1507708 (Refugee)

[2018] AATA 783

1507708 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 783 (15 March 2018)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1507708

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Nigeria

MEMBER:Jane Marquard

DATE:15 March 2018

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

Statement made on 15 March 2018 at 8:45am

CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Nigeria – Political opinion –Father – Political activist – Violently targeted during Presidential elections – Grew up with a number of Boko Haram members – Spoke out against the Boko Haram – Involvement with Christian organisations – Economic hardship – Unable to work safely in his profession in Nigeria – Harm from the state – Illegally detained – Possible to relocate within Nigeria – Close family members in Australia – Delay in applying for a protection visa – Memory lapses

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5AAA, 36,65, 91R, 91S, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 Schedule 2

CASES
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FCA 614

Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. The applicant was born in [year] in Nigeria, and is a Nigerian citizen.

2. He first arrived in Australia on [date] January 2009 on a Student [Visa].

3. He applied for a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) on [date] July 2014.

4. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) refused to grant the visa on [date] May 2015.

5. This is a review of that decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).

   CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

   Evidence to the Department

6. A summary of the evidence provided by the applicant to the Department is as follows:

   ·He was born in [Town 1], Maiduguri, in Borno state, North East Nigeria in [year]. He is a Christian;

   ·His father was originally from the south-eastern part of Nigeria, but in the 1950’s due to hardship and persecution he suffered from his kinsmen, he migrated to Maiduguri, and this is where he brought up his family. The area is predominantly Muslim;

   ·His father and mother sold locally made [products] on a small scale. They did not receive social benefits as they were a minority in that area;

   ·His father was a leader of local Christians in [Town 1], from 1985 onwards. He was also a founder of [Political Organisation 1], which had an aim of generating political awareness and promoting the interests of minority tribes and Christians in Maiduguri. His father and associates were suspected to be against the government in northern Nigeria because they came from the southern part, Ibo;

   ·His father died in 1987 from medical complications after he was attacked by suspected agents of the state government on his way to a political gathering in Bama local government area. After this, the applicant and his siblings had to engage in hawking at risk to their personal safety;

   ·His mother is now living in Australia. He has [sisters] and [brothers] living in Australia. He was engaged to be married prior to coming to Australia;

   ·He attended school in Borno state and from [date] to [date] completed a Bachelor [degree] at [university], Borno state. Prior to coming to Australia he worked as a [occupation] at [Workplace 1], a company involved in [certain activities];

   ·He was violently targeted in 1993 during an uprising that arose from the annulment of Nigeria’s presidential election of 1992. He was targeted because his family was accused of being part of the coordinators and supporters of a presidential candidate from southern Nigeria, Chief Moshood Abiola. The southern candidate won the election but the results were annulled by the sitting president who was from northern Nigeria. This led to the targeting of minority groups;

   ·In 1999 he was the victim of a politically motivated attack during Nigeria’s return to democratic rule. He was [an official] of [Group 1] (Borno state charter). This group campaigned for the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian. When he won, there was a huge uprising against persons suspected of aiding in his victory. As [an official], he was viciously attacked and suffered lacerations, and his property was destroyed;

   ·In March 2002, he was attacked while in church during the Sharia riots, which had gripped much of northern Nigeria. Between 2002 and 2012, 12 northern states had introduced sharia law, which meant an increase in the loss of freedom for Christians;

   ·During the election of 2003, he canvassed for the incumbent president’s re-election through [Group 1]. This did not ‘go down well’, with suspected Jihadists who subsequently violently attacked them during a political rally on 7 February 2003. Four of his comrades were brutally killed during the ensuing violence;

   ·He was illegally detained from March to April 2007, along with six other members of [Group 1]. They were detained in a building which he later learnt belonged to a top government official. They were interrogated about working in cohorts with foreign governments and associations to discredit the state government. He and his association members were also suspected of being against the election bid of a northern candidate in the presidential elections. They were not taken to a police station or court. They had to sleep on the bare floor, and were badly fed;

   ·He was the target of religious hatred in 2008 during a total solar eclipse. Muslim fundamentalists believed that Christians were responsible for the wrath of God, who in punishment had stopped the sun from shining. Many Christians were attacked as well as churches and businesses. He sustained [serious injuries]. He was admitted at  [Hospital 1] Maiduguri for 15 days;

   ·The state is under control of Boko Haram which has killed more than 12,000 people. Boko Haram was formed in Maiduguri around 2003. He fears persecution, death and torture on account of his political and religious views. He was a vocal critic of the riots, destruction and killings perpetrated by them. He was known in his community to express strong views against Boko Haram members. People he grew up with had joined Boko Haram, and they made a promise to their comrades in arms to eliminate him. He was also an active and outspoken member of [Church 1] located in Maiduguri and his views against Islamic fundamentalism were well known;

   ·He was part of a Christian pressure group called ‘[Group 1]’ and avidly supported Christian candidates in elections. Four members of [Group 1] were killed by Boko Haram. Others have suffered physical attacks and significant damage to property;

   ·Upon graduation from [university] he began to make frantic arrangements to leave Nigeria and relocate to Australia. He feared for his life as people around him started to die mysteriously. In February 2007, [Ms A], who had been [an official] of [Group 1], died without illness. Six weeks later, their [other] officer, [Mr B], also died mysteriously. Two months later, in May 2007, [Mr C], the husband of their [senior official], was assassinated, stabbed to death by an unidentified man;

   ·In January 2009 he was finally able to leave Nigeria. He was fortunate to leave when he did as Boko Haram has made Maiduguri their base;

   ·He did not apply for political asylum until 2014 because he had hoped that his skills as a [occupation] would secure him permanent residency;

   ·If he returns he fears arbitrary arrest, detention, attacks by Boko Haram, and that his religious rights would be infringed upon;

   ·In September 2011, [Mr D], a Christian and founding member of [Group 1], and his mother, were attacked and murdered in his home by Boko Haram;

   ·There is daily escalation of attacks across the country, including in cities and rural areas in the north, south, east and western parts. Abuja has been attacked on a number of occasions. The attacks primarily target Christians and their sympathisers. There are also countless news articles about kidnappings of oil and gas workers in the Niger Delta area and many companies have closed for this reason. As an Australian trained [person], he would not be able to practise his profession because his work requirements would entail him going out to remote areas [which] would expose him to great danger because of the absolute lack of security in those areas;

   ·The actions of Boko Haram have also affected neighbouring areas and are now considered an ECOWAS problem. It is known to be active in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Benin and Togo. He also said that there are human rights abuses in other countries. He provided articles about these matters. Further, in Ghana, there was xenophobia against Nigerians.

7. He provided news articles about Boko Haram attacks in Maiduguri and other parts of Nigeria.

   Evidence to the Tribunal

8. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 12 December 2017 to give evidence and provide arguments. His representative appeared with him at the hearing. A summary of the evidence provided in writing and to the Tribunal at hearing is as follows:

   ·His family were Catholics and attended [Church 1] every week. They were also involved in some church associations. The applicant now attends [another church] in [Australian city 1].  There were many churches in his region. From time to time the churches were attacked, particularly if it was a time when there was an eclipse. The local Muslims believed that the eclipses were caused by non-believers. When a newspaper contained the story of the caricature of prophet Muhammad, there were demonstrations outside the church. Extremists came into the church and tried to set fire to it. This also happened in other churches in Maiduguri;

   ·His father was originally from the southeastern part of Nigeria, but in the 1950s, he migrated to Maiduguri, and this is where he brought up his family. The applicant has [brothers] and [sisters]. His mother, [brothers] and [some] sisters are living in Australia. One is a [professional] and the other came as students. Most are citizens now. One sister lives in the southeast of Nigeria, and is married. His father died in 1987. His mother and father had a business in Nigeria which his mother continued after his father died. They produced [certain products] on a small scale in Maiduguri;

