1412108 (Refugee) - [2015] AATA 3157

1412108 (Refugee) [2015] AATA 3157 (17 July 2015)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1412108
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Indonesia
TRIBUNAL MEMBER:  Katie Malyon
DATE:17 July 2015
PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.

Statement made on 17 July 2015 at 4:37pm

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

[The applicant] is a [age] year old citizen of Indonesia who arrived in Australia in February 2002 as the holder of a Tourist visa. This application to the Tribunal is for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant him and members of his family unit a Protection visa. It is [the applicant]’s third such application.
Since arriving in Australia, [the applicant] says he has ‘married’ [Ms A], an Indonesian student who is studying in Australia. Together with [Ms A], he has two young children, both of whom have been born in Australia. [Child 1] is three years old and [Child 2] is two years old: both [children] and their mother are included in [the applicant]’s current application as members of his family unit. The family’s representative advised the Tribunal by letter on 3 May 2015 that [Ms A] recently gave birth to the couple’s third (as yet unnamed) child who is not included in this application for protection.
In his current Protection visa application [the applicant] claims he fears returning to Indonesia because he is a Muslim who has converted to Christianity and, as a result, he and his family will suffer significant harm and discrimination. His family unit members have not previously made application for protection in Australia and have not made any claims of their own in this application: rather, they rely on [the applicant]’s claims. They each completed a Form 866D Application for a member of the family unit.
On 3 March 2015, the Tribunal wrote to [the applicant] at the last address for service provided in connection with the review and invited him to give oral evidence and to present arguments at a hearing to be held on 19 May 2015. [The applicant]’s representative confirmed in writing on 5 May 2015 that his client would attend the hearing. However, the day before the scheduled hearing, [the applicant] contacted the Tribunal by telephone and requested an adjournment as his only witness ([Pastor B] of [Church 3].) was currently in [another city] and would not be returning [for] two weeks. The Tribunal advised that evidence could be taken from [Pastor B] over the phone: this is a very common practice for the Tribunal. His representative should have been aware of this. [The applicant] stated that he would inform [Pastor B] of this and let the Tribunal know his intentions later in the day. He did not contact the Tribunal again. [The applicant] did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the time and place at which he was scheduled to appear for a hearing. Nor did he, or his [representative] contact the Tribunal to explain his failure to attend or, after his telephone discussion with the Tribunal on 18 May 2015 when he was informed that evidence could be taken from [Pastor B] over the phone, did he request that the hearing be rescheduled. In the circumstances, and pursuant to s.426A of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act), the Tribunal has decided to make its decision on the review without taking any further action to enable the applicant to appear before it.
The issues to be decided by the Tribunal in this case are whether [the applicant] and any member of his family unit are entitled to a Protection visa on complementary protection grounds or, in the case of members of [the applicant]’s family unit whether they are entitled to Protection as refugees. [The applicant] has already been found, in his first and second protection visa applications, not to be a refugee.
RELEVANT LAW
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c) of the Act. That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a Protection visa.
Refugee criterion
Section 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that a criterion for a Protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and, generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”[1]
[1] See, for example, Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379, Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225, MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293, MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1, Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387, Appellant S395/2002 v MIMA (2003) 216 CLR 473, SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18 and SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51
There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.
Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Section 91R(1) of the Act provides that persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant,[2] and systematic and discriminatory conduct.[3] Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act and include physical harassment of the person, physical ill-treatment of the person and denial of access to basic services where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group, such as a member of a family group.[4] The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or be officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy: it may be enough that the government has failed, or is unable, to protect the applicant from persecution. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.
[2] s.91R(1)(b) of the Act
[3] s.91R(1)(c) of the Act
[4] Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Mason CJ at [14 – 15], Gaudron J at [20], McHugh J at [41]
Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. Further, the persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared.[5]
[5] s.91R(1)(a) of the Act
Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. The High Court has stated that a ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.[6]
[6] Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Mason CJ at [12], McHugh J at [35]
In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.
Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.[7]
[7] MIEA v Singh (1997) 72 FCR 288
Complementary protection criterion
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act, he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) of the Act (the complementary protection criterion).
‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A) of the Act. A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. The terms ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ and ‘torture’ are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act and extracted in Annexure A.
Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. The ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition.[8] Relevant in this regard, the High Court has stated that a person can have a ‘well‑founded fear’ of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50%. Indeed, the High Court has prescribed a low threshold for determining whether an applicant’s fear is “well-founded” and it can be reached even if the event feared is “unlikely to occur” and has only a “10 per cent chance” of occurring: however, the chance of it occurring must be more than “far-fetched” or “remote” and the evidence must indicate “a real ground for believing that the applicant … is at risk of persecution”.[9] A fear of persecution “is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”.[10]
[8] MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33
[9] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 429 per McHugh J
[10] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act and extracted at Annexure A.
