1400950 (Refugee)

[2015] AATA 3523

1400950 (Refugee) [2015] AATA 3523 (7 October 2015)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1400950

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Pakistan

MEMBER:Meena Sripathy

DATE: 7 October 2015

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 07 October 2015 at 5:11pm

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan, applied for the visa [in] July 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] December 2013.

3. The issues in this review are whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan for one or more of the five reasons set out in the Refugees Convention; and, if not, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of him being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm.

4. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

   Evidence before the Department

5. The applicant is a [age] year old man from Quetta, Pakistan of Hazara ethnicity and Shi’a religion. He is single, and his family comprises his parents, [and siblings] who reside in Pakistan, and [siblings] residing in Australia. The applicant arrived in Australia [in] June 2013 as the holder of a Student visa, valid until August 2016.  He completed [number] years of schooling in Pakistan, up to college level, and stated his occupation as student. He provided no details of any past employment.

6. In response to questions in the application about why he left Pakistan, whether he experienced harm there and what he fears if he returns, he provided the following information in the application.  He applied for a visa for Australia to study [a course], but also to seek protection on the basis of his Hazara ethnicity, Shi’a religion and membership of the social group of Hazara students in Pakistan.  He states he has been discriminated against all his life in Pakistan because he is Hazara and Shi’a. He was present [at a certain location] at early prayers [in] September 2011 and was lucky to avoid death when a car with explosives exploded and killed [several] people outside the mosque. His family was threatened because it became known that his brother was studying in Australia. After he finished high school he could not safely leave his house to attend university for a period of one year.  He fears being targeted and killed or severely injured.  His father was forced to resign from his job and retire because of direct threats he received while working for [Organisation 1] as [occupation]. A friend of the applicant’s [was] severely injured in an attack on a student bus going to university in June 2012 when several other students died. The applicant fears fanatics who target Hazaras and Shi’as in Pakistan. He claims the government has admitted that they are unable to control what is happening and cannot provide adequate protection.

7. Included with the application are the following documents:

   ·Letter from [an official of a Shia organisation] (Regd) Quetta certifying the applicant as an active volunteer worker and confirming that the applicant is, by his association with the organisation, a target of terrorist organisations Lakshar-e-Jangvi and Sipal-e-Sahaba.

   ·Letter from [an official of a Hazara organisation], Quetta certifying the applicant as a member of the Hazara, Shi’a community and his father as an active member of the organisation.

   ·Statement dated [in] February 201 by [a] brother of the applicant, setting out his claims for protection.   The applicant’s brother described his fears arising as a result of the escalating threat to Hazaras, and in particular, prominent, well educated, professional Hazaras, and those who worked for the government.  He claimed that his father was one of these people who were increasingly targeted by extremists since 2008 and 2009.  He details threats and dangers experienced by his father and claims that his life was in danger if he were to return from Australia, where he had been living since 2007.  

8. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Department of Immigration in relation to the present application [in] November 2013. The Tribunal has listened to the audio recording of this interview and notes the following information he provided.

9. He confirmed his nationality, ethnicity and religion.  His family comprises his parents, [and siblings] who all live in Quetta. He was born in Quetta and has lived at one address there from birth until a few days before his departure for Australia in 2013. He clarified that the information provided in his application about his address was incorrect as he misunderstood that question.  He confirmed that he only stayed at that address in Karachi for a few days before leaving for Australia. He provided the following information about his father. He was [occupation] with [Organisation 1], now retired.  He retired two years early, because of increasing threats he received because his [position] required him to travel outside his area and extremists were following him and threatening him.  Regarding his study in Australia, he told the delegate he is not currently studying because of his mental state.  He is very worried and unable to study. He confirmed he has not sought medical assistance for his condition because he does not believe a doctor can help him feel safe.  When asked about his experiences in Pakistan, the applicant recounted numerous incidents he witnessed, including explosions at the mosque he was praying at in 2011, and at a procession he participated in. He referred to a friend of his being injured in an incident on a bus full of students.  He stated that he was unable to study for 12 months after finishing school because he was too afraid to leave his area to attend university.  He is afraid to return to Pakistan because he wants to be able to finish his education. Also now that he has been living in the west, he will be considered an infidel and his life even more threatened. When asked why then he came to Australia if it makes his situation worse, he said he had to come here to study.  When asked if he could live elsewhere in Pakistan and be safe, he said there is nowhere he can go where he would not be recognised because of his appearance and how he speaks.  He stated even in Karachi he is not safe as he witnessed an incident just a few days before he came here. 

