1512348 (Refugee)

[2017] AATA 2978

1512348 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2978 (21 December 2017)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1512348

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  China

MEMBER:David McCulloch

DATE:21 December 2017

PLACE OF DECISION:  Perth

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

Statement made on 21 December 2017 at 9:24am

CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection Visa – China – Particular social group – Fear of state persecution – Adherents of the Church of Almighty God – Eastern Lightning – Genuineness of religious practice – Witness credibility – Inconsistencies in evidence

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 36, 65, 424AA, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES
MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39
Randhawa v MILGEA(1994) 52 FCR 437
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of China, applied for the visa [in] November 2014 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] August 2015.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 14 December 2017 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

4. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

5. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

6. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

   owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

7. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

8. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal has had regard to DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered Religious Organisations and Other Groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015 and DFAT Thematic Report – China: Fujian Province, 16 December 2016, copies of which were given to the applicant in the hearing.

9. The issue in this case is the credibility of the applicant and whether, on accepted claims, the criteria for protection are fulfilled. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.

   Background and claims

10. The applicant provided the Tribunal with a copy of the decision of the delegate which indicates the following in relation to her immigration history. The applicant arrived in Australia [in] October 2012 on a [Student] visa which had been granted [in] September 2012. That visa was cancelled by the Department [in] August 2013, after which the applicant became an unlawful noncitizen. The applicant remained an unlawful noncitizen until a Bridging visa was granted [in] November 2014 in association with the application for the Protection visa.

11. The application forms for the Protection visa indicate the following in relation to the applicant. The applicant was born on [birth date] in [Fujian] Province.  She speaks, reads and writes both English and Chinese. The applicant is of the Han ethnic group and lists her religion as Christian (Almighty God).  The applicant has never been married. The applicant lists one address lived at from 2009 until 2012 in [Fuzhou] City, Fujian Province.  The applicant undertook schooling in China from [duration of schooling]. The applicant lists no qualifications and indicates her occupation or profession before coming to Australia as a student. The applicant lists no employment in China. The applicant indicates that, sometimes, she calls her relatives in China. The applicant lists both parents and her sister living in China.

12. The applicant provided a written statement as part of her application which provides as follows (not corrected for spelling or grammar):

    I came from Fujian Province. I was born into a Christian family. Both my parents were Christians and attended the house church. Our church is different from the official Patriotic Church in that ours is active in preaching gospel but it doesn't. My parents baptized me when I was [age], and when I was in [school], I often went to the gatherings. However, our church was investigated by the local government. When I was in [a certain] year of [school], my parents were arrested by the government for holding house church gatherings. I was warned by the teachers in my school never to attend any underground church. After I entered middle school, we students were all the more strictly forbidden to attend those unauthorized churches. My parents never stopped going to the gatherings, but, to avoid unnecessary risks, they often held their gatherings in other places than their home.

    Soon after I came to study in Australia in October, 2012, my parents told me that inspired by the Holy Spirit, they decided to convert to the church of "Almighty God", or "Eastern Lightning". During [2013], news came from my home that my parents were both caught while preaching gospel in other places. After they were caught, they lost their jobs and consequently, my family's economy began to go downhill daily. By and by, it had become more and more difficult for my family to provide me with enough funds for my tuition. I was worrying about my family and wanted to go back to China to see what had happened, but my parents wouldn't like me to go back and insisted on my staying in Australia and going on with my education. I had no alternative but to work part time as [occupation] to support myself. Unfortunately, I was swindled out of all my tuition. Finally, I could not even find the swindler, let alone get back my money.

    Recommended by someone, I began to attend a house church gathering held by one of my countrymen. We went on with our gathering for more than a year, sharing our Lord's grace.

    Released from their custody, my parents returned to their hometown and lived under the constant surveillance by the village administration and the local police station. Their family were always harassed by the policemen, so they didn't dare to stay in their hometown. They became [occupation] and worked in other places. My [sister] stayed and went to school by herself at hometown. Though she missed her parents very much, she couldn't live with them because there was no security living a migrant life with them.

    My parents preached gospel to me and told all about the church of Almighty God, which aroused my interest in it. My parents told me that the church of Almighty God was looked upon by the Chinese Communist Party as an evil cult sect and all its websites were blocked, but, they added, I could get access to the Almighty God's web abroad and read the censored materials.

    I attended some on-line sermons on the Almighty God's webs but I had some difficulty in sharing them with others. Once, on an impulse, I called my father sharing with him my spiritual experience over the phone only to be tapped by the police from the mainland China. It was only several days before my father was caught. The police even questioned my father about me, but he refused to say anything about me, so he was put into custody to be persecuted. They beat him so severely that he lost his hearing in one ear. The police tried to browbeat my parents into getting me back from abroad to confess my offences, otherwise, they threatened, I would be arrested the minute I got on the land of China.

    My mother called to caution me not to go back to China and not to worry about them. She added they were blessed by our Lord so they wanted to wait for the day to come when their persecutors were tried. From that time on, my parents stopped phoning me, because their telephone calls were being tapped. They didn't take their mobile phones with them when they went out or attended the gatherings as if they were engaging in underground work. I found it an awful tragedy for all the adherents of Almighty God's church in mainland China.

    Up to now, I have been searching in vain for a church of Almighty God in Australia. Maybe, the adherents of Almighty God are holding mobile gatherings to avoid the Satan from sabotaging Anyway, it has caused me much difficulty in finding their churches. However, it doesn't prevent me from pursuing my faith, as I can see their churches functioning and I can hear the God instructing us on the intend. Now I devote myself to reading the book "The Word Appears in the Flesh" and to the mission of preaching the gospel.

    To smear the reputation of Almighty God church, the Chinese Communist Party is accusing it of believing in the Doomsday to disorder social disability. It's a shear slander and actually we have no such doctrine as the Doomsday, but we only emphasize the Times of Kingdom, during which time "the world hasn't ended" and Jesus has returned in the flesh to speak. This time She has come for the purpose of making people to repent and, more important, of eradicating the root of all sins. She has worked out an overall plan for the God's work in three times (i.e. Times of Laws, Times of Grace and Times of Kingdom) Anyway, a Christian cannot stay in the Times of Grace all the time, he or she must obey the God's new direction and enter on a new Times.

    The Church of Almighty God is not an evil cult sect, and neither am I a pagan. As an adherent of Almighty God, I will select among my friends someone who has good character and quality and who loves God as a servant to God. I'm not afraid of being misunderstood, being laughed at or being attacked. Someone says that we adherents of Almighty God are different from other masses, but I don't think it's so important. What is most important is that we should love God, have faith in God, loyal to God and do as God has us do. Australia is a land of free faith, where any adherent of the Church of Almighty God can be sure of a place he or she can get a toehold in. To defend my freedom of faith and to prevent my parents from suffering more, I'm now applying for the protection by the Australian Government.

    Independent information

    Christianity in China

13. DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered Religious Organisations and Other Groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015 provides variously as follows:

    Historical overview of religion in China

    China is a religiously diverse country. Its ethnically varied population and long history of trade and engagement with foreign influences have resulted in a rich and complex society of faiths, belief systems and organised religious groups.

    Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism constitute the "three teachings", a philosophical framework which historically has had a significant role in shaping Chinese culture, including traditional folk religions. Although Christianity has been present in China since the 7th century, the rise of Christianity in China was promoted by Protestant Christian missionaries who became active in the nineteenth century. Catholics became active in China in the late thirteenth century.

    The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 under the control of the atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resulted in the expulsion of Christian missionaries and the establishment of “Patriotic Associations”: government-affiliated organisations which seek to regulate and monitor the activities of registered religious organisations on behalf of the CCP.

    Religious practice was forced underground throughout the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and people began to practice their religious faith in secret. This led to the development of so-called “underground” religious movements. State-sanctioned religious practice re-emerged under Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” policies in the late 1970s and 1980s. Han Chinese Buddhists and Daoists, in particular, have enjoyed greater freedom as Chinese leaders use such traditions to promote Chinese cultural identity to both a domestic and international audience.

    The Party is also increasingly willing to recognise and support the philanthropic activities of registered religious groups, particularly in disaster relief, health care and poverty alleviation. At the same time, members of religious faiths that are perceived by the government to be potentially threatening can be met with suspicion and government controls. Members of overseas-affiliated Christian organisations, Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims, in particular, can face interference, harassment, and at times, violence (see DFAT’s Country Report on China, March 2015 for a more detailed discussion of Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims).This report primarily discusses conditions for unregistered Protestant Christians, Catholics, and members of Falun Gong and other so-called “cult” organisations currently operating in China.