The implications of SZGIZ v MIAC
In SZGIZ v MIAC, the full Federal Court held that the operation of the statutory bar in
[11] SZGIZ v MIAC [2013] FCAFC at [38]
[12] Ibid at [43]-[47]
s.48A of the Act was confined to a further application which duplicated the same essential criterion for the grant of the visa as in the earlier unsuccessful application.[11] That is, it did not prevent a non-citizen who had made a valid application on the basis of the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act from making a further application on the basis of the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act or the family membership criteria in s.36(2)(b) or (c) of the Act while he or she remained in the migration zone.[12]
Applying the reasoning in SZGIZ, the Tribunal finds that, in relation to [the applicant], it does not have power to consider the criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act that sets out Australia’s protection obligations under the Convention because his first Protection visa application was refused on the basis of this criterion [in] April 2002 and a second application by him was again refused [in] July 2006 when he applied using the now acknowledged false Indonesian identity of[Mr C]. Instead, the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that it can only consider [the applicant]’s claims under the complementary protection provisions in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. As the members of [the applicant]’s family unit have not previously applied for protection their claims have been considered under both the Convention and complementary protection grounds.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department’s PAM3 Protection visas - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian – Refugee Guidelines as well as any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal is not precluded from considering other relevant information about Indonesia.
Credibility
The Tribunal accepts the difficulties of proof faced by applicants claiming protection. In particular, there may be claims that are not susceptible of proof. However, the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’, or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for an applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out.[13] The responsibility lies with an applicant to specify all particulars of their claims and to provide the Tribunal with sufficient evidence to establish those claims.[14]
[13] MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596
[14] s.5AAA(1) of the Act
In this regard, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the claims made by an applicant.[15] Nor is the Tribunal required to establish the applicant's case for him or her.[16] In addition, the Tribunal is not obliged to accept claims that are inconsistent with the independent evidence regarding the situation in an applicant’s country of nationality.[17] It is legitimate for the Tribunal to take into account any delay in the lodgement of a Protection visa application by an applicant in assessing the genuineness, or at least the depth, of an applicant’s claim to fear persecution.[18]
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
[15] Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451
[16] s.5AAA(4) of the Act. See also Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70; Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45
[17] Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547
[18] Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347
Material before the Tribunal
The Tribunal has had regard to the following material:
·     The current Protection visa application lodged with the Department [in] October 2013.
·     The application for review submitted by hand to the Tribunal on 10 July 2014 together with a copy of the delegate’s letter dated [June] 2014 refusing the current application for protection. A hard copy of the delegate’s letter was delivered to the Tribunal on 15 May 2015. It sets out, in considerable detail, the issues discussed with the applicant at his interview with the delegate [in] May 2014 and also includes:
(a)a summary of the claims in his original Protection visa application lodged [March] 2002 based on his being a Christian Javanese who was a Catholic and had been denied access to university and was part of a controversial anti-corruption political group whilst at high school;
(b)the Department’s decision in relation to that application;
(c)the decision of a differently constituted Tribunal dated 20 November 2002 affirming   the Department’s decision to refuse the original Protection visa application;
(d)a subsequent unsuccessful application for Ministerial Intervention;
(e)the claims in his second Protection visa application lodged [April] 2006 using the acknowledged false name of [Mr C] and based on his being a follower of the Ahmadiyah branch of Islam;
(f)the Department’s decision in relation to that application;
(g)the decision of a differently constituted Tribunal dated 20 February 2007 affirming the Department’s decision to refuse the second Protection visa application and finding that the applicant was not a Ahmadiyah Muslim as claimed because he had lodged multiple false documents in support of his application (as confirmed by the Ahmadiyah Association of Australia and sourced from the Ameer of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia in Indonesia) and had only a superficial and confused knowledge of the practices and beliefs of the Ahmadiyah. In addition, he had given contradictory evidence to the Tribunal in relation to his family; and,
(h)a subsequent unsuccessful application for Ministerial Intervention.
