espouse positions at variance with those of the Executive’, which were backed by actions of the other (judicial and legislative) branches of government (TSJ and ANC). IACHR detailed such acts against dissidents in authority: in the Executive, National Assembly (AN) deputies, mayors and councilors, and opposition party leaders. It reported harassment, persecution via the media, disqualification from public office and from political activity, violation of immunity, interference in public functions, unlawful raids on private property, and acquiescence in violent acts ‘against members of the opposition and, in general, against anyone voicing dissent’; also ‘stigmatizing pronouncements’, ‘unwarranted criminal suits, arbitrary arrests, and even impairment of the rights to life and personal safety’.[4]

   FPV reported 286 ‘political prisoners’ at 18 November 2018.[5] FPV claimed that 317 people were registered as ‘political prisoners’ at 19 November 2017 (down from 620 at 31 July).[6] At 2018’s start, according to FPV more than 340 political prisoners were in Venezuelan prisons or intelligence services headquarters. Opposition leader Leopoldo López was serving a thirteen year sentence for inciting violence during a demonstration in Caracas in February 2014, despite a lack of credible evidence. After more than three years in prison, López was moved to house arrest in July 2017.[7] During López’s detention, at the National Centre for Military Proceedings, there had been several reports of abuses against him, including torture and denial of visits from his lawyers and family.[8] López and former Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma, who was also under house arrest, (since 2015,[9]) were taken from their homes by security officials in August 2017 for speaking publicly against the vote for the National Constituent Assembly, which violated the terms of their detention.[10] A TSJ statement said López was forbidden from carrying out “political proselytism” and that Ledezma could not “issue statements to any media”.[11] Both were eventually returned to house arrest, though Ledezma was able to flee to Spain in November 2017.[12] López remained under house arrest in early 2019.[13] On 2 June 2018 the government provisionally released opposition coalition leader Roberto Picon from house arrest and former San Cristobal mayor Daniel Ceballos from the Ramo Verde military detention facility. Many others were released immediately following the 20 May elections. On 7 August 2018, three days after an alleged failed presidential assassination attempt, masked men abducted opposition National Assembly Deputy Juan Requesens from his home while Maduro made a televised address accusing him of involvement. Requesens was reportedly held by SEBIN in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day.[14] Caracas councilman Fernando Albán was arrested for alleged involvement in October upon returning from an advocacy trip to the United Nations in New York. He was held by intelligence services for several days until his death was reported by officials as a suicide. The UN called for an investigation into his death. A number of other opposition figures fled the country.[15]

   Several others arrested in connection with the 2014 anti-government protests or subsequent political activism remain under house arrest or in detention awaiting trial.[16] In April 2017 Amnesty International documented 22 ‘emblematic’ cases of people for political reasons arbitrarily detained from 2014 by various unlawful mechanisms, to demonstrate a broader pattern of efforts to silence dissent. The mechanisms included the use of military justice, arrest without a warrant, and the use of ambiguous and discretionary criminal definitions.[17] At 2017’s end, twelve of these people had been granted alternatives to detention, including activist Steyci Escalona, who was granted conditional release from pre-trial detention in November; the other ten remained arbitrarily detained, although the courts had ordered the release of many of them, including member of parliament Gilber Caro. Escalona and Caro, both members of Popular Will party, were arbitrarily detained in January 2017 after senior authorities publicly accused them of carrying out “terrorist activities”, and by 2017’s end, neither had been brought to trial. Despite Caro’s trial requiring authorization by parliament, his case was submitted to military courts.[18] Student and political activist Villca Fernández, from Mérida state, detained in January 2016, at 2017’s end remained arbitrarily detained by SEBIN in Caracas. He had been repeatedly denied urgent medical care and had reported other ill-treatment.[19]

   Dozens of other political leaders have been subjected to harassment, including Capriles of MUD, who in April 2017 was banned from holding public office for 15 years due to alleged financial irregularities[20]; the ban to take effect once he completed his term as Governor of Miranda state.[21]

   IACHR in December 2017 reported estimates that during the during the April-July 2017 protests 133 people were killed, 4000 were injured, and more than 5000 were arbitrarily detained; and IACHR detailed cases of human rights violations of detainees including (over one hundred cases of) ‘torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ and (dozens of cases of) sexual violence.[22] Many detainees were denied access to medical care or a lawyer of their choice and in many cases were subjected to military tribunals.[23] FPV claimed that at least 275 people arrested at protests were being tried by military courts in 2017, generally for offenses under the Organic Code of Military Justice (1998) such as rebellion and treason.[24]

   At least five mayors were removed from office in August 2017 for failing to stop protesters from blocking roads earlier in the year.[25] In mid-2017, after summary proceedings that violated norms of due process, TSJ sentenced five opposition mayors to 15 months in prison and disqualified them from running for office. At 2018’s start, one was being held at the intelligence services’ headquarters in Caracas, and the rest had fled the country. At least nine more mayors were subject to a TSJ injunction that could lead to similarly long prison sentences if they are accused of violating it.[26]