10. The delegate, in his reasons for decision, accepted the applicant as a credible witness. He accepted he was a Shi’a Hazara male from Quetta Balochistan; that his father was forced to retire early due to a heightened risk of harm; and that the applicant has witnessed and been in close proximity to a number of incidents in Quetta targeting Shi’a Hazaras.  The delegate found that the applicant had a real chance of persecution on the basis of his religion and ethnicity in Quetta. However, in considering whether he could relocate elsewhere to avoid the persecution, the delegate concluded that it would be safe, reasonable and practicable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi and the application was refused on this basis. 

    Evidence before the Tribunal

11. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 9 September 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The hearing was conducted in English, at the applicant’s request. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent who was present at the hearing.

12. At the commencement of the hearing the applicant gave the Tribunal a number of articles relating to incidents of Hazaras being killed or attacked in Quetta in May and June of this year, and also an article about the second of two terrorist attacks on Hazaras in a week in Karachi in January 2014.

13. The applicant provided his passport at the hearing.  He confirmed evidence he gave at the department interview about where he lived in Pakistan prior to coming to Australia, his family composition and his education.  He confirmed that the information provided in his application about his address in Pakistan was incorrect, and the result of a misunderstanding of the question.  He was born, and remained living at one address in Quetta, Pakistan until about one week prior to his departure to Australia in 2013.  He lived in Quetta with his parents and siblings.  He has [a number of siblings].  [He has siblings living] in Australia on a permanent basis.   [One] brother left home many years ago, when he was very young, and he has never been told the circumstances of his departure or what has become of him.  The other [siblings] are all single, studying and live at home in Quetta with his parents.  His father is retired since the past two years.  He previously worked at [Organisation 1] for some 25 or 30 years.  The applicant told the Tribunal his father retired earlier than was required and he believes that this was because of problems he had been having at work involving harassment from extremists.  The applicant’s father obtained a lump sum retirement payment and has invested this money and now lives from the interest income and rent from an apartment he [owns]. Apart from his immediate family, the applicant’s father has one surviving [sibling] and his mother has [siblings].  All of these relatives live nearby in Quetta.  His father’s [relatives] are living in Australia.  The applicant has one other cousin who lived for a short period of time in Lahore in 2013 but around the time that the applicant came to Australia, this cousin moved to [another country] for work. He has no other relatives living outside Quetta. The applicant studied in Quetta at the institutions named in his application.  He explained that he studied at one school up to [a certain] level and then moved to [another] College to complete his final [years] of high school.  After this he sat an interstate test for university, but then travelled to Australia for study.  The Tribunal noted that his evidence was broadly consistent with information and documents provided in his student visa application file.   He explained that he had a gap in his education for a period between finishing at [school] and commencing his higher school certificate in [year]–[year] because of security incidents at that time which caused him to fear for his safety.  After this he decided to attend a college closer to home because of his safety fears.

14. The applicant told the Tribunal he came to Australia as a student, but his main reason was to seek protection.  He felt unsafe in Pakistan.  The applicant explained that as a student he was always made to feel different and taunted and verbally abused on the basis of his religion and ethnicity.  He was called an infidel and told that he did not belong.  His school was in a military area, and therefore was a bit safer, but still his father had to drive him there.  The situation because worse over the years, and by the time his younger siblings started school, they attended a different one, closer to home.  The applicant said he witnessed many incidents on the way to school over these years, including targeted killings of Hazaras.

15. The Tribunal asked the applicant about his father’s experiences when he was working. The applicant referred the Tribunal to his brother’s statement which he included with his application. He said his father was followed and would get phone calls at home.  He believes that these people knew that his brother was overseas at this time.  They considered his family were infidels because they had sent their son to a western country. His father had to leave home at different times to avoid being followed.  He was never physically harmed but he was harassed constantly. 

