1601864 (Refugee)

1601864 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3974 (24 July 2018)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1601864
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Nepal
MEMBER:Luke Hardy
DATE:24 July 2018
PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.

Statement made on 24 July 2018 at 11:49am
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Nepal – Particular social group – Woman with child born out of wedlock – Single mother – Divorced women – Involved in extramarital relationship – Subject to negative attitudes for inter-caste relationship – Subject to stigmatisation – Not being able to remarry – Decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 5K-LA, 36, 65, 499

CASES
MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 29 January 2016 to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicants, [Ms A] and her sons [Master B] and [Master C], are all citizens of Nepal. [Ms A] arrived in Australia attached to her former husband’s student visa in 2008. She later visited Nepal and returned to Australia. Her marriage ended with divorce in February 2013 and she began a relationship with [Mr D]. She was granted a student visa in her own right in 2013. [Master B] was born in Australia in [year]; [Mr D] is his father. [Ms A] took [Master B] back to Nepal in July 2014 to live with her mother. She came back to Australia alone and pursued study. She travelled again to Nepal in January 2015 and brought [Master B] back here with her. She lodged her protection visa application on 27 April 2015 gave birth to [Master C] in [date]. [Master C], whose father is also [Mr D], was later added to the current protection visa application. The delegate refused to grant the visas on 29 January 2016. The applicants then sought review by the Tribunal. As far as I know, [Mr D] is the subject of his own protection visa application.
[Ms A] appeared before the Tribunal on 19 July 2018 to give oral evidence and present arguments. An interpreter attended, although [Ms A] preferred to give evidence in English most of the time. I am confident she was not at a disadvantage during those parts of the hearing when the interpreter did not interact.
[Master B] and [Master C] did not attend the hearing. They have no claims of their own. They are included in the application only as dependent applicants, whose success or otherwise in this matter depends on the outcome of [Ms A’s] application.
For the purposes of this review, [Ms A] submitted a copy of the delegate’s decision record which contains an uncontested summary of claims she made over time to the then Immigration Department.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the “refugee” criterion, or on other “complementary protection” grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, he or she is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country: s.5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, he or she is a refugee if he or she is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s.5H(1)(b).
Under s.5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if he or she fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance he or she would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss.5J(2)-(6) and ss.5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (“the complementary protection criterion”). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss.36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration – PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and relevant country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issues
The main issue in this case is whether the applicants are entitled to protection in Australia as refugees or, if not, on complementary protection grounds.
For the following reasons, I have concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Claims
[Ms A] claims she cannot return to Nepal because she is a divorced woman who has borne two children out of wedlock. She claims the scandal will hurt her and that this will in turn affect her capacity to raise and protect her children. She claims “membership of a particular social group” or of a variety of groups characterised as “single mothers in Nepal”, “divorced women in Nepal”, “mothers of illegitimate children in Nepal”, “de facto wives in Nepal”, “women in non-traditional marital relationships in Nepal”, and other iterations of her cognisable social circumstances.
In her original protection visa application [Ms A] claimed her former husband was of a higher caste than her own Magar caste. She claimed her husband was abusive and that his treatment of her led to their separation and divorce. She told me at the Tribunal hearing that there has been no contact at all between her and her former husband since the divorce in 2013. She claimed to me that she and [Mr D] are also of different castes, although neither of them Dalit. This was not a claim she relied on in her original protection visa application but at that time, she told me, she and [Mr D] had not re-commenced living together. She confirmed to me that for the last few years since [Master C] was born she and [Mr D] have been cohabiting and raising their children together. She says the relationship is strong. She said that [Mr D] works to support her and their children. Whereas she claimed to the Department that she would be vulnerable as a single mother in Nepal, this claim is arguably affected by the evidently ongoing support and close presence of [Mr D] in her life.
[Ms A’s] evidence to the Tribunal regarding her relationship with [Mr D] did not appear consistent with what she had told the Immigration Department in her protection visa application and her protection visa interview. On those occasions she said that she and [Mr D] were estranged and that he had abandoned her mainly because of her becoming pregnant not just once but twice. Whereas she did not describe a significant rapprochement in her evidence to the Department, a rapprochement that had occurred some months before the protection visa interview, she emphasised in her evidence to the tribunal that she and [Mr D] are cohabiting parents. On hearing her evidence at the Tribunal hearing, I am not satisfied that she resolved this discrepancy. On the evidence before me, [Ms A] embellished evidence about [Mr D] in her claims to the Department.
