1417564 (Refugee)
[2017] AATA 129
•4 January 2017
1417564 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 129 (4 January 2017)
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DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 1417564
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Turkey
MEMBER:Frances Simmons
DATE:4 January 2017
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants Protection visas.
Statement made on 04 January 2017 at 5:05pm
CATCHWORDS
Refugee – Protection visa – Turkey – Religion – Alevis – Political opinion – Anti-government protests – Particular social group – Discrimination – Women – Freedom of worship – Employment – Physical assault
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 91R, 91S, 425, 499
Migration Regulations 1994
Acts Interpretation Act1901, ss 2, 25C
CASES
MZAIC v MIBP FCAFC 25
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347
Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
SZBQJ v MIMIA [2005] FCA 143
SZBBP v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 5
MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FMCA 13
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicants Protection visas under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). The applicants are a husband and wife and their three dependent children, two of whom were born in Australia. The first named applicant, [the applicant husband, named], first arrived in Australia on December 2008. He returned to Turkey [in] March 2009 and re-entered Australia with his wife and eldest child [in] November 2009. The second named applicant, [the applicant wife, named], travelled back to Turkey for a month in December 2010 before returning to Australia.
The applicants, who claim to be citizens of Turkey, applied for protection visas [in] January 2014 and the delegate refused to grant the visas [in] September 2014. Before they travelled to Australia, the adult applicants lived in Istanbul. In summary, the adult applicants claimed that they are of the Alevi faith and, because of their faith, they have suffered discrimination. [The applicant husband] claimed he has been assaulted and mistreated because of his faith and because he has been politically active in support of Alevi rights.
The delegate refused to grant the applicants protection visas and they applied to Tribunal for review of this decision. The adult applicants appeared before the Tribunal on 7 March 2016, 15 August 2016, and 19 September 2016 to give evidence and present arguments. Claims were also presented on behalf of the child applicants. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Turkish and English languages. The applicants were represented in relation to the review by their registered migration agent.
RELEVANT LAW
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Refugee criterion
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.
There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.
Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.
Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.
Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.
Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.
In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.
Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.
Complementary protection criterion
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.
Section 499 Ministerial Direction
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal has considered the latest DFAT Country Information Report on Turkey which was published on 5 September 2016. This report was preceded by DFAT reports published on 11 July 2016 and 2 June 2014.
Member of the same family unit
Subsections 36(2)(b) and (c) provide as an alternative criterion that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in s.36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that one person is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as another if either is a member of the family unit of the other or each is a member of the family unit of a third person. Section 5(1) also provides that ‘member of the family unit’ of a person has the meaning given by the Regulations for the purposes of the definition. The expression is defined in r.1.12 of the Regulations to include a spouse and dependent children.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Background
[The applicant parents] are citizens of Turkey and together they have three children, two of whom were born in Australia. [The applicant parents] married in 2001. In their protection visa applications [they] indicate that they speak, read and write Turkish and English. In his protection visa application [the applicant husband] states that between 2003 and 2008 he worked as a manager at [Employer 1] in Istanbul. In her protection visa application [the applicant wife] states she is not currently employed and that the last job she held was between 2001 and 2002 when she worked as an [occupation 1].
[The applicant husband] was granted a [temporary] visa in December 2008 and he arrived in Australia [in] December 2008. He departed Australia [in] March 2009. [The applicant husband] applied for a [different temporary] visa in June 2009 and that visa was granted [in] October 2009. [The applicant husband] and the couple’s eldest child were dependents on the visa grant. [The applicant parents] and their eldest child arrived in Australia [in] November 2009. [The applicant wife] departed Australia with her son [in] December 2010 to visit her family and they arrived back in Australia [in] January 2011. [The applicant husband] remained in Australia. A further [temporary] visa was granted [in] January 2011. [Tthe applicant husband] lodged an application for a [different temporary] visa in January 2012 and he was granted that visa [in] July 2012.[1]
[1] This history is set out in the delegate’s decision record a copy of which was provided to the Tribunal with the application for review.
[In] January 2014 the applicants applied for a protection visa.
Application to the Department
In his protection visa application[2] and his first statement[3] of claims [the applicant husband] states he left Turkey because he was beaten, tortured, and discriminated against and downgraded by the Turkish authorities, ordinary people and employers in Turkey for being Alevi. He claims that he was discriminated against in employment; subjected to abuse, mistreatment and pressure during the months of Ramadan, ostracised during his education, and abused and discriminated against in the course of military services. He claims that he has suffered discrimination all his life because he is of the Alevi faith. He claims that he was beaten once while at school when his teacher found out he was an Alevi, forced to stand on one foot and not allowed to play in the school yard, he was threatened with violence, and subject to heavy discrimination.
[2] Departmental file, folio 85-88.
[3] Departmental file, folio 99-105
[The applicant husband] also claims that he faced discrimination and non-preferential treatment when he served in the military and he was beaten about 15-20 times during his service. He claims that he faced discrimination in employment, particularly in the public service. He claims that his friends would verbally abuse him because he was Alevi and accuse him of having sex with family members. He claims that his [name] caused problems for him all the time as [it relates to] the way the Alevis do their worship and [a related word] [has a religious meaning].
[The applicant husband] claims that following a football match in 2000 a chaotic gathering occurred in the street. He was not part of the group but he was caught up in the protest and, along with many others, arrested and detained by the police who sprayed tear gas on the crowd. The police labelled him as an instigator; they recognised him as an Alevi because he was wearing the sword of Ali around his neck. He claims that he was detained along with a lot of other people. He was accused of being a provocateur during the protests about the closure of the Cem houses and he was severely beaten. After he was released he had to seek treatment for the injuries he sustained during this incident.
[The applicant husband] claims that he organised about twenty of his friends to attend a protest in 2005 about the attacks to the Cemevi in [his district]. He claims that he was beaten by the police and detained in [a named] police station for three days, during which time he was tortured. His [limb] was broken due to the torture and he received treatment for it. He claims that after going through so much abuse, discrimination and mistreatment, it was only because he was an Alevi he decided to leave Turkey in order to escape continued abuse, discrimination and mistreatment. He does not want his children to go through similar mistreatment. He claims that if he returns to Turkey he will be mistreated, oppressed, discriminated against and subject to violence.
[The applicant husband] expanded upon his claims in an interview with the delegate [in] August 2014, which The Tribunal has listened to. After this interview, [the applicant husband] provided a second statement dated [in] August 2014.[4] In his statement [he] said that the main reason he came to Australia was to ‘escape persecution’. He reiterated his claims that he was detained and mistreated in 2005 and during the three day detention he was tortured and beaten so badly that his [limb] was broken and he required medical treatment.
[4] Departmental file, folio 108-109.
[The applicant husband] claimed that after this incident the danger to his life did not stop. He was verbally abused and beaten severely by three people in May 2006 when he left [a named location] in Istanbul. He also claimed that he was verbally abused and attacked in April 2008 by two workers named [names]. This happened in [Employer 1] in Istanbul where he worked for about five and half years. It was not the first time these workers targeted him. They used to insult Alevis, accuse Alevis of having incestuous relationship with their mothers and sisters and force him to attend Friday prayers.
[The applicant husband] claims that at the time he left Turkey he had a positive relationship with his employer and did not want to lose him as an employee but his employer understood that [the applicant husband] should leave Turkey and provided him with documentation of his employment. He arrived in Australia [in] December 2008 and returned to Turkey [in] March 2009. He returned to Turkey because he did not know that he was able to apply for a protection visa and he lacked the knowledge to do so. He also thought that he could go back to Turkey to bring his wife and son to Australia as well as his wife was also exposed to abuse, mistreatment and discrimination for being an Alevi.
Claims made by [the applicant wife]
In [the applicant wife’s] written claims[5] she states that she left Turkey because she was discriminated against, abused, insulted and unfairly treated due to her Alevi identity and faith. She claims that many people are too scared to attend Cemhouses, fearing they will be targeted in various ways, including being beaten, discriminated against and denied employment. [The applicant wife] claims that she has suffered discrimination in employment in the past and she claims that she was ‘refused employment by several workplaces’, when they found she was of Alevi faith. She claims that she was sacked from an [employer] in Istanbul where she worked for two years after her manager found out she was of Alevi faith.
[5] Departmental file, folio 99-101; folio 70-73.