   Freedom House reported that the number of political prisoners increased from 103 at end 2016 to over 600 in July 2017. Most were later released, leaving about 200 behind bars at 2017’s end.[27] In December 2017, 44 people arbitrarily detained for what local NGOs considered to have been politically motivated reasons were released with alternative restrictions on their freedom.[28]

   It was reported in May 2018 that according to FPV and the Organization of American States (OAS) there were 338 political prisoners in Venezuela, the highest number since the 1960s.[29] In December 2018 FPV reported that the authorities were holding 288 political prisoners.[30]

   On 28 January 2019 the Venezuelan Program for Education-Action in Human Rights reported "35 people murdered in the context of the protests" since 21 January and accused the police special forces unit (FAES) of carrying out eight "extra-judicial executions" following the protests. Another NGO, Foro Penal, said 850 people, among them 77 children, had been arrested.[31] On 29 January U.N. human rights spokesman Rupert Colville said at least 40 people are believed to have been killed in Venezuela's recent violence, including 26 shot by pro-government forces, five killed in house raids and 11 during looting. He said more than 850 people were detained between 21 and 26 January, including children as young as 12. On 23 January 696 people were detained across the country, the highest daily number of detentions in 20 years.[32] Residents of one poor Caracas neighbourhood, Petare, said police and national guardsmen swarmed Petare’s streets on 23 January night, summarily executing suspected agitators: “people say they killed people in their own homes who had no criminal records.”[33]

   When President Maduro introduced the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card[34], or Fatherland Card[35]) on 29 December 2016 as an electronic card which would initially serve to ration and distribute the food sold by the Local Committees of Supply and Production (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP)) system[[36]] and social missions[[37]],[38] there was immediate adverse reaction that  the government was preparing to increase social control and retaliation against dissent.[39] Opposition political leaders said the card was a means to collect information to limit political activism.[40]

   [3] 'Freedom in the World 2019 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 5 February 2019, section B1, 20190218085724

   [4] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.95 paragraph 165 (detailed at pp.93-105 paragraphs 166-189), CISEDB50AD9024

   [5] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, pp.12-13 Section 1.e, 20190314114120

   [6] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.95 paragraph 165, CISEDB50AD9024

   [7] ‘Human Rights Watch. World Report 2018. Events of 2017’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2018, pp.617-624 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.617-618, NGED867A63. By another report, there were about 200 political prisoners at end 2017: ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [8] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at p.395, NGED867A612

   [9] ‘Human Rights Watch. World Report 2018. Events of 2017’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2018, pp.617-624 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.617-618, NGED867A63

   [10] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [11] ‘Human Rights Watch. World Report 2018. Events of 2017’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2018, pp.617-624 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.617-618, NGED867A63

   [12] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [13] 'Freedom in the World 2019 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 5 February 2019, section B1, 20190218085724

   [14] ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Venezuela’, United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 13 March 2019, p.13 Section 1.e, 20190314114120

   [15] 'Freedom in the World 2019 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 5 February 2019, section B1, 20190218085724

   [16] ‘Human Rights Watch. World Report 2018. Events of 2017’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2018, pp.617-624 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.617-618, NGED867A63

   [17] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at p.394, NGED867A612; citing ‘Silenced by Force. Politically-Motivated Arbitrary Detentions in Venezuela’ (AMR 53/6014/2017), Amnesty International, 26 April 2017, CISEDB50AD8611

   [18] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at p.394, NGED867A612

   [19] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.395-396, NGED867A612; citing ‘Urgent Action. Prisoner of conscience needs medical care’ (AMR 53/7464/2017), Amnesty International, 13 December 2017, CISEDB50AD8632

   [20] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [21] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.97 paragraph 171, CISEDB50AD9024

   [22] ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela. Country Report’, Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, on OAS Organization of American States website, 31 December 2017, p.110 paragraph 193 (detailed at pp.128-141 paragraphs 237-256), CISEDB50AD9024

   [23] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at p.395, NGED867A612

   [24] ‘Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in Venezuela. Baseline Study, July 2017’, ICJ [International Commission of Jurists] Global Redress and Accountability Initiative, 21 August 2017, p.9, CISEDB50AD9032

   [25] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [26] ‘Human Rights Watch. World Report 2018. Events of 2017’, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2018, pp.617-624 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.617-618, NGED867A63

   [27] ‘Freedom in the World 2018. Venezuela Profile’, Freedom House, Accessed 2 February 2018, pp.[8]-[9], NGED867A64

   [28] ‘Amnesty International Report 2017-18’, Amnesty International, 22 February 2018, pp.393-397 ‘Venezuela’ at pp.394-395, NGED867A612

