1503079 (Refugee)
[2017] AATA 320
•20 February 2017
1503079 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 320 (20 February 2017)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1503079
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Lebanon
MEMBER:Shahyar Roushan
DATE:20 February 2017
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Statement made on 20 February 2017 at 12:36pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Lebanon – Political opinion – Arab Liberation Party – Religion – Sunni Muslim – Opposition to March 14 Coalition – Palestine Liberation Organisation – Divorce – Court ruling on dowry and alimony – Prison conditions
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 424, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Background, Claims and Evidence
The applicant, a Sunni Muslim, is [age] years old and a citizen of Lebanon. He arrived in Australia [in] January 2014 on a [temporary] visa. [In] February 2014, he married [Ms A], an Australian citizen. [In] May 2014, the applicant applied for a protection visa.
In a statement attached to his application for a protection visa the applicant made the following claims:
Since his arrival in Australia, he has applied twice for a waiver of condition 8503 imposed on his [temporary] visa. He applied for the waiver because of ‘the fear of real harm that threatens me by my enemies in Lebanon’. He did not mention these problems previously because he felt that it was ‘a peculiarly Lebanese matter that is difficult for outsiders from civilised democracies such as Australia to fathom’.
He is fearful of his ex-father-in-law, [Mr B], who is ‘very well connected’ in Lebanon. [Mr B] is the owner of a successful [company] and some of his ‘partners’ are from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). He is also associated with [an official] of the Arabic Democratic Party (ADP) in Jabal Mohsen. The PLO was persuaded by [Mr B] to demand extortion from the applicant. He was left with no option but to declare himself bankrupt, which was a direct consequence of being forced to sell his [business] to finance the PLO. His ‘bankruptcy’ was not the result of his commercial failure.
The applicant ‘fled’ Lebanon and went to [Country 1]. He returned to Lebanon a few years ago to stay permanently with his wife and [children]. However, his marital relationship broke down and ended in divorce.
During the period the applicant was in [Country 1], [Mr B] was also abroad. He returned to Lebanon after the applicant returned from [Country 1]. [Mr B], together with ‘some of the strong families in Tripoli’ are part of the March 14 Coalition. These families are supporting his ex-wife in her ‘legal battle’ against the applicant and ‘the threats’ made against the applicant and his current wife via social media and phone calls. He is fearful of [Mr B] and, ‘through him’, the PLO and the ADP. He was advised by his siblings and his lawyer in Tripoli not to return to Lebanon.
He is a Sunni Muslim, but his ‘political choices’ are very different to the majority of the population in Tripoli. He is a supporter of the Arab Liberation Party (ALP) and its leader, Faisal Karami. He is close to [key party supporters]. This has put his life in danger. The ALP, which is based in Tripoli, is part of the March 8 Coalition and it is opposed to the March 14 Coalition. The party is aligned with Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).
Faisal Karami was a Minister in the Cabinet of Mr Najib Mikati, serving until 15 February 2014. His appointment as a Minister generated much controversy and, on 18 January 2013, Mr Karami's convoy was attacked in Tripoli by Salafi gunmen, injuring four people. Tripoli has become a hotbed of Salafi militias since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Gunfights, bombings and counter bombings have escalated in Tripoli. The applicant’s closeness to [key party supporters] places him in ‘real danger’.
In support of his application for a protection visa, the applicant submitted a copy of his Australian Marriage Certificate and a copy of a Certificate of Islamic Marriage as evidence of his marriage to [Ms A]. The applicant also submitted a letter from [Mr C], [an official] of [an organisation], dated [in] September 2014. In his letter, [Mr C] stated that he has known the applicant since he came to Australia and that the applicant has conveyed to him his story and the risk he will face in Lebanon.
The Departmental Interview
The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister [in] September 2014. Where relevant, the applicant’s evidence to the delegate is referred to below.
The delegate refused to grant the visa [in] January 2015. The delegate found that the applicant is currently involved in an acrimonious financial divorce settlement with his ex-wife, which will be decided in the courts in Lebanon. The delegate did not accept that the applicant’s father-in-law has influence and power in Lebanon, including within the March 14 Coalition. She did not accept that members of the March 14 Coalition would be interested in becoming involved in the divorce settlement of the applicant and his ex-wife. The delegate was also not satisfied that the applicant will be targeted for serious harm by non-state actors in Lebanon. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon. Nor was she satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.