[The applicant wife] also claims that her neighbour rejected her food because of her religious identity and she found this insulting and degrading. She claimed she suffered more severe forms of discrimination at school: she recounts an incident that occurred to her in primary school where she was ostracised and mistreated by her classmates and claims that her teachers discriminated against and abused her because of her Alevi identity. [The applicant wife’s] claims that when her son started primary school she and her husband cautioned her son not to tell anyone he was Alevi because they did not want him to experience similar problems to the ones that they did.
[The applicant wife] arrived in Australia in February 2009. At the time she was hopeful the situation in Turkey would improve and they could return to Turkey. However, so far the developments have not been promising. In the current political environment if they return to Turkey they will face abuse, oppression, and discrimination. [The applicant wife] expanded upon these claims at the interview with the delegate [in] August 2014. The Tribunal has listened to the audio recording of this interview.
After the interview the applicant’s representative also made a complaint about the quality of the interpretation at the interview the applicants attended with the delegate.
The delegate’s decision
The delegate accepted the applicants were of Alevi faith. The delegate’s decision notes that people of the Alevi faith are estimated to comprise about twenty to twenty-five per cent of Turkey’s population of 80.7 million people. The delegate’s view was that while country information indicated that Alevis in Turkey are likely to encounter discrimination, the country information did not indicate that all Alevis are at risk of persecution.
The delegate noted that when the applicant was asked why he returned to Turkey in 2009, he said that at the time he did not know what a refugee meant. The delegate did not accept this was plausible and noted that, even if the applicant planned to apply for a [temporary] visa when he departed Australia, there was no guarantee that this visa would be granted.
The delegate noted that after returning Australia in 2009 [the applicant husband] did not lodge an application for a protection visa until 2014 but did apply for a [different temporary] visa in 2012. The delegate noted that [the applicant husband] stated he did not lodge an application for protection sooner because he thought the situation in Turkey would improve. The delegate did not accept this explanation.
The delegate did not accept that [the applicant husband] had been targeted by the Turkish authorities and harmed or that he had been politically active in Turkey or that he had been detained and mistreated by the authorities or that he was beaten by his colleagues. The delegate accepted that [the applicant husband] was of the Alevi faith but did not accept that there was a real chance that he would face serious harm or significant harm for this reason.
With respect to the claims advanced by [the applicant wife], the delegate noted [her] concern that people would reject her food and, when they discovered her religion, they distanced themselves from her but found such treatment did not amount to persecution. The delegate concluded that, having regard to the country information about the treatment of Alevis, [the applicant wife] was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations.
Because the delegate found that neither of the adult applicants were persons to whom Australia had protection obligations, the delegate also refused to grant the three dependent applicants protection visas.
Application to the Tribunal
Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction with respect to the adult applicants children
At the first Tribunal hearing the Tribunal drew to the attention of the adult applicants that their children were not named as applicants on the review application form. The response of the adult applicants and their representative indicates that this was an oversight for which their representative was responsible. The adult applicants stated that they intended to include their children in their application for review and believed they had done so.
The Tribunal has considered whether, in these circumstances, it has before it valid applications for review in respects of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant protection visas to [the applicant’s children]. At the hearing the Tribunal discussed with the adult applicants the issue of whether it had jurisdiction with respect to the child applicants and the applicants made submissions about this issue.
Section 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act1901 (the AIA) provides that ‘Where an Act prescribes a form, then strict compliance with the form is not required and substantial compliance is sufficient’.[6] Although the Migration Act does not ‘prescribe’ a form for Part 7 review applications, it does refer to an ‘approved form’. Section 25C of the AIA applies to the making of an application in the approved form, with the Full Federal Court in MZAIC v MIBP holding that the correct question to be asked was whether the application for review was made in, or substantially in, the approved form.[7]
[6] Subject to a contrary intention, the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 applies to all legislative instruments, notifiable instruments and other instruments: s.2 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
[7] [2016] FCAFC 25 (Kenny, Tracey, Buchanan, Robertson and Mortimer JJ, 9 March 2016) at [51], [52], [58] and [135].
In this particular case while the online application for review form does not identify the dependent children as applicants for review, the approved form does identify the applicants’ were seeking review of the delegate’s decision dated [in] September 2014 and attached a copy of this decision to the application for review. Relevantly, the delegate’s decision refuses to grant protection visas to the adult applicants and their three dependent children. In these circumstances, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the application for review is an application to review the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant protection visas to [all the applicants, named].
In these circumstances the Tribunal finds that the children of the adult applicants have made valid applications for review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant them protection visas. The Tribunal finds that the application for review is an application to review the decisions with respect to the adult applicants and their three dependents. The Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction with respect to the application for review by the child applicants. The Tribunal notes that, even if it did not have jurisdiction with respect to the three child applicants, it would not change its decision with respect to the two adult applicants.
The Tribunal notes that, in accordance with its obligations under s 425 of the Act, the child applicants were invited to the hearing on 19 September 2016. While the child applicants did not attend this hearing, the adult applicants put forward claims on behalf of their children. These claims are considered below in the assessment of claims and evidence.
Evidence presented at the Tribunal hearings
The Tribunal has considered the adult applicants’ evidence at the hearings on 7 March 2016, 15 August 2016, and 19 September 2016. Before the Tribunal the adult applicants claimed they were of the Alevi faith and that they continue to practise their faith in Australia. The Tribunal questioned the applicants about the problems they claim to have experienced in Turkey because of their religious beliefs and activities and their political beliefs and activities. The applicants were provided with opportunities to put forward any other claims they wished to make and to present claims on behalf of their children. Where relevant their evidence is discussed further below in the assessment of claims and evidence.
During the hearings the Tribunal discussed with the applicants country information about the treatment of Alevis in Turkey, including recent reports from the United Kingdom Home Office and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Where relevant this country information and the applicants’ responses are discussed further below in the Assessment of Claims and Evidence.
The Tribunal also discussed the issue of relocation with the applicants. The Tribunal put to the applicants that even if it accepted that the applicants faced a real chance of being harmed in Istanbul, it was not clear why they could not relocate to part of Turkey that was dominated by Alevis (such as Tunceli province where 95 % of the population is Alevi) to avoid the harm they feared. [The applicant wife] said the eastern part of the country is in the hands of the PKK. In central parts of the country there were attacks on Alevis and they were being killed. [The applicant husband] also claimed that the only way they could avoid the harm that they feared was to be silent; the silent majority could live in Alevi dominated areas if they remained silent. The Tribunal put to the applicants that country information (set out below) indicated that Alevis were able to freely express their faith and identity. [The applicant husband] responded that if you’re silent you can live.
The applicant’s representative made oral submissions. He emphasised that if the children freely expressed their identity in Turkey this could make them targets. The representative noted that the fact that there were no Alevi governors demonstrated the level of discrimination in employment and the DFAT report indicated that Alevis still preferred to hide their identities. The applicants would not hide their identity and were active people and this would cause them trouble.
In addition to their oral evidence to the Tribunal, the applicants provided additional documentation B.
The Tribunal has considered support letters from the Principal and the school counsellor at the primary school attended by [the third named applicant]. The Principal writes that [the third named applicant], who is school captain in 2016, is an exemplary student and sportsman and a leader in his school community. A letter from his school counsellor observing that he has been uncharacteristically emotional and is frightened about returning to a country where bombs go off and kill people and where he fears that his family will be harmed.
The Tribunal has considered a statutory declaration from [Mr A], which affirms he is a religious figure known as ‘Dede’ within the Alevi community and which states that he has known the adult applicants for about three years and he is aware that they are of Alevi religious background and that they actively participate in the activities of the Alevi community in Sydney, including the Cem activities conducted by him. The statutory declaration sets out the [Mr A’s] views about the situation of Alevi people in Turkey and asserts that many people are scared to attend Cemhouses, fearing that they would be black listed and targeted in various ways.
The Tribunal has considered a medical certificate dated [in] June 2005 which indicates that [the applicant husband] received treatment at [a specified] Hospital. He was diagnosed with [a specified] fracture, battery and striking by another person, and [marks on] various parts of the body.
The Tribunal has considered support letters for [the applicant husband] from [a named Australian] Football Club.