    Government Framework

    Article 36 of China’s Constitution states that citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief and that no state organ, public organisation or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion. Discrimination on religious grounds is prohibited in theory.

    The conditions governing the establishment of religious bodies and religious sites, the publication of religious material, and the conduct of religious education and personnel are outlined in the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) which came into effect in 2005. At the national level, the CCP’s United Front Work Department, State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and the Ministry of Civil Affairs provide policy guidance and supervision on the implementation of the regulations. Local authorities, including provincial religious affairs bureaux, have significant discretion in implementing the regulations.

    The Chinese government limits religious practice to five religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism) and members are required to register with the government’s Patriotic Associations mentioned above. These organisations are overseen by SARA and are required to adhere to the principles of independence and self-governance from foreign associations. Registered religious organisations are permitted to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, collect donations and conduct charitable activities. Government subsidies are available for the construction of state-sanctioned places of worship and religious schools.

    Proselytising is permitted in registered places of worship and in private settings but not in public or by foreigners. Distributing unapproved literature and associating with unregistered religious groups is also not permitted. Theological restrictions are imposed on some religions. For example, Chinese Protestants are expected to be non-denominational, and Catholics are required to be independent from the Vatican. In the past, Chinese non-governmental institutions (NGOs), including religious organisations, were permitted to receive donations in foreign currency and favourable tax treatment could apply if the funds were used for charitable activities. However, draft NGO regulations submitted to the National People’s Congress in December 2014 may ban NGOs in China that are mainly funded or have close links to foreign organisations. The draft has not yet been made publicly available and DFAT is not able to comment on the extent to which religious NGOs in China will be affected by the new regulations should they be passed/agreed.

    While the Chinese Constitution protects religious activities within the patriotic religious organisations’ framework, the government does not generally tolerate activities that are perceived to disrupt public order, harm the health of citizens or interfere with the state education system. Religious groups that fail to affiliate with one of the five official patriotic associations are considered illegal. As a result, they can be vulnerable to coercive and punitive action by authorities and denied legal protection under Chinese law.

    Broadly speaking, DFAT assesses religion in China can be practised within state-sanctioned boundaries, as long as such practices do not challenge the interests or authority of the Chinese Government. Religious adherents are therefore subject to a range of restrictions that vary in extent and intensity according to local conditions. Given this, it is difficult to generalise about religious practice in China but basic assumptions can be made according to whether people exercise their faith in registered or unregistered institutions, whether they practice openly or privately, and whether or not religious expression is perceived by the government to be closely tied to broader ethnic, political or security policies.[1]

    […]

    The rise of unregistered Christian groups in China

    SARA permits friends and family to hold small, informal prayer meetings without official registration. This, combined with the controlled nature of religious worship amongst registered Christian institutions, has led to the proliferation of a sizeable unregistered Christian community in both rural and urban China. Known as “house” or “family” churches (for Protestant organisations), and “underground” churches (for Catholic organisations) these bodies are private religious forums that adherents create in their own homes or other places of worship.

    House churches can be found across China and vary in size and religious practice. Gatherings of 30 to 40 people are generally tolerated, although DFAT is aware of cases where gatherings of fewer people have attracted negative attention by authorities. On the other hand, there are also some house church congregations that number in the thousands and are able to operate with little to no interference from local authorities. A number of house churches are known to restrict their own size and activities so as to avoid official attention.

    Members of both unregistered and registered religious organisations can face adverse attention by authorities when: they are perceived to have links with foreign influences (either through personnel or funding); are critical of the government or advocate for issues considered political or sensitive by the government; belong to large and potentially influential networks; are engaged in other criminal activities; or are operating in provinces or local settings where corruption is prevalent, and the potential for extortion and running afoul of local authorities’ favour, is potentially higher. Occasionally, anti-crime campaigns with quotas for a certain number of arrests can also prompt local officials to crack down on Christian activities that had previously been tolerated.[2]

    […]

    [1] DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015, para 2.1 – 2.11

    [2] DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015, paras 3.1 – 3.3

    Protestant Christians

    The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) was established in 1949 to oversee China’s “post-denominational” (i.e. non-denominational) Protestant church. The “Three-Self” is a Chinese abbreviation for the church’s three principles of self-administration, self-financing and self-evangelisation. There are approximately 60,000 registered Protestant churches under the supervision of the China Christian Council (CCC) and the Three Self Patriotic Movement, as well as several hundred thousand affiliated meeting points. Approximately 200 pastors graduate every year from China’s one seminary and 20 Bible schools run by the CCC. Qualifications from foreign seminaries are not officially recognised in China.

    Unregistered Protestant churches tend to have more theological freedom than state-sanctioned churches but risk adverse treatment by authorities due to their unregistered status. As members of “illegal” organisations, unregistered Protestant church members can experience harassment, raids and destruction of church property, pressure to join or report to the government-sanctioned religious organisations, and occasional violence and criminal sanction, particularly in response to land disputes with local authorities. For example, authorities have been known to apply indirect pressure on house churches by cutting off electricity or forcing landlords to evict house church members.

    In 2013, the Zhejiang provincial government launched a “three rectifications and one demolition” campaign. According to the provincial government’s website, the campaign was launched to improve cities’ landscapes and urban planning, as well as “push economic development”. The three-year campaign requires old residential areas, old factories and “urban villages” to be renovated and for illegal structures to be demolished. As of September 2014, more than 300 church crosses had been removed under the policy, many of them state-sanctioned churches. Some media reports have speculated that the policy is an attempt to limit the influence of the Christian church. In response to criticisms about the campaign, the government has stated that the campaign had been implemented “with fairness and justice. … No matter what background [the building has], we tear down what should be torn down, with no exceptions and no sparing of feelings”. The Zhejiang chapters of the Three-Self movement and the Christian Council have also urged believers to “obey the government …in order to establish a good image for Protestantism”.

    Some members of house churches are able to move freely between registered and unregistered churches, for example, they may be permitted to use registered facilities as a place to hold weddings or to purchase bibles. However, this arrangement does not apply to all unregistered church goers, some of whom report difficulties in hiring hotel or restaurant venues for weddings because of their association with illegal (unregistered) church organisations. Registered churches are able to organise their own activities as long as they accord with government regulations.

    DFAT is aware of a number of police raids imposed on at least eight unregistered Protestant churches in Guangzhou in September 2014. In 2013 unregistered churches in Shandong, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang were forcibly closed after they refused to register with the state-sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM).

    One of the largest house churches in Beijing, the Shouwang Church, has repeatedly resisted attempts by the government to register with the TSPM (the congregation numbers in the thousands). Members collected US$6 million in donations to purchase a place of worship but the sale was cancelled following pressure by the authorities. An attempt to rent a large conference room was also cancelled some months after the initial proposal had been agreed. Members eventually started to hold outdoor worship services.

    Members who have persisted in attending worship services at the Shouwang church-designated outdoor venue have been subject to repeated detention, intimidation and harassment. Five church leaders have reportedly been under house arrest since 2011. The church’s website is frequently blocked. Credible sources have told DFAT that members have repeatedly been detained for five and seven day periods but had received relatively good treatment in detention because they had been peaceful and cooperative with authorities.[3]

    [3] DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015, paras 3.6 -3.12

    Recent suggestion of a ‘crackdown’ on religion in China

    The Tribunal made a request of the Country of Origin Information Services Section of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (COISS) asking for research to be undertaken in relation to evidence of a recent crackdown in China on Christians, and new laws restricting Christian practice. The following response was provided on 30 November 2016.