   [29] ‘After Fraudulent Election, Venezuela President Sworn in Before Illegitimate Constituent Assembly’, Latin American Herald Tribune, 24 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA28011

   [30] Venezuela group says 2018 marked by torture of political prisoners’, United Press International (UPI), 4 December 2018, CXBB8A1DA39892; 'Freedom in the World 2019 - Venezuela', Freedom House, 5 February 2019, section B1, 20190218085724

   [31] ‘Maduro rival says taking control of Venezuela's foreign assets’, AFP [Agence France-Presse], 28 January 2019, 20190129095126

   [32] ’More than 40 dead, 850 detained in Venezuela violence, U.N. says’, Reuters, 29 January 2019, 20190130141714

   [33] ‘Venezuelan attorney general orders Guaidó investigation as crisis deepens’, The Guardian, 30 January 2019, 20190130123340

   [34] ‘More than 16 Million Venezuelans Enrolled in the Carnet de la Patria System’, RNV (Radio Nacional de Venezuela), 2 November 2017, now only accessible on Internet Archive Wayback Machine website, captured 21 February 2018, CXC90406621214; ‘Freedom on the Net 2017 - Venezuela’, Freedom House, 14 November 2017, p.20, NG2A465F5210; ‘Transparency International denounces “Venezuelan apartheid”’, MercoPress, 17 March 2018, CXBB8A1DA26569; ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Venezuela’, United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 20 April 2018, p.27 Section 3, OGD95BE927489; ‘President Maduro's Likely Re-election in Breadline Venezuela’, Gunson P, International Crisis Group, 17 May 2018, CIS7B839411363.

   [35] ‘With low turnout, Venezuela’s election will create what opponents call ‘puppet congress’’, Washington Post, The, 31 July 2017, CXC90406611372; ‘Venezuela's Maduro re-elected amid outcry over vote’, Reuters, 20 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA27642; ‘Poor Venezuelans crowd pro-Maduro stations in hope of vote 'prize'’, Luc Cohen & Francisco Aguilar, Reuters, 21 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA27653; 'Venezuela. Humanitarian crisis. Thematic report - 23 May 2018', ACAPS, 23 May 2018, pp.3 & 8, CIS7B839411184; ‘Maduro's tweeters, activists cash in on Venezuela election win’, Berwick A, Reuters, 26 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA34198.

   [36] ‘Life in the South American country’s poor ‘barrios’ revolves around the CLAP boxes. According to the government, six million families receive the benefit, from a population of around 30 million people. … Stamped with the faces of Maduro and Chavez, the CLAP boxes usually contain rice, pasta, grains, cooking oil, powdered milk, canned tuna and other basic goods. Recipients pay 25,000 bolivars per box, or about $0.12 at the black market rate. That is a godsend in a country where the minimum monthly wage is less than $2 at that rate - and would be swallowed up by two boxes of eggs or a small tin of powdered milk. Inflation, at more than 4,000 percent annually according to opposition data, is pulverizing household income. … A dozen recipients told Reuters that often they arrived half-full and would only come every few months. Outside of the capital Caracas, delivery was even more sporadic.’: ‘For poor Venezuelans, a box of food may sway vote for Maduro’, Andreina Aponte & Ana Isabel Martinez, Reuters, 12 March 2018, CXBB8A1DA34199

   [37] ‘Carnet de la Patria ha otorgado protección social a más de 250.000 familias venezolanas [Carnet de la Patria has granted social protection to more than 250,000 Venezuelan families]’, AVN [Agencia Venezolana de Noticias], Gobierno del Estado Bolivariano de Yaracuy [Government of the Bolivarian State of Yaracuy], 16 May 2017, CXC90406621223 (Google Translate translation ‘“Carnet de la patria”: el nuevo racionamiento de comida en Venezuela [“Homeland card”: the new food rationing in Venezuela]’, Avendaño O, Panam Post, 29 December 2016, CIS38A80129134 (Google Translate translation ‘Carnet de la Patria. El apartheid revolucionario’ [Homeland Card. Revolutionary apartheid], Transparencia Venezuela [Transparency Venezuela], undated [2018], [document created 15 March 2018], p.5, CIS7B839419024.

   [39] ‘“Carnet de la patria”: el nuevo racionamiento de comida en Venezuela [“Homeland card”: the new food rationing in Venezuela]’, Avendaño O, Panam Post, 29 December 2016, CIS38A80129134 (Google Translate translation ‘Freedom on the Net 2017 - Venezuela’, Freedom House, 14 November 2017, p.20, NG2A465F5210; the reference in footnote ‘147 Yoerli Viloria Diario de Los Andes, “El Carnet de la Patria pone en peligro la privacidad” [The Homeland Card endangers privacy] January 29, 2017, is not accessible.