1410882 (Refugee) - [2016] AATA 4267

1410882 (Refugee) [2016] AATA 4267 (29 July 2016)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1410882
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Pakistan
MEMBER:Bruce Henry
DATE:29 July 2016
PLACE OF DECISION:  Brisbane
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Statement made on 29 July 2016 at 4:27pm

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan, applied for the visa [in] November 2012 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] June 2014.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 15 December 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Pashto and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration (the Department)[1] and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
[1] The relevant guidelines are found in the Departmental policy manual, PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian, entitled Complementary Protection Guidelines and Refugee Law Guidelines
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.
Background
The application and the applicant's written claims are on the departmental file which is before the Tribunal. The applicant attended an interview at the Department [in] March 2013, and a recording of the interview is located on the departmental file. No further claims or submissions have been received by the Tribunal during the course of the review.
In his application the applicant claimed to be a Pashtun Turi and a Shia Muslim from [a certain] area in the Upper Kurram Agency of Khyber-Pakhtunkhua Provicnein Pakistan. He claims to be a Pakistani citizen, and the Department has accepted that claim based on the available identity documentation.
The applicant’s claims were set out in a statutory declaration that accompanied the application, in which he said:
My parents are deceased. We are [number] siblings, [details of composition]. They all live in Parachinar and only [one sibling] and myself are single.
Why I left my country:
While I was working as a driver, I used to do volunteer work for the local [Charity 1], driving people to and from their head office. The Taliban did not like that. In 2008, while I was driving passengers from Parachinar to Peshawar, my car was stopped by the Taliban and I was arrested. I was held for about four hours during which time, my back was inspected. When the Taliban saw the scars in my back, they realised that I was a Shia and they slashed my back with big knives. I still have the scars from this episode. After this, I was left unconscious in the bush and some villagers picked me up and took me with them. They then asked my family to pay ransom money and after a month, my family paid a large amount and I was released. The villagers were not Taliban, they were Sunnis.
At the beginning of 2012, while I was driving my [vehicle] with passengers through [a location], my vehicle was showered with bullets. [Number] of my passengers died as a consequence of the bullets and [number] were injured. I was not injured. I called the army to assist, but nobody showed up so I drove my [number] passengers, including the [dead] and the [injured] to Parachinar myself.
After that episode, I received threatening calls and letters. I was asked to stop volunteering for the [Charity 1] and the [Charity 2]. Since I was also the founder of an unregistered charity called [Charity 3], we used to receive donations to assist people injured in war. The Taliban did not like my involvement with these organisations. In addition, Shia militias approached me to recruit me to fight the Taliban. I am a pacifist and I told them that I did not want to fight, kill or being killed.
My life is in danger in Pakistan because of the presence of the Taliban and the Shia militias in my area. I am scared to go back because the fighting is continuing with the Shias and I will be detained, quartered and killed by Taliban if I am caught again.
I cannot live anywhere else in Pakistan because I am a Shia. I will be recognised as a Shia by the way I pray and practice my religion. Because of this I will not able to practice my religion safely. Also, I refused to join the Shia militias to fight the Taliban.
The Pakistani Sunnis and Taliban say that Shias are infidels and they declared jihad against Shias all over Pakistan.
What I fear might happen if I go back to my country:
I fear that if I go back to my country I will be tortured and killed because I am a Shia and a pacifist. I do not want to join the Shia militias to kill other people.
Who I think will harm or mistreat me if I go back:
I think that the Taliban and perhaps the Shia militias will kill me if I go back
Why I believe they will harm or mistreat me if I go back:
I believe I will be killed because I am Shia and I was also involved as a volunteer with the [Charity 2], the [Charity 3] and the [Charity 1]. These solidarity activities, are not liked by the Taliban.
Why I believe that the authorities in my country will not protect me if I go back:
I believe that the authorities in my country will not protect me if I go back because the Pakistani Government have been unable to stop the fighting and killings for a long time. Also the Pakistani Government has been unable to penetrate the Taliban line surrounding our village so they are unable to provide us with the protection we need to survive. Also, the Pakistani government is corrupt and they are mainly Sunni. They will never protect the Shias.
Other matters that I would like the Department to consider
I am a Shia. Shias have been systematically eliminated by the Taliban. I fear for my life. This is all I want to say about my claims and my reasons to leave Pakistan.
The applicant provided to the Tribunal a copy of the decision record of the departmental delegate, in which his claims were summarised as follows:
The applicant's claims are summarised below:
·The applicant fears persecution at the hands of the non-state agents, namely Taliban and/or pro-Taliban militants as well as Sunni militia operating in the Kurram Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) for reasons of his religion as a Shia, his Pashtun ethnicity, his membership of Turi tribe and his work with charitable organisations in Pakistan.
·The applicant claims to be a [age] year unmarried male of Shia religion, with [siblings], belongs to Turi tribe and was born in the Upper Kurram Agency in FATA, Pakistan. His family currently resides in their family home in Upper Kurram Agency region.
·The applicant completed [number] years of school education in Parachinar, Pakistan. In 1997, he commenced work as a driver in Parachinar. In 2002, he started his own business of operating a [vehicle] transporting people from Parachinar to various areas of Pakistan and he operated this business until he departed Pakistan in 2012.
·The applicant claims that there has been escalation of violence against Shias in Parachinar in recent years wherein houses and shops were burnt down by the militias.
·The applicant claims that he was involved in three charitable organisations in Parachinar, namely [Charity 1], [Charity 2] and [Charity 3]. The applicant was the founder of [Charity 3] and worked in all these organisations as a volunteer.
·The applicant claims that in 2008, his car was stopped by the Taliban when he was transporting people to Peshawar and he was detained for 4 hours. While being detained he was severely beaten up when scars on his back was discovered which identified him as a Shia. He was left unconscious at the road side and some Sunni militias took him with them. He was released when his family paid ransom money to these people.
·In early 2012, the applicant's [vehicle] was shot at by the Taliban. [Number] of the passengers died and [others] were injured. The applicant also sustained minor injuries in this incident. The applicant requested the Army who was nearby, for assistance but they refused. The applicant then took the injured and dead to the local hospital in his [vehicle].
·The applicant claims since this incident he started receiving threatening calls and letters from the Taliban threatening him to stop working for the charity organisations.
·The applicant claims that the Shia militia approached him and asked him to join them to fight against the Taliban which the applicant refused as he did not want to kill anyone or get killed himself
·The applicant claims that he is wanted by the Taliban or pro-Taliban groups because he is a Shia and belongs to a minority tribe.
·He claims that there is nowhere safe for him in Pakistan as he had been targeted by the Taliban and Shia militia and the Pakistani government is unable to protect him.
·The above claims were explored at length during the Protection Visa interview.4 Considerations relevant to the assessment of the credibility of specific claims were put to the applicant and his responses to this information have been taken into account in assessing protection obligations.
In discussing these claims the delegate said:
At the Protection Visa (PV) interview, the applicant was questioned in relation to his family, his education and his life style in Pakistan, and what he fears will happen if he were to return to Pakistan. I found his testimony to be brief, vague and lacking relevant level of detail with several inconsistencies in his evidence presented at the PV interview. The applicant's testimony at interview in relation to his fear of harm from the Taliban has led me to conclude that he has significantly misrepresented the level of his fear and led me to question the credibility of his claims. Furthermore, the applicant's reasons of fear and subsequent interest from the Taliban he claims to have received since 2008 due to his alleged association with charitable organisations, was such that I dismiss these claims in their entirety and find the applicant has fabricated these claims to strengthen his PV application.
The applicant has claimed that he was involved with three charity organisations, namely [Charity 2], [Charity 1] and [Charity 3] in Parachinar. The applicant was the founder of [Charity 3]. The applicant was asked his reasons of involving himself with these organisations. The applicant responded that he wanted to assist people who were poor and affected by the war in his country by providing his driving services, assisting them in completing their paperwork for [Charity 1], etc. When asked why he wanted to assist these people, he was unable to elaborate except to say that it was his wish to assist as they were poor and needy people and the applicant came from a rich and affluent background. The applicant was asked to provide details of the structure of these organisations. The applicant did not comment. The applicant was asked how these organisations were funded. The applicant said that they received donation. When asked to provide details of these donations and their sources he was unable to elaborate except to say that rich people donated money whatever and whenever they could. The applicant was asked why he stopped working for these organisations and he responded that he could not continue.