    While most sources indicate a recent crackdown on Christians in China comprising (amongst other things) assaults on churches, church members and the imprisonment of Christians,[4] other sources suggest a more nuanced picture, noting greater freedom for small, private house churches.[5] A wide range of sources discuss the September 2016 release of draft legislation outlining a new suite of regulations governing religious practice and worship. COISS has recently released a paper on the legislation, key summary points of which are included below.[6]

    [4] See for example: USCIRF 2015, 2015 Annual Report - China, 30 April, p.33 < Accessed 26 November 2016 <CISEC96CF1685>; ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.2 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>:‘China Tries Christian Church Members on Spying, Illegal Business Charges’ 2016, Radio Free Asia, 19 October < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13944>

    [5] US Department of State 2016, 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom - China, 10 August, p. 10 < Accessed 26 November 2016 <OGD95BE926678>

    [6] See: Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS) 2016, Situational Update – China: Regulations on Religious Affairs, 18 November, p.8 <CR943F68571>

    Major government reports

    The Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s 2016 Annual Report outlines a range of State actions targeting Christians throughout 2015:

    During the reporting year, Chinese government and Communist Party officials continued to prevent many Protestant Christians from worshipping freely, taking a range of actions that experts believed were connected to the national-level ‘‘sinicization’’ campaign.^[131]

    …

    In the past year, authorities in Zhejiang province continued to harass and closely monitor Christians. In one example, officials continued to implement a campaign launched in 2013 purportedly to address ‘‘illegal structures”, but which appeared to target Christian sites and crosses, many of which were state-approved.^[144] As of September 2016, officials reportedly had removed more than 1,500 crosses (an estimated 90 percent of all church crosses in the province) and destroyed more than 20 churches.^[145] Officials also appeared to have increased government presence within churches
    …

    Other local government actions against Protestant believers this past year included reported threats ^[151] and a ban on religious activities, including prayer, in hospitals.^[152]
    …

    Authorities in other regions of China also restricted Protestant religious observance this past year. Government officials detained Protestant believers,^[157] conducted raids on church buildings and gatherings,^[158] and pressured landlords to evict churches from meeting spaces.^[159] According to ChinaAid, churches in Guangdong province were hit especially hard, with numerous house churches subjected to government raids and many ultimately closed down.^[160][7]

    [7] Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2016 , Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2016, 6 October, pp.7-9 < Accessed 24 November 2016 <CIS38A80122196>

    The USCIRF’s Annual Report 2015 speaks of ‘unprecedented violations’ in the realm of religious freedom in 2014, noting an ‘alarming increase in systematic, egregious, and ongoing abuses’. It ‘recommends that China be designated a ‘country of particular concern’, noting that the ‘State Department has designated China as such since 1999’.[8] It proceeds to state that:

    [8] USCIRF 2015, 2015 Annual Report - China, 30 April, p.33 < Accessed 26 November 2016 <CISEC96CF1685>

    …although Christianity is state-sanctioned, the government continues to engage in severe violations of religious freedom against both registered and unregistered Catholics and Protestants. Some have characterized the new wave of persecution against Christians that swept through China in 2014 as the most egregious and persistent since the Cultural Revolution.[9]

    [9] USCIRF 2015, 2015 Annual Report - China, 30 April, p.33 < Accessed 26 November 2016 <CISEC96CF1685>

    The US DoS’ 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom - China provides a mixed report on the treatment of Christians throughout 2015. While noting that ‘authorities still regularly harassed and detained small groups that met for religious purposes in homes and other locations’, the reports also writes that:

    Some house church members said they had more freedom than in the past to conduct religious services, as long as they gathered only in private and kept congregation numbers low. In some areas, however, authorities shut down churches that tried to maintain a low profile.[10]

    [10] US Department of State 2016, 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom - China, 10 August, p. 10 < Accessed 26 November 2016 <OGD95BE926678>

    The UK Home Office’s March 2016 report Country Information and Guidance – China: Christians states:

    In 2014, harassment of both underground and state-sanctioned churches increased, especially in Zhejiang Province where at least 400 churches were torn down or had crosses forcibly removed and/or demolished in 2014. Hundreds of people have been detained for short periods and some remain in custody, accused under ambiguous crimes more often used to punish political dissidents. Leaders and members of both registered and unregistered churches have faced increased harassment and arbitrary arrests; typically leaders of house churches are more vulnerable to these types of charges, but in 2014 pastors of sanctioned churches also faced detention or arrest.[11]

    [11] UK Home Office 2016, Country Information and Guidance - China: Christians, 11 March, Para.2.2.4, p.5 < Accessed 28 November 2016 <OGD7C848D26>

    In a March 2015 report, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) contextualises physical assaults on church infrastructure within official provincial-level state campaigns:

    3.8 In 2013, the Zhejiang provincial government launched a “three rectifications and one demolition” campaign. According to the provincial government’s website, the campaign was launched to improve cities’ landscapes and urban planning, as well as “push economic development”. The three-year campaign requires old residential areas, old factories and “urban villages” to be renovated and for illegal structures to be demolished. As of September 2014, more than 300 church crosses had been removed under the policy, many of them state-sanctioned churches. Some media reports have speculated that the policy is an attempt to limit the influence of the Christian church. In response to criticisms about the campaign, the government has stated that the campaign had been implemented “with fairness and justice. … No matter what background [the building has], we tear down what should be torn down, with no exceptions and no sparing of feelings”. The Zhejiang chapters of the Three-Self movement and the Christian Council have also urged believers to “obey the government …in order to establish a good image for Protestantism”.[12]

    [12] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015, DFAT Thematic Report: Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March, para. 3.8, p.7 <CISEC96CF1260>

    In a slightly earlier source, the US DoS reported in 2014 that treatment of unregistered Christian groups across the country varied, ranging from tacit approval and non-interference in activities to assault, imprisonment and criminal charges:

    In parts of the country, local authorities tacitly approved of or did not interfere with the activities of some unregistered groups. Guangdong officials, for example, increasingly allowed unregistered places of worship to hold services provided they remained small in scale and did not disrupt “social stability.” In other areas local officials punished the same activities by restricting events and meetings, confiscating and destroying property, physically assaulting and injuring participants, or imprisoning leaders and worshippers. In some parts of the country, authorities charged religious believers not affiliated with a patriotic religious association with various crimes, including “illegal religious activities” or “disrupting social stability.” Local authorities pressured religious believers to affiliate with patriotic associations and used administrative detention, including confinement and abuse at RTL camps, to punish members of unregistered religious or spiritual groups. While the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed legislation in December to abolish RTL camps and state media announced inmates would be released, state media later issued a clarification that all pre-abolition penalties would be considered legitimate. Advocacy groups reported some camps had simply been re-labeled.[13]

    [13] US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, sect. 2, para. 4, p.10 < <OG54B544637>

    Other sources

    In its 2016 Annual Report, ChinaAid writes that the ‘deterioration of religious freedom and human rights in China continued at an alarming rate’.[14] ChinaAid attributed this deterioration to efforts of the Communist Party of China ‘to maintain unity outside the party’.[15]

    [14] ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.2 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>

    [15] ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.2 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>

    The report notes escalating levels of persecution targeting house churches:

    In summary, as part of the Xi Administration’s tightened control over society, the regime targeted religious leaders, political dissidents, human rights lawyers and activists, and NGOs for persecution. Human rights and the rule of law deteriorated to the point of bringing China back to an era of political terror. Religious persecution, especially of house church Christians, was the most severe it has ever been.[16]

    [16] ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.4 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>

    The report lists five main categories of what it describes as the intensification of suppression of urban house churches:

    1) forcibly shutting down and banning house churches and their meeting sites; 2) requiring them to disband, then apply for official registration and join the Three-Self Church; 3) exerting pressure through city inspectors, neighborhood committees and the police to force landlords to terminate leases with house churches; 4) taking pastors and other church leaders into custody for public security or criminal offenses, and raiding and confiscating church property; and 5) other means including subpoenas, fines, intimidation and cutting off water and electricity.[17]

    [17] ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.9 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>

    Summarising what it describes as the escalating ‘persecution’ of rural house churches in 2015, the report states:

    Compared with 2014, persecution of China’s rural house churches also escalated, with the government using criminal charges, including allegations of cult involvement, to detain and arrest church pastors and evangelists. Religious affairs management agencies and public security bureaus increased their scrutiny of rural house churches. In China’s southwest and northwest, local police frequently raided house church services, and the number of church assets confiscated and church leaders placed in administrative detention increased dramatically. Religious persecution was exceptionally serious in the provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, and in the Xinjiang autonomous region.[18]

    [18] ChinaAid 2016, ChinaAid 2015 Annual Report - Promoting Religious Freedom and Rule of Law, 1 March, p.14 < Accessed 25 November 2016 <CIS38A80122270>

    Separately, in November 2016, ChinaAid reported on the ‘escalating pressure’ placed upon Christians in the northwestern province of Xinjiang:

    A local Christian told a China Aid reporter on Nov. 13 that religion was a sensitive issue in Xinjiang. In the past two months, Xinjiang authorities detained or arrested dozens of Christians for holding house church gatherings, including: three Christians in Wensu County, two people from Xinhe County, three people from Baicheng County, seven people from Akesu, two Christians in Yanqi County, two individuals in Hejing County, and 16 people in the Kuerle region, 13 of whom were also physically attacked.[19]

    [19] ‘Xinjiang escalates pressure against Christians’ 2016, ChinaAid, 18 November < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13988>