The Tribunal has considered a psychologist’s report with respect to [the applicant wife] dated [March] 2016.[The applicant wife] told the psychologist that her husband was involved in organisations that belong to religious Alevi groups which caused discrimination, harassment and fear of persecution to their family. The psychologist considered her presentation was consistent with ‘generalised anxiety disorder with panic attacks’. The psychologist considered her symptoms of GAD were a direct result of her negative life experiences.
The Tribunal has considered a statement from [the applicant husband] (the third statement) dated [March] 2016[8]reiterating his claims that he would be harmed if he returned to Turkey and detailing his past experiences of harm in Turkey.
[8] Tribunal file, folio 87-88.
The Tribunal has also had regard to the country information reports submitted on behalf of the applicants about the situation of Alevis in Turkey. These include news articles that report that six Alevi homes in the eastern province of Turkey were tagged with yellow homes causing concern amongst the Alevi community as well as reports concerning how the States compulsory [Sunni Islamic] religious classes discriminate against Alevi students.
Country Information
The latest DFAT country information report published on 5 September 2016 provides the following assessment of the situation of Alevis in Turkey:
4.39 Alevis are the largest non-Sunni religious minority in Turkey (see ‘Demography’). Credible academic estimates suggest ten to 15 per cent of Turkey’s population is Alevi, although the community claims it is closer to 30 per cent … An estimated 1.5 million Alevis attend Cemevi monthly. Alevis are widely distributed across Turkey, but are concentrated in central and inner-eastern Anatolia, Istanbul and other major cities. Tunceli is the centre of the Alevi faith and 95 per cent of its population is Alevi.
Official Discrimination
4.40 As the Turkish state does not officially recognise Alevism as a religion, Cemevis are not recognised as official places of worship and do not receive public funding. However, some local governments are starting to provide land or other forms of support. A European Court of Human Rights decision in December 2014 stated that the Turkish Government should pay the electricity bills of Cemevis as this was the practice for mosques. This decision has not been implemented widely. There are approximately 3,000 Cemevis across Turkey. Alevi groups argue that this number is insufficient to meet the needs of their community and that they have difficulty in securing the necessary Government approvals to build further Cemevis. Alevis cannot establish schools in which to train their clergy.
4.41 Unlike the Lausanne minorities, Alevi children are not exempt from mandatory religious and ethics classes in public schools. In recent years, religious and ethics classes have begun to include limited elements of other faiths, including Alevism. Alevi groups have been consulted on parts of the course that cover Alevism, but feel that the coverage of Alevism remains cursory. Alevi groups have argued that content covering Alevism has been included at the end of the school year, when students are normally absent to begin exam preparation.
4.42 As with other religious minorities, much Alevi property was confiscated in the early period of the Turkish republic. Unlike other religious minorities, Alevi property is not eligible to be returned under a recently enacted decree as the decree refers to confiscations from 1936 onward and the majority of the Alevi property was confiscated in 1924 and 1925.
4.43 In 2013 the Government publicly claimed that it had undertaken extensive consultations with the Alevi community in regard to the community’s concerns and was considering providing some concessions. The only outcome, however, was the renaming of Nevsehir University to Haci Bektas Veli after a prominent Alevi figure. As part of its campaign for the November 2015 parliamentary elections, the AKP undertook to provide legal recognition for Cemevis.
4.44 Like other minority groups, Alevis are able to secure public sector employment, including in the military, but many report they do not feel comfortable revealing their religion. Securing promotions can be difficult if they are open about their Alevi identity. There are few, if any, Alevi police chiefs in Turkey. There are no Alevi Governors in any of the 81 provinces of Turkey.
4.45 Alevis in Turkey enjoy many religious freedoms: they are generally free to gather in Cemevis to undertake religious ceremonies and in many spheres of life can freely express their identity without fear of discrimination. Increasingly, municipal governments in Alevi-majority areas are providing financial support for Alevi cultural institutions. DFAT is not aware of any discrimination against Alevis in terms of access to health care or education, other than the requirement to undertake Islamic religious classes.
Societal Discrimination
4.46 Alevis are often accepted as an integral part of Turkish society. The leader of the CHP is an Alevi and up to 40 Alevis are believed to be represented in Parliament in 2016 (including 30 in the CHP; five in the BDP and two in the AKP). Alevis are able to obtain employment in the private sector or run their own businesses, and to celebrate their annual religious holidays, although these are not recognised as official holidays. The three main Alevi Foundations are able to operate freely and advocate on behalf of the community. However, despite the size of the Alevi community, Alevis keep a low profile within society and many Alevis still prefer to hide their identity, especially from Sunni Muslims. Overall, DFAT assesses that Alevis face low levels of societal discrimination on the basis of religion.
Violence
4.47 The Alevi community has suffered significant violence in the past. Over 30 Alevis were killed in 1993 when a Sunni mob set fire to a hotel in Sivas, in which an Alevi group was holding a cultural celebration. Authorities did not intervene at the time, but later tried and convicted many of those responsible. Following a range of discussions with representatives of the Alevi community, DFAT is not aware of significant instances of community violence against Alevis in recent years. Some civil society groups claimed that Alevis were killed in the Gezi Park protests in May–July 2013, though none said that this was the result of intentional targeting of Alevis …
4.48 Overall, on the basis that Alevis are generally free to practise their faith, express their identity, find employment and achieve political representation, DFAT assesses that Alevis are at a low risk of violence on the basis of their religion.
The Tribunal has considered the country information provided by the applicant’s representative in relation to the treatment of Alevis in Turkey, including reports from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.[9] The Tribunal has also had regard to the country information cited in the delegate’s decision and more recent country information, including a country of origin report by the United Kingdom Border Agency on the situation of Alevis, which was discussed with at the applicants at the hearing.[10]
ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
[9] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Turkey: Situation of Alevis, including political and religious rights; treatment of Alevis by society and authorities; state protection (June 2012-May 2015), 12 June 2015, TUR105167.E, available at: see also Tribunal file, folios48-52, 90-97.
[10] United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Turkey: Alevis, February 2016, Version 1.0.
Nationality
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal accepts that the applicants are citizens of Turkey.
Credibility assessment
In determining whether the applicant is entitled to protection in Australia, it is necessary to make findings of facts on relevant matters. In assessing the credibility of the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal accepts that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims.[11] I am also mindful that if the Tribunal makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by the applicant but is unable to make that finding with confidence it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true.[12] However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Further, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant has not been made out.[13]
[11] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992 at para 196).
[12] MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
[13] Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
The Tribunal has issued guidelines on the assessment of credibility in protection visa cases, which state, in part:
… The tribunal considers all the material before it and is not restricted to claims and evidence considered by the primary decision-maker. If the review applicant raises new claims or presents material for the first time to the tribunal, the tribunal will consider the credibility of what has been provided, including any reasons for why it was not provided earlier in the application process. There may be good reasons why new information or claims are presented by applicants at a later stage in the application process. These reasons may include stress, anxiety, inadequate immigration advice and uncertainty about the relevance of certain information to an applicant’s claims [footnotes omitted].
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal accepts that the applicants are of the Alevi faith and that, whilst in Australia, they practise their Alevi faith at an Alevi cultural association in [Suburb 1]. The Tribunal accepts that the applicants have three children, two of whom were born in Australia, and that they would prefer to raise their children in Australia. In assessing the adult applicants’ evidence the Tribunal has been mindful that they may have been nervous and anxious appearing before the Tribunal and to the representative’s submission that [the applicant husband] has difficulty expressing himself. The Tribunal has also had regard to the psychologist’s report about [the applicant wife]. However, having observed the applicants to give evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that they were able to understand and respond to the Tribunal’s question and seek clarification when required. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicants had a meaningful opportunity to present their claims and that they had the capacity to do so.
For all the reasons that follow, the Tribunal formed the view that the adult applicants have not been truthful about their reasons for leaving Turkey or why they are afraid of returning to Turkey now. Overall, for the reasons that are set out in detail below, the Tribunal formed the view that the adult applicants were prepared to exaggerate the difficulties that they experienced in Turkey in the hope of securing residency in Australia. For the reasons detailed below, the Tribunal considers that [the applicant husband] has exaggerated the problems that he has faced in Turkey in the past because of his religious beliefs and it does not accept he was politically active in support of Alevi rights or other causes. To the extent that each adult applicant has sought to corroborate the other’s evidence, this does not overcome the Tribunal’sconcerns about the credibility of the applicants’ claims.