   ·They had extended family in Maiduguri, but they have all moved out. Most of them have moved back to the southeast; 

   ·He attended a primary government school where he learnt Arabic, and had to do Islamic prayers. He then attended a Christian government high school in Maiduguri.  From [date] to [date] he completed a Bachelor [degree] at [university], Borno state;

   ·Around 2004 he first became aware of Boko Haram. The area where he lived was predominantly Muslim. Many of the children who he played with in the area later became members of Boko Haram. First, they started working for hard-line politicians who would use them to harass people. Later he became aware that they were working for Boko Haram. He could not talk to them anymore. They became extremist, and were involved in demonstrations. They brandished flags around. At the university, there were riots relating to the Muhammad cartoon, and the Christian students were attacked. His mother’s business was affected as many customers were hostile as they were Muslim. While at university he worked as an intern at [Workplace 1]. He worked there from 2007 until 2009 when he came to Australia. After university, his brother helped him come to Australia as soon as he could. He was fearful of being a [occupation] in Nigeria, as [people in his profession] need to travel to remote areas and many [were] being killed in these areas;

   ·His father was involved in a cultural association of people from his ethnic group. During elections he would organise and mobilise the populations to support a candidate, mostly a Christian candidate. This was [Political Organisation 1], which had an aim of generating political awareness and promoting the interests of minority tribes and Christians in Maiduguri;

   ·His father and associates were suspected to be against the government in northern Nigeria because they came from the southern part, Ibo. His father was once attacked while at a rally and brutally assaulted. His father died of a [medical condition]. Asked if it was related to a political attack, he said that he could not say. He died in hospital in his home town;

   ·His entire family were members of the same church. They were all members of an association attached to the church, called [name deleted]. [Sentence deleted]. He was also involved in [Group 1]. This was formed by youths in [Church 1]. This group discussed what was happening in society, and condemned what extremists were doing. When there were attacks on churches, they would go and volunteer their assistance and try and help. He would stand up and talk on platforms at rallies organised by [Group 1]. They would hold these rallies in schools or churches. They had guards check to see if extremists were coming so they could disperse in time. They also had police protection. There was no website. He has some papers relating to [Group 1], which could be sent to the Tribunal;

   ·In around 2007 members of [Group 1] were attacked during a rally, and four members of the group died. Extremists arrived in three or four vans, brandishing machetes and cutlasses and struck people dead as they ran in different directions. It was on television, but they did not blame Boko Haram – they said the Christians instigated the attack;

   ·In 1999 he was the victim of a politically motivated attack during Nigeria’s return to democratic rule. He was [an official] of [Group 1] which campaigned for the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian. When he won, there was a huge uprising on persons suspected of aiding in his victory. One of his colleagues was beaten previously, but he did not get beaten;

   ·In March 2002, he was attacked while in church during the solar eclipse, but he was not physically harmed;

   ·During the election of 2003, they were seen as targets as they were mobilising people and there was an attack on them at a rally. Asked if anyone was killed, he said that no-one was killed;

   ·The government arrested him and his group for 21 days in 2003. The Tribunal suggested to him that in his Department papers he said he was arrested in 2007. He then said it was in 2007. They were not charged, but were kept there because of their political activism, along with six other members of [Group 1]. They were detained in a building which he later learnt belonged to a top government official. Asked why the government had concerns about [Group 1], he said that they criticised the government about how they dealt with attacks on churches and other matters;

   ·Asked if he would be an activist if he returned to Nigeria, he said that he hoped he would not have to return. But he has been an activist his whole life;

   ·He was asked about the reference to being a target of religious hatred in 2008 during a total solar eclipse, as referred to in his application. Asked what happened, he said it was similar to before. Churches and businesses were attacked. He was physically attacked going to church. He was injured on his back and was hit. Asked if he had other injuries, he said his leg was injured. He went to hospital for three to four days;

   ·He fears he would be killed if he returned. In 2011 he learnt that some of his colleagues from [Group 1] had been killed. He is known to most of the people in his area who are involved in Boko Haram. He spoke at rallies more than five times;

   ·He was asked how he knew that Boko Haram had promised to eliminate him. He said that one of them whom he had grown up with warned him that it was in his best interests to leave;

   ·Asked about the colleagues from [Group 1] who died, he said one woman died and an officer [and] they chased him and ran to his house and killed him. These people died after he left. He kept in contact with the members;

   ·Asked if any of his colleagues from [Group 1] died while he was in Nigeria, he said that it was the four he had mentioned earlier while in the church attack;

   ·Following the Tribunal hearing the applicant provided a copy of a Personal Injury Report from [Hospital 1], Maiduguri, dated [January] 2009, requested by [the] Ward Police Station. The Report stated that he suffered injuries on [date] August 2008. He incurred ‘[serious injuries]..it is likely that he begins to recover fully in 6 to 9 months for recovery from his physical symptoms and psychological symptoms’. The doctor stated that the applicant had informed him that he had suffered previous attacks on his person starting from 1999, and including 2002, 2003,and 2007. He told the doctor that the attacks were directly related to his membership of the political/religious organisation. He told the doctor that on [date] August 2008 at approximately 11pm while he and members of his congregation were in church, it was besieged by armed Boko Haram members. The attack was ostensibly in response to the total solar eclipse that was unfolding. He and other members of the association were attempting to escape when he suddenly felt an object hit his head and he lost consciousness and only gained consciousness in the hospital.

   Independent country information

9. The Tribunal has considered independent country sources about Nigeria. Some of the relevant information is referred to in the discussion below.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

10. In coming to a decision the Tribunal has taken into account evidence on the Department file, before this Tribunal, and independent country information.

11. A summary of the relevant law is set out in Attachment A.

12. The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason claimed. Similarly, that an applicant claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not establish that such a risk exists, or that the harm feared amounts to ‘significant harm’. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for him or her. It is the responsibility of the applicant to specify all particulars of the claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the claim, or to establish or assist in establishing the claim: s.5AAA. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant. (MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596; Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191; and Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70.)

    Nationality

13. The applicant provided a copy of his passport and gave evidence that he was a citizen of and born in Nigeria. It was clear that he was familiar with the culture, history and geography of Nigeria, and the Tribunal accepts on the evidence before it that he is a citizen of Nigeria, and that Nigeria is the receiving country for the purposes of the complementary protection provisions.

    Findings of fact

1. When assessing claims the Tribunal must make findings of fact in relation to the claims. In doing so, the Tribunal is mindful of the difficulties faced by refugee applicants, including issues related to the use of interpreters, nervousness and anxiety in a Tribunal environment, and stress caused by separation from home and family. There may also be memory issues resulting from the lapse of time, and cultural issues which affect how an applicant answers questions. The benefit of the doubt should be given to an applicant who is generally credible but unable to substantiate all of his or her claims.  All this is taken into account in these findings.

2. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was brought up in Maiduguri, Borno in north eastern Nigeria as he provided a number of personal particulars relating to Maiduguri and had knowledge of the area.

3. The Tribunal accepts that his family were Christians and attended [Church 1]. The Tribunal accepts on the basis of his detailed evidence about these matters that his father was involved with Christian organisations aimed at promoting the interests of Christians in Maiduguri. The Tribunal does not accept, as claimed in his application, that his father died in 1987 from medical complications after he was attacked by suspected agents of the state government on his way to a political gathering in Bama local government area. When asked about his father’s death at the Tribunal hearing, he said that his father died of a [a medical condition]. Asked if it was related to a political attack, he said that he could not say, and his father died in hospital at home. The Tribunal accepts this more contemporaneous account of the circumstances of his father’s death, rather than the account given to the Department, as it was given in response to the direct question about whether his death was the result of an attack.

4. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant grew up in a predominantly Muslim area and that many of his classmates later took on extremist views and some became involved with Boko Haram. Country information indicates that Maiduguri has been at the centre of Boko Haram activity.[1]

   [1]NY Times, 23 September 2016; CNN, 1 February 2016

5. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant was involved with church groups including [Group 1], which assisted those Christians who were victims of Boko Haram. While the applicant said that he would provide documents about [Group 1], and did not do so, the applicant accepts that he was involved with this youth organisation as he was able to discuss its activities with the kind of detail which reflects first-hand experience. The Tribunal accepts that he spoke at rallies for the church more than five times. 

6. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant and his family were subject to harassment as Christians living in a city where Boko Haram support was growing, and because they supported candidates in elections who came from southern regions.

7. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant was physically harmed in an attack in 1993 during an uprising, or that he suffered lacerations and had his property destroyed in 1999. This is because he made no reference to being violently targeted in 1993 when giving his evidence to the Tribunal despite being asked about the events in which he was targeted. In regard to the 1999 attack, he said at the Tribunal that his friend was beaten but he was not. This evidence differed to his evidence to the Department where he said that he was viciously attacked and suffered lacerations, and his property was destroyed. When these differing accounts were put to the applicant at hearing, he stated that he may have been confused about what occurred when. The Tribunal accepts that details about events may become confused over time, however the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would not remember being physically harmed in 1993, or that he would not recall that he suffered lacerations and property damage in 1999. The Tribunal accepts however that he may have been present when these attacks took place.

8. The Tribunal is satisfied that four of his church colleagues were killed in violence by extremists in either 2003 or 2007. There were some discrepancies in relation to his evidence about this. He told the Department that four of his comrades were brutally killed in an attack in 2003, but he told the Tribunal that no-one was killed. He told the Tribunal that these comrades were killed when extremists attended a rally in 2007, brandishing cutlasses and machetes, and attacked church members as they ran. The Tribunal accepts that he may have got the dates confused in relation to these deaths when he gave evidence at the Department and Tribunal.

9. The Tribunal is satisfied that he was present when there was an attack on his church relating to the solar eclipse in 2008. The Tribunal is satisfied that he was injured and hospitalised, although there were discrepancies in the evidence about the incidents in 2008. He told the Department that he sustained [serious injuries], and was admitted at [Hospital 1], Maiduguri for 15 days. He told the Tribunal he was injured on his back and was hit, and his leg was injured. He said that he went to hospital for three to four days. When asked about these discrepancies in his evidence, he said that these events took place nine years ago, and his memory had suffered over time. The Tribunal accepts that memory suffers over time, even though it is somewhat difficult to understand how he would not recall the exact nature of injuries and times of hospitalisation. He later provided a medical report from [Hospital 1] to the Tribunal relating to his hospitalisation. The Tribunal is satisfied on this basis that he was injured at the church in 2008.

10. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the specific persons mentioned in his Department application were killed or disappeared in the circumstances mentioned in his application. In his Departmental application, he said that upon graduation from [university], he began to make frantic arrangements to leave Nigeria and relocate to Australia. He said that he feared for his life as people around him started to die mysteriously. In February 2007, [Ms A], who had been the publicity secretary of [Group 1], died without illness. Six weeks later, their [other] officer, [Mr B], also died mysteriously. Two months later, in May 2007, [Mr C], the husband of their [senior official], was assassinated, stabbed to death by an unidentified man. He said that in September 2011, [Mr D], a Christian and founding member of [Group 1], and his mother were attacked and murdered in his home by Boko Haram. The Tribunal is satisfied that associates of his may have been killed by Boko Haram. However the Tribunal does not accept that the specific people named in his application were colleagues of his that were killed or disappeared in the circumstances mentioned in the Department application. This is because, when the Tribunal asked him about the reasons leading to him leaving Nigeria, and his fears for returning, he did not mention these deaths. When asked specifically if any of his colleagues were killed, he said that the only colleagues who died were four members of [Group 1] who died when extremists attacked a rally they were attending, brandishing cutlasses and machetes, and attacking church members as they ran. The Tribunal asked the applicant at hearing why he did not refer to the deaths and disappearances of [Ms A], [Mr B], [Mr C] and [Mr D], as in his application he had referenced these incidents as being related to his need to leave the country and his fear of returning. He said that it is has been many years, and there have been many events that have happened so he gets dates and issues confused. He recalls that he was apprehensive because people in his association died. Asked why he did not mention them, he said the chronology about what happened gets confused. The Tribunal accepts that memory of dates and details of incidents may become confused over time. The Tribunal does not accept that key and significant events, such as disappearances of colleagues, would be forgotten or confused, particularly as the applicant indicated in his Department application that he made efforts to leave because of these incidents.

11. The Tribunal notes that the applicant arrived in Australia in 2009 but did not apply for a protection visa until 2014. Such a delay could indicate that an applicant did not have a genuine fear of serious harm, as a person who had such a fear could be expected to apply as soon as possible. When this was discussed with the applicant, he said that he came to Australia as a student, and had other visas, and was hoping to get permanent residency. He submitted that while on these visas, there was no risk of him being forced to leave Australia. Although it is somewhat difficult to understand why he did not apply for protection if he feared for his life on return, the Tribunal accepts that he believed that he would be granted a different type of permanent visa.

12. As set out above, the Tribunal has not accepted that all the incidents of harm which the applicant claims have taken place did in fact occur. This does not mean however that the Tribunal rejects all the claims made by the applicant. As Gummow and Hayne JJ observed in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [191], ‘the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising’.

13. The Tribunal has accepted that the applicant and his family, as well as other church members, were subject to harassment and violence from extremists, some of whom may have been Boko Haram members.

    Refugee criteria – there must be a well-founded fear of persecution

14. An applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason.

15. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent. A real chance in the context of refugee assessment has been described by the High Court as a substantial chance, as distinct from a remote or far-fetched possibility, however it may be well below a 50 per cent chance: Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379.

16. The applicant claims that he fears for his life, or significant physical harassment and ill-treatment, at the hands of Boko Haram. He claims that he would be easily identifiable by Boko Haram leadership and agents as he grew up with a number of young men who proceeded to join Boko Haram. He claims that his views and opinions against Islamic fundamentalism are well known, and he constantly condemned their attacks on Christians and the burning of churches, and was always speaking in churches and rallies where hundreds of people would assemble to listen. Even though a significant amount of time has passed, people he knows who are members of Boko Haram are still there. A [person] he knows was killed by Boko Haram. There are still attacks on churches and harassment by Boko Haram every day.

17. The Tribunal is satisfied that there is a real chance of persecution, were the applicant to return to his home region in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal is satisfied that the essential and significant reason for this persecution would be religion/ethnicity and/or imputed political opinion.

18. The reasons for this are set out below.

    Boko Haram activity in Borno region

19. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT):

    Boko Haram is a radical Islamic movement which seeks to impose a strict form of Sharia, or Islamic law, in northern Nigeria. ‘Boko Haram’ means ‘Western Education is Sinful’ in the Hausa language and the movement forbids Muslims from taking part in political or social activities they associate with Western society including voting in democratic elections or receiving a secular education.[2]

    [2] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018.

20. A number of sources, including Human Rights Watch in its most recent report in 2017, have said that Boko Haram has lost much of its power recently and that Madiuguri is relatively safe:

    The seven-year old Boko Haram conflict is winding down as military operations by Nigerian forces and its north eastern neighbors intensified against the insurgents. An estimated 550 civilians died in Boko Haram attacks in 2016 compared to almost 3,500 in 2015. Insurgents resorted to suicide bomb attacks in crowded places, like IDP camps, markets and mosques, using mostly women and girls to bypass security. On February 11, two young women detonated suicide bombs in a Dikwa, Borno camp, killing about 58 IDPs. A third girl confessed to security agents that she backed out of the suicide assignment when she recognized her relatives sheltering in the camp.