Application for Review
The applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision. He was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 15 November 2016 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from [Ms A]. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.
At the hearing, the applicant’s representative submitted medical evidence relating to [Ms A], including a letter from her GP, a letter from her Physiotherapist and a Psychological Assessment report. These documents essentially state that [Ms A] suffers from a range of physical ailments, including [specified ailments], restricting her capacity for daily activity. She also suffers from [further conditions].
In a submission to the Tribunal, dated 14 November 2016, the applicant's representative stated that subsequent to the breakdown of the applicant’s previous relationship, he was handed down a ‘verdict’ to pay the sum of US $[amount] and [amount] Lebanese Lira to his ex-wife. The applicant requested to pay by instalments as he could not afford to pay the lump sum. However, the other party refused this offer and insisted on full payment. The applicant’s lawyer informed him that, if he were to return to Lebanon without having paid the requisite amount, he will be detained at the airport and imprisoned for [term].
It was submitted that the applicant currently has a family in Australia, including a young child. His wife suffers from both physical and mental health issues and she is reliant on the applicant’s support.
The applicant’s representative also provided the Tribunal with untranslated documents with regard to the applicant’s circumstances in Lebanon. However, he was granted further time to submit English translations of the material submitted at the hearing.
On 7 December 2016, the applicant’s representative provided the Tribunal with a copy and translation of a ‘Petition of Execution’, filed in Tripoli on [a date in] May 2016, as well as a letter to the Tribunal from the applicant addressing the concerns raised with him at the Tribunal hearing.
The Petition names [Ms B], the applicant’s ex-wife, as petitioner and the applicant as respondent. According to the Petition, on [a date in] October 2014, an Order was issued by [a specified] Court in Tripoli, ordering the applicant to pay the sum of US $[amount] and [amount] Lebanese Liras to his ex-wife. The latter had also obtained an Order of Provisional Seizure on [the applicant’s] inheritance share’ in a property in lieu of deferred payments of dowry and alimony. It is stated that the Petition was filed due to the applicant’s non-compliance with the orders. The Petition requests that the matter be referred to [a government agency] in order to detain the applicant under the relevant provisions of the law. The Petition also requests that the property seized under temporary orders to be transferred to the applicant’s ex-wife permanently.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal has had regard to the DFAT Country Report Lebanon (published on 25 February 2014); the DFAT Thematic Report-Sectarian Violence in Lebanon (published on 18 December 2013); and DFAT Country Report Lebanon (published on 18 December 2015).
Analysis, Findings and Reasons
The Tribunal had a number of concerns regarding the credibility of aspects of the applicant’s evidence.
First, the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant has significantly exaggerated the power, connections and the influence he has attributed to his former father-in-law, [Mr B].
In the statement attached to his application for a protection visa, the applicant had stated that [Mr B] is ‘very well connected’ in Lebanon. He stated that [Mr B] is the owner of a successful [company] and some of his partners are from the PLO. He is also associated with [an official] of the ADP. He claimed that the PLO was persuaded by [Mr B] to demand extortion from the applicant, which resulted in the applicant selling his [business], declaring bankruptcy and fleeing from Lebanon. The applicant stated that he is fearful of [Mr B] and, ‘through him’, the PLO and the ADP.
In his oral evidence to the delegate, the applicant stated that it was [Mr B], a former [occupation], who had to declare himself bankrupt in the 1990s after he experienced problems with others and accumulated a large amount of debt. He stated that this resulted in [Mr B] departing Lebanon and residing abroad for a number of years. He stated that [Mr B] was involved in business deals with supporters of the PLO and ADP. The applicant also departed Lebanon for [Country 1] because he had no other financial means. When he was asked by the delegate, given these circumstances, how [Mr B] is powerful or influential in Lebanon, the applicant responded that [Mr B] was with the PLO before he left Lebanon, but he joined the March 14 Coalition upon his return. When again asked how [Mr B] is powerful, he said members of March 14 Coalition helped his former father-in-law return to Lebanon and that [Mr B] had changed political sides.