When asked to explain why he could not continue, he said the Taliban were threatening him and he did not feel safe in his country and decided to leave. When asked to provide details of these threats he was unable to provide any details except to say that he received several threatening calls. Given the above vague and ambiguous account by the applicant, I am unable to accept that the applicant was involved with charitable organisations or received threats for that reason from anyone in Pakistan as claimed.
The Department accepted that the applicant is a Pashtun and a Shia Muslim. The delegate found:
In summary, I accept that the applicant was born in Parachinar, Pakistan and that he is a Shia Pashtun. However, I do not accept that:
·the applicant was involved with any charity organisation in Pakistan;
·the applicant was targeted by the Taliban because of his charity work with voluntary organisations or for any other reason;
·the applicant was of any adverse interest to the Pakistani authorities; as he was never charged of any crime;
·as he was able to obtain his passport in [2012] without any difficulty;
·as he continued to reside there until his departure was organised with the assistance of a people smuggler without any incident;
·there was no ongoing interest in the applicant from the Pakistani authorities because he was asked to join a Shia militia;
Notwithstanding the above, I need to assess the applicant's other claim of harm feared as he claims that there is general insecurity in the country especially in Parachinar where Shias of Turi ethnicity are being targeted by militant groups and he fears that he would be targeted for those said reasons. Based on the available country information noted in Part B below, I accept as plausible that the applicant claims that there are ongoing security concerns in that area due to Taliban activity.
After considering that country information, the delegate concluded:
Given the country information indicating that Shia Pashtuns continue to be targeted for sectarian violence in the Kurram Agency, I accept the applicant faces a real chance of being targeted for reasons of his religion should he return to his home in Kurram Agency, Pakistan.
The delegate rejected the claim, however, on the basis that the applicant could relocate elsewhere in Pakistan:
That is, there is no doubt that certain parts of Pakistan (including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) are particularly dangerous places for Shia Muslims. While there have been isolated attacks in other parts of Pakistan, notably the attack in Rawalpindi at Ashura in 2013 that left seven dead, these attacks are highly unusual in places such as Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore. I note that the applicant believes he will be targeted if he is identified as being from the Kurram Agency, as he asserts is evident from his national identity card and accent, for example. However, I have not been able to locate information indicating that Turis from the Kurram Agency are being targeted in the large cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi or Lahore in Pakistan, apart from the rare attacks against Shias more generally.
While the UNHCR asserts that those at risk of being targeted by anti-government elements may not be able to relocate, I do not consider that this applies to the applicant. As stated above, I do not accept that the applicant worked for [Charity 1] or any other charity organisations, or that he ever received threatening telephone calls from the Taliban. I further do not accept that the applicant has a profile that would increase his risk above those of other Shias in Pakistan. With a Shia population of up to 40 million people in Pakistan, the infrequency of sectarian attacks in the cities I have identified and many diverse, large urban centres, the possibility of the applicant being caught up in sectarian violence appears extremely low. As such, I am satisfied that the applicant as a Shia Muslim and Turi, could live without facing a real chance of persecution in these larger cities I have identified.
With regards to the applicant's particular circumstances I acknowledge that he has never resided in Islamabad, Rawalpindi or Lahore although he claimed to have travelled to Islamabad for business purposes and the applicant has previously stayed in Peshawar where he did not encounter any difficulties. While I acknowledge that the applicant does not have any relatives in Islamabad, Rawalpindi or Lahore the fact that he has experience of residing outside his place of origin, his ability to speak Urdu, his skill as a businessman and a driver and his affluent familial background, I consider he would be able to establish himself in these large cities and his capacity to subsist would not be threatened there.
Therefore, I am satisfied that relocation within Pakistan is a safe and reasonable option for the applicant.
The hearing
At the hearing the applicant told the Tribunal that his family owned farming land in their ancestral village. After his father died in about 1990 the family divided the land between he and his [brothers], and they each owned about [number] acres of land. They did not work on the land themselves, apart from [number] of the brothers who farmed their own land. He and his other brothers worked in other jobs and local people from the village worked the land for them. He worked as a driver after finishing school, working for [Charity 1] driving between Parachinar and Peshawar.

The applicant said that his problems with the Taliban started around 2008. The road between Parachinar and Peshawar was being kept open by government soldiers, but the Taliban frequently attacked people using the road. His evidence on these matters was consistent with the claims he made in his application and when interviewed by the Department, which are set out above. As is also noted above, the Department accepted those claims as genuine, abut found that the applicant could reasonably relocate to Lahore in Pakistan.
The applicant also told the Tribunal that he had been attending [a] church in [city]. He said that he is studying the bible, and has attended the [church] ‘two or three times’.
The Tribunal asked the applicant why he could not safely relocate to Lahore in Pakistan. He said Shias have problems in Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi, as Lashkar and other Sunni groups are active in all of these cities. He added that he is in a relationship with an Australian citizen who is about to have a child.
After the hearing, the Tribunal received a considerable amount of additional information from the applicant and his representatives, including a Certificate of Baptism stating that the applicant had been baptised at [Church 1] in [city] [in] December 2015.
In the submissions accompanying the baptismal certificate the representative stated:
The Applicant instructs that he has been attending [Church 1]. He instructs he was disillusioned by Islam and therefore was examining other faiths. This lead him to take an interest in Christianity. We enclose a copy of the applicant’s baptism certificate for your attention. The Applicant instructs that his [Pastor] can be contacted on [phone] or [email] if the Tribunal wishes to confirm the veracity of the Baptism Certificate. The Applicant instructs that he has been attending [Church 1] for more than [number] years, he attends the Church most days. In addition to attending Church Services, the applicant attends bible studies. The Applicant is fearful that if he returns to Pakistan, he would be subjected to serious harm due to his faith.
In assessing the genuineness of the applicant’s conversion, we submit that it is imperative to take into consideration the applicant’s motivation for changing his faith. As outlined by the applicant he became dissatisfied with Islam and wanted to discover a religion that he believed to be more kin to his beliefs.
The Applicant instructs that given the uncertainty associated to the immigration process in Australia, he required spiritual guidance which the Church has been able to provide him. We respectfully submit that in light of the applicant’s testimony and evidence provided from his church, it is apparent that the applicant’s conversion to Christianity is genuine. In particular, we note that the applicant was introduced to the Church by his friend. We submit that there are a number of factors which indicate that the applicant’s conversion is sincere and as such his conduct while in Australia should not be disregarded when assessing his protection claim. In addition, we submit that his genuine conversion to Christianity would place him at risk of serious harm upon return to Pakistan.
It is our submission that the applicant would be at risk of harm both due to his Christian beliefs and due to Muslim Shia beliefs. Although the applicant has converted, he would still be considered a Shia by the Taliban given his area of origin and scars on his back. The Applicant was previously identified as a Shia by the scarring on his back and subjected to harm. Further, if the applicant was identified as a Christian, he would be at risk of serious harm from extremist groups in Pakistan who hold a great hatred towards the Christian Community.
The representative referred the Tribunal to a number of other decisions of this Tribunal (differently constituted) in relation to the question of the reasonableness of the relocation option for Turi Shias. The submission on this question concluded:
We respectfully submit that the following factors indicate that it would be unreasonable for the Applicant to be forced to relocate within another area of Pakistan. The Applicant has no family in any other area of Pakistan which could provide a support network to him if he had to relocate internally. We note the information outlined above which clearly indicates that the availability of family support networks is important when assessing the viability of relocation. Without such support network, the Applicant would be vulnerable to harm. The Applicant would have no access to amenities in another area of Pakistan. We note that in Pakistan most individuals obtain employment through kinship and family ties. The Applicant’s family remains in Parachinar. Given this area that is clearly adversely affected by sectarian violence, his family’s ability to earn a livelihood is greatly hindered. As such, the Applicant would not be able to rely on assistance from his family to assist him relocate.