Whereas [Ms A] said to the Department that she is vulnerable to abuse by predatory males, on account of being a divorced single mother, she appears not to have been candid to the Department about her being in a long-term cohabitant exclusive relationship with [Mr D].
[Ms A] says she cannot marry [Mr D] because she is of the Magar caste and he is of the Thakuri, both of which castes come under the Chhetri, which is a relatively high but not the highest caste in Nepalese society. Notwithstanding her claims about not being able to engage in inter-caste marriage, [Ms A] claims she was able to marry her former husband even though he was of the highest caste, the Brahmin. I understand [Ms A] to be suggesting that to marry [Mr D] would somehow attract anger and rejection from his family and/or hers, and disapproval from society in general.
[Ms A] claimed to me that she received some social and emotional support from her own family during her first marriage but said that she did not receive any since then. I put to her that this did not appear to be true on the facts: she had repeatedly claimed that she was able to leave her first child with her mother for around six months in 2014-5 while she studied in Australia. In response she denied again having received any support from her family since commencing her relationship with [Mr D]. I put to [Ms A] that her family did not appear to have ostracised her over either inter-caste relationship, not even the extra-marital one. She had claimed to the Immigration Department that when she went back to Nepal in 2014, she did so to keep company with her then-sick father; that was the occasion on which she took and left [Master B] there. [Ms A] then said to me that it was Nepal’s conservative and superstitious society that will ostracise her.
I asked [Ms A] to tell me specifically what kind of harm she feared from people in Nepal. In reply, she said she feared she would be the subject of negative comments. She did not mention being vulnerable, for any reason, to abuse by predatory males. She did, however, say that she and her husband would be forced to live apart, due to being unmarried partners in an inter-caste relationship; in this way she was claiming again that she would essentially be a single mother in Nepal. I asked for evidence to the effect that she and [Mr D] would not be able to reside together and she said that due to “political turmoil” in Nepal it would be hard to stay together. This assertion was also unsupported: [Ms A] did not identify any political conditions either actively or tacitly favourable to separating her from her husband or children. I asked again for evidence supporting these claims about being prevented from living together and [Ms A] said that even her mother would not help her. When I asked why, she said it was because her mother is old. I put to her that her mother is only about three years older than when she was minding and raising [Master B].
I discussed s.5(1) with [Ms A]: the various forms of significant harm and the relevance of intention to harm in three of those forms, including torture. (See below.) I asked [Ms A] if any treatment she fears facing in Nepal could reasonably be regarded as serious or significant harm for the purposes of the Act. In reply, she said that in the event of return to Nepal she will face a life of “torture”. When I asked her for detail, she said she will be forced to stay and listen to people’s “back-biting and negative comments”. I questioned whether negative comments could amount even over time to persecution or significant harm and [Ms A] said, “Nepal is conservative. I want to be strong but [it is] not possible.”
[Ms A] also said she will be separated from her children, but did not support that assertion with any evidence and, all things considered, it struck me as being baldly speculative.
[Ms A] suggested that she would not be permitted to remarry due to caste issues, but provided no evidence to support this. According to independent evidence cited below, inter-caste marriage is not illegal, and divorce and remarriage are legally-available options for women in Nepal including Magar-caste women.
[Ms A] claims, at least implicitly, that her children will be stigmatised by negative comment arising from their having been born to her out of wedlock. She implies the presence of a father in their daily life will not ameliorate this. I have considered these implicit claims.
Independent country information
I have had regard to the following independent information:
Second marriages are not condoned for high-caste Hindu women, and they result in a reduction in social and ritual status if they occur. Men also gain a bad reputation if they divorce their wives, but they do not lose ritual status if they remarry. For other groups [d]ivorce involves much less stigma for women. Among the Magar, for instance, women who leave their husbands and remarry lose a few ritual privileges, but this is nothing compared to what happens to high-caste women.[1]
[1] “Nepali – Marriage and family,” Countries and Their Cultures,
I have had regard to the following information found in the DFAT Country Information Report: Nepal, dated 21 April 2016:
3.35 There are no legal barriers to inter-caste marriage in Nepal and the government has provided monetary incentives of 100,000 NRs (approximately AUD1, 300) to each inter-caste couple married since 2009. According to one study that examined 123 inter-caste marriages from Banke, Parbat and Shanusha districts between December 2011 and March 2012, 80 marriages were between a Dalit male marrying a non-Dalit female and 43 were between a non-Dalit male marrying a Dalit female. The former type of union was generally more successful. However, overall, success of an inter-caste marriage depends on a range of factors including economic, educational, social and political status. The practice of downgrading one's caste as a result of inter-caste marriage still exists in remote and rural areas. Dalit families involved in such arrangements can risk even further social exclusion and non-Dalit families risk losing their status in society.
3.36 DFAT assesses that inter-caste couples can face disapproval by their families or society. Accusations of criminal activity such as theft, kidnapping, child marriage and rape can be used by the (relatively) higher-caste family to pressure the break-up of inter-caste marriages. Physical attacks and social exclusion by the families can also be imposed on couples in order to force a break-up of the relationship. Women (regardless of their Dalit or non-Dalit status) generally suffer more than men from such attacks, particularly social and familial humiliation (see section on ‘Women’ below).