    In October 2016, Radio Free Asia reported on a ‘nationwide crackdown on house churches not affiliated with the Three-Self Patriotic Association of government-approved churches’.[20] The article notes the ‘shrinking space’ for people with religious beliefs and ‘worsening of the environment’ for religious worship under the draft religious rules released in November (discussed below). It further reports on the trial of two members of an unofficial Protestant house church on ‘spying charges’ following ‘an ongoing crackdown on their Huoshi Church by police and religious affairs officials’.[21] The article continues:

    [20] ‘China Tries Christian Church Members on Spying, Illegal Business Charges’ 2016, Radio Free Asia, 19 October  < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13944>

    [21] ‘China Tries Christian Church Members on Spying, Illegal Business Charges’ 2016, Radio Free Asia, 19 October  < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13944>

    The administration of President Xi Jinping regards Christianity as a dangerous foreign import, with officials warning last year against the "infiltration of Western hostile forces" in the form of religion.[22]

    [22] ‘China Tries Christian Church Members on Spying, Illegal Business Charges’ 2016, Radio Free Asia, 19 October  < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13944>

    A crackdown on Protestant churches in the eastern province of Zhejiang has widened and intensified to other regions of China during the past year, church members have told RFA.[23]

    [23] ‘China Tries Christian Church Members on Spying, Illegal Business Charges’ 2016, Radio Free Asia, 19 October  < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13944>

    In May 2016, Christianity Today reported on the widespread removal of crosses from more than 400 churches in the eastern seaboard province of Wenzhou under the orders of provincial party secretary Xia Baolong.[24] An earlier, related story from the New York Times indicates that local officials defended such actions on the grounds that the churches ‘violated zoning restrictions’.[25]

    [24] ‘400 Down, More to Follow’ 2015, Christianity Today, 26 May < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13992>

    [25] ‘Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around a Toppled Spire’ 2014, The New York Times, 29 May < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13947>

    Reflecting on similar instances of authorities bulldozing churches, a November 2014 article from the Financial Times reports that the ‘destruction of the Sanjiang church was the beginning of a concerted year-long campaign to rein in Christianity in the province.’[26] The article quotes Fenggang Yang, director of the Centre on Religion and Chinese Society at Purdue University, as saying ‘the party still sees Christianity as a very serious threat that it needs to suppress’.[27] The report also notes ‘growing tensions… between Christianity and the Communist government’.[28]

    [26] ‘The rise of Christianity in China’ 2014, Financial Times, 7 November < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX1B9ECAB7343>

    [27] ‘The rise of Christianity in China’ 2014, Financial Times, 7 November < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX1B9ECAB7343>

    [28] ‘Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around a Toppled Spire’ 2014, New York Times, 29 May, < Accessed 26 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E13947>

    Several recent sources comment on violence targeting Christians:

    An April 2016 article published by Christianity Today reports on the death of a pastor’s wife in Henan province as she ‘and her husband were buried as they attempted to prevent their church from being bulldozed by developers’.[29]

    [29] ‘China Reveals What It Wants to Do with Christianity’ 2016, Christianity Today, 28 April < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CX6A26A6E6366>

    Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2016 China chapter states that ‘Some groups, including certain Buddhist and Christian sects, are forbidden, and their members face harassment, imprisonment, and torture’.[30]

    [30] Freedom House 2016, Freedom in the World 2016 - China, 7 March, p.5 < Accessed 28 November 2016 <NGE43874C127> 

    An August 2015 report by CNN notes that ‘a video shows Christians in China’s Zhejiang province pushed back by security forces armed with batons’ during attempts to tear down the cross of their church.[31]

    [31] ‘More violence against Christians in China’ 2015, CNN (IReport), 6 August < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CXBD6A0DE19016>

    The World Watch Monitor - 2015 List of Violence Against Christians reported that no Christians were killed for faith-related reasons and 258 churches were attacked in the period between 1 November 2013 and 31 October 2014.[32] This quantum of church attacks marks China as the leading country in terms of attacks on churches in the reporting period.[33]

    [32] World Watch Monitor 2015, Violence against Christians in the WWL 2015 reporting period (1 November 2013 – 31 October 2014): Christians killed for faith-related reasons & churches attacked, 1 January < Accessed 28 November 2016 <CISEC96CF15118>

    [33] World Watch Monitor 2015, Violence against Christians in the WWL 2015 reporting period (1 November 2013 – 31 October 2014): Christians killed for faith-related reasons & churches attacked, 1 January, p.2 < Accessed 28 November 2016

    Proposed Regulations on Religious Affairs

    A recent COISS Situational Update from 18 November 2016 discusses in detail the proposed Regulations on Religious Affairs (see ‘Additional Reading’ below).

    Briefly, the Situational Update summarises:[34]

    • Religious affairs are closely monitored and controlled by the Chinese government through the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and lower level religious affairs bureaus. These organisations work with the United Front Work Department (UFWD) to select leaders for official ‘patriotic’ religious associations representing the five main religions in China.[35]

    • The current Regulations on Religious Affairs (2005) require religious groups to register and report on their religious activities. Officials may impose harsher requirements and penalties for groups that are perceived to be a threat to state party objectives. This creates a significant obstacle for some groups to practice their faith. Many practice their faith in secret house churches.[36]

    • The draft Regulations on Religious Affairs (2017) were released for comment in September 2016 and are anticipated for release in 2017. They include measures bringing greater scrutiny of the finances of religious groups, restrictions on religious schools, and limits on access to foreign religious writings, including on the Internet.[37] They tighten controls to enable imprisonment and excessive fines for those who do not adhere to the regulations.[38]

    • The regulations may significantly curtail activities of protestant Christians, in particular those in house churches, as the government will have greater ability to apply punishments to those who use unapproved homes or other venues for religious practices or hold prayer meetings.[39]

    • For Catholics, the regulations severely restrict the church’s foreign contact, theological training and overseas pilgrimages – reducing the influence of the Holy See – and render religious activities of unofficial bishops as illegal.[40]

    Fujian Province

    [34] Country of  Origin Information Services Section (COISS) 2016, Situational Update – China: Regulations on Religious Affairs, 18 November, p. 2 <CR943F68571>

    [35] Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2016, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2016, 6 October, p.122 < Accessed 28 November  <CIS38A80122196>

    [36] Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2016, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2016, 6 October, p.121 < <CIS38A80122196>

    [37] ‘China Seeks Tighter Grip in Wake of a Religious Revival’ 2016, The New York Times, 7 October < Accessed 11 October 2016 <CX6A26A6E10627>. An unofficial translation of the draft regulations is available at State Council 2016, Religious Affairs Regulations Draft Revisions (Deliberation Draft), unofficial translation by ChinaLawTranslate, 8 September < Accessed 10 November 2016 <CIS38A80122593>

    [38] Lawrence, B 2016, ‘China’s Religious Persecution Report (2015-2016): An Executive Summary’ 2016, China Aid,

    [39] Carney, M 2016, ‘Chinese Communist Party readies crackdown on Christianity’, ABC, 8 October < Accessed

    [40] Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2016, Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2016, 6 October, p.123 < <CIS38A80122196>

1. DFAT Thematic Report Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China, 16 December 2016 provides at follow:

   Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief, and that no state organ, public organisation or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion. However, the establishment of government-affiliated organisations to regulate and monitor the five officially recognised religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism) has, in theory (and, in some circumstances, practice), restricted religious freedom in China.

   Generally speaking, individuals in Fujian can practice religion within state-sanctioned boundaries, as long as such practices do not challenge the interests or authority of the Chinese Communist Party. In practice, the Chinese Communist Party obstructs religious practice at an organisational level, and is largely indifferent to religious practice at the individual level, with the exception of Party members, who are not permitted to follow any officially recognised or other religion. Religious adherents can be subject to a range of restrictions that are inconsistent or lack transparency. An individual’s ability to practice religion can be influenced by whether the individual exercises their faith in registered or unregistered institutions, whether they practice openly or privately, and whether or not an individual’s religious expression is perceived by the Chinese Communist Party to be closely tied to other ethnic, political and security issues.[41]

   …

   Unregistered churches (otherwise referred to as underground or house churches) are predominantly independent Protestant and Catholic congregations which refuse to acknowledge or associate with the officially sanctioned TSPM and CPA. By definition, unregistered churches are clearly subject to less control by the state than TSPM- and CPA-linked churches but also operate at greater risk given their unregistered status. Some in-country contacts questioned the validity of the ‘registered’ and ‘unregistered’ dichotomy, pointing out that members of a congregation will often move between the two.

   Asia Harvest estimates that in 2011 there were 1.57 million worshippers of Protestant-linked unregistered churches and one million worshippers of Catholic-linked unregistered churches in Fujian. Accurate data on the number of unregistered churches in Fujian is unavailable, however in-country contacts report that they are able to be identified and accessed, particularly by Protestants.