The primary decision maker contended that the Applicant’s ability to subsist in Australia suggests that he would be able to relocate. With respect, we submit that the Applicant’s ability to subsist in Australia is not comparable to the situation in Pakistan. In Australia, the Applicant has been able to rely on community support programs and a developed society to support him. Given these matters, if the Applicant was forced to return to Pakistan and relocate internally he would be extremely vulnerable to harm. We further note that, despite the primary decision maker’s ruling that the Applicant is not a specific target of the Taliban, the Applicant would be easily identified as a Shia Turi given his religious practices, name, accent and the fact that his documents clearly highlight his area of origin. We note that extremists clearly have a vendetta against Shia Turis and as such the Applicant would still be at risk of harm throughout the country. In addition, we note country information below which indicates individuals of Shia faith continue to fact harm through Pakistan including in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Multan. Given these matters, if the Applicant was forced to return to Pakistan and relocate internally he would be extremely vulnerable to harm.
It is clear that extremists endeavour to target individuals who belong to religious minorities and as such, no matter where the Applicant resides, he would be at risk of serious harm. For example, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) although emanating from FATA it has been linked to attacks in cities including Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Lahore, Multan, Karachi and Quetta. The have also been linked to Lashkar-e-Janghi. Accordingly, in light of the fact the two groups are aligned and commit attacks throughout the country, it is highly plausible that the Applicant would be at risk of harm upon relocation.
Assessment of claims
The Tribunal found the applicant to be generally credible in his evidence at the hearing, and notes that his evidence at the hearing was consistent with the claims he had made earlier in his application, with the additional claims that he had been reading and studying the bible and had attended a [church] in [city].
On the basis of the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal accepts that he is a Turi Shia from the Kurram Agency, that he lived in the Parachinar area until he left Pakistan to come to Australia, and that he has experienced problems with Taliban related militia groups because of his work driving between Parachinar and Peshawar. These claims have been consistently made by the applicant, and given that the country information set out in the attachment indicates that such problems were commonplace in the area at the time the Tribunal is satisfied that his claims are genuine.
Further, the Tribunal is satisfied on the basis of the country information that notwithstanding the DFAT assessment that there is ‘a low level of sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’, and ‘a low level of generalised violence in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies’, violence against Shias continues to occur in those areas such that it is satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant would face serious harm as a Shia Turi because of his religion should he return to either Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the Kurram Agency.
On the basis of the information set out in the attachment, particularly from DFAT and the US Department of State, the Tribunal accepts there has been some improvement in the security situation in FATA and KP since the security forces launched the counter-insurgency Operation Zarb-e-Azb against the militants. However, the long standing and serious level of sectarian violence compounded by the presence of anti-Shia militant groups targeting the Shias in the area together with the weight of the country information indicating that the authorities in Pakistan are struggling to contain that violence causes the Tribunal to accept that the state of Pakistan cannot meet the level of protection which citizens are entitled to expect as discussed in MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1.
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution for reasons of his Shia religion and his Turi ethnicity if he returns to his home region, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Tribunal accepts the overlapping reasons of ethnicity (Turi) and religion (Shia Muslim) are the essential and significant reason for the harm the applicant fears. Therefore his fear of persecution is for a Convention reason. Accordingly, the requirements of s.91R(1)(a) are met.
Having regard to the non-exhaustive list in s 91R(2) of the type and level of harm that will constitute ‘serious harm’ for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b), the Tribunal accepts that the persecution feared by the applicant involves serious harm, including significant physical harassment or ill-treatment and a threat to his life or liberty. It follows that the requirements of s 91R(1)(b) are also met.
In relation to the question of relocation, the Tribunal notes that the country information, particularly from the South Asia Terrorism Portal and the media reports referred to in the attachment, indicates that terrorist sectarian violence has again recurred in the major cities of Pakistan. On the basis of this information, the Tribunal also accepts the representative’s argument that because the applicant is a Turi Shia he faces an increased risk of harm, more than other Shias who belong to established communities in big cities, because the Taliban single them out due to the protracted and ongoing Shia-Sunni fighting in FATA.
In all the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal concludes that it would not be reasonable for the applicant to relocate within Pakistan, including to the Punjab.
In making these findings, the Tribunal has not found it necessary to consider the new claims made by the applicant at and after the hearing regarding his relationship to an Australian citizen and conversion to Christianity.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Bruce Henry

Member
ATTACHMENT
Country information
As noted above, the Tribunal is required to have regard to DFAT publications prepared expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The most recent such DFAT report[2] on Shias in Pakistan states:
[2] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Thematic Report – Shias in Pakistan, 15 January 2016, p.15
2.34 There have also been numerous incidents of religious, sectarian and communal violence in Pakistan. In some cases, this violence is mutual, with different religious groups acting as belligerents. However, DFAT assesses that minority groups are disproportionately affected by sectarian violence in Pakistan (see also ‘Religion’, below). There is no evidence to suggest these groups specifically target women or children. A number of Sunni militant groups operate throughout Pakistan, including Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM). Shia militant group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) is the main perpetrator of violence against Sunnis. All of these groups are banned but continue to operate illegally in Pakistan. While Operation Zarb-e-Azb has substantially reduced the level of sectarian violence between these groups, they maintain a presence throughout Pakistan, particularly in Karachi, Quetta and parts of Punjab. According to SATP, there were 276 fatalities from sectarian violence in 2015. …
4.20 Levels of generalised and sectarian violence remain lower in Punjab than other parts of Pakistan. Credible sources have told DFAT more recently Lahore has experienced a 20-25 per cent reduction in the rates of ‘crime against persons,’ including kidnapping, since the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and implementation of the National Action Plan.
4.21 In 2014, there were 18 sectarian attacks in Punjab and the Islamabad Capital Territory combined, resulting in 21 deaths. According to the SATP, a total of 16 Shias died in three attacks in Punjab and the Islamabad Capital Territory in 2015. This included separate IED attacks on different Shia imambargahs in Rawalpindi on 9 January and 18 February 2015, and an attack on a group of Shias returning from a religious gathering in Rawalpindi on 16 January. There were no Shia deaths from sectarian violence in Lahore in 2015.
4.1 Islamabad remains relatively safe for migrant Shia communities. According to the Turi community, for example, there has only been one attack on Turi migrants in Islamabad in the past four years: on 10 August 2013, there was an attempted suicide IED attack on a Shia imambargah in Bahra Kahu. The suicide bomber – from Punjab – was killed by guards at the imambargah while the other four perpetrators – from Sadda, Kurram Agency – were prosecuted in an anti-terrorism court in September 2015.
4.22 Some Turi migrants in Islamabad have reportedly received unspecified threats from sectarian elements. According to Islamabad-based think tanks, there is a declining incidence of kidnapping for ransom incidents in Islamabad. Kidnappers have historically targeted Ahmadis and, to a lesser extent, wealthy migrants from tribal areas. …
4.25 DFAT assesses that there is a moderate level of generalised violence in Balochistan. There is also a moderate level of sectarian violence - despite a decline in the number of sectarian attacks, Hazara Shias remain segregated and are a key target of militant groups.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
4.26 The majority of the population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is Pashtun and predominately Sunni. The Shia population is largely concentrated in Hangu, Kohat, Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan. Most Shias in Peshawar are long-time residents of the Old City, while many Shias in Hangu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan are Turi or Bangash Shias from Kurram and other parts of the FATA.
4.27 Credible sources have told DFAT that sectarian attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have decreased by 60 per cent and are at their lowest level in four years. These sources also highlight a 42 per cent decline in the provincial homicide rate. Despite these trends, militants continue to target Shias in some parts of the province. This tends to be greater in areas such as Hangu and Kohat because of their proximity to tribal areas, as well as Dera Ismail Khan, while the presence sectarian groups in other areas – including the Swat Valley – is minimal. According to the SATP, 27 Shias died in four sectarian attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2015. For example, 22 Shias died and 50 were injured during a complex attack at an imambargah in the Hayatabad area of Peshawar on 13 February 2015.
