1604111 (Refugee)

[2017] AATA 915

1604111 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 915 (18 May 2017)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1604111

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Nigeria

MEMBER:Carolyn Wilson

DATE:18 May 2017

PLACE OF DECISION:  Adelaide

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

Statement made on 18 May 2017 at 11:22am

CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Nigeria – Religion – Christian – Race – Yoruba – Teacher – Threats by Boko Haram – Sharing Bible with students – Attacks on family member – Western Education

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Nigeria applied for the visa [in] September 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] February 2016.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 4 April 2017 to give evidence and present arguments.

4. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.

   RELEVANT LAW

5. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

6. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

7. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

   owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

8. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

9. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

10. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.

11. The applicant is [an age] year old married man from Lagos, Nigeria.  He claims to have been a teacher in Lagos. He arrived in Australia in July 2013 holding a [temporary] visa. In September 2013 he applied for a protection visa.

12. The applicant provided little detail in his application for the protection visa.  He answered ‘no’ to the question of whether he had ever experienced harm in his country.  In response to the question of what he feared may happen if he returned he wrote ‘to be killed’.  As to who might harm him he wrote ‘the Islamic group’ because ‘of what I heard about and what the Islamic group do’.

13. At his interview with a delegate [in] September 2015 he raised new claims.  The delegate has summarised the new claims in the decision record as follows: 

    In May 2013 he taught at a school in [State 1], Nigeria.

    Whilst working at this school, two pupils went to the staffroom and asked him whether he was Christian and if they were able to read the bible.

    He is wanted by Boko Haram for giving the bible to two Islamic students.

    When the parents of the pupils found out, they accused him of converting them to Christianity.

    A week later, seven people with bikes ambushed him but he managed to escape.  He also added towards the end of the interview that the people got hold of his personal documents and traced him back to Lagos.

    He returned to teach at the same school a week after this incident.

    He was told by his [relative] and wife that his [Relative 1] was kidnapped, killed and her body dumped after he arrived in Australia.

14. The applicant provided a newspaper article purportedly from [a newspaper] dated [in] May 2013.  The article claims the applicant is wanted by Boko Haram for distributing bibles to students and states ‘[details deleted]’. The applicant told the delegate he had consented to the newspaper publishing this article.

15. The delegate found the applicant’s claims were not credible.  The delegate did not accept the applicant’s claim to have been teaching in [State 1], as he had not included this in his employment history in his visa application form.  It followed the delegate did not accept the applicant was wanted by Boko Haram for the bible incident, because they did not accept he had ever been at a school in [State 1].  The delegate found that as a resident of Lagos, even as a Christian, the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution from Boko Haram as the group were not active in the southern states of Nigeria.

16. On review the applicant maintained he has been targeted by Boko Haram because he is accused of trying to convert Muslim students whilst on a teaching [job] in [State 1].  He says he cannot provide evidence he worked at the school [State 1] because that school has since closed down, due to Boko Haram threats.  He can only provide evidence he was employed as a teacher in Lagos.

17. The applicant provided a certificate from [a hospital] certifying [Relative 1] age [age] years had died on [a date in] March 2014 from [an] injury.   He claims his family told him two men in a car kidnapped his [Relative 1] off the street, asking her ‘where is [the applicant]?’ as they took her. 

18. The applicant said his wife and children moved to live with [a family member] after the [Relative 1’s] death.  His wife was fearful of strange people she saw near her old home.  He confirmed his [family members] have not been harmed or threatened. 

    Country information

19. The Tribunal has had regard to country information from the DFAT Country Report Nigeria (10 February 2015) on the targeting of Christians by Boko Haram, which states:

    3.14  Both Christians and Muslims have faced violence at the hands of Boko Haram due to their religious beliefs. Boko Haram opposes Christianity as well as less restrictive forms of Islam. Credible local and international sources advise that Boko Haram attacks Muslim communities more frequently than Christian communities and that individual Muslims have been kidnapped and assassinated by Boko Haram. It is considerably less common for Christians to be targeted individually. 

    3.15  There have been numerous attacks on predominantly Muslim occupied villages in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. In November 2014, Boko Haram fighters burnt homes, killed several people and occupied villages in Adamawa state. This continues a series of attacks committed across all three states under a state of emergency that since August 2014 that have resulted in over 500 deaths and 300 kidnappings. Numerous local government areas are now under direct Boko Haram control as a result. The girls who were abducted from Chibok in April 2014 by Boko Haram (see ‘Security Situation-Boko Haram’, above) are understood to be made up of a mix of Muslims and Christians. Christians have also been targeted in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and occasionally in the central state of Plateau.  Boko Haram killed four Christians in Yobe, 25 Christians in Adamawa and six in Gombe in separate attacks in January 2012. The group destroyed two churches in Bauchi on 22 January 2012. 

