1507242 (Refugee)
[2016] AATA 4424
•16 September 2016
1507242 (Refugee) [2016] AATA 4424 (16 September 2016)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1507242
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Pakistan
MEMBER:Giles Short
DATE:16 September 2016
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Statement made on 16 September 2016 at 10:19am
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
[The applicant] is a citizen of Pakistan. He has said that he comes from [Town 1] in [a] District of Punjab and that he completed a [course] at a [university] in Lahore in 2010. He has said that he first came to Australia as a student in February 2010 and that he last returned to Pakistan in 2013 for his brother’s wedding. In his application for a protection visa he referred to Shia and Sunni riots and he said that although he had not personally been harmed he had received threats that he would be harmed if he went back to Pakistan. When he was interviewed by the primary decision-maker in relation to his application [in] March 2015 he said that when he had gone back to Pakistan in 2013 the elders in his family had wanted him to marry a [relative] named [Ms A], nicknamed [name], but that he had not done so. He also said that his brother’s marriage had ended in divorce. He said that he himself had married an Australian [girl] [in] March 2014 and that he feared that the community or the family of the girl whom he had been supposed to marry would kill him because he had married a girl with no religion.
[The applicant’s] application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and he has applied to this Tribunal for review of that decision. A summary of the relevant law is set out at Attachment A. The issues in this review are whether he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five reasons set out in the Refugees Convention in Pakistan and, if not, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.
On 28 July 2016 a letter was sent to [the applicant] at the last email address provided by him to the Tribunal in connection with the review in accordance with section 441A of the Migration Act 1958. The letter invited him to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review at a hearing on 14 September 2016. [The applicant] was advised that if he was not able to attend the hearing he should advise the Tribunal as soon as possible. He was advised that the Tribunal would only change the hearing date if it was satisfied that he had a very good reason for being granted an adjournment. He was told that, if he was not advised that an adjournment had been granted, he must assume that the hearing would go ahead. He was advised that, if he failed to attend the scheduled hearing and an adjournment had not been not granted, the Tribunal might make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable him to appear before the Tribunal.
In an email message dated 13 September 2016 [the applicant] said that he could not attend the hearing on 14 September 2016 because of a ‘bad sore back’. He produced a photograph of a medical certificate dated [in] September 2016 stating that he would be unfit for work/school from 12 September 2016 to 14 September 2016 because of a unspecified ‘medical condition’. The Tribunal immediately sent [the applicant] an email message in response, saying that I did not accept that the fact that he was suffering from a sore back meant that he was unable to attend a hearing before the Tribunal. [The applicant] sent a further email message to the Tribunal later that day saying that he had ‘slipped down on pitch last Sunday’ and that his back had been affected badly. He said that he had not been able to celebrate the Eid festival and that it was even hard for him to move and that he requested the Tribunal to rearrange his hearing.
[The applicant] did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the time and place at which he was scheduled to appear. He was clearly aware of the hearing and as referred to above he had been told by the Tribunal that, if he was not advised that an adjournment had been granted, he must assume that the hearing would go ahead. It is clear that he received the Tribunal’s message indicating that he had not been granted an adjournment because, as referred to above, he responded repeating his request for an adjournment. He was not entitled to assume that an adjournment had been granted in the absence of advice from the Tribunal to that effect. I do not accept that his claim that he was suffering from a bad sore back provides an adequate and sufficient reason for the grant of an adjournment. I accept that he provided a medical certificate saying that he was unfit for work/school on the day of the hearing but that does not in my view establish that he was unfit to attend the scheduled hearing without further information as to how his medical condition actually affected his capacity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In these circumstances, and pursuant to section 426A of the Migration Act, I have decided to make my decision on the review without taking any further action to enable [the applicant] to appear before me.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Does [the applicant] have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five reasons set out in the Refugees Convention in Pakistan?