4.28 DFAT understands that Shias continue to relocate to the relative safety of Peshawar from other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA. There are also options for internal relocation within Peshawar. Credible sources have reported the movement of some Shia families from parts of the Old City to the New City to distance themselves from an LeJ sleeper cell in the area, for example.
4.29 In the past, there have been Sunni-Shia clashes in parts of Hangu, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan and Mansehra. For example, attacks in Rawalpindi during the Moharram period in 2013 sparked sectarian tensions in Hangu and Kohat.
4.30 Overall, DFAT assesses that there is a moderate degree of generalised violence and a low level of sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
4.31 The majority of the Shia population in the FATA is concentrated in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. Shias account for 40 per cent of the population in Kurram Agency, which is estimated to number approximately 935,000 people. Upper Kurram is predominantly Shia (approximately 80 per cent), while Central and lower Kurram are majority Sunni. Most of these Shias are from the Turi tribe, an exclusively Shia Pashtun tribe comprising approximately 500,000 people dispersed throughout Pakistan. Shias also make up approximately 40 per cent of the Bangash tribe, which populates Orakzai Agency, as well as Kohat, Hangu and other settled parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – mainly Peshawar.
4.32 According to the FATA Research Centre (‘FRC’), there were relatively few sectarian or other militant attacks in Kurram Agency in 2014 or the first six months in 2015. FRC data indicates there were 14 security incidents in Kurram Agency from January-June 2015, mostly in lower Kurram. Most of these were IED and ambush attacks against security forces around Shabak and Thal, although there was also a failed suicide IED attack on a football match in Alizai on 6 May 2015. On 13 December 2015, however, an IED attack at a market in Parachinar killed 25 people and injured 62 others. Militant groups LeJ and Ansarul Mujahideen have both claimed responsibility for the attack. A number of media reports suggest the attack was motivated by the militants’ desire to ‘punish’ Pakistani Shias for participating in Syria’s civil war. Others have characterised the attack as an attempt to contest government control following the Pakistani military’s 12 December 2015 announcement that Operation Zarb-e-Azb has almost eliminated the insurgent presence in the Shawal Valley. Given these conflicting positions, DFAT is unable to attribute responsibility for the attack or confirm the motivations of the perpetrators.
4.33 Credible sources have told DFAT that Turi Shias have travelled to Syria to participate in the country’s civil war. These contacts have also informed DFAT that militants, including those associated with the Haqqani Network, have relocated from North Waziristan and Khyber Agency into Orakzai and central Kurram, and that these groups are possibly targeting security forces as a first step towards establishing a more permanent presence in these areas. While the 2013 ‘peace accord’ between Shia Turis and Sunni Bangash remains in place, Turi Shias are reportedly concerned about the movement of Haqqani Network militants into Kurram Agency because of their ability to create rifts between Bangash Sunnis and Turi Shias. DFAT understands the Thal-Parachinar Road remains open and there have been no major security incidents on the road in 2015. Federal security forces continue to maintain armed checkpoints along the road, which is used by both civilian and military vehicles. The 13 December 2015 IED attack in Parachinar highlights a degree of vulnerability in these security measures.
4.34 More than 3,700 families returned to their places of origin in 2014, including Parachinar and surrounding villages in upper Kurram. This represents approximately 25 per cent of those formerly displaced - most of who were reportedly Sunnis from lower Kurram. Returns to Kurram and Orakzai Agencies recommenced on 1 October 2015 following a nine-month suspension because of ongoing military operations. From October – November 2015, 3,041 families returned to Kurram Agency and 710 families returned to Orakzai Agency. Many Shia Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) have also settled in Kohat, Hangu, Peshawar and Islamabad where they have established family and community networks.
4.35 According to the SATP, there was only one sectarian attack in the wider FATA in 2015: on 4 January, an IED attack targeting Shias at a volleyball match in the Kalaya area of Orakzai Agency killed four people and injured eight. FRC data indicates most casualties in the FATA in the first six months of 2015 (1,104 deaths in 181 incidents) were militants or security forces killed as part of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. A total of 113,311 families returned to the FATA in 2015, including North and South Waziristan and Khyber Agencies.
4.36 DFAT assesses there is a low level of sectarian violence overall in the FATA, however the level of generalised violence varies throughout the FATA. This violence is greatest in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies because of ongoing military activity associated with Operation Zarb-e-Azb. DFAT assesses there is a low level of generalised violence in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies.
State protection
5.1 DFAT assesses that Pakistani authorities are broadly willing to protect Shia communities. The National Action Plan to counter terrorism seeks to combat extremism and sectarianism, while Operation Zarb-e-Azb has resulted in a significant decline in the number of sectarian attacks. During Moharram, provincial authorities and the Federal Ministry of Interior cooperate with local Shia communities to provide security for participants in Ashura processions. Security authorities have told DFAT that official security for Shia mosques and Ashura processions is provided on a case-by-case basis depending on the threat level and availability of resources. These security measures include shutting down mobile phone services and deploying police forces (plain clothed and uniformed) to patrol areas surrounding processions. The Government of Pakistan has introduced a ban on the use of loudspeakers at mosques for hate speech during periods of heightened sectarian differences such as Ramadan. Although authorities have arrested a number of people for violating this ban and have reportedly begun to register Madrassas, DFAT does not yet have sufficient information to assess the effectiveness of these measures. The Army also generally operates at a heightened state of readiness at these times.
5.2 However, capacity constraints limit the federal and provincial governments’ abilities to protect the Shia community, which is large and widely dispersed. Although Pakistani authorities continue to capture and prosecute members of sectarian groups, conviction rates remain low.
5.3 Shia communities frequently make provisions for their own security. This includes physical security of Shia mosques, self-protection ‘scout’ units and lines of security to search those attending Ashura processions.
Internal relocation
5.4 As indicated in the 15 January 2016 DFAT Country Report on Pakistan, section 15 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of movement throughout Pakistan and there are no legal impediments to relocation. This applies equally to Shias and other religious sects. Because of Pakistan’s size and diversity, internal relocation offers a degree of anonymity and the opportunity for victims to seek refuge from discrimination or violence. In many cases, there are options for members of most ethnic and religious minorities, including Shias, to relocate to areas of relative safety within Pakistan. Many large urban centres such as Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad are home to mixed ethnic and religious communities. These cities also provide greater access to employment, education and health care services. For example, Turi migrants in Islamabad have told DFAT these factors were central to their decision to relocate from Kurram Agency.

The current UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan[3] state:
The largest Muslim minority in Pakistan, Shias, are the target of violent attacks by Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout the country. Sectarian violence between Sunni (Deobandi) and Shia Muslims is long-standing in Pakistan, dating from the mid-1980s. Until the mid-1990s, the majority of the sectarian-motivated attacks took place in Punjab, but violence has since spread to the rest of the country. Although both Sunni and Shia militant groups have engaged in acts of violence against each other over the years, according to analysts the majority of recent violent attacks were committed by Sunni militants inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology.
In the last year sectarian violence targeting the Shia minority, including through attacks on Shia processions and religious gatherings and sites, reportedly continued. Such attacks were carried out predominantly in the North-West of the country – including in Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu, Kohat and Tank districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and Kurram and Orakzai Agencies in FATA – as well as in urban centres throughout the country – including Gilgit (Northern Areas), Lahore (Punjab province), Karachi (Sindh province) and Quetta (Balochistan province). Sectarian violence has resulted in hundreds of deaths and large-scale displacements from Kurram. Tensions and clashes between Shia and Sunni tribes in Kurram Agency kept the main road linking the region to the rest of the country blocked throughout 2010 and 2011 (with the exception of a brief reopening in February 2011), thereby impeding access to provisions as well as healthcare services. Incidents of violence against the Shia minority continued in 2011 in Pakistan's Kurram tribal agency, despite an alleged peace deal between the Taliban and Shia tribes in the area brokered by Pakistani security forces in February 2011. By October 2011, over 100 Hazara Shias were reportedly killed in targeted attacks in Balochistan province alone and large numbers were reported to be fleeing the province. Law enforcement authorities are reportedly unable or unwilling to protect members of religious minorities, including Shias. Sunni militant groups, such as the banned Lashkar-e Jhangvi, reportedly operated with impunity, including in areas where State authority is well established, such as Punjab province and Karachi.