·     Documentation submitted to the Department or the Tribunal in support of the current application including:
§a copy of Akta Nikah (Marriage Certificate) in Bahasa Indonesia dated [October] 2010 issued by [Church 4] confirming the marriage of [Mr C] ([the applicant]’s false name) and[Ms A];
§certified copies of NSW Birth Certificates for each of [Child 1] and[Child 2];
§a Statement from [Pastor B] dated [September] 2012 confirming [Mr C] ([the applicant]’s acknowledged false name) and his family are active members of [Church 4] ([Church 3]–[Australia]) congregation;
§an unsigned, unsworn and undated Statutory Declaration from [Ms A] stating that, inter alia, in recent years Islamic fundamentalism has become worse throughout Indonesia particularly where her husband’s family live in Central Java, that she is aware of recent attacks on Christian villages there, despite her father’s support it would be difficult for the family to live in Sulawesi as Christians are worried by Muslims, her ‘husband’ could be discriminated against in terms of getting a job and an education, and she does not want her [child] affected by these types of religious differences;
§an unsigned, unsworn and undated Statutory Declaration from [the applicant] (a.k.a.[Mr C]) stating that, inter alia, his family are strong Muslims and live in an area that is fundamentalist, it would be impossible and dangerous for his family to return to Java Tengah (that is, Central Java), it would be hard to live in Sulawesi as there is resentment and suspicion of Muslims, he is concerned for his child for the same reasons, since he left Indonesia things have got worse between religious groups, events are currently very bad with attacks on Christian villages, he believes his wife would be subject to humiliation and degradation as a result of these circumstances;
§copy of Akta Penyerahan Anak (Child Delivery Certificate ) in Bahasa Indonesia dated [April] 2013 issued by[Church 4] confirming [Child 1] was dedicated to the Lord by [his/her] [father] and [his/her] mother[Ms A];
§copy of Baby Dedication Certificate dated [August] 2013 issued by [a church] confirming [Child 2] was dedicated to the Lord by [his/her] parents [the applicant] and[Ms A];
§copies of two unsigned Kartu Pribadi (Personal Cards) in Bahasa Indonesia issued in July [year] and July [year] in respect of ‘[applicant’s name]’(sic), then aged 6 and 12 respectively confirming, inter alia, his attendance at [a] school, his religion as Islam and that of his parents’ religion is also Islam;
§certified copy of Surat Keterangan Catatan Kepolisian (Police Certificate) in Bahasa Indonesia dated [August] 2005 in respect of [the applicant] undertaken for work purposes;
§copy of Akta Cerai (Divorce Certificate) stamped ‘Untuk Ex Suami’ (For Ex Husband) in Bahasa Indonesia issued in Bogor dated [April] 2009 in relation to ending the marriage between [name deleted] and[the applicant];
§copy of Kartu Keluarga (Family Card) in Bahasa Indonesia dated [December] 2007 with details of the primary applicant’s parents and his [siblings] noting that all live in Bogor and are Muslim;
§copy of Akta Baptism (Baptism Certificate) in Bahasa Indonesia issued by [Church 4] in [Australia] in relation to [Mr C] ([the applicant]’s acknowledged false name) dated [April] 2009;
§original statement by [Pastor B] dated [May] 2014 on [Church 4] ([Church 3] –[Australia]) letterhead confirming that: [the applicant] and family are active members of the congregation; [The applicant] is one of the Elders and is in charge of co-ordination of the Sunday service: he and his [wife] are both devout Christians especially [the applicant] who was a convert from Moslem; and, the family attends Sunday services at church and Friday evening prayer meetings at the Pastor’s residence; and,
§signed Statutory Declaration from [The applicant] dated 4 May 2015 confirming that: he became a follower of the Ahmadiyah branch of Islam; he comes from a Muslim family; he converted to Christianity during 2008; his wife is Christian; he believes that, since his arrival in Australia, there has been a growing intolerance towards persons who have converted in any circumstances: and, his claims are genuine and he has maintained his Christianity at his church.
·     The Department’s PAM3 Protection visas - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian – Refugee Guidelines.
·     Relevant country information including DFAT country information reports.

Nationality of the applicants

On the basis of [the applicant]’s Travel Document (issued in his name by the Consulate General of Indonesia in [Australia] [in] 2013 and presented to the Department [in] April 2013) as well as[Ms A]’s passport (issued by the authorities of Indonesia [in] 2005, a copy of which [the applicant] provided to the delegate at the time of his interview [in] May 2014) I find that they are both citizens of Indonesia. It appears that, although [the applicant] and [Ms A] live together and have children together, they are not legally married: they have not provided a copy of a Marriage Certificate issued by the [Registry] of Births Deaths and Marriages. Rather, they have provided a copy document issued by [Church 4] (or [Church 3] –[Australia]) printed in Bahasa Indonesia and titled ‘Akta Nikah’.[19] I note that [the applicant] has used his acknowledged false name of [Mr C] in the Akta Nikah, which has been signed by[Pastor B]. Despite this, the Tribunal accepts that [the applicant] and [Ms A] live in a defacto spousal relationship for immigration purposes. Accordingly, [Ms A] is hereinafter referred to as [the applicant]’s defacto partner within the meaning of that term in s.5CB of the Act.
[19] Literally translated as ‘Marriage Certificate’: see >
On the basis of the certified copy [of the] Birth Certificates provided, I accept that the children applicants were born in Australia. The certified copy Birth Certificate issued in respect of the eldest child [Child 1] contains the name of [Ms A] as the mother: no father is named on the Birth Certificate. The certified copy Birth Certificate issued in respect of the second child [Child 2] contains the name of [Ms A] as the mother and [the applicant] as the father. The nationality law of Indonesia states, in part, that any person born abroad where the parents are not legally married, the child takes the nationality of the mother.[20] [The applicant]’s defacto partner has completed a Part D Application for Member of the Family Unit for each of herself and her [children] as part of[the applicant]’s current protection visa application. There is no evidence before me indicating that the children applicants are not nationals of Indonesia.
[20] Article 4(7) Citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12 2006: see also There are Consular processes that need to be undertaken for registration of the birth and issue of a passport.