[The applicant’s] claims
[The applicant] is aged in his late [age]. In answer to questions 42 to 48 on Part C of the application form (seeking his reasons for claiming protection) [the applicant] said that he had left Pakistan to obtain an education and then to go back there but that the circumstances had now changed due to Shia and Sunni riots. He said that he had not been personally harmed but he had received threats that he would be harmed if he went back to Pakistan. He said that he and his family had the right to practise whichever religion they believed in but he believed that conservative Sunni and Shia groups would harm him if he went back. He said that the police were very corrupt and they were well known for their inability to protect innocent citizens.
[The applicant] was interviewed by the primary decision-maker in relation to his application [in] March 2015. He said that some circumstances had changed since he had made his application but that there was nothing in his application which he wished to change. He said that his home town was [Town 1] but that he had moved to Lahore in 2005 or 2006. He said that he had attended [an education provider] as well as [a named] University in Lahore and he confirmed that he had completed a Bachelor degree. He said that his parents had moved back to [Town 1] nearly a year before the interview. He said that his father had his own [business]. He said that he had married an Australian [girl] [in] March 2014. He said that when he had gone back to Pakistan in 2013 the elders in his family had wanted him to marry a [relative] named [Ms A], nicknamed [name], but he had not done so. He said that his brother had married a [relative] named [name] but that his brother had subsequently got a divorce.
[The applicant] said that he belonged to the Punjabi ethnic group and that he was a Sunni Muslim. He said that he did not really practise his religion in Australia but that he had done so when he had been living with his family in Pakistan. Asked why he feared returning to Pakistan he said that his father was a member of a Sunni group so they had had a little trouble with ‘the other ones’ by which he said he meant both Shia Muslims and Wahhabis. He repeated that the elders in his family had wanted him to marry his [relative] and he said that he believed in love marriages. He also said that there was trouble and fighting within his extended family.
[The applicant] said that before this the issue had been small but now that his brother had got a divorce and he himself had refused to marry his [relative] it was a really big problem. He said that nearly eight months before the interview someone had opened fire on where his brother had been working [at a workplace] in [a town]. He said that he did not know who had been responsible because he was not in too much contact with his brother. He said that one of his father’s employees had been injured [by] a bullet. He said that although this had happened to his brother they were angry with him as well.
[The applicant] said that his father and brother worked together in the family [business] and that they all lived in the one house. He said that his father had reported what had happened to the police. He said that his family did not know who had been responsible: it might have been the girl’s family or it might not have been. He said that at this time his brother had only pronounced the first divorce. He said that he did not know when his brother had pronounced the second and third divorces. He said that the girl’s family were [specified relatives] and they were aggressive. He said that they had been involved in police matters because one person had tried to stab someone and had been selling [illegal products] as well. He said that they had been saying: ‘We will shoot your son.’
[The applicant] then said that the girl whom his brother had married had been from [one] side of the family and that the girl whom he had been supposed to marry had been from [another] side. He said that some of the family members were saying that he was living with a girl with no religion and that he was committing a sin. He said that they had said that if he came back to Pakistan they would teach him a lesson. He said subsequently that it had been the family of the girl whom he had been supposed to marry who had said that they would teach him a lesson and that this had been one or two months after they had heard that he had got married here. He said that when [a certain relative] had died and his family had gone to the funeral the girl’s family had been saying that they were no longer part of the family. He said that he feared that they would harm him if he returned to Pakistan and that he felt very insecure. He said that his father had told him not to come back until they told him that it was safe for him to come back.
[The applicant] said that apart from this problem there were bombings and shootings every day in Pakistan. He said that you never knew where it was going to happen. He said that this had been why his family had moved back to their home in [Town 1]. He said that too many blasts happened in Lahore and crime was getting higher and higher as well. He said that if he returned to Pakistan he would definitely stay in Lahore rather than returning to [Town 1] because [Ms A]’s family lived there. The primary decision-maker put to him that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said that Islamabad and Lahore were relatively free from politically-motivated terrorist and sectarian violence. [The applicant] said that he was more worried about violence from the girl’s side of the family.