The adult applicant’s claims about their past experiences in Turkey
[The applicant husband’s] claims
The Tribunal has carefully considered the evidence [the applicant husband] has presented to Department and the Tribunal about his past experiences in Turkey. The Tribunal accepts that [the applicant husband] is of the Alevi faith and that, while he was living in Turkey he regularly attended a Cemevi and that he has continued this practice in Australia. The Tribunal accepts that when he was at school and undertaking military service between 1997 and 1998 [the applicant husband] may have experienced a degree of discrimination because of his Alevi faith and that - although [his name] is not an uncommon name in Turkey -- it is possible that this was sometimes linked to his name. While [the applicant husband] has complained he has experienced discrimination in employment, the information he provided with his protection visa application indicates that between 2002 and 2008 he was continuously employed in Turkey in a managerial capacity and his evidence indicates that his employer thought highly of him. Previously he has found work as [an occupation] and, in Australia, he is currently working at [Employer 2].
The Tribunal found [the applicant husband’s] evidence about why he left Turkey and what he was afraid would happen to him if he returned to Turkey to be vague and difficult to reconcile with his conduct in voluntarily returning to Turkey from Australia in 2009. When the Tribunal first asked why he first travelled to Australia in 2008, [the applicant husband] replied to run away from Turkey. When asked why he was afraid he would be harmed if he returned to Turkey he responded that because of what he had exposed to because of his beliefs and what happened to him in the past he believed the situation would be worse for him if he returned to Turkey. Asked to identify who would harm him, he said primarily the majority Sunni community in Turkey and the authorities (the police). Asked why he would be of adverse interest to the authorities, [the applicant husband’s] response was vague and unpersuasive. He responded that he didn’t think he would particularly draw the attention on himself but if you express yourself and your beliefs as a member of the Alevi community then attacks target the Alevi community in some cases. Questioned further he told the Tribunal that the government in Turkey was increasingly authoritarian. However, as discussed further below, in the Tribunal’s assessment [the applicant husband’s] claims that he fled Turkey in 2008 to escape persecution are undermined by his conduct in voluntarily returning to Turkey in March 2009.
The Tribunal was concerned that [the applicant husband’s] evidence about his claimed political activity in Turkey was vague and shifted over the course of the protection visa application process. Questioned specifically by the Tribunal about whether he feared harm because of his political beliefs, [the applicant husband] said that he did. Asked to explain what political beliefs he held that would cause problems for him, he told the Tribunal that the present prime minister and the president said that Alevis were threats to them. He told the Tribunal that he had never been a member of a political party but he claimed for the first time that he took part in the political activities of ‘left leaning organisations’ because they tried to protect ‘our rights’. Asked to identify these organisations, he named two Turkish political parties: the CHP and the HDP. When Tribunal put to [the applicant husband], it was not clear on what basis he would engage in political activity that would attract the attention of authorities in Turkey, he said that he was not member of political organisations but these organisations tried to support their way of life and if he had to go back he would support these organisations because of his affinity with them. When the Tribunal put to him that he had not mentioned that he was involved with left leaning political organisations before the Tribunal hearing and his evidence did not indicate he had such involvement, the applicant responded he was always involved politically, he didn’t take part much, but he was always involved politically. Despite being given opportunities to do so, [the applicant husband] did not identify in any meaningful detail how he participated in the activities of left leaning political organisations or why this would expose him to risk of harm. The Tribunal did not find his evidence about supporting these organisations persuasive.
The Tribunal was further concerned that [the applicant husband’s] evidence about when he was last involved in political activity in Turkey was confused, unpersuasive and lacking consistency over time. When asked to tell the Tribunal when he was last politically active, [the applicant husband] told the Tribunal he took part in protests against government attitude towards Cem houses and May day demonstrations in 2005 . Asked when he was last involved in political activity, he stated in 2005. When asked to confirm that he had not been involved in any public protests or political activity since 2005, [the applicant husband] referred to attending demonstrations against actions by the authorities to curtail Alevi rights in 2005. Asked to confirm that he had not been involved in any public political activity including in relation to the rights of Alevis since 2005, he said that there are issues regarding the Cem houses and he had taken part in these activities in 2008. However, as the Tribunal put to the applicant he did not mention taking part protests about Cem houses in 2008 to the Department. The applicant acknowledged he did not tell the Department about this and suggested this was because of some misunderstanding on his part. However, given that [the applicant husband] provided two lengthy statements to the Department about his claims for protection, the Tribunal is concerned that [he] did not mention his claimed involvement in protests about Cem houses in 2008 to the Department.
The Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of the applicant’s claims to have participated in protests about Cem houses were reinforced by the applicant’s vague and unpersuasive evidence about the activities he took part in 2008. When invited to tell the Tribunal what activities he was involved in relation to the Cem houses in 2008, he said there was nothing they did as the Alevi community as such. He said that he didn’t take part in protest meetings but to give support to Alevi people living in the Gezi park area he went to this area. When it was put to him that it did not appear that he did not take part in protests, he claimed he could not do so because he was prevented from doing so by police barricades. At the third Tribunal hearing, the applicant was questioned again about his political activity in Turkey but the Tribunal found his evidence to be vague and limited to generalities. He gave evidence that after the incident in 2005, he was still active but not as openly. He claimed that he was being watched and targeted so he wasn’t too visible. Asked how he was active, he said he participated in meetings with people who shared his views and his Alevi faith, particularly during election time. He confirmed he was not a member of any political party but suggested that during election time he might display a poster of candidate.
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims that he was detained and beaten in 2005 after arranging a protest about the closure of [a local] Cem House in 2005. In his written claims [the applicant husband] claimed that in 2005 he was detained for three days by the police for attending and arranging a demonstration to protest against the closure of Cemevi, during which he was tortured and beaten and sustained a broken arm and had bruises on the back. Before the Tribunal [the applicant husband] claimed he was detained for two days by the authorities in 2005 after arranging a protest about the closure of a Cem House. At the first hearing when [the applicant husband] asked whether he had been to a protest relating to the treatment of Alevis before, he said no. He confirmed that 2005 was the first time he had been involved in public protest activity about the treatment of Alevis and the closure of Cem houses. When the Tribunal asked the applicant why, if he was not involved in any protest activity before 2005, he became involved in this protest, his response was vague and unpersuasive. He told the Tribunal there were ‘other things’ and ‘small meetings because of the incidents taking place in the neighbourhood’. He claimed these meetings happened between 2003 and 2004. However, when asked whether he went to any meetings before 2005, the applicant said no, not many of them. He said before this government came to power there was not much need for them to protest. He then referred to there being massacres in Sivas and claimed he took part in gatherings in Taksim but not as a member of a group but just to be present. When the Tribunal asked what happened to [the local] Cem House, [the applicant husband’s] response was vague: he stated that at the time it was closed but he had heard about it since. While the Tribunal accepts such a Cem house exists and cannot discount the possibility it was closed or attacked in 2005, the Tribunal found [the applicant husband’s] evidence about his involvement in protest activity in 2005 to be vague and difficult to reconcile with his evidence that he had not previously attended such protests.
Overall, the Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence about his past involvement in political activity in Turkey to be vague and lacking in meaningful and persuasive detail. While it is possible that [the applicant husband] is sympathetic to the CHP and the HDP, he was not a member of either party, and nor, on the evidence before it, does the Tribunal accept that he was ever involved in protests or other public political activity such as putting up posters in support of these parties or any other left leaning political organisations or attending May Day protests or protests in Taksim square. In assessing the applicant’s evidence about this issue the Tribunal has considered his representative submission’s that, in the case of this particular applicant, his political and religious activity are intertwined. However, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal was concerned that [the applicant husband’s] evidence about his activism in support of Alevi rights and against the closure of Cemevis was vague and, like other aspects of his evidence about his political activity, shifted over time.
In this context, the Tribunal found [the applicant husband’s] evidence that he would be involved in political activism if he returned to Turkey to be contrived and unconvincing. In particular, at the hearing in September 2016 [the applicant husband] claimed that if he has to return to Turkey he would continue to push for an Alevi governor and work to get a senior level police official. He asserted that he would continue to promote improvements in the situation of Alevis. It was his right not to suffer discrimination and have his freedom and he would work hard until he had these. He did not want his children to receive religious lessons and to express his opposition to these things will mark him as an active person. However, [the applicant husband’s] evidence about the political activity that he would involve himself if he returned to Turkey was difficult to reconcile with his earlier evidence at the first hearing that he had not been politically active since the incident at the Cem house in 2005 and nor does his evidence indicate that, whilst in Turkey, he pushed for Alevi governors or better representation of Alevis in the police force when he was in Turkey. Having regard to his vague and shifting evidence about his political activity in Turkey, the Tribunal did not find persuasive that the applicant was politically active in support of Alevi rights in the past and that he would be politically active if he were to return to Turkey now.
The Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of [the applicant husband’s] claims were deepened by the conduct of [the applicant husband] in returning to Turkey in March 2009. As noted above, the Tribunal considers [the applicant husband’s] conduct in voluntarily returning to Turkey in March 2009 undermines his claims that he fled Turkey to escape persecution and casts doubt upon the genuiness of his claims to fear harm if he returns to Turkey. Further, as the Tribunal put to the applicants, [the applicant husband] stayed in Turkey without experiencing difficulties between March 2009 and November 2009. At the hearing [the applicant husband] claimed that during these seven months he was hiding at the home of his [Relative A]. When it was put to the applicants that [this relative A] was Alevi and she was still living in Turkey, [the applicant husband] stated they just kept to themselves and did not involve themselves in any activity. He stated that he believed that going back to Turkey was foolish but he had to return. However, as the Tribunal put to [the applicant husband], it did not appear that he was in a hurry to return to Australia. [He] stated that he had to wait for the outcome for the visa application however, as the Tribunal put to him, he didn’t apply for the [different temporary] visa until June 2009 at which time he had been back in Turkey for a number of months. He reiterated that there were things they had to do in Turkey like selling their furniture.
The Tribunal has considered, but rejects as lacking in plausibility, [the applicant husband’s] evidence that when he returned to Turkey he didn’t know he could apply for a protection visa and that he thought he could bring his wife and child back to Australia as his wife was also suffering because she was Alevi. The Tribunal does not accept that it is plausible that [the applicant husband] was unaware that he could apply for a protection visa when he returned to Turkey in 2009. Further, the Tribunal considers the timing of his departure from Turkey in 2009 undermines his claims that he and his family were facing harm in Turkey because of their faith. While it may be that [the applicant husband] had to sell his furniture before travelling to Australia, the fact that he returned to Turkey in March 2009, did not apply for a visa to leave Turkey until June 2009, and then remained in Turkey until November 2009 undermines his claims that he left Turkey in 2008 because he was afraid of being persecuted. The Tribunal finds that [the applicant husband’s] conduct in returning to Turkey in March 2009 for an extended period of time and the timing of his return to Australia, in November 2009, is inconsistent with his claim to fear persecution in Turkey.
The Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of [the applicant husband’s] claims about why he left Turkey were compounded by his confused and inconsistent evidence about the events that he claims caused him to leave Turkey in 2008. At the first hearing [the applicant husband] was asked about the last time he was physically assaulted because of his Alevi faith and he told the Tribunal that this occurred in 2008. In response to questions about who assaulted him in 2008, he said he did not know who the person was but that his attackers denigrated him and chanted religious words. He claimed that the assault occurred when he was leaving the Cem house and he did not know who the attackers were. He claimed that he required medical treatment for the injuries he sustained. [The applicant husband] subsequently told the Tribunal that in 2006 he was assaulted by two colleagues. However, when Tribunal put to [the applicant husband] that in his written claims he had claimed that he was assaulted by colleagues in 2008 and by unknown assailants in 2006, he shifted his evidence and claimed that the assault by colleagues occurred in 2008 and assault by unknown assailants occurred in 2006. This caused the Tribunal to be concerned that [the applicant husband] was shifting his evidence in an attempt to address discrepancies between his oral evidence and his written statement of claims. [The applicant husband] claimed there was no discrepancy between his oral and written evidence, the only difference was the year that it occurred, and he suggested he may not have been aware that he said the wrong year but later he realised the dates were wrong. However, given [the applicant husband] claims to have been assaulted by his colleague happened the same year he decided to leave Turkey, the Tribunal was concerned that he initially gave clear evidence that he did not know who assaulted him in 2008. The Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] has adequately explained his inconsistent and shifting evidence about this issue and it finds that this reflects poorly on his credibility as a witness.
The Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of [the applicant husband’s] claims to fear harm in Turkey are deepened by his lengthy delay in applying for protection. At the hearing [the applicant husband] claimed that if he had known he could apply for protection he would have done it the moment he arrived however they did not know much about these things and relied upon the agency who advised them if they wanted to live in Australia they should apply for [temporary]visas. Before the Department [the applicant husband] provided a different explanation: he suggested that his delay in applying for protection could be explained by the fact that he was waiting for the situation in Turkey to improve. The Tribunal does not accept that it is plausible that [the applicant husband], or for that matter, [the applicant wife] were unaware they could apply for protection until 2014. [The applicant husband] is a resourceful man who advised the Tribunal he spoke Turkish and English. He advised the Tribunal that he had the assistance of a migration agent to apply for a [different temporary] visa in 2009. Further, as the Tribunal put to [the applicant husband] it seems reasonable to expect that they might make inquiries in Australia about applying for a protection visa. He acknowledged that it was right to question how people of their education could not know about this, they knew about refugees but they thought they had to be fleeing war. He did not know he could apply because he was persecuted because of his religious beliefs. The Tribunal has considered these explanations but, having regard to the fact that [the applicant husband] applied for other visas and is an educated and resourceful person the Tribunal does not accept that it is credible that he was unaware that he could apply for a protection visa until 2014. The Tribunal finds the various explanations that he has advanced for his substantial delay in applying for a protection visa lack credibility and this, in turn, casts further doubt on the genuineness of his claims to fear persecution in Turkey.
For all the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finds that [the applicant husband] is not a credible witness and it does not accept that he has told the truth about why he left Turkey or why he wants to remain in Australia. While the Tribunal accepts that [the applicant husband] is of the Alevi faith, the Tribunal finds that [the applicant husband] has greatly exaggerated the problems he experienced in Turkey in past because of his Alevi faith. In response to country information which indicates that an Alevi is unlikely to face ill treatment by the authorities amounting to persecution, simply because of their Alevi faith, the applicant said that there are millions of Alevis in Turkey and, in his opinion, he had been treated differently compared to many other Alevis because of his activities (including protesting at the closure of Cem house) and being a practising Alevi. However, while the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant regularly attending a Cemevi in Istanbul, the Tribunal does not accept that he had any difficulty do so and nor does the Tribunal accept that he was ever involved in protests about the closure of cemevis or in any other public protests.
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] was ever politically active in Turkey and nor does the Tribunal accept that he would be motivated to be politically active if he returned to Turkey now. While the applicant may be sympathetic to the CHP and HDP, he is not a member of either party and the Tribunal does not accept that he expresses his political views through public protests or other public political activity. Before the Tribunal the applicant claimed to have been detained by the authorities on two occasions: in 2000 and in 2005. However, while [the applicant husband] may have been subject to discrimination in the past because of his Alevi faith, the Tribunal is not satisfied that he ever attracted the adverse attention of the authorities because of his involvement in political activity, including protests about attacks on, or the closure of, Cemevis. While the Tribunal is prepared to accept that it is possible that the applicant was, along with many others, was exposed to tear gas and then detained and briefly assaulted by the authorities in the aftermath of a football match in 2000, the Tribunal notes that the applicant has not claimed to have been engaged in political activity on this occasion. The Tribunal finds that the incident was a result of an interaction with the authorities in the aftermath of football match and, while the Tribunal has considered the possibility that the authorities may have mistreated him because he was identified as an Alevi, given that [the applicant husband] has not claimed to have been involved in political activism at the time and the arrest occurred in the aftermath of a football match, the Tribunal does not accept his claim that the police accused of organising protests against the closure of Cem houses is credible. The Tribunal finds the applicant’s brief detention in 2000 was an isolated incident that occurred sixteen years ago, and eight years before the applicant first left Turkey.
The Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] organised or was involved in a protest against the closure of Cem house in 2005 and, as a result, arrested, detained and assaulted by by the authorities. Having regard to the Tribunal’s cumulative concerns about the credibility of [the applicant husband’s] claims to have been politically active in Turkey, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept that he was detained and assaulted by the Turkish authorities in 2005 after organising a protest about the closure of a cem house. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has considered the medical documentation submitted by [the applicant husband] about the treatment he claims he received for his injuries at [the specified] Hospital, which is some [distance] from Istanbul, in June 2005. However, this documentation does not overcome the Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of the applicant’s evidence that he was arrested and assaulted by the authorities because of his involvement in a protest about a cemevi. While the applicant may well have suffered an assault of misadventure or assault that led to his treatment in [the specified] hospital June 2005, the Tribunal is not satisfied that he was assaulted and mistreated by the authorities as claimed.
The Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] left Turkey to escape the problems he had experienced as a person of Alevi faith. Having regard to his confused and shifting evidence about who assaulted him in 2008, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept that the applicant was assaulted in 2006 or in 2008 for reasons relating to Alevi faith. The Tribunal does not accept that either assault ever occurred. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was insulted and beaten by his fellow workers or that these men insulted his religion and forced him to attend Friday prayers as claimed. While the Tribunal has considered the possibility that the applicant has experienced some discrimination in the past at school and during his military service, the Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] was assaulted in 2006 or 2008 as claimed or that he was arrested, detained and assaulted by the authorities in 2005 as claimed.
For all of the above reasons, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was, at the time he departed Turkey, or is now, of any adverse interest to the authorities in Turkey or to any other person or group because of his religion, his claimed political activity or for any other reason. While the applicant may have attended a Cem house in Turkey on a regular basis, the Tribunal does not accept that he was subject to serious harm or significant harm because he did so and the Tribunal rejects his claims that he was involved in protests against the closure/attacks upon Cem houses in 2005 or at any other time. While the applicant may have lived with his [Relative A] between March 2009 and November 2009, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was hiding or keeping a low profile during this period. Looking forward, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that the applicant will face serious harm( including being arrested and/or imprisoned and/or beaten by the authorities or being beaten and mistreated by members of Sunni majority as he has claimed) for reasons of his claimed religious/ political profile in Turkey. The Tribunal has considered [the applicant husband’s] claims that if he returns to Turkey he will attract the adverse attention of the authorities because of his political opinion but, having found that [the applicant husband] would not be motivated to involve himself in political activity and/or public protests, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance that he would face harm of any type for this reason.
[The applicant wife’s] claims for protection
The Tribunal accepts that [the applicant wife] is of the Alevi faith. At the first Tribunal hearing [the applicant wife] said that her national identity card states that her religion is Islam and that she did not think about leaving this section blank. [The applicant wife] testified that in Turkey she practised her faith by attending Cem houses with the religious leader. In Australia she practices in the same manner: she attends a Cem house. She stated that in Turkey Alevi belief is not accepted as a religion and Cem houses are not recognised as places for prayers so they are always a bit fearful when they go. When it was put to her that while Cem houses are not officially recognised lots of people attend Cemevis she said yes, but there is always fear and pressure. Asked whether anything ever happened to her when she attended a Cem house, she said years ago she was subject to a verbal attack. While this may have occurred, but it is apparent from [the applicant wife’s] evidence that this verbal attack did not deter her from continuing to attend Cemevis and her evidence does not indicate that she experienced any harm doing so. The Tribunal finds, based on [the applicant wife’s] evidence that she has not been subject to serious harm or significant harm because she has attended Cem houses in Turkey.
When [the applicant wife] was asked whether she had ever experienced serious harm or significant harm in the past because of her religious identity she referred to losing jobs, experiencing discrimination and the psychological consequences of this, and being denigrated in the community. Asked when she lost a job because of her Alevi faith, she said this happened in 1999 when a colleague told her boss about her faith and she was sacked. She was not told why she was sacked but she learned that they knew of her Alevi faith. She said when she worked for a [business] she was also told they did not want people of Alevi faith. She claimed she had been assigned to the most difficult jobs. The Tribunal put to [the applicant wife] that it needed to consider whether the discrimination she claimed to have experienced rose to the level of serious harm or significant harm. Further, even if the Tribunal accepted that she had previously experienced discrimination in employment, she had remained living in Turkey for years after she was last employed ([the applicant wife] is now the primary caretaker of her children) and she and her family were able to support themselves.
When it was put to [the applicant wife] that any discrimination she experienced might not rise to the level of serious harm or significant harm, she stated that it was not easy to forecast what the future might bring but with the way Turkey was headed she believed that she would be subject to physical attacks, as would her children. [The applicant wife] did not apply for a protection visa until 2014 and, while the Tribunal has considered the applicants’ evidence that they were not aware they could apply for protection visas, for reasons that are discussed in more detail above, the Tribunal does not accept that any of the explanations offered for the delay in applying for a protection visa plausible. Despite claiming to fear harm in Turkey, [the applicant wife] has `travelled back to Turkey from Australia before returning to Australia. When [the applicant wife’s] delay in applying for a protection visa is considered together with her migration history, it reinforces the Tribunal’s view that she does not have a genuine fear of being harmed in Turkey.
When asked whether there were reasons, other than her religious beliefs, that she would face harm in Turkey she told the Tribunal ‘only the religious problems’. I reminded [the applicant wife] that before the delegate she expressed concerns that she would face problems because she was a woman and she claimed that she did not believe she could freely express her views under an Islamist government heading very fast to a Sharia system and that she would be forced to wear a head scarf. It was put to her that the country information did not support her claims that she would be forced to wear a head scarf and that, while women do experience a degree of discrimination in public and political life it did not appear she would face serious harm or significant harm because she was a woman if she returned to Turkey.[14] Furthermore, while the applicant adverted to the fact that the deputy prime minister in Turkey had said that women should not laugh out loud, as I discussed with [the applicant wife] this statement was mocked by Turkish women on social media.[15]
[14] United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Turkey: Women fearing gender-based violence, February 2016, Version 1.0, (noting ‘being female on its own does not establish a need for international protection’ and the claims of gender-based violence need to be considered on their merits) available at:
[15] BBC News, ‘The women having a laugh in Turkey’, 29 July 2014 > >
The Tribunal finds that [the applicant wife] has not been subject to serious harm or significant harm in Turkey in the past because of her Alevi faith or because she is a woman of Alevi faith or because she is a woman or for any other reason. Before the Tribunal, [the applicant wife] acknowledged that she had not been politically active in the past and, when it was put to her that it was difficult to accept a person who had no history of political activism in support of Alevi rights would become politically active upon returning to Turkey, [the applicant wife] replied this was the Tribunal’s concern. The Tribunal finds that she would not be politically active if she returned to Turkey now. To the extent that [the applicant wife] has sought to suggest that she is a person who will be politically active in support of Alevi rights, the Tribunal this suggestion unpersuasive as [the applicant wife’s] own evidence does not indicate that she has been politically active in the past. The Tribunal does accept that she had any genuine interest or commitment to being politically active in the future. At the third hearing [the applicant wife] stated she wanted their religion to be stated as Alevi on their identity cards for themselves and for their children. However, given that [the applicant wife] had previously given evidence that her national identity card states that her faith is Islam and she was not aware that, since 2006 one option has been to leave this section blank, the Tribunal rejects any suggestion that she will be motivated to be politically active about this issue or any other issues.
While the Tribunal considers that [the applicant wife], who has watched her children thrive in the Australian community, may have other motivations for applying for a protection visa, the Tribunal is not satisfied that she fears that she will be harmed in Turkey and/or that her children will be harmed in Turkey. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal has considered the psychologist’s report about [the applicant wife] but while the Tribunal accepts that [the applicant wife] may be anxious and depressed about her uncertain immigration status, to the extent that the psychologist’s report is based upon [the applicant wife] self-reporting of her past experiences (and those of her family) in Turkey the Tribunal considers it can be given limited weight and it does not overcome the Tribunal’s concerns about the credibility of her claims. The Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant wife] was not free to practice her Alevi faith by attending a cem house or that she feared doing so, given that the country information, set out above, indicates that Alevis are generally free to practice their faith and establish houses of worship. While the Tribunal has considered the possibility that [the applicant wife] has experienced discrimination in the past and was once subject to the verbal insults when she was leaving a Cemevi, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any discrimination or verbal insults [the applicant wife] has experienced in the past decade rise to level of serious harm or significant harm. Looking forward, for the reasons that are set out in detail below, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that [the applicant wife] will face serious harm or significant harm because of her political opinion or because she is an Alevi woman or because of her religious beliefs and activities.