There is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that any of the applicants have a right to enter and reside in a county other than Indonesia and, therefore, they are not excluded from Australia’s protection obligations under s.36(3) of the Act. I accept that all applicants should be assessed against Indonesia as the “receiving country” for the purposes of the complementary protection obligations in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. In relation to the members of[the applicant]’s family unit (that is, his defacto partner and the [children] applicants) I accept that their claims should be assessed against Indonesia as the “country or reference” for the purposes of the Convention in s.36(2)(a) of the Act.
The primary applicant’s claims for protection
[The applicant]’s claims in his current Protection visa application as set out in his Form 866C Application for a Protection (Class XA) visa are as follows:
·     He is relying on ‘sur place' events that have happened after his arrival in Australia.
·     His defacto partner is Christian and he converted to Christianity in 2008.
·     He believes he will be subjected to significant harm and discrimination, as well as religious based persecution and discrimination, if returned to Indonesia.
In a written submission dated 23 September 2013, [the applicant]’s representative provided further details of his client’s claims for protection. Essentially, through his representative,
[the applicant] notes that he previously applied for a Protection visa, then under the name[Mr C], and now claims that he:
·     Is from Central Java where his parents and brothers still live: the area is characterised by an adherence to fundamentalist Islam. Islamic fundamentalism is growing in popularity in Indonesia.
·     Was baptised in 2008 into[Church 3], a Christian Indonesian church in [Australia] and ‘married’ [Ms A] [in] October 2010.
·     Will not be able to return to Central Java and be accepted by his family because of his conversion from Islam to Christianity.
·     Cannot relocate to Manado in Sulawesi (where his defacto partner is from) because he is a Christian convert from Islam.
·     May be at risk of significant harm under s.36(2A) of the Act, specifically inhuman treatment or degrading treatment, if his claims for protection became known in Indonesia.
·     Previously claimed he belonged to the Ahmadiyah branch of Islam. His previous claims relating to his adherence to the Ahmadiyah faith are relevant.
·     Relocation to Central Java is not an option as police protection would not be afforded in his circumstances and that re-establishing his family in Sulawesi would be difficult.
The secondary applicants’ claims for protection
Through his representative, [the applicant] claims that, in relation to his children, his previous claims relating to his adherence to the Ahmadiyah faith are relevant as is the Convention on the Rights of the Child since religious based conflict may result in discrimination and ostracism of the children.
Consideration of the primary applicant’s claims
As noted above, the mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well founded ‘or that it is for the reason claimed. Similarly, the fact that an applicant for protection claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not establish that such a risk exists or that the harm feared amounts to ‘significant harm’. I am not required to accept uncritically any or all of the claims made by [the applicant]. The responsibility lies with him to specify all particulars of his claims and provide sufficient evidence to the Tribunal to establish his claims.[21] It remains for [the applicant] to satisfy me that all of the statutory elements are made out.[22] Although he indicated that he would attend the hearing, [the applicant] did not do so.
[21] s.5AAA(1) of the Act
[22] MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596; SZTGS v MIBP [2014] FCA 908, Logan J at [34]
In this case, many questions about [the applicant] claims remain unanswered. A significant majority of his claims are unsubstantiated and implausible: there are also numerous inconsistencies with information provided in his earlier applications for protection and country information. Without further detail, many of his claims amount to mere assertions. Because [the applicant] failed to attend the scheduled hearing I was unable to question him about his claims as well as to question him about why he presented, or caused to be presented, bogus documents to immigration authorities on two separate occasions and why he did so to a differently constituted Tribunal. Had [the applicant] attended the hearing, I would have asked him many questions including:
·     Why should I believe his unsubstantiated claim that he belonged to the Ahmadiyah branch of Islam and was persecuted because of this when these claims were totally rejected by the Department in his second application for protection as well as by a differently constituted Tribunal and, moreover, these claims are inconsistent with the claims in his first Protection visa application in which states he is a Catholic and that he ‘belongs to the Christian-Javanese ethnic group’. I would have asked him to produce evidence to satisfy me of his unsubstantiated claim that he was an Ahmadiyah and, as a result, was persecuted.
·     The basis of the unsubstantiated and implausible claim that his family in Indonesia will not accept him, his defacto partner and his children having regard to the fact that his parents who, based on evidence provided I accept are Muslim, sent him to the local [Christian] school [for] 10 years from 1982 to 1992 and gave one of his [siblings] the Christian middle name of[deleted].
·     How he managed to obtain personal documents dating from his primary school days in 1979 and 1984 if he says his family does not support him because of his conversion from Islam to Christianity. Documentation dating back more than [number] years is either false or, if genuine, could only have been provided with the co-operation of family members in Indonesia (unless, implausibly, that [the applicant] brought such documentation with him when he came to Australia most recently using the acknowledged false name of[Mr C]). Provision of [number] year old documentation, assuming it is genuine, is inconsistent with [the applicant]’s claimed lack of family support.
·     Why I should accept as authentic the uncertified copy documents in Bahasa Indonesia indicating that his religion as a child and that of his parents is Islam when, in support of his second application for protection, the Tribunal found he had lodged false documentation in relation to being an Ahmadiyah and that he has otherwise been prepared, in the past, to lodge bogus identity documentation with the Department and the Tribunal. He also made inconsistent claims in his first Protection visa application that he was a Christian Javanese and declared in that application that he was a Catholic.