[The applicant] agreed that what he had said in his application for a protection visa was very different from what he had said at the interview. He repeated that his father was a member of a Sunni group and he said that this always led to trouble as well. He said that in Pakistan people took revenge and they did not care whether it was the father or the son. He said that one year previously people had been killed on both sides in Lahore. He said that every day the problems were getting higher and higher. The primary decision-maker put to [the applicant] that he had applied for protection on the day he had been meant to leave Australia which suggested that he had only applied for protection because he had wanted to remain in Australia, not because he had feared returning to Pakistan. [The applicant] said that he had thought that he would leave later.
The primary decision-maker put to [the applicant] that he had told his compliance officer that he lived in a part of Pakistan not affected by problems. [The applicant] said that he did not remember saying this. The primary decision-maker put to him that he had told his compliance officer that he wanted to stay in Australia so that he could complete the [final] subject for his graduate diploma. [The applicant] said that he had thought that if could stay a little bit further he would get study rights and he could complete his studies. He said that then he would have gone back to Pakistan but he said that now things had totally changed. He said that the community and the girl’s family were really taking it seriously that he had married a girl with no religion. He said that he feared that they would shoot him and kill him. He asked how he could obtain study rights so that he could complete his studies.
Consideration of [the applicant’s] claims
Even with the benefit of the interview with the primary decision-maker I consider that [the applicant’s] claims for protection are vague and lacking in detail. With regard to the claims which he made in his application for a protection visa - relating to Shia and Sunni riots - he said at the interview that his father was a member of a Sunni group so they had had a little trouble with ‘the other ones’ (by which he said he meant both Shia Muslims and Wahhabis) but he did not provide any further detail of any troubles which his father or other members of his family had had because of their religion. Although he claimed in his application for a protection visa that he had received threats that he would be harmed if he went back to Pakistan, the threats to which he referred at the interview related to his marriage to a girl with no religion, not to his religion. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that he or his father or brother in Pakistan have been threatened because of their religion as Sunni Muslims or specifically because of his father’s membership of a Sunni group. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be persecuted for reasons of his religion as a Sunni Muslim or that he will be prevented from practising his religion as a Sunni Muslim if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
With regard to the claims which [the applicant] made at the interview with the primary decision-maker - relating to his marriage - I note that in his application for a protection visa he said that he had last returned to Pakistan in 2013 for his brother’s wedding but he made no mention of his claims that the elders in his family had wanted him to marry a [relative] named [Ms A], nicknamed [name], but he had not done so. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that the family of the girl whom he was supposed to marry have threatened to harm him because he did not do so. Even accepting that his brother’s marriage has ended in divorce he has not claimed that his brother has even had to leave their home and, although he said that there had been an incident in which someone had opened fire [at a workplace] in [a town] where his brother had been working, he said that his family did not know who had been responsible: it might have been the girl’s family or it might not have been. [The applicant’s] claim that the community and the family of the girl whom he was supposed to marry will kill him is no more than a bare assertion, lacking in any detail. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be killed or otherwise harmed because he has married an Australian girl with no religion, because he did not marry the girl whom he was supposed to marry or because his brother’s marriage has ended in divorce.
At the interview with the primary decision-maker [the applicant] said that apart from his specific problems there were bombings and shootings every day in Pakistan. However apart from his claims based on his religion and his marriage, dealt with above, he did not suggest that he faced a real chance of harm for one or more of the five Convention reasons in the context of these bombings and shootings. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that one or more of the five Convention reasons is the essential and significant reason for any harm which he fears in the context of such bombings and shootings. These being the only claims which [the applicant] has made, I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five Convention reasons if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Are there substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm?