   Given that legislative protections for freedom of religious belief extend only to government-affiliated organisations (such as the TSPM and the CPA), the operations of unregistered churches depend on the attitude of local authorities. Their treatment varies greatly across China, and within Fujian. Generally speaking, in-country contacts suggest that local authorities in Fujian tolerate the operations of unregistered churches who operate discreetly, including by limiting the number of worshippers and meeting in inconspicuous locations. DFAT understands that congregations of up to 50 people can meet weekly in private houses without being closed down / repressed by local authorities.

   Broadly speaking, DFAT understands that should an unregistered church or an individual perceived to be associated with an unregistered church engage in active and public proselytising, or are perceived to openly criticise the Chinese Community Party or the framework that regulates religious practice, the church or individual would likely be exposed to harassment, raids and destruction of property, pressure to join or report to TSPM- and CPA-linked churches and occasional violence and criminal sanction. In practice, this is more likely to affect leaders of unregistered churches, rather than individual worshippers. Leaders who amass a large (undefined) and unregulated congregation or personal following can also attract negative attention from the authorities.

   Representative examples of the treatment of unregistered churches in Fujian are difficult to obtain. China Aid documented the destruction of an unregistered church (the Yulin Christian Church) in Fujian in January 2016 (although the events leading up to this incident are unknown). DFAT is unable to comment on the frequency of this occurring in Fujian, but open-source reporting and credible in-country contacts suggest that it has not been a common occurrence.

   Charismatic leaders perceived to be associated with an unregistered church that come to the overt attention of local authorities are sometimes accused of committing offences unrelated to religious practice, such as fraud or corruption.[42]

   [41] DFAT Thematic Report Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China, 16 December 2016, paras 3.4-3.5

   [42] DFAT Thematic Report Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China, 16 December 2016, para 3.11-3.15

2. In a 2016 report Freedom House categorises provinces in China in terms of the levels of religious persecution within those provinces. Fujian province is listed as ‘low’.[43]

   Church of Almighty God and ‘evil cults’

   [43] Freedom House, the Battle for China's Spirit, 2016, p.25

3. Some religious groups are banned by law, designated as ‘evil cults’ (xiejiao)[44] and followers can be sentenced to terms in prison.[45]  Article 300 of China’s Criminal Law states that those who participate in ‘superstitious sects or secret societies or weird religious organizations’ are subject to imprisonment.[46]  A judicial explanation from 1999 described the term ‘evil cults’ as:

   “those illegal groups that have been found using religions, qigong [a traditional Chinese exercise discipline], or other things as a camouflage, deifying their leading members, recruiting and controlling their members, and deceiving people by molding and spreading superstitious ideas, and endangering society.”[47]

   [44] The term ‘xiejiao’ has been translated has also been translated as ‘heterodox teaching’, however the term ‘evil cult’ is more usually used in English now.

   [45] US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, Section II, page 4, paragraph 3 < OG54B544637

   [46] US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2015, USCIRF 2015 Annual Report - China, 30 April, pp 35-36 <​ > CISEC96CF1685

   [47] US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, Section II, page 4, paragraph 3 < OG54B544637

4. The following ‘Christian-related’ groups are banned as ‘cults’: the Local Church (also called the ‘Shouters’), Established King, Lightning From the East, Lord God Sect, Lingling Sect, All Scope Church, South China Church, Disciples Sect (Narrow Gate), Three Ranks of Servants, Cold Water Sect, Commune Sect, New Testament Church/Apostles Faith Sect, Resurrection Sect, Dami Evangelization Association, and World Elijah Evangelism Association.[48] The CCP has a Leading Small Group for Preventing and Dealing with the Problem of Heretical Cults and its implementing “610” offices, which are tasked with eliminating Falun Gong, and addressing ‘evil cults’.[49] 

   [48] Yang Fenggang 2012, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule, New York, Oxford University Press, pp.103–5, CIS961F9402249. The US Department of State gives variations of these names: the Local Church  (‘Shouters’), Eastern Lightning, the Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church, Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (or San Ban Pu Ren), Association of Disciples, Lord God Sect, Established King Church, Unification Church, Family of Love, and the South China Church.  (US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, Section II, page 4, paragraph 3 < OG54B544637)  

   [49] US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, Section II, page 4, paragraph 4 < OG54B544637

5. There are no public criteria for determining, or method of challenging, the designation of ‘evil cult’.[50]  Protestant communities have been concerned by some of the new ‘cults’, and particularly by Eastern Lightning because they consider it heretical, and because the vast majority of its converts are drawn from unregistered Protestant house-church congregations.[51]

   [50] US Department of State 2014, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – International Religious Freedom Report 2013, 28 July, Section II, page 4, paragraph 4 < OG54B544637

   [51] Dunn, Emily C. 2009, ‘“Cult,” Church, and the CCP: Introducing Eastern Lightning’, Modern China, Vol. 35, No. 1, Jan, page107, paragraph 2 CIS26553

6. According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), on 3 June 2014 the Chinese government published a list of 20 ‘cults’ and began ‘a sweeping crackdown’ against them.[52]  As part of the ‘anti-cult’ campaign, the government ‘issued a directive to “eradicate” unregistered churches over the course of the next decade’.[53]

   [52] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2015, USCIRF 2015 Annual Report  – China, 30 April, page 36, paragraph 1 < ​ CISEC96CF1685

   [53] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2015, USCIRF 2015 Annual Report  – China, 30 April, page 36, paragraph 1 < ​ CISEC96CF1685

7. The China Aid Association also reported that more than 20,000 religious practitioners were accused of being heretics and were taken into police custody during the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘anti-cult’ campaign in 2014, with around 1,100 people convicted on criminal charges and sentenced.[54]  China Aid described the 2014 campaign against ‘cults’ as ‘similar to the crackdown on Falun Gong in 1998’.[55]  Many ‘anti-cult’ trials have been conducted in secret, with the accused forced to accept government-appointed lawyers and not allowed to hire their own legal counsel.[56]  In addition, the Chinese government ‘intimidated and pressured family members of those accused of so-called “cult activities” to not raise their legal cases and incidents of persecution publicly, thus many remain unknown’.[57]

   [54] China Aid Association 2015, China Aid 2014 Annual Report – Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China, 30 April, p.6, paragraph 5  <​ > CISEC96CF1731

   [55] China Aid Association 2015, China Aid 2014 Annual Report – Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China, 30 April, p.3, paragraph 2  <​ > CISEC96CF1731

   [56] China Aid Association 2015, China Aid 2014 Annual Report – Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China, 30 April, p.7, paragraph 2  <​ > CISEC96CF1731

   [57] China Aid Association 2015, China Aid 2014 Annual Report – Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China, 30 April, p.7, paragraph 2  <​ > CISEC96CF1731

8. Eastern Lightning focuses on evangelising Christians because they are thought less likely than the general population to inform the authorities of their activities.[58] During 2014 the Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning, was banned and more than 1,000 adherents were arrested and convicted.[59]  In February 2015 two members of a banned religious group were executed for murdering a woman who rejected their apparent attempt to recruit her in a McDonald’s restaurant.[60] 

   [58] Dunn, Emily C. 2009, ‘“Cult,” Church, and the CCP: Introducing Eastern Lightning’, Modern China, Vol. 35, No. 1, Jan, p.107, CIS26553

   [59] China Aid Association 2015, China Aid 2014 Annual Report – Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China, 30 April, p.3, paragraph 2  <​ > CISEC96CF1731

   [60] ‘China may increase penalties for illegal cults to life in prison’ 2015, Reuters, 24 June < CXBD6A0DE8867

9. In December 2012, Fujian was mentioned in relation to a nationwide crackdown on members of a Christian sect, the so-called Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning.[61] The Longyan Public Security Bureau issued a press statement in December 2012 saying that 27 members of the Church of Almighty God had been arrested for illegal propaganda and spreading malicious rumours. Also in December 2012, six people were detained for 15 days in Gongkou village in Zhangzhou city, Fujian province for promoting the Church of Almighty God.[62]  This well-known sect has been declared an ‘evil cult’ and its members have been subject to waves of arrest since the late 1990s. It has also been condemned by other Christian groups.[63]

   [61] Li, Yao 2012, ‘Christians warn against cult influence’, China Daily, 20 December < >  CX312592

   [62] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2013, RRT Country Information Request - CHN41439 - Family planning; Falun Gong; Christians, Returnees, and Corruption, Country Information Report No. 13/28, 3 July, CX310619

   [63] See Section 5 Cults and Sects

10. DFAT Thematic Report -  Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015 provides:

    The interpretation of what constitutes a cult can vary throughout China, with some local authorities listing behaviours such as “deifying leaders, deceiving people, and spreading superstitions and heretical beliefs” as grounds for labelling a group a “cult”. Practices deemed superstitious, cult-like, or beyond the vague legal definition of “normal,” can attract harassment, detention and imprisonment by authorities (for example, in December 2012, Chinese media reported more than 1,300 people across 16 provinces had been detained for propagating rumours of an apocalypse). A joint interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 1999 stated that punishments for cult crimes can be applied when one “resists group bans by relevant departments, resumes banned groups, establishes other sects, or continues [illegal] activities”. Individuals who organise or use “superstitious sects, secret societies or evil religious organisations” to undermine the state’s laws or administrative regulations can be sentenced from three to seven years in prison under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. Government crackdowns against cults occur with relative frequency in China.