·     Why he claims to come from Central Java when, consistent with his first and current Protection visa applications, he indicates that he grew up and was educated in Bogor, Bandung and Jakarta and then, when not living in Australia from February 2002 until August 2004, he worked in Bogor or Jakarta. All these cities are located in West Java, not Central Java.
·     The inconsistent information in relation to his education and family provided in his different applications to the Department and to the Tribunal;
·     Details of his addresses for the last 30 years having regard to the fact that, in his Form 80 Personal Particulars for assessment including character assessment, he has provided addresses for the last 5 years only;
·     The inconsistency between the statement in his application that he was baptised in 2008 and the certified copy Certificate of Baptism lodged with his application indicating that he was baptised [in] April 2009.
·     Having regard to country information, on what plausible basis he thinks it would be difficult to re-establish his family in Manado, Sulawesi where his defacto partner is from and where her father is a Christian Minister having regard to the fact that this is a largely Christian area of Indonesia where over 70% of the population Christian.[23]
·     For similar reasons, it appears implausible to me as to why he could not, in the alternative, re-establish his family in West Java where he is from. Jakarta, for example, is in West Java and has a population of more than 11 million people of whom over 12% of are Christian[24] and there are a number of [Church 4] churches there (that is, the Christian congregation to which [the applicant] and his family belong in Australia)[25] as well as dozens of other Protestant and Catholic churches.
[23] A google search indicates that the location of 3 Bethel Gereja churches in Jakarta including Menteng (where the applicant formerly lived) and there are over 5,000 such church throughout the Indonesian archipelago >
[The applicant]’s failure to attend the scheduled hearing has also meant I have not been able to clarify what he means when he says that he may be at risk of significant harm, specifically inhuman treatment or degrading treatment, if his claims for protection ‘became known’ in Indonesia. It is not clear if, for example, he is suggesting that his details may have been disclosed as part of the Department’s data breach.[26] Available information indicates that the Department's data breach involved personal information of people detained in immigration detention facilities on 31 January 2014 being briefly available on the Department’s website. The information available on the Department website included the name, date of birth, nationality, gender and details of the detention (including the date and place of detention and the reason why the person was detained). However, [the applicant] was not in immigration detention on 31 January 2014. In the circumstances, to the extent that the claims of his application for protection may become known in Indonesia is in any way connected with the Department’s data breach it is clear that such a claim is baseless. In accordance with s.431 of the Act, the Tribunal does not publish any statement which may identify an applicant for a Protection visa or any relatives or dependant of the applicant. In the circumstances, I find [the applicant]’s claims for protection in this, or either of his former applications for protection, will not become known in Indonesia.
[26] “Department of Immigration and Border Protection: Own motion investigation report” Australian Privacy Commissioner November 2014 at >
Because [the applicant] did not attend the hearing, I can assess his application for review only on the basis of evidence before me. On information provided, I accept that [the applicant] grew up a Muslim (probably a Sunni Muslim, the predominate branch in Indonesia) in Bogor, West Java in a family who, having regard to the fact that he went to a Catholic primary school and has a [sibling] with a Christian middle name, could be described as a liberal Muslim family.
Since [the applicant] did not attend the hearing, I was unable to explore his claim and ascertain, to my satisfaction, whether he was, in fact, an Ahmadiyah Muslim in Indonesia when this had been categorically rejected by a differently constituted Tribunal in February 2007. I am therefore unable to explore [the applicant]’s claim that he fears harm as a Christian convert from being an Ahmadiyah Muslim. Country information indicates that the Indonesian Constitution respects religious freedom for six officially recognised religions: Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu and Confucianism. Indonesia prides itself on its pluralism: the 2014 Human Rights World Report notes that then President Yudhoyono stated on 31 May 2013 his government ‘would not tolerate any act of senseless violence committed by any group in the name of religion’.[27] More recently, at Indonesia’s Muslim Congress held February 2015 in Yogyakarta and attended by President Joko Widodo, the Indonesian Minister for Religious Affairs (Mr Lukman Hakim Saifuddin) reiterated for the assembly the “guaranteed constitutional right of Indonesians of whatever religion culture or ethnic origin to practice their religion in freedom and peace”.[28] The government observes the following religious holidays as national days: the Ascension of the Prophet, Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, the Muslim New Year, the Birth of the Prophet Mohammed, Good Friday, the Ascension of Christ, Christmas Day, the Buddhist holiday Waisak, Chinese New Year and the Hindu holiday Nyepi. Additional Hindu holy days are recognised as regional holidays in Bali and the Balinese do not work on Saraswati Day, Galungan, and Kuningan.[29]
[27] Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Indonesia, 31 January UCAN 2015 Indonesian Muslim Congress affirms respect for minorities, 20 February 2015 States Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2011