The applicant’s oral evidence to the delegate was put to him at the hearing under s.424AA of the Act. He responded that [Mr B] had not asked the PLO to extort the applicant. However, after [Mr B] departed Lebanon, the PLO approached the applicant, asking for money. His ex-wife sold the applicant’s [business] to cover her father’s debts. When he was reminded that, in his evidence to the Tribunal earlier, he had stated that he had closed his [business] because the business was not profitable, he responded that he had closed the [business] but he did not sell it because it was not in his name.
In his post hearing submission, the applicant offered further explanations, stating that [Mr B] is ‘a very influential and dangerous man’. He is in the [related] business and has associations with the PLO and the ADB. His influence and connections attracted ‘troubles and enmities’, affecting the applicant. He stated that [Mr B] was declared bankrupt and left Lebanon in [the 1990s]. His creditors then started ‘hassling and threatening’ the applicant. The ‘pressure’ resulted in the sale of the applicant’s [business]. Whist he had purchased the [business] with his own money, ‘the legal title’ was not in the applicant’s name which enabled his ex-wife to sell the [business] to repay her father's debt.
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s explanations. However, the Tribunal is unable to reconcile certain inconsistencies in his evidence. For example, there is no clear explanation as to why the applicant had claimed in his written statement that the PLO ‘were convinced’ by [Mr B] to ‘demand extortion’ from the applicant, why he had claimed that he had to declare bankruptcy, why he had claimed that he had to flee Lebanon and why he had provided no information about [Mr B’s] financial circumstances. The Tribunal is also unable to reconcile the applicant’s evidence that he had closed his [business] because it was not profitable and his evidence that his ‘bankruptcy’ was not the result of his commercial failure. As these inconsistencies essentially arise from what was stated by the applicant in writing to the Department, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s contentions at the hearing and in his post-hearing submission that the inconsistencies in his evidence ‘during the Departmental interview were solely due to miscommunication/misunderstanding on the interpreter’s part’. In addition, the applicant was represented by his registered migration agent throughout the process. At no point during the interview or following the interview the applicant had raised any concerns in relation to interpreting at the interview.
The Tribunal, therefore, does not find the applicant’s account of his commercial activities and financial affairs in Lebanon reliable and persuasive. The Tribunal also does not accept the applicant’s account of [Mr B’s] commercial activities, financial affairs and profile in Lebanon reliable and persuasive. The Tribunal is of the view that the applicant has significantly exaggerated [Mr B’s] profile, power, connections and the extent of his influence. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s claims in this regard. Specifically, the Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B] was with the PLO. Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B] and members of his family are ‘with’ the March 14 Coalition. The Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B] has strong connections with, or influence over, March 14 Coalition, or their members and supporters. Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B] has strong connections with, or influence over, the ADP or their leaders, members and supporters. The Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B], or any member of his family, has any intention or capacity to harm the applicant through his claimed influence over the PLO, the ADP or March 14 Coalition.
Secondly, the applicant provided inconsistent evidence in relation to the threats he claims to have received following his departure from Lebanon.
In his oral evidence to the delegate, the applicant stated that, on one occasion, his [Relative 1] had received an indirect verbal threat from his former father-in-law. He stated that his father-in-law had told his [Relative 1] that if the applicant were to return to Lebanon ‘we know how to deal with him’. At the hearing, however, the applicant stated, about two months after he came to Australia, his ex-wife’s [relatives] went to his [Relative 1] and told him that they would harm the applicant. He stated that his ex-wife’s [relatives] belong to March 14 Coalition.
At the hearing, the applicant’s oral evidence to the delegate was put to him under s.424AA of the Act. He responded that the threats were from [Mr B], but his ex-wife’s [relatives] were communicating these threats. He stated that the interview was held two years ago and, at that time, he had information that [Mr B] had threatened his [Relative 1]. He later found out that his ex-wife’s [relatives] had made the threats. The applicant added that the interpreting was not accurate at the interview.
In his post hearing submission, the applicant offered further explanations, stating that ‘upon an encounter with [his] [Relative 1] on the streets, [his] ex-wife's [relatives] had threatened to harm [him]’. He stated that he later found out that they had made the threat under [Mr B’s] instructions. Therefore, he told the Department that the threats were made by his father-in-law. He stated that he considers [Mr B] the ‘mastermind’ and the rest of the family members are his ‘pawns’. The threat communicated to his [Relative 1] by his ex-wife’s [relatives] was orchestrated by [Mr B].