In light of the foregoing, UNHCR considers that members of the Shia community, particularly those in areas where Taliban-affiliated groups are active, such as the northwest of Pakistan and in urban centres, may, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.
[3] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan, 14 May 2012, HCR/EG/PAK/12/02, pp.36-41, available at: accessed 15 December 2015
A recent report on the situation for religious minorities in Pakistan from Minority Rights Group International[4] (MRGI) states:
Moving beyond a state-centric analysis to look at socio-economic and culture factors will point out how prejudice and discrimination against certain religious communities, including some Muslims, has become ingrained within Pakistani society. Pakistan’s Shi’a, for example, while exempt from many of the formal legal discrimination affecting Ahmadis, Christians or Hindus, are nevertheless subjected to comparable levels of prejudice and violence. Mounting sectarian violence against Shi’a, as well as discrimination against religious groups who until recently had managed to escape systematic targeting, such as Ismaili Muslims, points to the growth of an even more exclusionary form of nationalism based on a very specific understanding of ‘Muslimness’. As a result, these groups are socially excluded and the space ceded for them to practise their religions or achieve scholastic and economic success remains extremely limited.
[4] Shikha Dilawri, Ahmad Salim, Dr Humera Ishfaq, Mome Saleem, Searching for Security: The Rising Marginalization of Religious Communities in Pakistan, 9 December 2014, available at: accessed 28 July 2016
The 2016 assessment of the situation in Pakistan from MRGI[5] states:
In fact, in the first quarter of 2015 fatalities among minorities actually rose by 38 per cent compared to the same period in 2014, while general conflict-related fatalities were 20 per cent lower – a disparity that suggests that minorities do not necessarily benefit equally from security efforts. But while perceptions of the NAP’s effects have been mixed, with some crediting it for the improved security situation while others have criticized its expansion of military powers, the plan’s acknowledgement of the specific situation of minorities– including its aim to ‘stop religious extremism and to protect religious minorities’, as well as curb hate speech – are unusual in their acknowledgement of the specific situation of minorities.
Whether this will achieve a lasting impact for minorities, however, remains to be seen. Despite the weakening of extremist outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the decrease in overall sectarian violence, 2015 saw increased numbers of Shi’a killed in sectarian attacks compared to the previous year. In January, Jundallah – an offshoot of the TTP, which has pledged allegiance to ISIS – bombed a Shi’a mosque in Shikarpur, Sindh province, killing 60 people. Just over two weeks later in Peshawar, another Shi’a mosque was targeted during Friday prayers by the TTP, leaving at least 20 dead. Later, in December 2015, LeJ claimed responsibility for a bombing in Parachinar in the north-west tribal region, killing at least 22 Shi’a.
[5] Minority Rights Group International State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2016, available at: accessed 28 July 2016
Further, the current European Asylum Support Office (EASO) report on Pakistan[6] states:
According to the consulted sources, there are no laws or government policies that discriminate against Shias in Pakistan. Neither are there any legal restrictions on freedom of religion for Shias. There is little societal discrimination that would restrict Shias in their daily life.
Occasionally violent clashes between Sunni and Shia communities arise. Attacks against the Shia community by sectarian Sunni extremist groups, some with a clear anti-Shia stance, have caused numerous casualties. Anti-Shia groups have held hate campaigns against Shias, branding them as infidels and even calling for their murder.
[6] European Asylum Support Office, EASO Country of Origin Information Report — Pakistan Country Overview, Brussels, August 2015, available at accessed 15 December 2015
It should be noted that the cited source for the information on ‘societal discrimination’ and the ‘hate campaigns against Shias’ is the 2015 DFAT report on Shias in Pakistan, the previous version of the report cited above.
The South Asia Terrorism Portal’s Pakistan Assessment 2016[7] states:
[7] South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment 2016, available at accessed 28 July 2016
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, 831 terrorism-linked fatalities have already occurred in Pakistan in 2016, including 222 civilians, 102 Security Force (SF) personnel and 507 terrorists/militants. The country has also recorded 82 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) resulting in 715 fatalities (183 civilians, 68 SF personnel and 464 terrorists). Further, 43 blasts accounting for 176 deaths and over 520 injuries in the current year.
During the corresponding period of 2015, Pakistan had seen 1,334 terrorism related fatalities, including 351 civilians, 107 SF personnel and 876 terrorists. The country witnessed 111 major incidents resulting in 1,021 fatalities (147 civilians, 59 SF personnel and 815 militants) in this period, as well as 83 blasts accounting for 214 deaths and over 398 injured.
Through 2015, Pakistan recorded a total of 3,682 fatalities, including 940 civilians, 339 SF personnel and 2,403 terrorists/militants as against 5,496 fatalities, including 1,781 civilians, 533 SF personnel and 3,182 terrorists/militants in 2014. The number of major incidents also declined from 402 (accounting for 4,173 deaths) to 322 (resulting in 2,923 fatalities) over this period. Similarly, 2015 recorded 216 incidents of bomb blasts resulting in 495 deaths, down from 388 incidents resulting in 840 deaths recorded in 2014. Moreover, as against 25 suicide bombings accounting for 336 deaths in 2014, year 2015 recorded 19 such incidents resulting in 161 deaths.
Terror-related fatalities have sustained a declining trend in Pakistan since the peak of 2009 when fatalities totaled a staggering 11,704 (2,324 civilians, 991 SF personnel and 8,389 militants). 2014 saw a transient aberration in the trend, with 5,496 fatalities, a marginal increase, on year on year basis, from 5,379 fatalities recorded in 2013. All four Provinces of Pakistan – Balochistan, KP, Punjab, and Sindh – along with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pakistan administered Kashmir (PaK) recorded declines.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb(sharp and cutting) launched on June 15, 2014, in the tribal areas of Pakistan has been significant in bringing about this relative improvement. During the operation, domestically oriented terror groups have been targeted with full military might. Director General (DG) of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Lt. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa, claimed, on December 12, 2015, that since the launch of the operation “3,400 terrorists [were] killed, and 837 hideouts from where they were carrying out their terrorist activities [were] destroyed... Success came at a heavy price as 488 valiant officers and men of Pakistan Army, FC [Frontier Constabulary] KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and Bolan and Sindh Rangers sacrificed their lives, while another 1,914 were injured.”
Most recently, on April 3, 2016, ISPR claimed that SFs had ‘cleared’ 4,304 square kilometers of area in the North Waziristan Agency of FATA and “restored the writ of the Government in all areas especially in remote areas of FATA.”
Despite the rhetoric of "not discriminating among terror groups", however, Pakistani Forces have carefully avoided inflicting any harm on terrorist formations which serve perceived ‘state interests’. Islamabad’s policy of selective targeting of terror groups leaves the environment that breeds terrorism intact. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in its annual report released in March 2016 thus observes

The year 2015 could be flagged as one in which Pakistani state took some definitive steps to recover its lost writ in places as diverse as rugged mountainous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and thickly populated and crime-infested Karachi... The military crackdown on some of the militant groups sheltering in the country's northwestern tribal areas brought terrorist attacks down by almost half... Plainly the war was not over yet. Ending extremism required that there should be no pick and choose... .