Country information indicates that, from time to time and in some locations, there have been clashes between Islamic groups and other religious groups. However, as noted by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom in its 2014 report, Indonesia’s tradition of tolerance is reflected in the fact that the country’s diverse religious communities operate openly and with few restrictions, particularly for the six recognised religious groups. The same report has noted that the country’s transition to democracy and economic stability has been marred by some sectarian violence, terrorist attacks, the growth of the extremist groups and rising intolerance towards religious minorities: however, such incidents appear to be isolated and, having regard to the sentiments of the Indonesian government outlined above as well as reports of widespread inter-faith cooperation, are extremely rare with the government making strides in dealing with such terrorist networks.[30] DFAT assesses there is no evidence that intolerant ideology is a feature of mainstream Islam in Indonesia and that, generally speaking, most ordinary Indonesians can point to positive examples of inter-faith tolerance and understanding at the local level.[31]
[30] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2014 Annual Report DFAT Country Information Report – Indonesia 9 June 2015, p.13
Many reports have noted that inter-faith cooperation is strong in many parts of Indonesia including Manado, North Sulawesi where [the applicant]’s representative in his letter of 3 May 2015 indicates his client ‘feels obliged to return’. By way of example, in 2009, Idul Fitri (the Islamic feast of marking the end of Ramadan, which is a month of fasting and prayer) fell on a Sunday and, in Manado, most Muslims perform Idul Fitri prayers at the Manado Tikala Field. As the Muslim celebration was coming to a close and people were returning home from Idul Fitri prayers, Christians of the GMIM church were, at the same time, going to church to attend a Sunday service. Spontaneously, along the way, the Christians shook hands with and extended Idul Fitri greetings to the Muslims.[32] Further evidence of inter-faith cooperation is demonstrated in the 2006 decree on houses of worship that states that government leaders in all provinces, cities and regions should establish Religious Harmony Forums (Forum Kerukunan Umit Beragama, FKUB) comprising of local religious leaders to advise the governor, mayor or regent on the construction of houses of worship. Members of minority religions in Indonesia such as Christian, Hindus and Buddhists are guaranteed at least one representative on such forums. In Manado, Mr Ulyas Taha, the Deputy Secretary of FKUB and himself a Muslim (in what is predominately a Christian area) has said that the program is working ‘without any serious problems. It was established in 2009 and has since received 10 applications to build six new churches and four new mosques. We passed them all’.[33]
[32] Centre for Religious & Cross-Cultural Studies 2010 Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2009 Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta ,p. 59
[33] Human Rights Watch 2013 In Religion's Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia February 2013, pp.47 - 48
DFAT’s most recent country information report on Indonesia assesses that Christians in Indonesia are generally at a low risk of official discrimination and violence and are generally able to practice their faith without interference owing to their officially recognised status.[34] That said, the 9 June 2015 report observes that incidents of religious intolerance appear to be on the rise in Indonesia and members of Christian minorities can face a higher risk of societal discrimination and violence in regions where hard-line Muslim organisations are influential. However, of significance is DFAT’s assessment that such incidents occur relatively infrequently in Indonesia. While acts of religious intolerance rose in part as a result of former President Yudhoyono’s failure to act decisively in response to attacks on minorities and the subsequent emergence of a culture of impunity, DFAT assesses that this situation could change depending on how President Widodo responds to such incidents when they occur.
[34] DFAT Country Information Report – Indonesia 9 June 2015, p.16

Country information indicates that conversions between religious groups occur and are permitted by law, although conversions are controversial. In this regard, country information notes some Muslims have accused Christian groups of using food and microcredit programs to entice ‘impoverished Muslims’ to convert to Christianity in Indonesia.[35] However, as [the applicant]’s conversion to Christianity did not occur until after he left Indonesia, this issue is not relevant in his case. More importantly, he is a[occupation], has tertiary qualifications in Indonesia and indicates he has worked consistently since leaving school - not only in Indonesia but also Australia - and his circumstances are not such that he could be classified as ‘impoverished’. In light of the fact that [the applicant] appears to come from what could be described as a liberal Muslim family (having regard to the fact that not only did his parents send him to a [Christian] school for many years but also gave one of his [siblings] a Christian middle name) I reject [the applicant]’s claim that his family will not accept his conversion from Islam to Christianity.
[35] US Department of State 2012, 2011 International Religious Freedom Report – Indonesia, 30 July 2011, p. 17
Whilst I am satisfied that [the applicant] has converted from Islam and is now a practising Christian having been baptised in Australia in April 2009 and that he ‘married’ his defacto partner in a Christian church in Australia in October 2010 I am not satisfied, on the basis of available information (including information in his former applications), that he has converted from being an Ahmadiyah Muslim to Christianity and that, as a result, he or the members of his family would face persecution or significant harm for this reason if returned to Indonesia. Having carefully considered available information, I find that there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] and his family being removed from Australia to Indonesia, there is a real risk of significant harm to [the applicant] and his family as a consequence of [the applicant] being a Christian or because he converted from Islam to Christianity.