As stated above, even with the benefit of the interview with the primary decision-maker I consider that [the applicant’s] claims for protection are vague and lacking in detail. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that he or his father or brother in Pakistan have been threatened because of their religion as Sunni Muslims or specifically because of his father’s membership of a Sunni group. I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm because he is a Sunni Muslim or because his father is a member of a Sunni group.
With regard to [the applicant’s] claims relating to his own marriage and his brother’s marriage, I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm at the hands of the community or the family of the girl whom he was supposed to marry or the family of the girl whom his brother married but subsequently divorced, either because he himself has married an Australian girl with no religion, because he did not marry the girl whom he was supposed to marry or because his brother’s marriage has ended in divorce.
As referred to above, [the applicant] also referred at the interview with the primary decision-maker to bombings and shootings but (apart from his claims referred to above) he did not suggest that he would be at risk in the context of these bombings and shootings for any reason personal to him. I consider that the risk to [the applicant] in the context of such bombings and shootings is one faced by the population of the country generally and not by him personally and that it therefore falls within the exclusion in paragraph 36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act. These being the only claims [the applicant] has made, I am unable to be satisfied on the evidence before me that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as defined in subsection 36(2A) of the Migration Act.
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons given above I am not satisfied that [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore he does not satisfy the criterion set out in paragraph 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act for a protection visa. There is no suggestion that he satisfies subsection 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies paragraph 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, [the applicant] does not satisfy the criterion in subsection 36(2) for a protection visa.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Giles Short
Senior MemberATTACHMENT A - RELEVANT LAW
In accordance with section 65 of the Migration Act 1958, the Minister may only grant a visa if the Minister is satisfied that the criteria prescribed for that visa by the Act and the Migration Regulations 1994 have been satisfied. The criteria for the grant of a Protection (Class XA) visa are set out in section 36 of the Act and Part 866 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. As applicable to this application subsection 36(2) of the Act provided that:
‘(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or
(aa)a non citizen in Australia (other than a non citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)a non citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.’
Refugee criterion
Subsection 5(1) of the Act defines the ‘Refugees Convention’ for the purposes of the Act as ‘the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951’ and the ‘Refugees Protocol’ as ‘the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967’. Australia is a party to the Convention and the Protocol and therefore generally speaking has protection obligations to persons defined as refugees for the purposes of those international instruments. Article 1A(2) of the Convention as amended by the Protocol relevantly defines a ‘refugee’ as a person who:
‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’
The time at which this definition must be satisfied is the date of the decision on the application: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 72 FCR 288.
The definition contains four key elements. First, the applicant must be outside his or her country of nationality. Secondly, the applicant must fear ‘persecution’. As applicable to this application subsection 91R(1) of the Act stated that, in order to come within the definition in Article 1A(2), the persecution which a person feared must involve ‘serious harm’ to the person and ‘systematic and discriminatory conduct’. Subsection 91R(2) stated that ‘serious harm’ included a reference to any of the following:
(a)a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)significant physical ill-treatment of the person;
(d)significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
In requiring that ‘persecution’ must involve ‘systematic and discriminatory conduct’ subsection 91R(1) reflected observations made by the Australian courts to the effect that the notion of persecution involves selective harassment of a person as an individual or as a member of a group subjected to such harassment (Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Mason CJ at 388, McHugh J at 429). Justice McHugh went on to observe in Chan, at 430, that it was not a necessary element of the concept of ‘persecution’ that an individual be the victim of a series of acts:
‘A single act of oppression may suffice. As long as the person is threatened with harm and that harm can be seen as part of a course of systematic conduct directed for a Convention reason against that person as an individual or as a member of a class, he or she is “being persecuted” for the purposes of the Convention.’