    3.16  DFAT assesses that both Christians and Muslims face a moderate risk of violence from Boko Haram when they remain domiciled in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, particularly if they are based close to the fighting. Attacks on Christians by Boko Haram are opportunistic and infrequent. Individual Christians are highly unlikely to be targeted (emphasis added).Many Christians have moved internally within Nigeria to escape the risks posed by the Boko Haram insurgency.

20. The Tribunal has also had regard to a report by the UK Home Office Country Information and Guidance, Nigeria:  Fear of Boko Haram (June 2015), which states as follows:

    2.2.2 Boko Haram has called for an uprising against secular authority and a war against Christianity.  Despite this public rhetoric it has not exclusively, or even primarily, targeted Christians but focused its attacks against those it perceives to be in opposition to its ideology:  “unbelievers” or those perceived to support the authorities. It has particularly targeted state and federal targets, such as police stations but also schools, bus stations, banks, detention facilities, churches, mosques, markets, bars and villages…

    2.2.4 Boko Haram primarily operates in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where it has taken control of large areas of territory…

    2.2.5 Christians, state official, including members of the security forces, political and traditional leaders, Civilian Joint Task Force members, health workers and moderate Muslim clerics, those perceived to oppose Boko Haram (particularly if suspected of assisting the security forces), and women and children, living in areas controlled by Boko Haram – parts of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe state – are likely to be at risk of serious harm because of actual or perceived views and/or their gender.

    2.2.6 In areas outside of the control of Boko Haram – the large majority of Nigeria – while there have been reports of sporadic bombings, there is no other evidence to indicate that the group has systematically targeted persons who oppose or are perceived as opposing its ideology.[1] 

    [1]

21. The Tribunal has also had regard to a report prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada, entitled ‘The Capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such a Lagos’:

    2. Capacity of Boko Haram to Track Individuals

    In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Research Director of START, who has conducted desk and field research on Boko Haram, stated that the capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to other areas of Nigeria is the greatest in the northeast region (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe), with "diminishing capacity" moving away from this region (START 2 Mar. 2016). The same source stated that, in her opinion, the ability of Boko Haram to track down an "average citizen," such as someone who fled one of the cities that Boko Haram captured in 2014 or 2015, is "doubtful, even in the northeast" (ibid.). She explained that "while they have intelligence capabilities, they are not that advanced nor are they likely to use them for this purpose" (ibid.). Furthermore, the Research Director stated that Boko Haram does not have "the cyber sophistication to track individuals through hacking electronic systems," and their ability to track average citizens "would depend largely on word of mouth" (ibid.).

    Regarding the types of individuals Boko Haram might pursue and target, the Research Director said that

    [t]hey are most likely to track and target relatively high-status individuals, such as local government area officials (many of whom have fled either to Maiduguri or Abuja) or religious elites. These individuals have a public profile that makes it harder for them to blend in with local populations, and the nature of their activities (such as meeting with constituents, leading religious services) also creates vulnerabilities for them. (ibid.)

    She noted that Boko Haram has targeted elites as far away as Abuja (ibid.).

    The Assistant Professor stated that Boko Haram's tracking capabilities are "hard to assess," as the group "appears to be going through some sort of rebuilding process" (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). The same source noted that Boko Haram has greater reach in northern states, from Maiduguri to Plateau State to Kano State (ibid.). He stated that the types of individuals Boko Haram targets include senior military and police officers, school teachers, "especially ones that deem to promote an education system that the group rejects," and community activists (ibid.).

    In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior fellow at the New York-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), who specializes in Nigeria, stated that Boko Haram is "decentralized and local" and "does not appear to have the interest or capacity to go after an individual outside the northeast-except for former Boko Haram operatives who crossed the current … leadership" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016). The senior fellow stated that the other types of individuals Boko Haram targets include government officials, police, military, and religious leaders, "particularly Muslim leaders who oppose Boko Haram" (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). However, he indicated that there is no evidence of Boko Haram tracking down people beyond their area of operation in the northeast and north-central region of Nigeria (ibid.).

    ...

    2.1 Capacity in Southern Nigeria, Including Lagos

    The START Research Director was not aware of any targeted attacks by Boko Haram on individuals in the South, and that there have been "very few attacks in general" by Boko Haram south of the Middle Belt states [3] (START 2 Mar. 2016). Likewise, the CRS specialist in African affairs stated that Boko Haram's capacity in the South is "limited," and that there "seldom seems to be activity south of Abuja" (US 1 Mar. 2016).