I note [the applicant]’s representative has stated his client would ‘feel obliged’ to return to Manado. [The applicant] claims, however, that re-establishing his family in Sulawesi would be difficult. DFAT’s most recent report on Indonesia confirms that Indonesian citizens are able to move and reside freely within all territories of the Republic[36]. Anyone relocating merely needs to register with the relevant local authority within one year of their move. DFAT assesses that, generally speaking, income would be the main source of difficulty in relocating, rather than religion or ethnicity. Because I have found, based on available information, that there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] and his family being removed from Australia to Indonesia, there is a real risk of significant harm to [the applicant] and his family as a consequence of [the applicant] being a Christian or because he converted from Islam to Christianity, it has not been necessary for me to consider the application in this case of the relocation principle set out in s.36(2B)(a) of the Act.
[36] DFAT Country Information Report – Indonesia 9 June 2015, p.30
Upon their return to Indonesia, [the applicant] and his family may consider some areas more attractive than others. I accept that, after living in Australia for more than 10 years, [the applicant] may have some difficulty adjusting back to life in Indonesia. With [children] not yet at school, I acknowledge the attractiveness of considering the possibility of [the applicant] re-establishing his family in Manado, North Sulawesi where [Ms A]’s family live. In Manado, I note he would have the benefit of assistance from his defacto partner’s family who would, no doubt, celebrate the welcome return of their daughter and her family to this predominantly Christian area of Indonesia. [The applicant] could also consider other areas of Indonesia in which to re-establish his family including West Java where he has lived most of his life. Jakarta, for example, is located in West Java and is a thriving city of nearly half Australia’s population: the city has many Christian churches including three [Church 4] (the church that the [applicant's] family attends in [Australia]). In relation to work opportunities, I note Indonesia’s unemployment rate as at 30 March 2015 was 5.81% indicating that [the applicant] should have little or no difficulty finding work upon his return to Indonesia.[37] These compares favourably with Australia’s unemployment rate of 6.1% for the same period.[38] As [the applicant] did not attend the hearing I was unable to explore why it would not be plausible for him to re-establish his family in Manado, or consider cities in West Java such as Jakarta. Although I recognise it appears that [the applicant] has only lived in West Java when in Indonesia I am not satisfied it would be ‘difficult’ for him to re-establish his family in Manado: not only has he demonstrated resilience by managing to live in Australia for more than 10 years and support his young family whilst working in a foreign country without speaking any English (as indicated in his current Form 886C) but he would also have the benefit of assistance from his defacto partner’s family in what is a predominately Christian area of Indonesia.
[37] of the secondary applicants’ claims
As noted above, through his representative, [the applicant] claims that in relation to his children, his previous claims relating to his adherence to the Ahmadiyah faith are relevant as is the Convention on the Rights of the Child since religious based conflict may result in discrimination and ostracism of the children. I do not accept, just as a differently constituted Tribunal in February 2007 did not accept, that [the applicant] was ever a member of the Ahmadiyah branch of Islam. Accordingly, I reject the first basis of his children’s claims for protection as articulated by his representative.
In relation to the claim that religious based conflict may result in discrimination and ostracism of [the applicant]’s children I note again the country information referred to above that Indonesia’s Constitution provides the freedom to choose, believe, practice and worship a religion of choice and that Indonesia officially recognises the Protestant religion. As indicated above, DFAT’s most recent country information report on Indonesia is dated 9 June 2015. The report assesses Christians in Indonesia are generally at a low risk of official discrimination and violence and are generally able to practice their faith without interference owing to their officially recognised status.[39] While the report observes that incidents of religious intolerance appear to be on the rise in Indonesia and members of Christian minorities can face a higher risk of societal discrimination and violence in regions where hard-line Muslim organisations are influential, DFAT nonetheless assesses that such incidents occur relatively infrequently. The report contains no reference to any discrimination or ostracism arising because of a person’s membership of a family unit where another family member has converted from Islam to Christianity (or any other religion). By comparison, DFAT recognises there is a moderate to high risk of discrimination in the case of female divorcees,[40] Shi’a Muslims where hard-line Sunni organizations are influential,[41] the Ahmadiyah community in West and East Java,[42] Papuans engaged in separatist or criminal activities[43] and people with a disability.[44]
[39] DFAT Country Information Report – Indonesia 9 June 2015, p.16
[40] Ibid p.13
[41] Ibid p.15
[42] Ibid p.16
[43] Ibid p.18
[44] Ibid p.24
Based on available information, I find that, if [the applicant]’s children are returned to Indonesia, any claimed ‘religious based conflict’ will not result in discrimination and ostracism. I find that there is no real chance that [the applicant]’s children will be persecuted because of their Christian religion or their family’s Christian religion, or because their father is a convert to Christianity. Given the[children’s] young age, is it unlikely that they will have any major issues adjusting to life in Indonesia and will, if the family choses to re-establish in Manado, no doubt enjoy being part of their mother’s extended family. I also note, as an aside, that in the event [the applicant] and [Ms A] wish to have their children study at schools where English is the medium of instruction, Jakarta has 17 English-speaking international schools (many of which are Christian schools).[45] Manado also has one international school where English is the medium of instruction.[46] There are many such international schools throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
[45]
[46] >
[Ms A] has not made any claim of her own: rather, she relies fully on [the applicant]’s claims and has completed a Form 866 Application for a member of the family unit. The situation regarding Christians in Indonesia has been outlined above. In summary, DFAT’s most recent country report assesses that Christians are generally at a low risk of official discrimination and violence and are able to practice their faith without interference owing to their officially recognised status.