The Tribunal does not find these explanations satisfactory. The applicant claims that the threat was conveyed to his [Relative 1] about two months after he came to Australia. He was interviewed by the Department six months later. If the applicant initially knew that the threat was conveyed by his ex-wife’s [relatives] and only later he had found out that they were acting under [Mr B’s] instructions, it makes little sense that he had not disclosed these facts to the Department. As Noted above, the applicant had told the Department that his father-in-law had communicated the threat to his [Relative 1]. The Tribunal has already rejected the applicant’s explanation that the inconsistencies in his evidence are due to interpreting errors. The Tribunal finds the applicant’s claim in relation to the threat made against him in Lebanon unreliable and unconvincing. The Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B], his ex-wife’s [relatives] or anyone else had threatened the applicant through his [Relative 1] or in any other way.
In making the above findings, the Tribunal has had regard to the applicant’s delay of four months in making an application for a protection visa. In his written statement to the Department, the applicant stated that he had twice applied, unsuccessfully, for a waiver of condition 8503 imposed on his [temporary] visa. He also stated that had not mentioned his problems previously because he felt that it was ‘a peculiarly Lebanese matter that is difficult for outsiders from civilised democracies such as Australia to fathom’. At the hearing, the applicant also stated that he had tried to extend his [temporary] visa because of the problems with his ex-wife, as well as the fact that his current wife’s mother was suffering from [a medical condition] and he wanted to support his wife. When his visa was not extended, he applied for protection. In his post hearing submission, the applicant repeated the same explanation. The applicant went on to state ‘I do not fear the imprisonment or detainment in Lebanon for non-payment of the divorce settlement money. I fear the harm that my ex-wife's family will inflict upon me for divorcing her and then leaving Australia without payment’. He stated that he had received threats before and he took the chance to leave Lebanon because he knew ‘sooner or later they will take the steps to kill [him]’. In the Tribunal's view, if the applicant had received threats before and he had left Lebanon because he knew he would be harmed, he would have applied for a protection visa soon after he arrive in Australia instead of attempting to extend his [temporary] visa. The Tribunal, therefore, does not accept that at the time of his departure from Lebanon the applicant had a genuine fear of being harmed.
The Tribunal, however, accepts that the applicant was married to [Ms B] in 1990. The Tribunal accepts that he has [children] from that marriage, [named]. The Tribunal accepts that he resided in [Country 1] from 1998 to 2012 and that, soon after he returned to Lebanon, he separated from [Ms B]. He then engaged a lawyer and the couple were finally divorced [in] February 2014. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s relationship with [Ms B] was volatile and their separation was acrimonious. The Tribunal accepts that under the contract of his Islamic marriage, the applicant had agreed to pay [Ms B] US $[amount] in the event of divorce. The Tribunal accepts that his offer to pay this amount in instalments was rejected by [Ms B]. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant then departed Lebanon for Australia without making any payments to [Ms B]. A court subsequently ruled in [Ms B’s] favour, requiring the applicant to pay US $[amount], as well as [amount] Lebanese Liras in alimony payments. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is liable to pay this amount and that his failure to do so may result in him being prosecuted and detained by the authorities. The Tribunal accepts that, under Lebanese law, he may be prevented from leaving Lebanon until he has fulfilled his legal obligations.
In his written statement, the applicant stated that he faces ‘serious danger from the ALP. However, the remainder of his statement clearly indicated that he is, in fact, a supporter of the ALP. At the interview and the Tribunal hearing the applicant also reiterated that he was close to [key party supporters] as a child and that he is, and imputed to be, a low level supporter of Faisal Karami, the head of the ALP, which is aligned with the March 8 Coalition.[1] The Tribunal is prepared to accept this claim.