16. His father was present at the mosque in Quetta when there was a suicide bomber attack nearby and many people were killed.  There was a car filled with explosives which exploded outside the mosque and about 12 people were killed.  This was the incident in 2011 that he referred to in his application.  The applicant was also present [at a certain location] at that time, but he was not at the mosque. The applicant was also a participant in the Ashura day procession in 2004 when there was a major attack and many people were killed. The applicant believes that Hazara students are also targeted for harm in Quetta.   A close friend of his was hurt in an attack and lost his hearing.  He was on a bus going to the university outside town that the applicant was interested in applying for. After this incident, and because of it, the applicant decided not to apply for this university and chose to attend college closer to home.

17. The applicant told the Tribunal he is also afraid that now that he has been in Australia for some years, he will be targeted on the basis of being in an infidel country.

18. The applicant said he is in contact with his family regularly. His father is retired now and does not often leave the home. His siblings attend school, but it is close by to home.  They are limited in where they can go in the area and are too afraid to go outside of their area. When he was in Pakistan, the applicant and his father were involved in some local community organisations, [a Shia organisation] and [a Hazara organisation].  He sometimes participated in door to door appeals for money to assist community members. 

19. The Tribunal discussed with the applicant whether he could relocate to other areas in Pakistan outside of Quetta where he may be safe.  It put to him that independent information indicated that there are Hazara and Shia communities in various other cities such as Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi, and such large urban centres have mixed ethnic and religious communities and he may have greater opportunities for employment, services and access to state protection.  In response the applicant said that it is not possible for him to be safe anywhere in Pakistan because of his physical appearance.  He will always be identifiable as a Hazara and a Shia because of how he looks.  He said that in Karachi in December 2013, just after he left for Australia, there was an incident in which 5 Hazaras from his area were killed.  That could have been him.  The applicant confirmed that he has not lived anywhere in Pakistan other than Quetta.  He has only travelled outside of Quetta a few times, associated with obtaining his visa for Australia.  He went to Karachi to sit the IELTS test, and Lahore for the medical tests.  His father accompanied him both times.  His father came to Karachi with him when he departed for Australia in June 2013. They only stayed for a few days.  They stayed at the address of the person who assisted him with the visa application. The applicant has never worked in Pakistan because he was a school student before he left for Australia.  The applicant told the Tribunal if he returned to Pakistan he would have to continue study because he would be unable to find employment without any qualification. He believes he will be vulnerable as a visibly distinctive Hazara student wherever he is in Pakistan.

20. The applicant’s representative submitted that the applicant was very traumatised by what he had experienced when he came to Australia.  He has been too mentally disturbed to undertake his study since then.  He is in an extremely vulnerable state mentally and emotionally and is solely focused on obtaining security. She submitted it would be very difficult for a person in his mental and emotional state to relocate to a new place by himself.  He has no family members in any other place in Pakistan.  It is also very difficult for a Hazara to relocate because of their distinctive appearance. 

    Findings and reasons

21. A summary of the relevant law is set out at Attachment A.  In assessing the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal has taken into account the information in the Department’s files before it, including his application for the Protection visa, the various documents he provided to support his claims, his evidence to the delegate at interview and the evidence he gave when he appeared before the Tribunal, as well as the Department file relating to his Student visa application and documents submitted in support of that application.  It has also had regard to independent information referred to in the delegate’s decision and in Attachment B regarding relevant matters and conditions in Pakistan, as well as to the oral submissions made by his migration agent.   

22. The Tribunal’s first task in determining whether the applicant is owed protection is to make findings of facts on relevant matters.  The task of fact-finding often involves an assessment of an applicant’s credibility.  In this context, the courts have made it clear that the Tribunal must be sensitive to the potential difficulties faced by asylum seekers in putting forward their claims, and that the Tribunal should adopt a reasonable approach to making its findings with regard to credibility and afford the benefit of the doubt to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims.  However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant.  In assessing his credibility, the Tribunal has had regard to its ‘Guidance on the Assessment of Credibility’.