‘Systematic conduct’ is used in this context not in the sense of methodical or organised conduct but rather in the sense of conduct that is not random but deliberate, premeditated or intentional, such that it can be described as selective harassment which discriminates against the person concerned for a Convention reason: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1 at [89] - [100] per McHugh J (dissenting on other grounds). The Australian courts have also observed that, in order to constitute ‘persecution’ for the purposes of the Convention, the threat of harm to a person:
‘need not be the product of any policy of the government of the person’s country of nationality. It may be enough, depending on the circumstances, that the government has failed or is unable to protect the person in question from persecution’ (per McHugh J in Chan at 430; see also Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 per Brennan CJ at 233, McHugh J at 258)
Thirdly, the applicant must fear persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. Subsection 91R(1) of the Act provided that Article 1A(2) did not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless ‘that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution’. It should be remembered, however, that, as the Australian courts have observed, persons may be persecuted for attributes they are perceived to have or opinions or beliefs they are perceived to hold, irrespective of whether they actually possess those attributes or hold those opinions or beliefs: see Chan per Mason CJ at 390, Gaudron J at 416, McHugh J at 433; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 570-571 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
Fourthly, the applicant must have a ‘well-founded’ fear of persecution for one of the Convention reasons. Dawson J said in Chan at 396 that this element contains both a subjective and an objective requirement:
‘There must be a state of mind - fear of being persecuted - and a basis - well-founded - for that fear. Whilst there must be fear of being persecuted, it must not all be in the mind; there must be a sufficient foundation for that fear.’
A fear will be ‘well-founded’ if there is a ‘real chance’ that the person will be persecuted for one of the Convention reasons if he or she returns to his or her country of nationality: Chan per Mason CJ at 389, Dawson J at 398, Toohey J at 407, McHugh J at 429. A fear will be ‘well-founded’ in this sense even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent but:
‘no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.’ (see Guo, referred to above, at 572 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ)
Complementary protection criterion
An applicant for a protection visa who does not meet the refugee criterion in paragraph 36(2)(a) of the Act may nevertheless meet the complementary protection criterion in paragraph 36(2)(aa) of the Act, set out as relevant to this application above. The Full Court of the Federal Court has held that the ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the context of the Refugees Convention as referred to above (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33 at [246] per Lander and Gordon JJ with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ (at [297]) and Flick J (at [342]) agreed). ‘Significant harm’ for the purposes of the complementary protection criterion is exhaustively defined in subsection 36(2A) of the Act: see subsection 5(1) of the Act. A person will suffer ‘significant harm’ if they will be arbitrarily deprived of their life, if the death penalty will be carried out on them or if they will be subjected to ‘torture’ or to ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ or to ‘degrading treatment or punishment’. The expressions ‘torture’, ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ and ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ are further defined in subsection 5(1) of the Act.
Ministerial direction
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 56, made under section 499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship - ‘PAM3: Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines’ and ‘PAM3: Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines’ - and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
Requirement that the decision-maker be ‘satisfied’
It is generally not appropriate to use the term ‘onus of proof’ in connection with administrative decision-making. However it may be that, upon a proper construction of the relevant statutory provisions, a particular benefit claimed by an applicant will not be granted, or will be cancelled, if the decision-maker is not persuaded that particular facts exist: see McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 per Woodward J at 357, Jenkinson J at 369. In the context of refugee decision-making, the High Court has emphasised in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 and Guo, referred to above, that the law requires that the Minister (and this Tribunal standing in the shoes of the Minister on review) must be ‘satisfied’ that a person is a refugee. (The statutory law considered in those decisions has undergone significant changes but those changes are not material for the present purpose: as set out above, it is still the case that the Minister must be ‘satisfied’ that an applicant for a protection visa satisfies the criteria prescribed for the grant of that visa.) As Kirby J said in the latter case (at 596):
‘the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is “well-founded” or that it is for reasons of political opinion. It remains for the minister in the first place to be “satisfied” and, where that decision is adverse and a review is sought, for the applicant to persuade the reviewing decision-maker that all of the statutory elements are made out.’
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Immigration
-
Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
-
Judicial Review
-
Natural Justice
-
Procedural Fairness
-
Standing
-
Statutory Construction
0
9
0