Crucially, as SAIR has repeatedly emphasized, Islamabad continues to allow terrorist groups serving its supposed strategic interests in neighboring Afghanistan and India to operate with impunity from its soil. In the most recent and brazen move, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder and Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD) 'chief' Hafiz Muhammad Saeed reportedly set up a Sharia’h (Islamic law) court in Lahore to dispense "speedy justice", taking up citizens' complaints and issuing summons carrying a warning of strict action in case of non-compliance. This is the first instance of such a parallel judicial system to be established in the Punjab province. JuD claimed the ‘court’ only offers arbitration and resolves disputes in accordance with the Islamic judicial system, but failed to justify the summons. The impunity with which Saeed operates clearly confirms the support he receives from the Pakistani establishment. Saeed is the mastermind of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai (India) and in 2012 the United States (US) put a USD 10 million bounty on his head.
Further, despite repeated US calls to target the Haqqani Network – one of the most vicious terrorist formations operating from Pakistan into Afghanistan – in Operation Zarb-e-Azb, no visible action in this direction has been taken thus far. Significantly, according to an April 13, 2016, report published by the US National Security Archive, "a series of DIA cables (from January 11, 2010, and February 6, 2010) show that some funding for Haqqani [Haqqani Network] attacks are still provided by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, including $200,000 for the December 30, 2009, attack on the CIA facility at Camp Chapman." At least 10 people, including two female American CIA agents, Jennifer Lynne Matthews, who commanded the base; and Elizabeth Hanson, a targeting analyst; were killed in the attack.
Meanwhile, the genuine grievances of people across Pakistan are being brutally suppressed. Specifically referring to Karachi (Sindh) and Balochistan, the HRCP report observed

And while statistics suggested that things had improved in Karachi after the paramilitary operation in the country's biggest city, little attention was paid to complaints of rights violations at the hands of the security forces... In Balochistan growing concerns related to enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture remained unaddressed.

The assessment concludes:
The aid given to Pakistan to help US in its war on terror has long been misused by Islamabad to help terror groups subservient to its policy of exporting terrorism. Despite nearly 2,381 US troops, another 1,134 International Security Assistance Force personnel, and tens of thousands of Afghans killed as a result of this strategy by Pakistani proxies, the US and the ‘international community’ have failed consistently to hold Islamabad to account even for the money it receives from the West, purportedly to fight terrorism.
Pakistan continues to operate under the cover of global impunity, even as terrorism emanating from its soil targets the world community, mainly neighboring Afghanistan and India. The blowback of this policy of export of terror has brought untold misery upon the people of Pakistan, but the country’s establishment appears to continue to consider this an acceptable price to pay for its myopic ambitions.
In relation to the situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the latest SATP assessment states[8]:
At least 55 persons, including 36 civilians, 15 terrorists and four SF personnel, have already been killed in KP in terrorism-related violence in 2015 (till February 15), according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). During the corresponding period of 2014, terrorism-linked fatalities stood at 156, including 103 civilians, 41 SF personnel and 12 terrorists, indicating a decline of 66 per cent.
KP has recorded a continuous decline in fatalities, year on year, since 2010, with the exception of 2013. Fatalities through 2014 stood at 617, including 406 civilians, 108 SF personnel and 103 terrorists; as compared to 936, including 603 civilians, 172 SF personnel and 161 terrorists in 2013.
Other parameters of violence, such as major incidents, suicide attacks and explosions also remained low through 2014. The Province accounted for 49 major incidents of violence (each involving three or more fatalities) resulting in 436 deaths in 2014, as against 65 such incidents, accounting for 694 fatalities in 2013. As against 21 suicide attacks in 2013, in which 350 persons were killed and another 635 were injured, 2014 registered nine attacks resulting in 196 deaths and 260 persons injured. Similarly, there was a considerable decrease in incidents of explosion. In comparison to 189 blasts resulting in 598 fatalities in 2013, 2014 recorded 109 blasts resulting in 354 fatalities. Though the number of incidents of sectarian attack in 2014 was the same, at nine, as in 2013, the resultant fatalities decreased from 51 in 2013 to 18 in 2014. The number of such incidents and resultant fatalities stood at 10 and 58 respectively in 2012; one incident and 11 fatalities in 2011; and 12 incidents and 139 fatalities in 2010.
Violence was recorded in 22 of KP’s 25 Districts in 2014, an improvement over 2013, when violence was reported from all 25 Districts. As in 2013, Peshawar, the provincial capital, remained the worst affected District through 2014, recording 169 terrorism-related incidents, in which 348 people were killed and another 482 were injured.
The Investigation Wing of KP Police confirmed, on November 25, 2014, that terrorist attacks had recorded a decrease in 2014, as compared to 2013. According to the Police, the total number of terrorist attacks declined to 438, as against 468 reported during the corresponding period in 2013. 10 incidents of suicide attack were recorded in 2014, down from 18 such attacks in 2013.
While these numbers alone suggest an improvement in this lawless region of Pakistan, a range of compounding factors indicate that stability and state control remain as elusive as they were in earlier years. Indeed, as against 210 incidents of killing in 2013, there were 358 such incidents in 2014. More worryingly, 2014 witnessed the Peshawar carnage, one of the worst and most “barbaric act of terror” in Pakistan. This single attack demonstrated that though the fatalities in the Province had declined due to various reasons, the terrorists retained the motivation and wherewithal to execute devastating attacks and, indeed, that they were willing to cross over into levels of viciousness that they had not employed before. …
Little can be expected from the Federal Government as well, given the steps that were taken in the aftermath of the Peshawar attack. Islamabad has chosen to intensify selective operations against domestically oriented terrorist formations, even as it continues to support a range of terrorist groups operating against Afghanistan and India, or who support ‘global jihad’. Unfortunately, these distinctions are far from sustainable, as most state sponsored groups in Pakistan maintain some contact with the anti-state formations and, crucially, share a common ideology with these. Eventually, as long as any such groups are allowed to flourish – and, indeed, are supported by state institutions – at least some of them will break away from their masters in the establishment and target state institutions. Incipient evidence of the entry of the even more radical Islamist State (IS) ideology and networks in the region can only constitute an even greater danger for Pakistan. Indeed, the Government of the neighbouring province, Balochistan, in a 'secret information report' dated October 31, 2014, conveyed to the Federal Government and law enforcement agencies a warning of increased footprints of IS. The report disclosed that IS had claimed to have recruited 10,000 to 12,000 followers from the Hangu District of KP and Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to a September 23, 2014, report, moreover, terrorists supporting IS distributed hundreds of pamphlets in Afghan refugee camps and madrassas (seminaries) in Peshawar and other regions of KP. The pamphlets read, “Every Muslim must follow the orders of Caliph and should contribute in whichever capacity he or she can to assist the Islamic State against Taghoot (those who transgress limits of Islam).”
Unfortunately, however, Pakistan’s duplicity on the issues of Islamist radicalization and terrorism continues.
[8] South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2015, available at accessed 28 July 2016

The SATP’s 2015 assessment for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is similarly pessimistic:
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched on June 15, 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, on June 8-9, 2014. At least 33 persons, including all 10 attackers, were killed in the Karachi attack. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), thus far killed more than 1,516 terrorists and 204 soldiers (no independent verification of fatalities of identities of those killed is available, as media access to the areas of conflict is severely limited). Major General Asim Saleem Bajwa, Director General (DG) of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), on January 16, 2015, claimed that SFs had killed 2,000 ‘terrorists’ under Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and also disclosed that 200 soldiers had been killed and another 800 had sustained injuries.
At least 411 persons, including 356 terrorists, 35 civilians, and 20 SF personnel, have already been killed in FATA in terrorism-related violence in 2015 (till March 15), according to partial data compiled by the SATP. During the corresponding period of 2014, terrorism-linked fatalities stood at 282, including 213 terrorists, 44 SF personnel and 25 civilians, indicating a rise of 45.74 per cent.
Though civilian and SF fatalities in FATA have recorded a seven years decline, overall fatalities have been higher due to the increase in terrorist fatalities under the ongoing military Operations in NWA and Khyber Agency. Total fatalities through 2014 stood at 2,863, including 2,510 terrorists, 194 SF personnel and 159 civilians; as compared to 1,716, including 1,199 terrorists, 319 civilians and 198 SF personnel in 2013.