[1] See Lebanon announces cabinet line-up, Now, 13 June 2011,
As it was put to the applicant at the hearing, his possible detention and inability to depart Lebanon would be as a result of enforcement of a generally applicable law requiring the applicant to pay child support and money owed to his ex-wife under their marriage contract, which does not constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention. There is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the law in question is discriminatory, or is applied in a discriminatory way towards the applicant for a Convention reason. In his post-hearing submission, the applicant acknowledged that ‘the payment of the divorce settlement monies is a matter of general law which is applicable to everyone in Lebanon’. The applicant also stated ‘I do not fear the imprisonment or detainment in Lebanon for non-payment of the divorce settlement money. I fear the harm that my ex-wife's family will inflict upon me for divorcing her and then leaving Australia without payment’. The applicant reiterated at the hearing that he will be harmed by his ex-wife’s family if he were to return to Lebanon. He claimed that [Mr B] and his family are close minded. They are against divorce and consider it a taboo. He also stated that his ex-wife’s family are against [Faisal Karami], because they are with March 14 Coalition; and that [Mr B] might bring it to March 14 Coalition’s attention that the applicant supports Faisal Karami in order to harm him.
The Tribunal has rejected the applicant’s claims that [Mr B] is powerful, well connected and influential. The Tribunal has rejected the applicant’s claims that [Mr B], or any member of his family, has any intention or capacity to harm the applicant through his claimed influence over the PLO, the ADP or March 14 Coalition. The Tribunal has also rejected the applicant’s claim that [Mr B], his ex-wife’s [relatives] or anyone else had threatened the applicant through his [Relative 1] or in any other way in connection with the applicant’s divorce from [Ms B]. Indeed, as it was put to the applicant at the hearing, following the separation, he lived in Tripoli between September 2012 and January 2014 in a house that belonged to [Mr B]. During this period he initiated divorce proceedings, instructed a lawyer to act on his behalf and negotiated with [Mr B]. He did not claim to have been harmed in any way during this time. The Tribunal, therefore, does not accept that [Mr B] and his family would harm the applicant because they are against divorce and consider it a taboo or that [Mr B] had not previously harmed the applicant ‘out of his greed’ or in order not to make [one of his daughters] a widow, as contended by the applicant. The Tribunal does not accept that [Mr B] would encourage March 14 Coalition supporters to harm the applicant because of his support for Faisal Karami. In the Tribunal's view, the fact that the applicant was not subjected to any form of harm, let alone serious harm, during that period reinforces the Tribunal's finding that [Mr B] and members of his family had no intention to harm the applicant.
The Tribunal accepts that, on one occasion after the applicant came to Australia, one of his [children] posted a comment on [social media], essentially stating that the applicant was dead. The applicant stated at the hearing that he knows his [child] would not kill him, but [was] conveying what [the] grandfather would do. The Tribunal does not accept this interpretation. In his oral evidence to the delegate and to the Tribunal, the applicant acknowledged that his [child] was angry at [the] parent’s marital situation. At the hearing, he also stated that he had received no other ‘threats’ from his [child]. The Tribunal is of the view that the applicant’s [child’s social media] comments were a mere spontaneous expression of [personal] anger and hurt following the applicant’s acrimonious separation from his wife and his subsequent departure from Lebanon.
As it was put to the applicant at the hearing, in the Tribunal's view, his ex-wife and her family are only interested in recovering the ‘settlement’ money. They have pursued the matter through legitimate legal means to recover what is legally owed by the applicant to [Ms B] under the ‘divorce settlement’. As it was also put to the applicant at the hearing, harming or killing the applicant would not assist [Ms B] in recovering the debt. The applicant stated in his post-hearing submission that he intends to eventually repay the settlement money.
The Tribunal, therefore, does not accept that, if the applicant were to return to Lebanon, he would be subjected to serious harm or significant harm at the hands of [Mr B] or members of his family in Lebanon. The Tribunal does not accept that, if the applicant were to be detained in Lebanon, he would be subjected to serious or significant harm by anyone acting under the instructions, influence or guidance of [Mr B] or anyone else. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would be subjected to serious or significant harm at the hands of the authorities acting under the instructions, influence or guidance of [Mr B] or anyone else.