    Security forces recovered most areas controlled by the group, and rescued thousands of residents. However, 197 of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls abducted in April 2014, as well as over 300 elementary school students abducted from Damasak, Borno, in November 2014 are still missing. Apart from Maiduguri, Borno state capital, which has been largely free from attacks, many parts of the state remain unsafe and inaccessible. In July, a team of United Nations humanitarian aid workers were attacked by suspected insurgents as they traveled the 53 mile Bama to Maiduguri road. Two people were injured in the attack and UN temporarily suspended aid deliveries following the incident. Aid supplies resumed a few days later.

    The naming in August by the Islamic State (ISIS) of Abu Musab Al-Barnawi as the new leader of Boko Haram, spurred a rift between his followers and those of Abubakar Shekau who insists he remains the leader. The Nigerian military declared in late August that Shekau had been killed in a military air raid. Previous claims of Shekau’s death proved untrue.[3]

    [3] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017, 13 January 2017, >

    On 24 December 2016, Press TV reported that President Buhari claimed government troops had inflicted a heavy defeat on Boko Haram, capturing its last stronghold:

    Buhari added that the army troops managed to crush the remnants of Boko Haram at “Camp Zero”, located deep inside the thick Sambisa Forest in the volatile Borno State, without mentioning the whereabouts of the group’s ringleader Abubakar Shekau.  

    According to the Nigerian president, Friday’s victory marked the “final crushing” of the Takfiri group. The triumph was achieved after the army gradually tightened the noose around terrorists in the forest through a months-long counter-terrorism military campaign that was intensified in the last few weeks, covering some 13,00 square kilometers of the forest in an attempt to curb the group’s atrocities against civilians and clear the area of its presence.[4]

    [4]Press TV,  ‘Nigerian army lands crushing blow on Boko Haram: President’,

21. In apparent response to Buhari’s claims, however, the leader of Boko Haram called on fellow militants to ‘detonate bombs everywhere’. As reported by Press TV on 31 December 2016:

    The ringleader of the Nigeria-based Boko Haram Takfiri terrorist group has urged the militants to beef up extreme violence against people, denying recent claims by the government that the group has been crushed.

    In a video posted on YouTube purportedly by Boko Haram on Friday, a man, standing in front of almost a dozen armed men and a couple of pickup trucks in an undisclosed location, identified himself as Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the terror group, and read a statement, calling on his fellow militants to “kill, slaughter and abduct all the infidels... and detonate bombs everywhere.”..

    He also denied that the army had ultimately defeated terrorists after it captured Boko Haram’s last major stronghold. “The battle is just beginning.”[5]

    [5] Press TV, ‘Kill, slaughter, kidnap infidels, Boko Haram leader says’,

22. Notwithstanding the diminution in power of Boko Haram, Borno has been at the centre of violent attacks on both Muslims and Christians in the recent past, with attacks on Muslims more common, and attacks on Christians regarded as opportunistic and infrequent. The DFAT report on Nigeria in 2018 states:

    Both Christians and Muslims have faced violence at the hands of Boko Haram due to their religious beliefs. Boko Haram opposes Christianity as well as less restrictive forms of Islam. DFAT considers credible local and international advice that Boko Haram attacks Muslim communities more frequently than Christian communities and that the group has kidnapped and assassinated individual Muslims. Christians are less commonly targeted individually. 

    Numerous attacks have been perpetrated on predominantly Muslim occupied villages in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria have killed more than 100 civilians since November 2017, although Amnesty International claims the real figure may be higher still as some attacks may have gone unreported. The girls abducted from Chibok in April 2014 by Boko Haram .. are understood to  include both Muslims and Christians. Boko Haram has targeted Christians in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and occasionally in the central state of Plateau. 

    DFAT assesses that both Christians and Muslims living in the north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa face a moderate risk of violence from Boko Haram, particularly if they live close to the fighting. Attacks on Christians by Boko Haram are opportunistic and infrequent and highly unlikely to target individual Christians. Many Christians have moved internally within Nigeria to escape the risks posed by the Boko Haram insurgency. DFAT assesses that Christians and Muslims residing in the Middle Belt and southern states face an extremely low risk of violence form Boko Harm or ISIS-WA.[6]

    [6] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018.

23. The United States Department of State International Religious Freedom Report for 2016 referred to a number of violent attacks in the northeast, with 2,900 people dying during the year:

    The U.S.-designated terrorist organization Boko Haram split into two factions during the year, one pledging allegiance to ISIS and calling itself the Islamic State of West Africa (ISIS-WA), headed by Abu Musab al Barnawi, and another headed by Abubakr Shekau and retaining the traditional Boko Haram name, the Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (JASDJ). Most residents referred to both groups collectively as Boko Haram.

    Boko Haram continued to commit acts of mass violence in its stated quest to impose its religious and political beliefs in the northeast. Boko Haram perpetrated numerous attacks, including mass killings, often directly targeting civilians. According to estimates from the NGO Nigeria Watch, 2,900 people, including Boko Haram members, died as a result of the group’s activities during the year, compared with a press estimate of 4,780 killed in 2015. On January 30, Boko Haram raided the village of Dalori, three miles outside of Borno State capital Maiduguri, killing 122 people and abducting a number of children. In some cases, the group employed women and children as suicide bombers, such as in the October 29 suicide attack in Maiduguri that killed nine.

    Boko Haram killed two Christians, burned houses, and vandalized shops in incidents in Kuburumbula and Boftari, Borno State in September. The group also burned seven houses and vandalized shops. Boko Haram tied up and killed one of the men in front of his family. On September 18, Boko Haram shot and killed eight Christians as they left a Sunday church service in Kwamjilari village in Borno State.

    Most captives of past Boko Haram kidnappings of women and girls for purposes of forced marriage or sexual exploitation remained unaccounted for. In August Boko Haram released a video showing at least 50 of the 200 girls kidnapped from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State in 2014; the group demanded the release of captured Boko Haram fighters in exchange for the kidnapped girls, some of whom it said had been killed in airstrikes and 40 of whom had been married. The New York Times reported in October that the government secured the release of 21 of the girls and quoted a government official who denied Boko Haram fighters were released in exchange for the girls.

    Tens of thousands of refugees remained in neighboring countries after having fled the violence in the northeast, and more than 1.7 million people remained internally displaced.[7]

    [7] United States Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2016,

1. In 2017 Boko Haram attacked an oil exploration team working near Maidugurri, killing 48, including five geologists.[8]

   [8] Bloomberg, ‘Boko Haram Attack on Oil Team killed 48’, 28 July 2017,

2. The Tribunal has also had regard to a report by the UK Home Office which states that Christians in Borno are at risk of serious harm:

   Boko Haram has called for an uprising against secular authority and a war against Christianity.  Despite this public rhetoric it has not exclusively, or even primarily, targeted Christians but focused its attacks against those it perceives to be in opposition to its ideology:  “unbelievers” or those perceived to support the authorities. It has particularly targeted state and federal targets, such as police stations but also schools, bus stations, banks, detention facilities, churches, mosques, markets, bars and villages …

   ... Boko Haram primarily operates in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where it has taken control of large areas of territory …

   ... Christians, state official, including members of the security forces, political and traditional leaders, Civilian Joint Task Force members, health workers and moderate Muslim clerics, those perceived to oppose Boko Haram (particularly if suspected of assisting the security forces), and women and children, living in areas controlled by Boko Haram – parts of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe state – are likely to be at risk of serious harm because of actual or perceived views and/or their gender.[9]

   [9] UK Home Office, Country Information and Guidance, Nigeria: Fear of Boko Haram, June 2015

3. There have also been some recent attacks by Boko Haram, including on Christians in Borno. According to a report from Stanford University’s Mapping Militants Project, Boko Haram ‘continued operations into 2016, mainly employing suicide bombers to attack civilian, police and government targets’. The report includes reference to several bomb attacks from mid-2015:

   ·August 25, 2015: Two teenage suicide bombers, one male and one female, detonated explosives in Damaturu, Nigeria (five killed, 41 wounded).