    Groups such as the Guanyin Method Sect (Guanyin Famen or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy), Zhong Gong (a qigong exercise discipline), and Falun Gong (see below) are banned by the Chinese government. The government also considers several Christian groups to be “evil cults,” including the “Shouters,” Eastern Lightning, Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church, Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (or San Ban Pu Ren), Association of Disciples, Lord God Sect, Established King Church, Unification Church, Family of Love, and South China Church.

    Both registered and unregistered orthodox Christian Churches tend to deride the doctrines of “cultish” organisations as heresy. However, at the same time, government crackdowns on “cults” often bring attention and scrutiny of Christian house churches by government officials, scholars, and ordinary people who can find it difficult to distinguish between the two.[64]

    [64] DFAT Thematic Report - Unregistered religious organisations and other groups in the People’s Republic of China, 3 March 2015. Para 3.20 – 3.21

11. Research into the Church of Almighty God (Eastern Lightning) was undertaken by the Country of Origin Information Services Section of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (COISS). The following information was provided on 21 February 2017:

    Eastern Lightning, founded in Henan province in 1989, has undergone a number of name changes, including New Master of Power 新能力主 (xīnnenglizhǔ), True God 实际神 (shijishen), Eastern Lightning 东方闪电 (dōngfāng shǎndian) and Church of Almighty God 全能神教会 (quannengshen jiaohui).[65]

    [65] The List of China’s Banned Religious Groups, The Hong Kong Institute, CENSUR Korea, 1 July 2016, ​CIS38A80122644, p.26

    In August 2014, five members of the Church of Almighty God cult went on trial for the May 2014 murder of a 37 year old woman in a McDonald’s restaurant in Shandong province.  In February 2015 two members of the group, father and daughter Zhang Fan and Zhang Lidong, were executed for beating the woman to death.[66]

    [66] ‘Inside China's most radical cult’, Telegraph Group -United Kingdom, 2 February 2016, CX6A26A6E14569

    Eastern Lightning beliefs

    Eastern Lightning, also known as the Church of Almighty God, or Quannengshen, is ‘a cult that believes that Jesus has risen in the shape of a 40-something Chinese woman named Yang Xiangbin, also sometimes known as Lightning Deng’.[67]  After being placed on police ‘wanted lists’, in 2001 Yang Xiangbin and Zhao Weishan, the founder of the group, ‘travelled to the United States on false passports and claimed political asylum’.[68]  The group ‘boasts a slick website in both Chinese and English’ as well as ‘professionally produced videos’ and instructions sent from the heads of the group in the US in June and July 2014 ‘preached that the "chosen ones" should be ready to "sacrifice their lives" and that their ultimate goal is to kill the Communist Party, referred to in their teachings as "the Great Red Dragon"’.[69]

    [67] ‘Inside China's most radical cult’, Telegraph Group -United Kingdom, 2 February 2016, CX6A26A6E14569

    [68] ‘Inside China's most radical cult’, Telegraph Group -United Kingdom, 2 February 2016, CX6A26A6E14569

    [69] ‘Inside China's most radical cult’, Telegraph Group -United Kingdom, 2 February 2016, CX6A26A6E14569

    Human rights lawyer Teng Biao has said that ‘the group had a right to its beliefs, and should not be persecuted by the government for subscribing to an unorthodox faith’ and that a believer ‘can be jailed for years only because he or she gives materials to other people’.[70]

    [70] "'Eastern Lightning': The banned religious group that has China worried", CNN, 3 February 2015,  CXBD6A0DE7234

    Methods used by Eastern Lightning

    In an article in the Spring 2015 edition of ChinaSource Quarterly titled ‘Cults in China’, Tony Lambert notes that ‘[t]he cult which today has the most influence is without doubt Eastern Lightning or as it now calls itself, “The Church of Almighty God” (Quannengshen)’.[71]  Lambert discusses how well-resourced the Church of Almighty God is, its use of ‘intimidation, blackmail, physical violence and murder’, and that cult members are trained to infiltrate orthodox churches as ‘moles’:

    [71] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘The War against Cults in China’, p.5

    Eastern Lightning is well-funded and prolific in its propaganda—several of its books contain over 1,000 pages. According to its own internal documents, this cult particularly targets leaders of evangelical house churches in preference to other Christians. It is condemned by both Christians in the registered and the unregistered church and is widely regarded by Chinese believers to be demonic in inspiration.

    Its practices go far to bear this out. It specializes in intimidation, blackmail, physical violence and murder—as seen most recently in the case of the woman murdered in McDonald’s. People are lured into the cult by monetary incentives but find it almost impossible to leave.

    Cult members are trained to infiltrate orthodox house churches as “moles.” For weeks or months they give every evidence of being devout Christians—praying, singing and using all the right, pious language. However, when they deem the time to be ripe, they target house-church leaders, inviting them to their own Bible studies to reveal “higher truth.” The revelation of the female Messiah is then gradually introduced. Christians have been kidnapped and brainwashed by the cult. Those who have resisted have been drugged and had compromising photos taken of them. They have then been threatened with blackmail and beaten. [72]

    [72] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘The War against Cults in China’, p.5

    Lambert goes on to state that the actions of members of the Church of Almighty God in infiltrating house churches have led to both official registered churches and unregistered churches viewing them as a threat and attempting to protect themselves from infiltration.[73]  The actions of the Church of Almighty God has also provided the authorities with a reason to target unregistered churches in order to crack down on cults:

    [73] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘The War against Cults in China’, p.5

    Both Three Self (official) churches and house churches have circulated materials to counter Eastern Lightning. The cult has had a negative effect in other ways, apart from its sheep stealing. First, it has helped create a climate of fear and mistrust in some house churches which goes against the traditionally warm atmosphere of close fellowship they usually engender. Secondly, it and other cults have given an excuse to local authorities to crack down on perfectly orthodox house churches under the pretense they are heretical cults. In 2014, it seems that there has been an increase in the number of house churches facing persecution from being wrongly so labelled.

    Chinese Christians agree that only sound biblical teaching can expose the cults. The recent action by the Chinese government will only have forced Eastern Lightning further underground as has happened with Falungong. Criminal actions should be punished, but only love and patient explanation of the true gospel can win back the thousands who have been led along this dark road.[74]

    [74] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘The War against Cults in China’, p.5

    Brent Fulton notes in the same publication that as the Church of Almighty God ‘has been ruthless in its attacks on unregistered churches’, ‘the current government crackdown [against Eastern Lightning] comes as somewhat of a relief to China’s Christians’.[75]  Fulton further notes that other Christians ‘who are otherwise law-abiding citizens will likely get caught up in the net as officials, who have no way of distinguishing one religious group from another, go trawling for cult activity’.[76]

    [75] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘Confronting the Cults’, p.2

    [76] ChinaSource Quarterly – Cults in China, ChinaSource, 13 March 2015, CISEC96CF11235, ‘Confronting the Cults’, p.2

    Other religious groups reject Eastern Lightning:

    […] Even the China Aid Association, which reprimands the government for wielding the ‘evil cult’ label indiscriminately, describes Eastern Lightning as “a violent cult” and “very harmful . . . to Christian churches and society,”[77] constituting an independent affirmation of the government’s depiction of this group; the Shouwang Protestant Church, which has been subject to crackdowns, also rejects Eastern Lightning.[78] 

    [77] China Aid Association (对华援助协会), “Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China, January 2009–December 2009.” Available at aidreports/chinaaidreportE2009.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2013 and CIS18239. 