Terrorism and the disproportionate use of force by the state have caused massive collateral damage to property (and to life) in other tribal agencies as well. In August 2014, a damage need assessment survey carried out under the supervision of the FATA FDMA revealed that over 60,000 houses had been damaged in Orakzai, Khyber, South Waziristan and Kurram agencies. A total of 31 educational institutions (six institutions 100 per cent damaged, nine institutions 50 per cent and 16 institutions 20 per cent), eight health facilities, two buildings of the works and services department, 13 facilities of livestock, seven agriculture, eight public health engineering, 35 municipal committee buildings, including 21 shops, two sports facilities and 19 irrigation department establishments had also been damaged.
Federal Finance Minister Ishaq Dar disclosed, on February 18, 2015, that the cost of ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan may exceed USD 1.3 billion. Dar claimed that the Pakistani Government had already spent USD 400 million on the operation and IDPs.
Despite the hype, the Operations in NWA and Khyber Agency have failed to destroy the organisational network and leadership of the terrorists. This has repeatedly been demonstrated in their capacity to perpetrate carnage, as in the Peshawar Army Public School attack and the bloodbath of innocent Shias at Imambargah (Shia place of worship) in Peshawar. Pakistan is yet to make a decisive break from its long sustained strategy of supporting terrorist groups operating against Indian and Afghanistan, and the linkages of these groups with domestic terrorists operating within the country are growing progressively deeper and more complex. Despite some losses that TTP has suffered, it is likely to rise again out of the rubble that bombardments and drone strikes have created in FATA.
The SATP also publishes a ‘timeline’ of terrorism related incidents in Pakistan[9]. Recent reports include:
[9] Available at: accessed 29 July 2016
A 16-year-old wounded girl, identified as Marriyum, who sustained injuries during the March 27, 2016, blast in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park of provincial capital Lahore succumbed to her injuries in Jinnah Hospital, raising the death toll to 78. According to hospital sources, several injured persons of the blast are still admitted in different hospitals of the city, of which some are in critical condition and it is feared that the death toll might increase further. … Speaking on adjournment motions regarding the "terrible incident of suicide blast in Gulshan-i-Iqbal Park, Lahore" on March 27, 2016, the Senators called for a full-fledged military operation on militants' hideouts in Punjab. Initiating the debate, PPP parliamentary leader, Saeed Ghani, recalled that before this incident, the Punjab Government had always opposed a military operation, claiming that there were no organised militant groups in the province. He said the incident had proved the existence of terrorist groups in Punjab. He called for a military operation in the province similar to those initiated in Karachi and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (21 April 2016)
Three Shias were shot dead in a sectarian attack at the Najaf Imambargah in North Karachi Town of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. SSP Central Investigation Arab Mahar said, "The victims were riding a motorbike and were attacked near Shafiq Mor". (7 April 2016)
Two Shias, identified as Malik Asim and Ameer Haider, were killed and another, identified as Hasan, sustained injured when unidentified armed assailants opened fire at them in Jaffar Tayyar Society of Malir Town in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. DIG East Dr Kamran Faisal said, “The murder took place using a 9 mm pistol. It seems like a target killing.” (27 May 2016)
The continued existence of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and its inability to take action against them affect the US-Pakistan bilateral ties, including security assistance, the Pentagon said in its six-monthly report on Afghanistan sent to the Congress. According to the report, “The US continues to be clear with Pakistan about steps it should take to improve the security environment and deny safe haven to terrorist and extremist groups”. “These conversations continue to affect not only US dialogue with Pakistan on security and stability in Afghanistan but also during discussion of other issues in the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship such as security assistance,” the Pentagon report read.
US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has not given certification that Pakistan has taken action against the Haqqani Network. As a result, the Pentagon has withheld USD 300 million in Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan for the current fiscal year ending September 30, 2016. The Pentagon in a blunt message to Pakistan said the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remained a sanctuary for various groups. “These include the Taliban, al Qaeda, AQIS, the Haqqani Network, LeT, TTP, Islamic State-Khorasan, and the IMU. This sanctuary and these groups remain a security challenge for both countries and pose a threat to regional stability and security,” said the report. (18 June 2016)
Renowned Qawwal (Sufi singer) Amjad Sabri (45) was shot dead in a targeted killing incident in Liaquatabad Town of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. The TTP-Hakimullah Mehsud faction spokesperson Qari Saifullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for the attack. In 2014, Islamabad High Court had issued a notice in a blasphemy case to Amjad Sabri along with two TV channels for the playing of a qawwali during a morning show. The traditional qawwali sung by Amjad Sabri had mentioned religious figures, which was deemed offensive. (22 June 2016)
Three militants and one soldier killed during a clash in Khwar Pattay village of Malam Jabba area in Swat District of KP. The official sources said the incident occurred during a search operation in Khwar Pattay village. “The security forces and the police imposed a curfew and launched a search operation in Khwar Pattay in Malam Jabba after the forces received information about the presence of militants in the area,” the sources said. During the search, they said, the militants opened fire on the soldiers and killed one of them identified as Javed. The sources said the security forces killed three militants in retaliatory fire. (26 June 2016)
A Police constable, identified as Farmanullah, was killed and six other civilians were injured in a roadside bomb blast on Pajagi Road in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. “Exact target of the bomb has not been determined at the moment but the explosion killed a policeman identified as Farmanullah, who was deputed guard of a retired judge and was on his way to duty,” said Wasim Riaz, a senior police official. (30 June 2016)
At least 11 persons including two Police officials sustained severe wounds in a bomb blast in a shop near Toro Chowk in Mardan town of same District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Police officials said that 600 kilograms of explosive material was used in the bomb whereas no loss of life has been reported yet. (5 July 2016)
The CTD foiled a major terror bid, while recovering huge cache of weapons and explosives during a raid in Malir area of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. The CTD claimed that the alleged terrorists were going to use these weapons to target a shopping centre and installations of intelligence agencies. (5 July 2016)
At least two militants of TTP Swat Chapter were killed in exchange of fire with Police in Manghopir area of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. One Police personnel also sustained injuries in the shootout. (7 July 2016)
The Kurram Agency PPP President Hamid Hussain Toori was shot dead by unidentified assailants in Parachinar town of Kurram Agency in FATA. The motive behind the target killing is yet to be ascertained as the assassinated leader of the PPP had no enmity with anyone. (12 July 2016)
In relation to the question of internal flight or internal relocation alternatives (IFA/IRA), the UNHCR report states[10]:
In the context of Pakistan, an IFA/IRA will generally not be available in areas of FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Balochistan province, which are currently affected by sustained security and military counter-insurgency operations and retaliatory militant attacks. The availability of an IFA/IRA outside these areas needs to be assessed individually, on the basis of the framework detailed in these Guidelines. Areas considered relatively stable may, nevertheless, be inaccessible in instances where access roads to and from such areas are considered insecure.
Given the wide geographic reach of some armed militant groups, a viable IFA/IRA will generally not be available to individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups. The operational capacity of certain militant groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, extends far beyond FATA or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as evidenced by high-profile attacks, such as suicide bombings, countrywide, particularly in urban centres. Furthermore, some non-State agents of persecution, such as local powerbrokers, organized criminal elements, as well as armed militant groups, reportedly have links to or are closely associated with influential actors in the local and central administration, law enforcement and/or judiciary. As a result, they often operate with impunity and their reach may extend beyond the area(s) under their immediate control.
An IFA/IRA will generally not be relevant where there is a reasonable likelihood that the individual concerned would be subject to criminal prosecution under Pakistan’s blasphemy and/or anti-Ahmadi laws.
For categories of individuals who fear harm as a result of religious norms of a persecutory nature or harmful traditional practices – such as victims of or individuals at risk of forced marriage, forced conversion or honour crimes – and for whom an internal relocation to another part of the country may be relevant, the endorsement of such norms by large segments of society and powerful conservative elements in the local administration needs to be taken into account.