Claims the applicants will face harm because of their Alevi faith
The Tribunal accepts that the applicants are of the Alevi faith. According to DFAT Alevis are largest non-Sunni religious minority in Turkey. As I discussed with the applicants, credible academic estimates suggest ten to 15 per cent of Turkey's population is Alevi, although the community claims it is closer to 30 per cent.[16] Alevis are widely distributed across Turkey, but are concentrated in central and inner-eastern Anatolia, Istanbul – where the applicants lived -- and other major cities. As I discussed with the applicants, an estimated 1.5 million Alevis attend Cemevi monthly. While [the applicant husband] drew attention to the fact that the number of people who regularly attend Cemevi is significantly less than the number of people who identify Alevi, as the Tribunal discussed with the applicants, a person might identify as being of a particular faith but not attend a place of worship on a regular basis and, having regard to the country information which indicates that Alevis are generally free to gather in Cemevis to undertake religious ceremonies, the Tribunal does not accept that Alevis are unable to attend Cemevis because they fear being harmed.
[16] DFAT Country information Report: Turkey, 5 September 2016, [4.39].
While the Tribunal acknowledges that Alevism is not officially recognised as a religion in Turkey and Alevi places of worship are not officially recognised, as the Tribunal put to the applicants, DFAT assesses that Alevis in Turkey enjoy many religious freedoms: they are generally free to gather in Cemevis to undertake religious ceremonies and in many spheres of life can freely express their identity without fear of discrimination. This is consistent with the assessment of the UK Home Office that Alevis are considered a heterodox Muslim sect by the state and their places of worship are not officially recognised, but they are nevertheless able to worship. [17] The Tribunal notes that DFAT is not aware of any discrimination against Alevis in terms of access to health care or education, other than the requirement to undertake Islamic religious classes. Alevis are often accepted as an integral part of Turkish society. The leader of the CHP is an Alevi and up to 40 Alevis are believed to be represented in Parliament in 2016. Alevis are able to obtain employment in the private sector or run their own businesses, and to celebrate their annual religious holidays, although these are not recognised as official holidays.
[17] United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Turkey: Alevis, February 2016, Version 1.0, (noting that Alevis comprise about twenty to twenty-five per cent of the population in Turkey)
The Tribunal places weight on DFAT’s assessment that Alevis face low levels of societal discrimination on the basis of religion. Further, while the Alevi community has experienced in the violence in past, following a range of discussions with representatives of the Alevi community, DFAT reported that it is not aware of significant instances of community violence against Alevis in recent years. On the basis that Alevis are generally free to practise their faith, express their identity, find employment and achieve political representation, DFAT assesses that Alevis are at a low risk of violence on the basis of their religion. The Tribunal notes that at the hearing in September 2016 the applicant claimed that there was an attack on a cemevi which he attended in Turkey [in] August 2016 and he asserted that the centres that are more active are subject to attacks. [The applicant husband] was provided with time to provide a news report of this attack (at the hearing he said it was in Turkish) but no such report was ever submitted and, on the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that anyone was harmed in this attack and, having regard to the available country information, has some doubts as to whether such an attack occurred. In any event, when asked whether the Cemevi was still active, [the applicant husband] indicated that it was.
The Tribunal has considered the submissions by the adult applicants that their circumstances are different because of their individual circumstances and past experiences of harm. However, having regard to its findings of fact and the available country information about the treatment of Alevis in Turkey, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance that the applicants will face serious harm or significant harm because for reasons of their religious identity, beliefs and activities. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal does not accept that either of the adult applicants have ever been politically active in support of Alevi rights or engaged in other public forms of political activism in Turkey. The Tribunal does not accept that the either of the adult applicants would be motivated to involve themselves in political activities that are critical of the Turkish state and and which might lead to them attracting the adverse attention of the authorities and being exposed to a real chance of serious harm or significant harm. For the avoidance of doubt, The Tribunal finds that the adult applicants would not involve themselves in such activity, not because they are afraid of the consequences of doing so, but because they have no genuine commitment to doing so.
The Tribunal acknowledges that the Turkish state does not officially recognise Alevism as a religion, and their places of worship, Cemevis, are not recognised as official places of worship and do not receive public funding. However, some local governments are starting to provide land or other forms of support. The Tribunal places weight on DFAT’s assessment that overall, Alevis face low levels of societal discrimination on the basis of religion, and that Alevis are generally free to practice their faith, express their identity, find employment and achieve political representation. The Tribunal notes that DFAT assesses that the risk that Alevis will face violence on the basis of their religion is low and considers that the country information supports the conclusion that there is no real chance (as opposed to one that it is remote) that Alevis will face violence because of their religion. While the applicants have claimed that they felt fearful attending the Cem house, the Tribunal considers that the weight of country information indicates that Alevis can freely practice their faith freely. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicants would have to hide their religious beliefs to avoid the threat of harm. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that the applicants were able to practise their Alevi faith freely and attend Cemevis before they left Turkey, and that they would be able to continue doing so upon their return.
Furthermore, while the applicants have both complained of experiencing discrimination in employment in Turkey in the past, [the applicant husband] was continuously employed by the same employer between 2002 and 2006 and, as noted above, the Tribunal has rejected his claims that he was mistreated by his fellow employees. Having regard to the available country information, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicants would be unable to find employment in Turkey because of their Alevi faith if they were to return there or that any discrimination the applicants may experience in employment if they were to return to Turkey would rise to level of serious harm or significant harm. Accordingly, while the Tribunal acknowledges there are instances of discrimination against Alevis in Turkey and a small number of reports of ill-treatment by the authorities and of societal discrimination and violence, the Tribunal is of the view that the available country information indicates that the prospect that the applicants would face serious harm or significant harm because of their religious identity and activities is remote; that is, there is no real chance that they would face serious harm or significant harm because of their religious beliefs and activities.
Claims made on behalf of the child applicants
In his written claims [the applicant husband] stated that he and his wife were concerned that his children would be subjected to verbal abuse, employment discrimination, detention, beating and torture in Turkey. At the hearing on 19 September 2016 the adult applicants gave evidence that their children would face harm because they were raising their children in the Alevi faith and their children would speak openly of their Alevi faith. Two of the children were born in Australia and the third child had lived in Australia from [between specified] years of age. The adult applicants claimed that in Australia their children can speak freely and say that they are Alevi faith. It is claimed that in Turkey their children will be seen as targets because of their Alevi faith. Other than expressing concerns about the security situation (addressed below), the adult applicants did not identify any other reasons that their children would face harm.
The Tribunal has specifically considered the claims that the applicant’s children will face harm because of their Alevi faith. In assessing the claims made on behalf of the child applicants the Tribunal acknowledges that in assessing whether discrimination faced by an applicant amounts to ‘serious harm’, all the relevant circumstances must be taken into account, including personal circumstances such as the applicant’s age.[18] However, having carefully considered the most recent country information available to the Tribunal about the treatment of those of Alevi faith, including DFAT’s assessment (set out below), the Tribunal does not accept that the child applicants will be unable to express their Alevi faith and identity in Turkey. While the Tribunal acknowledges that discrimination against Alevis may have been more pervasive when the adult applicants were children, based on the available country information and the latest advice from DFAT, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that the child applicants will face serious harm or significant harm because of their Alevi faith and/or because their parents’ religious beliefs and activities. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that the child applicants will be subject to physical attacks at school or elsewhere because they are identifiable as persons of Alevi faith or because they are open about expressing their Alevi faith.
[18] For example, in SZBQJ v MIMIA [2005] FCA 143 (Tamberlin J, 28 February 2005), the Court stated at [21] that ‘it is obvious that the impact and circumstances surrounding the application of a national policy may impact differently on different persons so that in one instance the impact may constitute persecution but in other cases the impact may not be so substantial as to amount to Convention persecution’. In SZBBP v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 5 (Driver FM, 18 January 2005) the Court held at [35] that in concluding that harm in the form of threats did not constitute serious harm, the Tribunal had erred in failing to take into account the applicant’s age and frailty.