    [78] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, Chapter 5

    A longstanding strategy used by Eastern Lightning has been to try to convert entire congregations by converting their leaders, either of underground house churches or registered Protestant and Catholic churches.  Tactics used have included seduction, extortion and threats.  Most converts were middle-aged women from impoverished rural areas, however according to Dunn the group was increasingly targeting wealthier urban areas, appealing to potential recruits through promises to save them from impending disaster or fatal disease.[79]  Eastern Lightning has ‘succeeded in transplanting itself throughout China’:

    Eastern Lightning has succeeded in transplanting itself throughout China, such that the areas targeted in a 2012 crackdown on the group were in the western provinces of Qinghai and Guizhou. Like some Protestant house church organizations, Eastern Lightning has reportedly used the old CCP tactic of building up support bases in the countryside from which to “encircle” cities (以农村包围城市yi nongcun baowei chengshi), and thus is increasingly found in urban areas, including Beijing and the southern industrial city of Guangzhou. It evidently has extensive financial resources with which to fund this expansion—Chinese media report that in 2012, tithes for its Shandong region alone totaled 44 million yuan, and in 2013, Zhao spent 10 million yuan promoting the group in Hong Kong. [80] 

    Eastern Lightning has painted itself as the latest victim in a long line of conspiracies in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has framed dissenting movements to justify their suppression and “massacre” (屠杀tusha)’.[81]  In Eastern Lightning’s texts[82], the Holy Spirit enables believers ‘to withstand torture at the hands of police and remain steadfast in their loyalty to the organization.’[83]  Ill-treatment of believers is interpreted as either God’s testing of them, or as the work of Satan, which the group teaches has become incarnated as a large red dragon, which the group identifies with the Chinese Communist Party.[84]

    Emily Dunn[85] notes that in relation to the trial of five members of the Church of Almighty God for the May 2014 attack, two of the five arrested stated that they were not members of  the ‘Almighty God’ group targeted by the authorities, but of an outgrowth of it, claiming that they were part of the “true ‘Almighty God’”, unlike the group targeted by the authorities.[86]  Eastern Lightning also emphasised their distance from the ‘psychopaths’.[87] 

    Online presence

    Eastern Lightning has a significant online presence and depicts itself as attracting upper-middle class, urban members:

    Increasingly, Eastern Lightning’s websites depict the movement as attracting upper-middle class, urban members. YouTube clips, social media pages, MP3 files and online discussion forums demonstrate technological sophistication, and pages in English, Korean and traditional Chinese suggest cosmopolitanism. Videos feature footage of staid, well-dressed members meeting in office spaces and appreciating Church choirs in concert halls. Anecdotes of judgment, dreams and visions are still offered for download, so this new emphasis is part of a strategy of expansion rather than a complete disowning of the group’s enchanted roots. Nevertheless, Eastern Lightning’s online projection is a far cry from rural Henan, and the ecstatic paroxysms of the movement’s quasi-shamanic origins.[88] 

    [79] "'Eastern Lightning': The banned religious group that has China worried", CNN, 3 February 2015,  CXBD6A0DE7234

    [80] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’,  Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, p. 202

    [81] Church of Almighty God, “Touguo Shandong Zhaoyuan xiong’an kan shishi zhenxiang 透過山東招遠兇案看事實真相, quoted in ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, p. 203

    [82] For an analysis of Eastern Lightning’s beliefs, see ‘Reincarnated Religion? The Eschatology of the Church of Almighty God in Comparative Perspective’, Studies in World Christianity, Vol 22 Issue 3, 2016, CIS38A80123456, p.220

    [83] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, Chapter 8, pp199-200

    [84]  , p.220,

    [85] Asian studies academic at the University of Melbourne

    [86] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, p. 204

    [87] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, p. 204

    [88] ‘Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China’, Emily Dunn, e-book, CISEC96CF15176, p. 202

    Interview, hearing, credibility and findings

1. In considering overall the credibility of the applicant the Tribunal is cognizant of the words of Beaumont J in Randhawa v MILGEA  (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 in which he stated that ‘in the proof of refugeehood, a liberal attitude on the part of the decision-maker is called for…[but this should not lead to]…an uncritical acceptance of any and all allegations made by supplicants’. The Tribunal notes also the remarks of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 191 where it was said that ‘the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising’. The Tribunal has sought to adopt the liberal approach outlined in these cases.

2. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a citizen and national of China and accordingly her claims will be assessed against China.

3. The Tribunal has the following credibility concerns with substantive claims by the applicant.

4. Firstly, the applicant has provided inconsistent evidence as to how many times her parents suffered difficulties in China from authorities due to their involvement in the Church of Almighty God. The applicant has also confused the timing of the events.

5. In the applicant’s written claims she indicates that, [in 2013], her parents were both caught by authorities for preaching the gospel of the Church of Almighty God. The written claims indicate, sometime later, a separate incident, in which authorities intercepted a phone call between the applicant and her father, causing the applicant’s father to be questioned, detained and persecuted.

6. In contrast, in the Tribunal hearing, the applicant indicated that her parents suffered difficulties at the time of the 2013 [arrest] because, at that point, a phone call between the applicant and her father discussing the Church was intercepted by authorities. When the Tribunal asked the applicant in the hearing if there were any other difficulties her parents faced from authorities due to involvement in the Church of Almighty God, she indicated that there were not.

7. The Tribunal noted to the applicant the inconsistencies in evidence. The applicant had not been consistent in terms of the timing of the incident involving her father, when the phone call was intercepted. The applicant had not been consistent in terms of how many adverse interactions her parents had had with authorities due to their involvement in the Church of Almighty God. In response to these inconsistencies, the applicant indicated that her memory may be faulty.

8. Whilst the Tribunal does not expect perfect recollection, and there can be understandable confusion as to dates, the Tribunal has difficulty accepting that the applicant would be confused as to whether her parents had had one or two adverse encounters with authorities, involving them variously been questioned, detained and persecuted. The Tribunal finds it further unlikely that the applicant would confuse the timing of the incident involving the interception of the phone call, or whether this had been the cause of the only adverse treatment of the applicant’s parents by authorities, or the second incident.

9. Secondly, the applicant has not been consistent in terms of when her parents started to proselytise to her in relation to the Church of Almighty God, or when the applicant decided to convert to the Church.

10. In the applicant’s written claims, she indicates that it was after the incident [in 2013] that her parents began to preach to her in relation to the Church of Almighty God, which aroused her interest in the Church, causing her to investigate the Church online. In contrast, in the Tribunal hearing, the applicant indicated that her father started to talk to her about the Church in around November 2012, and she had decided to convert to the Church by early 2013.

11. When the Tribunal pointed out to the applicant the inconsistency in evidence, she indicated that her memory may be faulty.

12. Again, the Tribunal accepts that there may be understandable confusion as to the precise dates of events. However, there is a considerable difference between a claim by the applicant that she was proselytised by her parents into the Church only a couple of months after arrival in Australia, and then converted soon after, and the claim that this did not occur until some months later, after her parents had been caught by authorities for being involved in the Church. The latter would be a very impactful event which the Tribunal considers would be a key marker in the sequence of events, not easily forgotten. The inconsistency on this issue is undermining as to the applicant’s credibility.

13. Thirdly, evidence by the applicant as to more mainstream church attendance in Australia has been inconsistent. In the Tribunal hearing, the applicant indicated that she had been attending [Church 1], weekly since about the end of 2014. The applicant provided a Certificate of Baptism at this Church dated [in] 2015. The applicant provided to the Tribunal a picture of her standing outside the Church. She also provided a video of her baptism.

14. The applicant indicated that she stopped attending this Church sometime in 2016 because of the adverse treatment of another parishioner by the Church because of that person’s involvement in the Church of Almighty God. The applicant indicated that she left the Church because of a fear that she would be discovered as a believer of the Church of Almighty God.

15. In the interview with the delegate that took place [in] August 2015, the applicant was asked about her church activities in Australia. The applicant indicated that, in 2013, she began to attend a gathering in [Suburb 1] that took place in a private home. She was introduced to this gathering by a friend. The applicant indicated that this was a Family Church.  The impression the applicant gave in the interview was that this attendance had been ongoing, although she said that there was a recent gap attendance because of illness.

16. The Tribunal put to the applicant in the hearing this information from the interview with the delegate pursuant to the procedural requirements of s.424AA of the Act. It was noted that this information was relevant because the applicant had made no reference in the interview to having attended [Church 1] for the previous eight or so months (prior to the interview) on a weekly basis. The Tribunal indicated to the applicant that it was difficult to accept that, if she had been so attending, she would not have mentioned attendance at this church in the interview.

17. In response, the applicant indicated that she did not mention attendance at this church in the interview because she had no evidence to prove that she was attending.

18. The Tribunal is not satisfied with this explanation. The applicant had no evidence to establish that she was attending the Family Church in [Suburb 1], yet she told the Tribunal about such attendance. The Tribunal does not consider it credible that the applicant would not have mentioned in the interview this subsequently ongoing and contemporaneous attendance at an established church, had it been occurring.