The applicant did not claim that he was ever targeted or harmed by anyone in Lebanon for the reason of his support Faisal Karami. Whilst he claimed that during the 1994, 2000 and 2006 elections he had assisted the ALP with some [administrative support], he did not claim to have been involved in any other political activities. In his written statement, the applicant claimed that he is against the March 14 Coalition and some leaders in the Coalition. However, he did not pursue this claim before the Tribunal. When questioned about his political activities in Lebanon, he only referred to the assistance he had provided to the ALP during elections. He did not claim to have been engaged in activity against, or to have expressed any views in opposition to, the March 14 Coalition.
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s reference to a January 2013 attack on Mr Karami's convoy in Tripoli by Salafi gunmen. As noted by the applicant in his written claims, at that time, Mr Karami enjoyed a high profile as a Minister in Mr Mikati’s then government. However, there is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that ordinary members and supporters of Mr Karami or the ALP are being targeted by Salafi gunmen or anyone else.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant would be subjected to serious harm in Lebanon at the hands of members and supporters of March 12 Coalition, radical Salafi militias or anyone else for the reason of his political opinion, his religion or membership of any particular social group, including his own family, those close to or associated with [Mr Karami] or any other social group apparent on the face of the evidence. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real risk that the applicant would face significant harm for reasons arising from his political opinion, his religion or his ‘closeness’ to [key party supporters].
The information contained in DFAT’s most recent Country Report in relation to Lebanon states that prisons in Lebanon are often overcrowded and lack adequate food or medical care. In addition, access to visits and lawyers is sporadic and not always guaranteed. DFAT also reported that it is aware of claims of torture in detention and prison. The report referred to videos showing prisoners being beaten in Lebanon’s largest prison, Roumieh, in June 2015. The prisoners in the videos, reported to be extremists, being beaten, kicked and slapped while handcuffed. It was noted that suspects arrested in relation to sectarian violence or extremism, as well as refugees, are at a particularly high risk of suffering from torture at the hands of Lebanese authorities.[2]
[2] DFAT, Country Report Lebanon, 18 December 2015.
The Tribunal accepts that prison conditions in Lebanon may be poor. However, there is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant would be regarded as an extremist, as a person suspected of involvement in sectarian violence or as a refugee. The evidence before the Tribunal does not establish, and the Tribunal is not satisfied, that the applicant will be singled out for torture or mistreatment, that he will be subjected to excessive punishment or that he will be treated any differently for any Convention reason. The Tribunal finds that the applicant’s detention in Lebanon, albeit in poor conditions, is the result of the non-discriminatory enforcement of a law of general application. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real risk that the applicant will be subjected to torture, or any other form of, mistreatment amounting to significant harm as a consequence of being detained or during any period which he may spend in prison upon his return. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm during any period which he may spend in prison.
The Tribunal has considered the department’s PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines in relation to imprisonment/prison conditions. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the detention conditions the applicant would most likely face, including overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions, amount to any form of significant harm as contemplated by s.36(2A). In addition, there is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that there is any intention to cause the applicant suffering by virtue of those conditions. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as a consequence of the poor conditions in prisons during any period which he may spend in detention on remand.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on the applicant for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)-(e) of the definition of torture in s.5(1). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer harm that would involve the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering or pain or suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of degrading treatment or punishment in s.5(1) which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer arbitrary deprivation of his life or the death penalty.
In his evidence, the applicant referred to general violence, religious conflict and political tension in Lebanon. However, there is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the tensions, lack of general security and any instability the applicant may be concerned about is faced by him personally. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the general security situation in Lebanon would expose the applicant to a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason.
Under s.36(2B)(c) of the Act there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm if the Tribunal is satisfied that the real risk is one faced by the population generally and is not faced by the applicant personally. The Tribunal is satisfied that the tensions, lack of general security and the instability the applicant fears are faced by the population generally and not by him personally. The Tribunal finds that there is no real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in Lebanon as a result of lack of general security and instability.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant and [Ms A], an Australian citizen, are married and have a [young] child together. The Tribunal accepts that [Ms A] suffers from a range of physical and psychological ailments and that she is reliant on the applicant in carrying out her daily activities. The Tribunal very much appreciates the challenges posed by this difficult situation. The Tribunal, however, is satisfied that [Ms A] and the applicant’s circumstances in Australia do not engage Australia’s protection obligations under the Refugees Convention or under s.36(2)(aa) in respect of the applicant.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
Shahyar Roushan
Senior Member
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Immigration
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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