Whether an IFA/IRA is reasonable must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking fully into account the security, human rights and humanitarian environment in the prospective area of relocation at the time of the decision. To this effect, the following elements need to be taken into account: (i) the availability of basic infrastructure, access to essential services, such as sanitation, health care and education, as well as food security in the prospective area of relocation; (ii) the availability of traditional support mechanisms, such as relatives and friends, in the area of prospective relocation; (iii) the ability of the displaced individuals to sustain themselves, including livelihood opportunities; (iv) the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance; (v) the criminality rate and resultant insecurity, particularly in urban areas; as well as (vi) the scale of displacement in the area of prospective relocation. In urban centres, the growing pace of rural-urban migration is reportedly placing increased pressure on basic facilities and services, including access to education, employment, housing, clean drinking water and sanitation. This is accompanied by increasing crime rates.
[10] Ibid, pp.42-43
The most recent US Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom[11] states in relation to Pakistan:
[11] United States Department of State, 2014 Report on International Religious Freedom - Pakistan, 14 October 2015, available at: accessed 27 July 2016. See Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom
Government Practices
Government policies did not afford equal protection to members of majority and minority religious groups, and due to discriminatory legislation, minorities often were afraid to profess freely their religious beliefs. Media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported killings of religious minorities by police. Minorities also stated the judiciary was biased against religious minorities, especially in cases involving blasphemy.
The government's general failure to investigate, arrest, or prosecute those responsible for societal abuses promoted an environment of impunity that fostered intolerance and acts of violence, according to domestic and international human rights organizations. In numerous cases during the year, authorities failed to protect victims of religiously motivated mob violence. …
Abuses by Rebel or Foreign Forces or Terrorist Organizations
There were several incidents involving the abuse of religious groups by individuals or organizations designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. government, and by armed sectarian extremist groups with strong links to such organizations, including Lashkar i Jhangvi, TTP, and Sipah-e-Sahaba.
There were continued attacks against prominent Shia. A public database of attacks on Shia in Sindh reported 139 people killed and 49 injured in 141 separate attacks during the year.
Sectarian violence between violent Sunni and Shia militants continued, and several religious minority individuals and communities across the country were the targets of religiously motivated violence. Attacks on the Shia minority continued, particularly in Dera Ismail Khan, Quetta, Hangu, Kohat, Tank, Dera Ghazi Khan, Gilgit, and in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. Attacks on houses of worship, religious gatherings, and religious leaders perpetrated by sectarian, violent extremist, and terrorist groups resulted in hundreds of deaths during the year.
The New York Times recently reported on suicide bombings in Lahore that occurred on 27 March 2016:[12]
[12] Salman Masood, New York Times, 27 March 2016, Blast at a Crowded Park in Lahore, Pakistan, Kills Dozens, available at: accessed 29 July 2016
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — A suicide bomber set off a powerful blast close to a children’s swing set in a public park on Sunday evening in the eastern city of Lahore, killing at least 69 people and wounding around 300, rescue workers and officials said.
The blast occurred in a parking lot at Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, one of the largest parks in Lahore, said Haider Ashraf, a senior police official in the city. The bomb was detonated within several feet of the swings in a park crowded with families on Easter.
Jamaat-e-Ahrar, a splinter faction of the Pakistani Taliban, claimed responsibility for the blast. Its spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, said in a statement that Christians were the target.
It was the third bombing in Pakistan in this month alone, a reminder that even as the military has cracked down on extremists over the past two years, Islamist groups remain a potent threat.
The bombing came as large protests were held in other parts of the country to protest the execution in February of the man who murdered a secular politician five years ago. While public opinion has largely been galvanized by attacks on civilians by jihadists, particularly the killing of 150 people at a school in Peshawar in 2014, the protests are a sign that widespread sympathy remains for extremist groups in Pakistan.
The Jamaat-e-Ahrar spokesman, Mr. Ehsan, said the bombing “was also to give a message to government that it cannot deter us even in their stronghold, Lahore.” Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province, is the hometown of Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif; his younger brother, Shahbaz Sharif, is the chief minister of the province.
Even though Pakistani officials rebutted the claim that Christians were the target, a large number of Christian families were in the park because of the Easter holiday, the local news media reported. The 67-acre park has walking paths, as well as rides for children.
As the country reeled from this latest spasm of violence, the civilian and military leadership huddled separately to deal with the precipitating sense of crisis. Prime Minister Sharif held a four-hour meeting with his top ministers while Gen. Raheel Sharif, the army chief, who is not related to the prime minister or his brother, directed intelligence agencies to investigate the attack and bring the perpetrators to justice.
Victims described a scene of chaos and devastation soon after the blast.
“I was standing near the roller coaster when the blast occurred,” said a 10-year-old boy who gave his name as Usman Ghani, and who was being treated for minor injuries at Shaikh Zayed Hospital. “I saw fire afterward. There were a lot of people in the park. It was so crowded that people had to break the boundary wall near the gate to cross over and run away.”
“I wish I hadn’t brought my daughter to the park today,” said Kamran Bhatti, 34, a frequent visitor to the park. “This is the only recreation we can afford for her. What is her fault?”
He continued: “While we were running out of the park, my daughter slipped and rolled over. She’s injured, but I thank my God that we are not crying for a lost child.”
His daughter, 7, was being treated for an injury to her leg at Jinnah Hospital on Sunday night.
Yousaf Masih, 50, who said he is Christian, said: “We came to the park after the Easter church services. We brought our food basket along with us, and like the usual outing on our festivals, we were spending our day.”
“There was a lot of rush due to Easter,” Mr. Masih said, adding that “a majority” of the people in that area of the park were Christian. “My children were playing cricket when we heard a huge blast on the main gate of the park. It was mayhem. Everyone was running for their lives. On our way out, we saw the body of the suicide bomber in the parking area.”
Others said security at the park was lax.
“There was no security, as such, at the gates,” said Azhar Shah, 23, a student. “The guard sitting at the main gate was not checking anyone.”
Mr. Ashraf, the police official, said of the park: “It was a soft target. Innocent women and children and visitors from other cities have been targeted.”
The State Department condemned the attack. “Attacks like these only deepen our shared resolve to defeat terrorism around the world, and we will continue to work with our partners in Pakistan and across the region to combat the threat of terrorism,” it said in a statement.
The explosion coincided with violence in other parts of the country as hundreds of protesters took to the streets to condemn the Feb. 29 execution of Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri for the 2011 killing of a governor, Salmaan Taseer. Mr. Taseer had campaigned for changes in the country’s blasphemy laws, saying they were used to persecute religious minorities, but to many in Pakistan, the idea of altering the country’s blasphemy laws is itself criminal, and Mr. Qadri has become a revered figure to his supporters.
Protesters clashed throughout the day with police officers in Islamabad, the country’s capital, marching on the main avenues of the city and trying to force their way into the city’s “red zone,” a high-security area that includes the Parliament, the Supreme Court and many diplomatic missions. They set several vehicles, including a fire truck, on fire and damaged public property. The police used tear gas to disperse the protesters, but appeared to be overwhelmed by their numbers. Army troops were called in to secure government buildings.
Pakistan has been shaken by a series of attacks this year. A suicide attack on a court in Peshawar was carried out early this month in retribution for Mr. Qadri’s execution, killing 16. The attack was also claimed by Jamaat-e-Ahrar. Also this month, a bomb left on a bus carrying government employees in Peshawar killed 14.
A state of emergency was imposed on hospitals in Lahore after Sunday’s blast. Private television networks broadcast images of rescue workers and ambulances rushing to the park and ferrying victims to hospitals. Distraught relatives milled about in hospital corridors as the wounded were treated.
“There was no prior intelligence report about the attack,” Muhammad Usman, the district coordination officer in Lahore, told reporters.
Mr. Usman also rebutted early reports that Christians had been targeted in the blast. “The park belongs to all,” he was quoted as saying.
Mr. Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, announced a three-day period of mourning in the province.