   ·October 2015: Boko Haram fighters bombed Abuja, Nigeria and suicide bombed a mainly Nigerian refugee camp in Chad (54 killed, 51 wounded).

   ·November 27, 2015: A Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated explosives in Dakasoye, Kano, Nigeria, targeting a Shiite religious procession (22 killed, 38 wounded).

   ·December 2015: Explosives detonated at a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria (20 killed, 65 wounded).

   ·February 1, 2016: Militants attacked Dalori, Nigeria with suicide bombs and allegedly burned children alive (86 killed, unknown wounded).

   ·February 9, 2016: Two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dikwa, Nigeria (58 killed, 80+ wounded).[10]

   [10] Stanford University, Mapping Militants Project 2016, Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram, 26 August 2016, >

   On 28 January 2016, Associated Press reported that at least ‘16 people have died after multiple suicide bombings in Chibok’, and that residents blamed Boko Haram.[11]

   [11] Associated Press, ‘Nigeria suicide bombings kill at least 16 in Chibok’, 28 January 2016,

4. On 1 February 2016, Agence France Presse reported that at least 50 people were feared killed when Boko Haram fighters armed with guns and explosives attacked the village of Dalori, near the northern city of Maiduguri. An army spokesperson said the assailants arrived, opened fire and set light to homes; three female suicide bombers were intercepted and ‘then blew themselves up’.[12]

   [12]Agence France Press, ‘More than 50 feared dead in Boko Haram attacks’, 1 February 2016,

5. Also in February 2016, suicide bombers killed at least 56 people and injured more than 70 others in a refugee camp at Dikwa, northeast of Maiduguri, in an attack attributed to Boko Haram. As reported by Reuters, the camp housed about 50,000 people driven from their homes by the Boko Haram uprising.[13]

   [13] Reuters, ‘Nigerian refugee camp hit by double suicide bombing’, 11 February 2016,

6. On 29 October 2016, two suicide attacks took place in Maiduguri at the entrance to the Bakassi IDP camp and outside a fuel depot. Eight people died in the attacks which were attributed to Boko Haram and were the first bomb attacks in the city for several months.[14]

   [14] Federal Office for Migration and Asylum (Germany), Information Centre Asylum and Migration Briefing Notes (7 November 2016), 7 November 2016, UNHCR Refworld, >

   On 9 December 2016, Press TV reported that over 50 people were killed when two women blew themselves up in a market in Madagali. Boko Haram was held responsible for the attack that took place ‘on the edge of the group’s Sambisa Forest stronghold, which the Nigerian military has been bombing ahead of ground assaults’. According to the report, Boko Haram ‘recently regained momentum after it was nearly obliterated months ago by a joint military force’.[15]

   [15] Press TV, ‘Bomb explosions kill at least 56 in northeast Nigeria’, 9 December 2016

7. On 9 January 2017, Press TV reported that five suspected members of the Boko Haram group and three civilians have been killed in two separate attacks, ‘after the terrorists detonated their explosive vests’. The attacks were ‘conducted in the eastern outskirts of the provincial capital Maiduguri’. The article further reported that:

   At dusk on Saturday [7 January], a group of Boko Haram terrorists launched an attack on a military base in the town of Buni Yadi, in the northeastern province of Yobe, leading to an “intense battle”, which killed at least five soldiers, including a newly-deployed captain.

   The attack, however, was “repelled” by army troops, said Lieutenant George Okupe, a spokesman for the Buni Yadi base.[16]

   [16] Press TV, ‘5 terrorists, 3 civilians die in bomb attacks in northeastern Nigeria’, 9 January 2017,

8. On 16 January 2017, Press TV reported that at least four people were killed and 17 injured ‘after a radicalized girl detonated her explosive-laden vest’ at a mosque at the [university]. No group had claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was taken to ‘bear the hallmark of the Boko Haram Takfiri terrorist group’.[17]

   [17] Press TV, ‘Four people, including university professor, killed in northeast Nigeria’, 16 January 2017, >

   On 25 January 2017, Voice of America reported that Boko Haram ‘continues to carry out deadly attacks despite the recent claim by Nigeria’s president that it had been crushed’ and reported that at least four people had been killed in three separate attacks by suicide bombers in Maiduguri.[18]

   [18] Voice of America, ‘At Least 4 Killed in Trio of Suicide Attacks in Nigeria’, 25 January 2017,

9. On 28 January 2017, Vanguard reported a Boko Haram raid on a military post in northern Borno state, believed to be in reprisal ‘over the successes by the Nigerian troops who have pushed Boko Haram from swathes of Nigerian territory’.[19]

   [19] Vanguard, ‘Al-Barnawi Boko Haram faction responsible for recent attack’, 28 January 2017,

10. On 29 January 2017, Associated Press reported:

    Gunmen believed to be Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamic extremists attacked a convoy of motorists along a recently secured highway, killing at least seven people and injuring many others, including soldiers in a military escort, witnesses said.…

    The incident came three days after Boko Haram gunmen suffered a heavy loss of members after a foiled attempt to attack a military base in Borno state. In that incident, a large number of the insurgents stormed a military base in Kamaya but failed to dislodge the soldiers.[20]

    [20] Umar, H, ‘Nigerian gunmen attack convoy on northeast highway, 7 killed’, Associated Press, 29 January 2017.

11. Vanguard further reported on 30 January that more than 20 people were feared dead after the attack on the convoy of motorists travelling under military escort and that ‘at least 15 trucks laden with food were seized’ by the attackers.[21]

    [21] Vanguard, ‘20 feared dead as Boko Haram opens fire on motorists in Maiduguri’, 30 January 2017,

12. A Christian News report indicated that Boko Haram attacked a Christian student headquarters in Maiduguri in July 2017. One Christian student was killed.[22]

    [22] Christian News, ‘Christian student killed in spate of Boko Haram attacks in Northeast Nigeria’, 21 July 2017,

13. Boko Haram attacked a logging site 20 km from Maiduguri in December 2017 killing 25.[23]

    [23] The Guardian, ‘Nigeria: dealt toll in Boko Haram attack on loggers rises to 25’, 1 January 2018, >

    In February 2018 Boko Haram kidnapped 100 schoolgirls in north-eastern Nigeria.[24]

    [24] USA Today, 22 February 2018, ‘Boko Harm kidnaps more Nigerian students’, >

    The information set out above, considered cumulatively, suggests that while Boko Haram is not as powerful as it once was, the organisation continues to attack government, Muslim and Christian targets. Borno, while somewhat safer than it once was, is commonly the site of attacks, including attacks in and around Maiduguri in 2017 and 2018 and the recent kidnapping of the schoolgirls. The Tribunal is satisfied, based on the applicant’s particular circumstances, and the country information set out above, that there is a real chance of serious harm were the applicant to return to the Borno region in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant grew up in Borno, and some of his former classmates are now Boko Haram members. He has also been active in his local church and outspoken in anti-Boko Haram activities, as have other members of his family. Although the DFAT Report suggests that individual Christians are highly unlikely to be targeted, the applicant’s personal circumstances suggest that he may be at greater risk of harm than other Christians living in Borno. The country sources indicate that although the power of Boko Haram has reduced significantly, there are still attacks taking place on Christians and people who speak out against Boko Haram there and in other parts of the northeast of Nigeria. For example in July 2017 a Christian student headquarters was attacked in Maiduguri, the applicant’s home town. Given these factors, considered cumulatively, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a real chance of serious harm, in the form of violence, were the applicant to return to his home region in the reasonably foreseeable future.

    A person will be excluded from refugee status if they can safely and reasonably relocate

14. The focus of the Convention definition is not upon the protection that the country of nationality might be able to provide in some particular region, but upon a more general notion of protection by that country: Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, it may be reasonable for a person to relocate in the country of nationality to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. A person will be excluded from refugee status if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, to expect him or her to seek refuge in another part of the same country.

