1510675 (Refugee)

The applicant sought protection in Australia, claiming she would suffer an arbitrary deprivation of her liberty if returned to Indonesia. She had travelled to Australia with her then-husband, a temporary skilled worker, and their children. Following their divorce, her husband, who was a permanent resident, notified the Department of Immigration and Citizenship of the changed circumstances, leading to the cancellation of her business visa. She remained in Australia on a different visa to stay with her children, who were permanent residents. The applicant contended that separation from her children would result in a deprivation of her liberty and human rights as a mother, and that Indonesian authorities would not intervene to protect her. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was required to assess her claims under both the Refugee Convention and the complementary protection criteria.

The Tribunal was tasked with determining whether the applicant met the criteria for a protection visa under section 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), concerning the Refugee Convention, and under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act, relating to complementary protection. This involved assessing the applicant's claims of fearing harm and arbitrary deprivation of liberty upon return to Indonesia, and whether any such harm would engage the protection provisions of the Act.

The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant protection. It found no nexus with the Refugee Convention and no agent of harm or relevant significant harm for the purposes of complementary protection. The Tribunal considered country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which indicated that Indonesian citizens do not require exit permits for foreign travel and that those returned after seeking protection overseas are unlikely to face attention from authorities, provided they have not crossed certain "red lines" such as advocating separatism. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's fear of arbitrary deprivation of liberty due to separation from her children did not meet the threshold for protection under the Act.