The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance (rather than one that is remote) that the child applicants will face serious harm or significant harm because of their religious beliefs and activities. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has placed weight on the advice from DFAT set out above. While the Tribunal accepts that the child applicants will have to attend compulsory Sunni Muslim religious classes at public schools and that such a requirement is discriminatory, the Tribunal notes that DFAT reports that in recent years, religious and ethics classes have begun to include limited elements of other faiths, including Alevism. Further, DFAT does not identify any other instances of discrimination in education and the country information indicates that the child applicants will be able to express their faith, including by attending Cemevis in the company of their parents as they do in Australia. The Tribunal finds that the country information does not support that conclusion that the child applicants face a real chance of being detained, beaten or tortured because of their Alevi faith and to the extent the adult applicants have suggested otherwise the Tribunal finds their evidence contrived, unconvincing and unsupported by the available country information.
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any requirement that the child applicants attend compulsory Sunni Muslim religious classes whilst attending public schools rises to the level of serious harm for the purposes of the refugee criteria or significant harm for the purposes of the complementary protection criteria. The Tribunal finds that the country information indicates that Alevis, who comprise up to thirty per cent of Turkey’s population, indicates that those of Alevi faith are free to worship at Cem houses. The Tribunal finds that the child applicants will be able to worship at Cemevis with their parents on weekends as they do in Australia and, based on the country information before it, the Tribunal finds that the child applicants will be able to express their religious identity and that there is no real chance that they will face serious harm or significant harm as a result of doing so.
The Tribunal notes that the evidence indicates that the adult applicants would prefer to raise their children in Australia and that they are concerned that their children would not be able to adapt to the way of life in Turkey. However, the Tribunal considers that the evidence indicates that the applicants children are cared for by devoted parents and the Tribunal does not accept that any difficulties that the child applicants may have adjusting to life in Turkey will amount to serious harm or significant harm.
Other matters
Concerns about the security situation
The Tribunal acknowledges that the applicants raised concerns about the security situation in Turkey. . [The applicant wife] said that there was no personal security and she was concerned about her personal safety and that of her family. The Tribunal acknowledges that there have been a number of recent terrorist attacks in Turkey, including in Istanbul, and at the hearing the Tribunal discussed with the applicants country information concerning the security situation in Turkey. In its most recent report DFAT acknowledges that :
Turkey’s security situation has deteriorated markedly since the previous DFAT Country Information Report was published in June 2014. This is due to external security threats related to the war in Syria and Iraq (which share borders with southeast Turkey), as well as internal security threats resulting from the civil conflict between Government forces and the PKK in the southeast. Terrorist threats and attacks, including by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL aka Daesh) and from the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), have also increased. The International Crisis Group has listed Turkey as one of ‘Ten Conflicts to watch in 2016’. [19]
[19] DFAT Country Information Report: Turkey, 5 September 2016, [3.36]
100. However, as the Tribunal discussed with the applicants, the security situation in Turkey appears to be a problem faced by the population in Turkey generally and not the applicants personally. Furthermore, as I put to the applicants, while the security situation has deteriorated in recent years, the country information does not indicate that there is a real chance that the applicants would be harmed as a result of this situation; while security incidents are more frequent in recent years, I consider that it is speculative to suggest that the applicants, who have identified Istanbul as their home area, will be harmed as a result; that is there is no real chance that the applicants will be harmed as a consequence of security situation in Turkey.
101. In any event, with regard to the general issues of the security situation in Turkey, these are problems that affect the entire Turkey population and, on the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any difficulties the applicants might experience because of the security situation in Turkey would be for the essential and significant reason of one or more of the Convention reasons. Accordingly, with respect any difficulties the applicants may experience because of the incidence of security situation in Turkey generally, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicants have a well-founded fear of Convention related persecution if they return to Turkey. Nor, on the evidence before it, can the Tribunal be satisfied that any problems the applicants may experience upon return as a result of security situation constitutes significant harm under s.36(2B)(c) of the Act as the real risk is one faced by the population of Turkey generally and is not faced by the applicants personally.
Failed asylum seeker claims
102. During the hearing [the applicant husband] expressed concern that he would be suspected of treason because he applied for asylum in Australia. However, as I put to the applicants, the protection visa application process is confidential and it was not apparent that the Turkish authorities would even be aware that they applied for asylum. Furthermore, as the Tribunal put to the applicants, the country information available to the Tribunal did not indicate that they would face serious harm or significant harm if they were returned to Turkey as failed asylum seekers. In response [the applicant husband] said that he knew that now but didn’t in the past. The applicants did not further pursue claims to face harm on the basis of being failed asylum seekers.
103. The Tribunal notes that DFAT has reported that it understands that it is not a crime in Turkey to seek asylum elsewhere and that that there is no significant stigma against returnees who have failed to gain asylum elsewhere.[20] The evidence before the Tribunal does not indicate that the applicants will face serious harm or significant harm for reasons of seeking asylum in Australia and for reasons of returning as a failed asylum seeker. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not accept that [the applicant husband] will be suspected of treason by the Turkish authorities or that the applicants will face harm of any type (including serious harm or significant harm) because they sought asylum abroad.
[20] DFAT Country Information Report: Turkey, 5 September 2016, [6.28]
Conclusions
[The applicant husband’s] claims for protection
104. The Tribunal has carefully considered all the claims presented by [the applicant husband]. Having regard to the available country information and its findings of fact and having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that he will face serious harm at the hands of authorities, members of the Sunni Muslim community, employers or any other persons or group for reason of his religion, actual or imputed political opinion, or for any reason if he returns to Turkey. In view of my findings of fact, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of Refugee Convention related persecution for any of the reasons he has claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds there is no real chance that he will be subject to serious harm for one or more of the reasons set out in the Refugees Convention or for any other reason if he returns to Turkey now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant does not satisfy the criteria in s.36(2)(a).
105. As the Tribunal has found that [the applicant husband] is not a refugee, the Tribunal has considered whether he is entitled to complementary protection. To meet this provision, the Tribunal must be satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Turkey, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm. In MIAC v SZQRB, the Full Federal Court held that the ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugees Convention definition.[21] Having considered the applicant’s claims singularly and cumulatively, on the evidence before it and having regard to findings of fact in relation to [the applicant husband’s] claims that he will face harm because of his Alevi faith and political activities and opinion and the definition of significant harm, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not face a real risk of ‘significant harm’ in Turkey as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Turkey.
[21] MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505 See also MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FMCA 13 (Riethmuller FM, 31 January 2013) (upheld on appeal in MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FCA 614 (Marshall J, 21 June 2013)) at [19] where the Court stated that the ‘real risk’ and ‘real chance’ tests appeared substantially the same.
[The applicant wife’s] claims for protection
106. The Tribunal has carefully considered all the claims presented by [the applicant wife]. Having regard to the available country information and its findings of fact and having considered her claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that she will face serious harm for reason of her religion, actual or imputed political opinion, or because she is a woman, or a woman of Alevi faith, or because she sought asylum abroad, or for a combination of these reasons if she returns to Turkey. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds there is no real chance that she will be subject to serious harm for one or more of the reasons set out in the Refugees Convention or for any other reason if she returns to Turkey now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant does not satisfy the criteria in s.36(2)(a).
107. As the Tribunal has found that [the applicant wife] is not a refugee, the Tribunal has considered whether she is entitled to complementary protection. Having considered her claims singularly and cumulatively, on the evidence before it and having regard to its findings of fact in relation to [the applicant wife’s] claims that she will face harm because of her Alevi faith and/or because she is an Alevi woman and/or because she sought asylum abroad, for the reasons set out above and having regard to the definition of significant harm in s.36(2A) and s 5(1) of the Act, the Tribunal finds the applicant does not face a real risk of ‘significant harm’ in Turkey as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed to that country.
The child applicants
108. Having regard to the available country information and its findings of facts, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that any of the child applicants will be subject to serious harm for one or more of the reasons set out in the Refugees Convention or for any other reason if they returns to Turkey now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Furthermore, while the Tribunal has considered whether the child applicants are entitled to complementary protection, for the reasons set out above and having considered the claims put forward on their behalf, the Tribunal finds that there are no substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the child applicants will face significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) and s.5(1) of the Act as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Turkey.
CONCLUSION
109. For the reasons given above the Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the applicants is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the applicants do not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) or (aa) for a protection visa. It follows that they are also unable to satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(b) or (c). As they do not satisfy the criteria for a protection visa, they cannot be granted the visa.
DECISION
110. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants Protection visas.
Frances Simmons
Member
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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