15. DFAT states the following in regard to the security situation and the possibility of relocation in Nigeria:

    Many Christians have moved internally within Nigeria to escape the risks posed by the Boko Haram insurgency. DFAT assesses that Christians and Muslims residing in the middle belt and southern states face an extremely low risk of violence from Boko Haram or ISIS-WA..There are no legal impediments to internal relocation in Nigeria. Freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights provided in Nigeria’s Constitution. Nigeria has as many as three million internally displaced persons (IDP’s) due to the insurgency in northeast and internal conflicts in the middle belt states…DFAT assesses that Nigerians can and do freely relocate internally. Internal moves can be more difficult for non-indigenes due to language, religious and cultural differences, particularly between northern and southern states.

    The security situation in Nigeria is volatile and numerous terrorist attacks have occurred in recent years on the civilian population and on foreign buildings. Conflict and terrorism killed a reported 4751 people in 2017; the actual number of deaths is likely to be higher. Nigeria’s north east remains under a state of emergency due to conflict between the government security forces and the terrorist group, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram… Southern Nigeria is also volatile due to confrontations between armed criminal groups and security forces predominantly in relation to the theft of and control over oil resources in the Niger Delta region. Inter-ethnic land disputes in the central region of Nigeria, known as the middle belt, and the central north escalated in 2016. Conflicts between the largely nomadic pastoralists and Christian farmers of the Berom tribe have traditionally occurred mainly in Plateau state over the last decade. The conflict has recently moved into the central northern states of Katsina, Nassarawa, Benue and Kaduna states.

    Christianity is the major religion amongst the Igbo and Yoruba people in the south and Islam is the major religion of the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuro people in the north. A mix of Muslims and Christians of various ethnicities comprise the middle belt, and major cities remain a fluid mix of different ethnicities and religions. [25]

    [25] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018

16. The UK Home Office and US State Department indicate that the Nigerian constitution and law allow for freedom of movement within the country, and the government generally respects this right in practice.[26]

    [26] UK Home Office, Operational Guidance Note Nigeria, 14 April 2009; US State Department, Human Rights Report 2009 – Nigeria, 11 March 2010, sec 2d.

17. The UK Home Office suggests that in areas outside of the control of Boko Haram – the large majority of Nigeria – while there have been reports of sporadic bombings, there is no other evidence to indicate that the group has systematically targeted persons who oppose or are perceived as opposing its ideology. The UK Home Office’s operational guidance note for Nigeria assesses that internal relocation to escape persecution by non-state agents is almost always an option.[27]

    [27] UK Home Office, Operational Guidance Note Nigeria, 14 April 2009.

18. A report by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in 2013 found that:

    There are reports of Igbos (who are mostly Christian) leaving the north for the south-eastern states and Igbo community leaders in the south supporting them to do so. Following Boko Haram’s January 2012 ultimatum to southerners to leave the north, thousands of people moved ‘to safer areas in the south-east’, according to the IDMC.[28] In response to the violence, some Igbo leaders in the southeast reportedly encouraged and supported their community members to return.[29] According to a March 2012 article by the BBC, almost 2,000 southerners took advantage of a ‘free bus service provided by elders from the south-eastern Igbo community’.[30] In January 2012, Voice of America reported that ‘Nigeria’s eastern Igbo leaders are calling for tribal families living in the north to immediately return home so avoid [sic] being killed or injured’.[31] The article goes on to say that ‘The Igbo community is setting up shelters in the southeast to house the evacuees returning from the north’.[32] However, another Igbo leader cited in the article criticised the call to southerners to return as unnecessary.[33] Religious violence is less prominent in southern Nigeria. According to Campbell, in southern Nigeria, ‘Local conflict tends to be based on ethnic differences and competition for access to resources, especially in the oil‑rich Delta and very rarely do the clashes have a religious component’.

    [28] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Nigeria: Increasing violence continues to cause internal displacement’, 8 June 2012, p. 9

    [29] Lobel, M, ‘Nigeria attacks: “Boko Haram bombed my church”’, BBC News, 16 March 2012,

    [30] Lobel, M, ‘Nigeria attacks: “Boko Haram bombed my church”’, BBC News, 16 March 2012, Labous, J, ‘Nigeria’s Igbo Tribal Elders Call for Evacuation Due to Violence’, Voice of America, 29 January 2012, Labous, J, ‘Nigeria’s Igbo Tribal Elders Call for Evacuation Due to Violence’, 29 January 2012,Voice of America, Labous, J, ‘Nigeria’s Igbo Tribal Elders Call for Evacuation Due to Violence’, 29 January 2012,Voice of America, Labous, J, ‘Nigeria’s Igbo Tribal Elders Call for Evacuation Due to Violence’, 29 January 2012,Voice of America, >

    The Tribunal discussed the principles from these reports with the applicant. Asked if he could safely and reasonably relocate, he said that he could not move. He said that because members of Boko Haram know him personally, they will find him anywhere. News travels, and they have been known to attack people in the southeast.

19. Notwithstanding these submissions, the Tribunal is satisfied that it would be safe for him to relocate to a different part of Nigeria given the country sources set out above. The Tribunal is satisfied, on the basis of country sources discussed above, that Boko Haram does not generally pursue individuals across Nigeria. The DFAT Report suggests that individual Christians are highly unlikely to be targeted even in the northeast. The UK Home Office report discussed above indicates that there is no evidence to indicate that the group has systematically targeted persons who oppose or are perceived as opposing its ideology.[34] The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada considered in some detail the question of whether Boko Haram would pursue individuals across Nigeria, in a report in 2016. The Report suggests that it would be difficult for Boko Haram to trace someone to another part of Nigeria, particularly the south:

    In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Research Director of START, who has conducted desk and field research on Boko Haram, stated that the capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to other areas of Nigeria is the greatest in the northeast region (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe), with "diminishing capacity" moving away from this region (START 2 Mar. 2016). The same source stated that, in her opinion, the ability of Boko Haram to track down an "average citizen," such as someone who fled one of the cities that Boko Haram captured in 2014 or 2015, is "doubtful, even in the northeast" (ibid.). She explained that "while they have intelligence capabilities, they are not that advanced nor are they likely to use them for this purpose" (ibid.). Furthermore, the Research Director stated that Boko Haram does not have "the cyber sophistication to track individuals through hacking electronic systems," and their ability to track average citizens "would depend largely on word of mouth" (ibid.). 

    [34] UK Home Office, Operational Guidance Note Nigeria, 14 April 2009.

1. The same report also discussed the types of individuals Boko Haram might pursue and target. The Research Director said that:

   [t]hey are most likely to track and target relatively high-status individuals, such as local government area officials (many of whom have fled either to Maiduguri or Abuja) or religious elites. These individuals have a public profile that makes it harder for them to blend in with local populations, and the nature of their activities (such as meeting with constituents, leading religious services) also creates vulnerabilities for them. (ibid.)She noted that Boko Haram has targeted elites as far away as Abuja (ibid.). The Assistant Professor stated that Boko Haram's tracking capabilities are "hard to assess," as the group "appears to be going through some sort of rebuilding process" (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). The same source noted that Boko Haram has greater reach in northern states, from Maiduguri to Plateau State to Kano State (ibid.). He stated that the types of individuals Boko Haram targets include senior military and police officers, school teachers, "especially ones that deem to promote an education system that the group rejects," and community activists (ibid.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior fellow at the New York-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), who specializes in Nigeria, stated that Boko Haram is "decentralized and local" and "does not appear to have the interest or capacity to go after an individual outside the northeast-except for former Boko Haram operatives who crossed the current … leadership" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016). The senior fellow stated that the other types of individuals Boko Haram targets include government officials, police, military, and religious leaders, "particularly Muslim leaders who oppose Boko Haram" (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). However, he indicated that there is no evidence of Boko Haram tracking down people beyond their area of operation in the northeast and north-central region of Nigeria (ibid.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a specialist in African affairs at the CRS said that Boko Haram has cells that operate across North and Central Nigeria (US 1 Mar. 2016). The same source stated that, in 2013, Boko Haram "appeared to conduct a purge" of people who aligned with the splinter faction Ansaru, which demonstrated the ability of Boko Haram to reach across areas of northern Nigeria (ibid.). However, she also noted that she was not in a position to say to what degree Boko Haram operatives might pursue someone beyond the area in which their cell operates (ibid.). Haram on individuals in the South, and that there have been "very few attacks in general" by Boko Haram south of the Middle Belt states [3] (START 2 Mar. 2016). Likewise, the CRS specialist in African affairs stated that Boko Haram's capacity in the South is "limited," and that there "seldom seems to be activity south of Abuja" (US 1 Mar. 2016).