    Regarding Boko Haram's capacity to track individuals in the South, the Assistant Professor stated,

    I suspect that the group’s reach is probably weak in the Southern parts of the country mainly because (1) the South is predominately Christian; (2) the South is predominantly Igbo (the Hausa and Fulani, which are largely Muslim, dominate northern Nigeria); (3) it is not easy for one ethnic group to move to another region, as they would stick out (they would not speak the local languages, know the local customs, etc.). The princip[al] ethnic group in Lagos are Yaruba, and there are Christian and Muslim Yarubas. (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016)

    The CFR representative stated that Boko Haram is "almost entirely inactive in Lagos" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016) and has "only carried out a single operation" there (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). The CRS specialist reported that recent Boko Haram activity in the South consisted of an attack on a fuel depot in Lagos in June 2014, and a "few isolated incidents" in 2015 between the police and alleged Boko Haram members in Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi (US 1 Mar. 2016).

    IHS Global Insight reports that in 2014, Nigerian authorities arrested more than 1,000 suspected Boko Haram militants in in the southern states of Rivers, Imo, Bayelsa and Abia (IHS Global Insight 1 Aug. 2014). The Assistant Professor indicated that the Nigerian government introduced "expansive security measures" in Abuja and Lagos, making it harder for Boko Haram to operate there (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016)....

    3. Targets of Assassinations

    The START Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which contains open-source information on over 140,000 terrorist attacks throughout the world from 1970 to 2014 (START n.d.b), has information on 20 assassination attacks attributed to Boko Haram between 2013 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of approximately 78 individuals (ibid. n.d.a). Of these attacks, the majority occurred in Borno state, but there were also assassination attacks in Kaduna, Kano, Gombe, Nasarawa, and Sokoto states (ibid.). Targets of the assassination attacks include village heads, district leaders, the leader of the opposition party, an Islamic scholar, the Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria, government officials and leaders, emirs, members of the political parties All Progressives Congress (APC) and People's Democratic Party (PDP), and police officers (ibid.).

    Reports of assassination attacks in Lagos or other southern states could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.[2]

    [2] IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Nigeria: The capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such as Lagos (2013-March 2016) [NGA105451.E], 11. März 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

22. The Tribunal notes the reports referred to above are from 2015 and early 2016.  The Tribunal has also had regard to more recent reports of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria. 

23. On 29 October 2016, two suicide attacks took place in Maiduguri at the entrance to the Bakassi IDP camp and outside a fuel depot. Eight people died in the attacks which were attributed to Boko Haram and were the first bomb attacks in the city for several months.[3]

    [3] Federal Office for Migration and Asylum (Germany) 2016, Information Centre Asylum and Migration Briefing Notes (7 November 2016), 7 November, UNHCR Refworld <>

    On 9 December 2016, Press TV reported that over 50 people were killed when two women blew themselves up in a market in Madagali. Boko Haram was held responsible for the attack that took place ‘on the edge of the group’s Sambisa Forest stronghold, which the Nigerian military has been bombing ahead of ground assaults’. According to the report, Boko Haram ‘recently regained momentum after it was nearly obliterated months ago by a joint military force’.[4]

    [4] ‘Bomb explosions kill at least 56 in northeast Nigeria’ 2016, Press TV, 9 December <

24. On 9 January 2017, Press TV reported that five suspected members of the Boko Haram group and three civilians have been killed in two separate attacks, ‘after the terrorists detonated their explosive vests’. The attacks were ‘conducted in the eastern outskirts of the provincial capital Maiduguri’.[5]

    [5] ‘5 terrorists, 3 civilians die in bomb attacks in northeastern Nigeria’ 2017, Press TV, 9 January <

1. On 16 January 2017, Press TV reported that at least four people were killed and 17 injured ‘after a radicalized girl detonated her explosive-laden vest’ at a mosque at the University of Maiduguri. No group had claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was taken to ‘bear the hallmark of the Boko Haram Takfiri terrorist group’.[6]

   [6] ‘Four people, including university professor, killed in northeast Nigeria’ 2017, Press TV, 16 January <

2. On 25 January 2017, Voice of America reported that Boko Haram ‘continues to carry out deadly attacks despite the recent claim by Nigeria’s president that it had been crushed’ and reported that at least four people had been killed in three separate attacks by suicide bombers in Maiduguri.[7]

   [7] ‘At Least 4 Killed in Trio of Suicide Attacks in Nigeria’ 2017, Voice of America, 25 January <

3. On 29 January 2017, Associated Press reported:

   Gunmen believed to be Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamic extremists attacked a convoy of motorists along a recently secured highway, killing at least seven people and injuring many others, including soldiers in a military escort, witnesses said.