19. The evidence on this issue causes the Tribunal to disbelieve the applicant’s claims as to attending [Church 1] from late 2014 up until at least August 2015. Whilst the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant subsequently attended this Church and was baptised in late 2015, the inconsistency on this issue creates overall doubts as to the applicant’s credibility and the circumstances as claimed in relation to her church attendance in Australia, and the motivation for that attendance.

20. Fourthly, the applicant’s indication that she has not been able to make contact with the Church of Almighty God or its members in [City 1], if she had been genuinely trying, is not credible in light of information indicating that Church members in Australia are readily contactable.

21. In the hearing, the applicant indicated that she had tried to find a Church of Almighty God in [City 1] but has not been able to.

22. As indicated in the COISS report above, the Church of Almighty God has a sophisticated online presence. A quick search by the Tribunal in September 2017 (by the Tribunal Member to whom this matter had been constituted) found this website: This simply involved typing ‘Church of Almighty God’ into the search engine and this site was the first site listed. After a few minutes of perusing the site, a chat window popped up with a chat instituted by a person called [Mr A] who indicated that he was located [overseas]. In response, the Tribunal asked [Mr A] if there was a Church of Almighty God in Australia, particularly in [City 1]. [Mr A] said that there was. The Tribunal asked for details. [Mr A] asked for a Facebook or Skype address. When the Tribunal asked why this was necessary, [Mr A] responded that this would facilitate members of the Church in Australia making contact.

23. In the hearing, this information was put to the applicant pursuant to the procedural requirements of s.424AA of the Act as relevant because it demonstrated that contact with Church members in [City 1] would readily have been facilitated by easy enquiries. The consequence of relying on this information could be to conclude, given that the applicant failed to take readily available steps to make contact with the Church in Australia, that she was not a genuine adherent.

24. In response, the applicant indicated that her home computer had broken down, and she went to a library to search for information relating to the Church of Almighty God. She indicated that she had never experienced a ‘pop-up window’ to enable her to chat to anyone.

25. The Tribunal also notes that the website provides a telephone contact number and an email address for enquiries, including a specific telephone number for Australia.

26. The Tribunal is of the view that this information put to the applicant suggests that she could readily have made contact with members of the Church of Almighty God in Australia. The failure by the applicant to make such effort is significantly undermining of claims that she is a genuine adherent to the beliefs of the Church or has a genuine desire to preach the Gospel of the Church.

27. Fifthly, the applicant’s evidence as to continuing involvement in a more mainstream Family Church and at [Church 1] in Australia, while at the same time being a believer of the Church of Almighty God, was not credible to the Tribunal in light of the attitude of the Churches to each other.

28. On any version of the applicant’s evidence, she had become a convert to the Church of Almighty God by at least the middle of 2013. Yet, the applicant claims to have attended a more mainstream Family Church and then an established church, [Church 1].

29. In the interview with the delegate it was pointed out to the applicant that, given the beliefs of the Church of Almighty God, there was an inconsistency in her continuing to practice at a house church. The applicant indicated that both religions believe in God and Jesus. When it was put to the applicant that the Church of Almighty God criticise the Bible she indicated that they have improved the Bible.

30. The Tribunal discussed with the applicant in hearing independent information contained in the COISS research extracted, which refers to the fact that the Church of Almighty God has been ruthless in its attacks on unregistered churches and that both official registered churches and unregistered churches in China view the Church of Almighty God as a threat. In that context, the Tribunal indicated to the applicant that it did not consider it consistent with her being a genuine adherent to the Church of Almighty God that she would continue to practice in a Family Church or an ordinary Christian church. In response, the applicant indicated that all the churches have a common foundation and that there is no inconsistency with the applicant’s more mainstream church attendance in Australia.

31. The Tribunal does not accept this explanation. The Tribunal does not accept that a genuine adherent of the Church of Almighty God would attend more mainstream Christian churches. The fact that the applicant claims to have done so is undermining of her claims to fully understand the beliefs and philosophy of the Church of Almighty God or to be a genuine adherent.

32. Sixthly, the applicant did not provide realistic or convincing evidence as to claims that her parents were arrested for attending an underground church in China, when the applicant was around [age].

33. The applicant was asked to explain precisely what happened in relation to the arrest. When asked, the applicant indicated that she was in attendance at the underground church gathering when her parents were arrested, with a total number of participants of around 10 people. When asked to explain what happened, the applicant said that the police came in and people were arrested and then the applicant was warned by her school not to attend church. When the applicant was asked what time of the day this occurred, she said that she could not remember.

34. The Tribunal noted to the applicant that, presumably, she had been attending gatherings at around the same time each week and therefore that would allow her to remember the time. The applicant indicated that she could not remember.

35. The Tribunal asked the applicant to provide more precise details of the arrest which would give the Tribunal the sense that she was describing events that actually occurred. The applicant said that she was blank as to what happened.  When pressed further, the applicant said that she was taken separately by police and questioned, but provided no further specific details.

36. The Tribunal certainly does not expect a perfect objective recollection of events that happened in childhood, many years ago. Nevertheless, the fact of the applicant’s parents and other parishioners being arrested by police would be an extremely impactful event for the applicant. The Tribunal considers that, if this event happened, the applicant would have been able to provide a narrative of events from her perspective, and some degree of detail, of a much more realistic and convincing nature than was provided by the applicant in hearing.

37. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant provided an account of the arrest of her parents that was recounting events that actually occurred.

38. The cumulative impact of these six credibility concerns are significantly damaging to the applicant’s overall credibility, and as to her substantive claims. They result in the Tribunal finding the applicant has not been a witness of truth.

39. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a genuine adherent of the Church of Almighty God.

40. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant had some knowledge of the Church based on Internet research. In the interview with the delegate, the applicant was able to indicate some of the beliefs of the Church. However, when first asked, she was not able to provide the name of the female Christ of the Church. When asked a second time, she did provide a name. The applicant indicated in hearing that she has researched the Church to some limited degree on the Internet.

41. The Tribunal considers that this Internet research has been undertaken to seek to learn about the Church for the purpose of making the claim for the Protection visa rather than on the basis of her being a genuine adherent.

42. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would be an adherent to, or member of, the Church of Almighty God on return to China. Therefore, the Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that there would be a real chance of the applicant facing serious or significant harm on return to China based on being, or being perceived to be, a member or supporter of the Church of Almighty God.

43. The Tribunal does not consider, on the applicant’s own evidence, that she has taken any significant actions in relation to activities of the Church of Almighty God in Australia that might become known to Chinese authorities such as to result in any risk to the applicant on return to China based on a belief of the applicant being involved in this church in Australia.

44. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has been truthful in relation to claims of her parents suffering adverse attention from authorities due to their being involved in the Church of Almighty God. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and her father had a phone call discussing the Church of Almighty God that was intercepted by authorities, causing difficulties for the applicant’s father or creating an adverse interest in the applicant.

45. The Tribunal has significant doubts as to whether the applicant’s parents are members of the Church. Even if they are, that does not persuade the Tribunal that she is a genuine adherent, or would be a practitioner on return to China, or that she would suffer any problem from association with her parents.

46. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant’s parents were arrested during her childhood for attending an underground church gathering.

47. In the hearing, the Tribunal explored with the applicant how she would wish to practice religion on return to China. The applicant indicated that she would only wish to practise and preach the Church of Almighty God and not practise in other churches.

48. The applicant is therefore not making claims of harm on return to China based on the practice of Christianity in any more mainstream church. In any event, the credibility concerns identified, particularly the third credibility concern, make clear that the applicant has not been candid in relation to more mainstream church attendance in Australia.

49. The independent information from the DFAT report in relation to Fujian, which is the applicant’s home area, indicates a significant degree of tolerance in that province towards Christian practice in both registered and small underground churches. The evidence indicates that individuals can practice in state sanctioned churches as long as such practices do not challenge the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. Generally, authorities tolerate the operation of unregistered churches which operate discreetly, with not more than 50 practitioners.

50. When this information was put to the applicant in hearing she indicated that her concern was based on involvement in the Church of Almighty God.

51. Considering all of the evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed, or for any other reasons.

52. In summary, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason for any of the reasons claimed, or for any other reasons.

53. In summary, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to China, there is a real risk that she will suffer significant harm.

54. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

55. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).

56. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).

    DECISION

57. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

    David McCulloch
    Member

    
    
    

5 October < Accessed 11 October 2016 <CX6A26A6E10628>

11 October 2016 <CX6A26A6E10572>