2. Further, the report commented on Boko Haram’s capacity to trace individuals in the south:

   Regarding Boko Haram's capacity to track individuals in the South, the Assistant Professor stated, I suspect that the group’s reach is probably weak in the Southern parts of the country mainly because (1) the South is predominately Christian; (2) the South is predominantly Igbo (the Hausa and Fulani, which are largely Muslim, dominate northern Nigeria); (3) it is not easy for one ethnic group to move to another region, as they would stick out (they would not speak the local languages, know the local customs, etc.). The princip[al] ethnic group in Lagos are Yaruba, and there are Christian and Muslim Yarubas. (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016) The CFR representative stated that Boko Haram is "almost entirely inactive in Lagos" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016) and has "only carried out a single operation" there (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). The CRS specialist reported that recent Boko Haram activity in the South consisted of an attack on a fuel depot in Lagos in June 2014, and a "few isolated incidents" in 2015 between the police and alleged Boko Haram members in Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi (US 1 Mar. 2016). IHS Global Insight reports that in 2014, Nigerian authorities arrested more than 1,000 suspected Boko Haram militants in in the southern states of Rivers, Imo, Bayelsa and Abia (IHS Global Insight 1 Aug. 2014). The Assistant Professor indicated that the Nigerian government introduced "expansive security measures" in Abuja and Lagos, making it harder for Boko Haram to operate there (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.[35]

   [35] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa, ‘The capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such as Lagos’, 11 March 2016, NGA105451.E.

3. When the report was discussed with the applicant at the Tribunal hearing, he responded that Boko Haram has attacked people as far away as Ghana. The applicant also referred to country sources which indicated that Boko Haram had been planning attacks across Nigeria, but these plans had been thwarted. He claimed that travelling from one place to another is not that difficult in Nigeria. He said that the report quoted was a Canadian report, and Canadians might not know much about Nigeria, and the report was general and did not relate to his specific circumstances. He said that there have been attacks in the southeast. He said that he was a community activist, as referred to in the report. Further Boko Haram members knew him by name, and they knew each other’s families.

4. The Tribunal has considered the country information and his responses to it carefully. The Tribunal accepts that country reports do not always fully reflect the in-country situation. However there are a number of reports from various reputable sources (referred to earlier in this decision) which have suggested that Boko Haram operates predominantly in the north and northeast, with very little activity in other parts of Nigeria, although there have been a few attacks in other centres and there is some presence in other cities. Although there have been some attacks in centres outside the northeast such as Abuja and Plateau, as pointed out in the UK Home Office Report, the vast majority of Nigeria is not under Boko Haram control. There are many areas where Boko Haram is not powerful, including Lagos and the southern states, where there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. The aim of Boko Haram is to establish a Sharia-led state in the northern region. The sources are clear that Boko Haram has no real presence in the southern states. As set out earlier in this decision, DFAT has said that Christians and Muslims residing in the middle belt and southern states face an extremely low risk of violence from Boko Haram or ISIS-WA. The analyst Zenn has said that Boko Haram have not been able to penetrate the south because most of their fighters come from the Quranic schools of northern Nigeria; they would struggle to blend in with the southern population where Christianity is the prevailing religion.[36] There has also been no local support for them in the southern states. There are few reports of attacks in these places. Although some articles suggest that in the future this may change, and that on occasion Boko Haram has planned attacks in Lagos, there is no empirical evidence of future Boko Haram infiltration into Lagos or the southern states, and no concern expressed by commentators that this will happen in the south in the reasonably foreseeable future.

   [36] Zenn,J in various writings on Boko Haram, see for example, Crisisgroup,  Boko Haram on the Back Foot, 4 May 2016, >

   On this basis, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant could safely relocate to another part of Nigeria. According to sources set out above, Boko Haram’s reach is weak in the southern parts of the country mainly because the south is predominantly Christian and Igbo and it is not easy for one ethnic group to move to another region as they would be noticeable and not know the local language and customs. The Tribunal is satisfied that Boko Haram does not have the capacity or cyber sophistication to track individuals, particularly in the south. DFAT has indicated that individual Christians are highly unlikely to be targeted, even in the northeast. Furthermore, according to the sources, Boko Haram is most likely to track high profile individuals, particularly religious elites or government officials. While the applicant was involved in local church activities and associations, he has not been in the country since 2009 and would not have a profile as a community activist any more, nor would he have a high profile even if he became involved in community activism in the south, such that Boko Haram would be interested in tracing him. He is also not in the high risk category of religious elites or government figures.

5. The Tribunal has also considered whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate. What is ‘reasonable’ in this sense must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation within his or her country. However, whether relocation is reasonable is not to be judged by considering whether the quality of life in the place of relocation meets the basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights. The Convention is concerned with persecution in the defined sense, and not with living conditions in a broader sense: SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18 and SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51, per Gummow, Hayne & Crennan JJ, Callinan J agreeing.

6. The applicant has claimed that, as an Australian-trained [professional], he would not be able to practise his profession because his work requirements would entail him going out to remote areas [which] would expose him to great danger because of the absolute lack of security in those areas. He claimed that there are many news articles about kidnappings of oil and gas workers in the Niger Delta area and many companies have closed for this reason. He also referred to the danger from Fulani herdsmen who have been attacking Christians. He said that the President of Nigeria is Fulani, which has given the Fulani herdsmen courage to carry out the attacks. They have many cattle and want land and they move around. If people do not allow them to graze, they attack them. Asked by the Tribunal if this took place primarily in the north, he said that Fulani are from that region, but they move huge distances seasonally for the grass.

7. The DFAT report has this to say about security in other parts of the country besides the northeast:

   Violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta continues to recur between militia groups competing for land and resources, and between militia and security forces sent to restore order. Several vigilante groups operate in the region, including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Avengers. The federal government has had varied results in suppressing their activities. Security forces occasionally directly target civilians in the region.

   Christian ‘settlers’ and Muslim ‘herdsmen’ continue to clash in central and northern Nigeria over land disputes and often in connection with national elections. While the clashes amplify a complex set of religious, ethnic and political tensions, in essence they represent competition for limited resources including land and political power. More than 300 Muslims and Christians died in violent clashes in Plateau state in January 2010. In July 2012, Muslim Fulani herdsmen shot Gyang Dangong, a Christian senator representing Plateau North.. Christians accused Fulani herdsmen of killing approximately one hundred Christians in Kaduna state in relation to land disputes in February 2014..although often attributed to religious violence between Christians and Muslims, issues of regional identity, ethnicity, indigeneity and settlement, access to land and livelihoods are drivers of the armed violence in the Plateau state. [37]

   [37] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018.

8. The Tribunal is satisfied that it would be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the applicant to relocate to a different part of Nigeria. Freedom of movement is guaranteed under the Constitution and the sources indicate that Nigerians move about the country freely. The country is divided loosely between the north and south on religious and ethnic lines, with Christians dominating the south, such that the applicant would have a Christian community, which has been important to him in the past. The applicant’s family originally came from the South so there should be no difficulty from a cultural point of view.[38] The area is predominantly Igbo (the applicant’s ethnicity) and Yoruba, and Igbo communities have supported relocation from the north of other Igbos.   