   …

   The incident came three days after Boko Haram gunmen suffered a heavy loss of members after a foiled attempt to attack a military base in Borno state. In that incident, a large number of the insurgents stormed a military base in Kamaya but failed to dislodge the soldiers.[8]

   [8] Umar, H 2017, ‘Nigerian gunmen attack convoy on northeast highway, 7 killed’, Associated Press, 29 January < Accessed 30 January 2017 <CXC904066830>

4. Vanguard reported on 30 January that more than 20 people were feared dead after the attack on the convoy of motorists travelling under military escort and that ‘at least 15 trucks laden with food were seized’ by the attackers.[9]

   [9] ‘20 feared dead as Boko Haram opens fire on motorists in Maiduguri’ 2017, Vanguard, 30 January <

5. The recently released Human Rights Watch World Report 2017 states, in part:

   The seven-year old Boko Haram conflict is winding down as military operations by Nigerian forces and its northeastern neighbors intensified against the insurgents. An estimated 550 civilians died in Boko Haram attacks in 2016 compared to almost 3,500 in 2015. Insurgents resorted to suicide bomb attacks in crowded places, like IDP camps, markets and mosques, using mostly women and girls to bypass security. On February 11, two young women detonated suicide bombs in a Dikwa, Borno camp, killing about 58 IDPs.[10]

   [10] Human Rights Watch 2017, Human Rights Watch World Report 2017, 13 January, p.451 <>

   The Tribunal has undertaken research on whether there has been recent activity by Boko Haram in Lagos.  The Tribunal noted the submissions contained reference to a foiled plot in 2015.  The research indicates there have been no attacks by Boko Haram in Lagos since their first attack in June 2014, when a car bomb and suicide bomb were detonated near a fuel depot in Lagos. The only Boko Haram activity in Lagos since that time has been the arrest of Boko Haram members.  Reports from 2015 to 2017 indicate dozens of Boko Haram members have been arrested in Lagos State, some after fleeing there from other parts of Nigeria.[11] 

   [11] ‘45 Boko Haram suspects charged for planned Dolphin Estate attack in Lagos’, International Business Times, 26 October 2015; ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram ‘spreads to Lagos’’, BBC News, 31 August 2015; ‘Wanted Boko Haram chieftain, five others arrested in Lagos’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 11 July 2016; ‘13 Boko Haram suspects arrested in Lagos, Kogi, others – SSS’, Premium Times, 10 January 2017.

6. The Tribunal has satisfied itself that there has been no substantial change in the reach of Boko Haram since the DFAT report in 2015. The Tribunal notes current country information still indicates Boko Haram are primarily active in the north east of Nigeria. The Tribunal finds the earlier reports from DFAT, UK Home Office and IRB Canada, which concluded people living outside of Boko Haram controlled areas are highly unlikely to be targeted, are reports that are still relevant and current.

   Refugee criterion

7. In essence the applicant claims a well-founded fear of persecution from Boko Haram for reason of his Christian religion and in particular because he is accused of sharing his bible with Muslim students whilst teaching in the [State 1]. His representative however submits the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution not just for his religion, but for his membership of numerous particular social groups, including:

   ·Active Christian Yoruba Teacher

   ·Christian teacher practising Christianity in northern Nigeria

   ·Christian teacher accused of converting student to Christianity

   ·Christian teacher distributing Bibles to Muslim students

   ·Yoruba Christian teacher with a Western Education from Australia

   ·Christian involved in church leadership activities in Nigeria and Australia

   ·Imputed opponent of pro-Islamic fundamentalist groups like Boko Haram

   ·Imputed opponent of pro-Islamic State of Nigeria

8. The representative submits ‘the applicant’s cumulative profile, as a committed and active Christian, his profession as a teacher, his western education from Australia, the previous accusations made against him about his conversion of Muslim students, would lead to the real possibility that he would be subjected to persecution or significant harm for convention based reasons at the hands of the Boko Haram or other fundamentalist groups’.

9. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claim to have come to the attention of Boko Haram because he allowed 2 students to look at his bible whilst he was teaching in [State 1].  The Tribunal has doubts about the veracity of the claim, in particular because he did not make this claim in his written protection visa application, he answered ‘no’ to the question of whether he ever suffered harm, and nor did he indicate in his written application that he had ever worked or lived in [State 1]. The Tribunal also found his description of how Boko Haram had attempted to harm him, and how he had got away, to be implausible. That is, the Tribunal finds it implausible he could have outrun 7 men on motorbikes who were shooting at him, without himself suffering injury, when the person walking next to him was shot dead.  The Tribunal also found his account of how he got back to Lagos following this incident to be lacking in detail and not credible.   The Tribunal considers that if he were teaching in [State 1], and if he was accused of trying to convert Muslim students, he has still embellished his account of how he says he was attacked and escaped.