Having carefully considered all of the evidence before me I find that members of
[the applicant]’s family unit included in his current application do not have a well-founded fear of persecution either for reasons of their own Christian religion or because of their membership of [the applicant]’s family and his being a Christian or because he is a Christian convert. In addition, I find that there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the family members of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Indonesia, there is a real risk they will suffer significant harm.
Is grant of the visa prevented by s.91WA of the Act?
A question that arises in relation to this case is whether the provisions of s.91WA of the Act apply to preclude grant of a Protection visa to [the applicant]. This section was introduced to the Act with effect from 18 April 2015 and applies to all applications currently before the Minister, including this application.[47]
[47] s.2 Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015
Section 91WA(1) of the Act requires the Minister to refuse to grant a Protection visa to an applicant who provides, or causes to be provided, a bogus document as evidence of their identity, nationality or citizenship, or if the Minister is satisfied the applicant has destroyed or disposed, or caused the destruction or disposal of, documentary evidence of their identity, nationality or citizenship. There is no express requirement in law that provision of the bogus document must be in connection with the current Protection visa application: nor is such a requirement discussed in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill or the Addendum Explanatory Memorandum. However, the requirement that the Minister must refuse to grant a Protection visa in circumstances contemplated by s.91WA(1) of the Act will not apply if the applicant: first, has a reasonable explanation for the provision, destruction or disposal; and second, either provides relevant documentary evidence or has taken reasonable steps to provide such evidence: s.91WA(2) of the Act: see Annexure A for further details.
Information in relation to [the applicant] indicates that he provided or caused to be provided a bogus document as evidence of his identity and nationality when he used an Indonesian passport in the name of [Mr C] to enter Australia [in] March 2006, apply for his second Protection visa and in support of a review application before a differently constituted Tribunal following refusal of his second application for protection. He has subsequently provided what he claims, and the delegate has accepted, to be his genuine Indonesian passport. Since [the applicant] did not attend the hearing, I have not had the opportunity to discuss these matters with him, or to form a view as to whether he has a reasonable explanation for providing or causing to provide a bogus document in the name of[Mr C].
Had [the applicant] attended the scheduled hearing I would have asked him a number of questions in relation to his acknowledged use of a bogus Indonesian passport including:
·     Why he presented a bogus Indonesian passport to immigration authorities on arrival in Australia in March 2006 and whether or not this was reasonable in the circumstances of his case.
·     Why he caused his current representative to provide to the Department, as part of his second application for protection lodged [in] April 2006, a certified copy of the biodata page of a bogus Indonesian passport as evidence of his nationality or citizenship and whether or not this was reasonable in the circumstances of his case.
·     Why he presented a bogus Indonesian passport at a hearing of a differently constituted Tribunal on 6 December 2006 and whether or not this was reasonable in the circumstances of his case.
Because I am satisfied that [the applicant] is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations for the reasons discussed above, it is unnecessary to me to make a finding as to whether he should be refused a Protection visa pursuant to s.91WA of the Act.
CONCLUSION
As indicated above, the Tribunal does not have power to consider[the applicant]’s application under the Refugee Convention criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act. For the reasons given above and on the basis of information before me, the Tribunal is not satisfied that [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.
For the reasons given above and on the basis of information before me, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any of [the applicant]’s family unit members are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.
There is no suggestion that any of the applicants satisfy s.36(2)(b) or (c) of the Act on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a Protection visa. Accordingly, the applicants do not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2) of the Act.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.
Katie Malyon
Member
ANNEXURE A
Extracts from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
bogus document, in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:
(a)purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or
(b)is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or
(c)was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly
……
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

36Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2A) A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)    the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)   the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B) However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)    it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)    the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)    the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
..
91WA Providing bogus documents or destroying identity documents
(1)The Minister must refuse to grant a protection visa to an applicant for a protection visa if:
(a)   the applicant provides a bogus document as evidence of the applicant’s identity, nationality or citizenship; or
(b)   the Minister is satisfied that the applicant:
(i)has destroyed or disposed of documentary evidence of the applicant’s identity, nationality or citizenship; or
(ii)has caused such documentary evidence to be destroyed or disposed of.
(2)Subsection (1) does not apply if the Minister is satisfied that the applicant:
(a)   has a reasonable explanation for providing the bogus document or for the destruction or disposal of the documentary evidence; and
(b)   either:
(i)provides documentary evidence of his or her identity, nationality or citizenship; or
(ii)has taken reasonable steps to provide such evidence.
(3)For the purposes of this section, a person provides a document if the person provides, gives or presents the document or causes the document to be provided, given or presented.
oOOo