   [38] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 10 February 2015.

9. The Tribunal has taken into consideration the submissions of the applicant that as an engineer he would be required to work in remote regions where there are kidnappings and killings, and his concern about Fulani herdsmen. The DFAT Travel Advice states that:

   Do not to travel to the riverine areas (river or swamp areas on or close to the coast) of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Rivers states in south-eastern Nigeria because of the very high risk of kidnapping, robbery and other armed attacks especially against foreign oil facilities and personnel.[39]

   [39] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Smart Traveller Website, 2018,

10. The Tribunal accepts that there are parts of Nigeria where it may be dangerous for the applicant to work, [in] particular the Niger Delta where much of the crime and kidnapping has taken place. However only some areas are dangerous, as set out in travel advice above. Nigeria is a large country of over 900,000 square miles, 36 states and a number of urban centres. DFAT has indicated that many Nigerians relocate for economic reasons seeking employment in different locations across Nigeria. The Tribunal is satisfied that there are other areas besides the Niger Delta and at risk areas where the applicant could work safely. Furthermore, while there have been Fulani attacks on Christians, these have been focused on Plateau and the northern states and are primarily related to local land/ethnic disputes. This still leaves large parts of the country including the south and Lagos where the applicant could reasonably relocate and be safe from Boko Haram, the Fulani and criminal elements. His family is formerly from the south eastern part of Nigeria which would assist the applicant in settling in were he to choose to live in that region. He still has a sister and her family, and other extended family living there. He is an educated man who has had experience in relocation and would be able to obtain support from Igbo and Christian communities.

11. Having considered all the factors cumulatively, the Tribunal is satisfied that it would be reasonable in the sense of practicable for the applicant to relocate within Nigeria, particularly to the southern states or Lagos.

12. The Tribunal is not satisfied therefore that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of his imputed political opinion (anti-Boko Haram activity) or ethnicity or religion (Igbo/Christian) or any other reason were he to return to Nigeria in the reasonably foreseeable future.

    Harm from the state

13. While not pressed at the Tribunal hearing, in a statement accompanying his application to the Department, the applicant expressed fear of being imprisoned or executed without the benefit of a hearing because he was illegally detained for 21 days by suspected agents of the state, in either 2003 or 2007 (he was unclear on the dates in his Tribunal hearing).

14. The Tribunal is not satisfied there is a real chance of serious harm for reasons of his political opinion/religion from state authorities. The applicant has told the Tribunal that this detention took place because of criticism of the way the state was combating Boko Haram. He suffered no other harm or threats from the state. The applicant has been in Australia since 2009 and has not been involved in any political activity. The detention itself took place over 10 years ago.

15. The Tribunal is not satisfied there is a real chance, that is a substantial chance or a chance that is more than remote, that he would face serious harm from the state if he returned to Nigeria in the reasonably foreseeable future, on the basis of his political opinion, as he has not been involved in any political activity since he left Nigeria and has not indicated that he would be involved in any anti-government activity.

    Complementary protection

16. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

17. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act.

18. Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. The ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition: MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33. The Tribunal is satisfied, for reasons set out earlier in this decision in relation to ‘real chance’, that there is a real risk of significant harm were the applicant to be removed from Australia to Nigeria, including arbitrary deprivation of life and torture. The Tribunal is satisfied that if the applicant returned to his home region, Maiduguri, there is a real risk (more than an insubstantial risk) that he would come to the attention of Boko Haram members who may inflict harm on him. This is because he is known personally to a number of Boko Haram members as he grew up with them, and also because they knew that he was a Christian who was particularly active in speaking out on Christian issues.

19. There are certain circumstances, however, in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These include where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. Under s.36(2B)(a) of the Act, there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country if the Tribunal is satisfied that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. That relocation must be ‘reasonable’ is also a requirement when considering the definition of ‘refugee’ and the tribunal draws guidance from the judgments of the High Court in SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18 and SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51, per Gummow, Hayne & Crennan JJ, Callinan J agreeing, which held that whether relocation is reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation within his or her country. The Federal Court has confirmed, in MZYXS v MIAC, that the issues which arise when considering the reasonableness of relocation in the refugee context are the same which arise in the complementary protection context.[40]

    [40] MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FCA 614 (Marshall J) at [37].

1. The Tribunal is satisfied that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk of significant harm.  The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk of serious harm (and also, significant harm) is localised to the northeast of the country where Boko Haram has strength and where the applicant was known to Boko Haram. The Tribunal is satisfied, on the basis of country information set out earlier in relation to relocation, that there are areas of the country where the applicant would not suffer significant harm.

2. Boko Haram operates in the north-eastern states with some impact in the Middle Belt states and elsewhere. Although there have been some Boko Haram attacks in centres outside the northeast, such as Abuja and Plateau, as pointed out in the UK Home Office Report, the vast majority of Nigeria is not under Boko Haram control. There are many areas where Boko Haram is not powerful, including Lagos and the southern states. The Tribunal is satisfied, based on the country sources discussed earlier, that there would not be a real risk of significant harm in other parts of the country, including possibly Lagos or the southern states. Boko Haram attacks are rare in those regions, and country sources suggest that it is unusual for Boko Haram to target Christian individuals and unlikely that Boko Haram would trace individuals to other parts of the country. Furthermore, freedom of movement is guaranteed under the Constitution, and Nigerians frequently relocate. It would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate, as the country is divided between the north and south loosely on religious and ethnic lines, with Christians dominating the south, as well as the ethnic group to which the applicant belongs, the Igbos. The applicant’s family originally came from the south so there should be no difficulty from a cultural point of view [41] He is an educated man who has lived overseas and is therefore familiar with relocation. He also has family in these regions.

   [41] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Report Nigeria, 10 February 2015.

3. Furthermore, in assessing reasonableness the Tribunal has considered the issue of possible attacks by Fulani herdsmen, and also risks to the applicant who states that as a [occupation] he will work in remote areas where there is crime and kidnapping. While there have been Fulani attacks on Christians, these have been focused on Plateau and the northern states, and not on other parts of the country, and are related to land and ethnic issues relevant to those regions. Criminal attacks and kidnappings on oil workers among others have taken place primarily in the Niger Delta, although there was one violent attack by Boko Haram in the north on a group of [people from the applicant’s profession].[42] This still leaves large areas of the country, including Lagos and parts of the south, where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate (as discussed in relation to relocation earlier in this decision). Notably, the UK Home Office’s Operational Guidance Note for Nigeria assesses that internal relocation to escape persecution by non-state agents is almost always an option.[43]

   [42] [Source deleted].

   [43] UK Home Office, Operational Guidance Note Nigeria, 14 April 2009.

4. The Tribunal is satisfied therefore that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm.

5. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would face any harm from the authorities on the basis that he was detained for 21 days after canvassing for Christian rights and criticising the government’s handling of Boko Haram. The applicant has not been in Nigeria since 2009, and has not been involved in anti-government issues since then. The detention took place over 10 years ago. The Tribunal does not accept therefore that he would be of any adverse interest to the authorities and therefore there is no more than a remote risk of harm. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real risk of significant harm from the authorities were the applicant to be removed from Australia to Nigeria.

6. The Tribunal is not satisfied therefore that there are substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Nigeria there is a real risk of significant harm.

   CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS

7. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

8. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).

9. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).

   DECISION

10. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

    Jane Marquard
    Member

    
    

    ATTACHMENT A

    RELEVANT LAW

11. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

    Refugee criterion

12. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

13. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

    owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

14. Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.

15. There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.

16. Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.

17. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.

100.   Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.

101.   Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.

102.   In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.

103.   Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

Complementary protection criterion

104. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

105. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act.

106. There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.

Section 499 Ministerial Direction

107.   In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

24 December 2016,

31 December 2016,