10. The Tribunal has considered the newspaper article provided by the applicant, and an email from his school in Lagos saying the Islamic group have asked about him.  Both of these pieces of information are inconsistent with country information about the lack of targeting of individuals in the southern states, and for this reason the Tribunal has doubts about their veracity.  The Tribunal considers that if the article is genuine, the information in the article has been provided by the applicant rather than a source from Boko Haram. However, even if the Tribunal accepted these two pieces of evidence are genuine, the Tribunal does not accept Boko Haram would have an ongoing interest in the applicant.  The applicant says he cannot return even to Lagos because Boko Haram have spies everywhere.  The Tribunal finds this is an exaggeration, and is not supported by the country information referred to above.  Given the findings by the IRB report, the Tribunal finds that even if there were attempts in 2013 to find the applicant at this school in Lagos, it is too farfetched to accept that in 2017 Boko Haram are still targeting and searching for the applicant, or that they would become aware of his return should he return in the foreseeable future.   The Tribunal makes this finding even taking into account the claims that he was a Christian teacher who shared a bible with Muslim students and ran away from an attempted assassination. The Tribunal does not accept these factors raise the applicant’s profile to such a level that Boko Haram have or would continue to search for him 4 years after the alleged event in 2013. 

11. The applicant claims his [Relative 1] was targeted by Boko Haram because they could not locate him.  The Tribunal does not accept as reliable his claim that his [Relative 1] was asked ‘where is [the applicant]’ as she was kidnapped as he has no firsthand knowledge of this, nor did he provide any reliable witness evidence that this occurred. The Tribunal finds his claim about his [Relative 1] is inconsistent with country information, and finds it farfetched that a group that is not known for targeting individuals outside the north of Nigeria, except possibly for high profile individuals, would target [Relative 1] of a Christian teacher who temporarily worked in [State 1] and had shared his bible with Muslim students a year earlier.  Whilst the Tribunal acknowledges country information indicating Boko Haram targets school teachers, the consensus from the country information referred to above is that Boko Haram are highly unlikely, and largely incapable, of targeting individuals outside the areas they control.  The Tribunal finds that if the applicant’s [Relative 1] was kidnapped and murdered, this was a tragic criminal act that is unrelated to the applicant. 

12. Even taking the applicant’s claims at their highest, and accepting he was chased one day after school by Boko Haram operatives who shot at him from motorbikes, the Tribunal does not accept Boko Haram would follow him to Lagos or would have any ongoing interest in him.  The Tribunal relies on country information from DFAT, the UK Home Office and the IRB Canada that individuals outside the reach of Boko Haram controlled areas are highly unlikely to be targeted, and finds the applicant is not someone of high profile that Boko Haram would track him to Lagos or maintain interest in him so longer after the incident in [State 1] in 2013.  Even taking all the claims cumulatively, as an active Christian, as a Christian teacher, someone who showed their bible to Muslim students, someone accused of proselytising, and someone who has spent time in the West, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant faces a real chance of persecution from Boko Haram should he return to his home area of Lagos in the reasonably foreseeable future.

13. The Tribunal finds there is not a real chance Boko Haram would target the applicant for reason of the claimed incident at a school in [State 1]s in 2013, or for reason of his religion, or because he is a member of any of the claimed particular social groups. The Tribunal finds the applicant does not meet s.36(2)(a).

14. Complementary protection

15. The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of him being removed from Australia to Nigeria.

16. In relation to the risk of being significantly harmed by Boko Haram, the Tribunal acknowledges the violent attacks by this group on both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria.  However, as reported in the country information above, the attacks are concentrated in the north of Nigeria. The Tribunal considers the risk of the applicant facing significant harm from Boko Haram as a resident in Lagos is too remote to amount to a real risk.  In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has taken into account all the circumstances raised by the applicant, including his ethnicity, his religion and religious activities, his claim to have been targeted in [State 1], and time spent in a Western country.  The Tribunal finds the country information supports a finding that even with all these circumstances taken into account, the applicant can safely return to his home area of Lagos.

17. The Tribunal is not satisfied there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Nigeria, there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm. The Tribunal finds the applicant does not meet the criterion for complementary protection set out in s.36(2)(aa).

    Conclusion

18. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

19. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).

20. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).

    DECISION

21. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

    Carolyn Wilson
    Member

    
    
    

(Zugriff am 09. Mai 2017)