Findings in relation to s.36(2)(a) of the Act
I have considered all of the evidence before me. I accept that [Ms A] is in an extramarital relationship with [Mr D]. I accept that there is a difference in their castes, but I do not accept that this is a significant difference. I certainly do not accept, on the evidence before me, that negative attitudes towards inter-caste marriages between Brahmins and non-Brahmins, or between non-Dalits and Dalits, apply in this case. Overall, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that caste issues prevent [Ms A] from marrying [Mr D] should they both wish to marry. In the event that they both do not wish to marry, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that it is due to well-founded fear of persecution.
I accept that [Ms A’s] two sons were born out of wedlock and that their status is relatively uncommon in Nepalese society. I accept that Nepalese society is generally conservative and unsympathetic towards people in extramarital “spousal” relationships, and also towards children of such unions.
I am prepared to accept that [Ms A] is presently a member of a variety of particular social groups characterised separately and together by [Ms A]’s profiles as a divorced woman, as a seemingly “single” mother, as a mother of “illegitimate” children, and as a woman living in an extramarital, inter-caste relationship with her partner and their extramarital children in Nepal. I also find that the children may be regarded in Nepal as members of a variety particular social groups in view of their being children born out of wedlock to inter-caste parents and, in particular, a mother who may be regarded by some in society as a person of questionable virtue. The country information consulted supports the view that these are all cognisable groups in Nepal.
However, I find that [Ms A] has made a number of contradictory, exaggerated and unfounded claims about abandonment and ostracism, and on the evidence overall, including independent country information, I do not accept that any one of the applicants in this matter faces a real chance of harm rising even cumulatively, whether at once or over time, to a level, degree or intensity capable of being regarded reasonably as serious harm, let alone persecution. I am not satisfied that any social or political conditions in Nepal give rise to a real chance of keeping the applicants apart or separating them from [Mr D].
I am not satisfied that there is a real chance of [Ms A] being persecuted in Nepal in the reasonably foreseeable future, let alone for any of the reasons identified in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act. She is not a refugee. As [Ms A] is found not to be refugee, the same finding extends to the dependent applicants [Master B] and [Master C], but as can be seen from findings in the preceding paragraph, I have considered their circumstances separately in light of implied claims about their prospects in Nepal.
For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that the applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a).
Findings in relation to s.36(2)(aa) of the Act
Having concluded that the applicants do not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), I have considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa).
A person who is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm.
Relevant to this, s.36(2)(aa) refers to a “real risk” of an applicant suffering significant harm. The “real risk” test imposes the same standard as the “real chance” test applicable to the assessment of “well-founded fear” in the Refugee Convention definition (ref. MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33).

“Significant harm” for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. “Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”, “degrading treatment or punishment, and torture, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act. According to s.5(1), the last three definitions of significant harm all require an element of intention to harm.
The applicants’ claims to complementary protection are essentially the same claims made with regard to being recognised as refugees. Those claims, as shown above, are tainted by exaggeration and fail to meet the “real chance” test. In particular, the harm feared does not amount even cumulatively to serious harm, or persecution. I also find, upon full consideration of the facts and the content of s.5(1) of the Act, that the harm feared in this case is not sufficient to amount even cumulatively to significant harm. In view of my findings of fact above, and in view of the “real risk” test imposing the same standard as the “real chance” test above, the applicants’ claims cannot succeed as complementary protection claims.
On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Nepal, there is a real risk that the applicants will suffer significant harm.
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
Other findings
There is no suggestion that any of the applicants satisfies.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. They are also unable to satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(b) or (c), and cannot be granted the visa. Accordingly, they do not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.
Luke Hardy
Member

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:    For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:    For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in them practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)    denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
..
36Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)    the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)    the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)    the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2018] AATA 3974

24 July 2018

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Immigration

Administrative Law

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Judicial Review

Jurisdiction

Statutory Construction

Natural Justice

Procedural Fairness

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