    Nationality

23. On the basis of the evidence of the applicant’s passport and the Tribunal finds that he is a citizen of Pakistan and Pakistan is his country of nationality for the purposes of this assessment of protection obligations. 

    Finding on the applicant’s credibility

24. The Tribunal notes that the delegate, in his statement of reasons, was of the view that the applicant was generally credible on the basis that he gave his testimony at interview in a detailed, spontaneous manner and without embellishment.  In the course of the review process the Tribunal has also had the opportunity of observing the applicant at a face to face hearing with the applicant and questioning him in some detail about his background and claims.  He responded in a direct and straightforward manner, though he was somewhat restrained and brief in his responses. The Tribunal has considered the explanation provided by the applicant and his representative for the brevity of his responses to some questions and it accepts that the applicant’s youth and the impact of witnessing traumatic incidents in his home country have likely had an impact on his presentation and responses to the Tribunal.  The Tribunal observes that the applicant has been entirely consistent in the information he has provided to the Department and Tribunal, and importantly, he has not sought to exaggerate or embellish his claims.  It also notes that his claims are supported by the independent information before the Tribunal which indicate that the Hazara community in Quetta has, since 2009, come under increasing attack from a number of armed militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who have carried out a number of coordinated and targeted attacks against Shi’a Muslims in an attempt to drive them out of the area.  Having carefully considered his evidence and all of the material before it, the Tribunal concludes that the applicant is a credible witness and accepts his oral evidence on that basis. 

    Findings in relation to applicant’s circumstances and past events

1. On the basis of the evidence and information before it the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a [age] year old Shi’a Hazara who was born in Quetta, in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.  It accepts that he has parents, [and siblings] who still reside in Quetta, he has one brother whose whereabouts is unknown, and [siblings] residing in Australia.  The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has resided in Quetta with his family from birth until about one week prior to his departure for Australia in June 2013. It accepts that all of the applicant’s extended relatives in Pakistan reside in Quetta, and he does not have any close family members living in any other place in Pakistan.  It accepts he has [siblings and other relatives] who reside in Australia.

2. On the applicant’s oral evidence, the Tribunal finds that he did not himself experience serious harm in Pakistan, but it accepts that he faced discrimination, harassment and verbal abuse throughout his life as a student. It accepts that he has witnessed numerous incidents of targeted killings of Hazaras. It accepts that he was present a Shi’a Mosque in Quetta in 2011 which was subjected to an attack by a suicide bomber in which numerous Shi’a Hazaras were killed and that he was also a participant in the Ashura day procession in 2004 when there was a major attack and many people were killed. 

3. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s father worked for [Organisation 1] for many years and that he was subject to threats of serious harm from extremists in the course of performing duties for his work.  The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s father retired early from his position because of his fear from the threats and harassment he was being subject to from extremists. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has a genuine fear of serious harm as a Shi’a Hazara student, and that he made decisions about where he would study on the basis of his concerns for his safety. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has a genuine fear of being seriously harmed if he returns to Pakistan because of his ethnicity and religion.

   Whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan for one or more of the five reasons set out in the Refugees Convention

4. The applicant fears being harmed by extremists groups in Quetta and throughout Pakistan on the basis of his Hazara ethnicity and Shi’a religion. Having accepted he is a Shi’a Hazara, the Tribunal must consider whether his fears of being persecuted by militant non-state actors are ‘well-founded’.  A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution if he or she has a genuine fear founded on a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention reason.[1]  As explained in Attachment A, a ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.

   [1] Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 389.

5. In determining this issue, the Tribunal has had regard to the independent information in Attachment B concerning the situation for Shi’a Hazaras and security conditions in the Quetta and Balochistan, including the presence and activity of LeJ, SSP, the TTP and the Taliban and other armed Sunni extremists in the region and throughout Pakistan, and the capabilities of the state to provide protection. 

6. This independent information confirms that the targeting and killing of Shi’as and Hazaras in Pakistan by militant groups is widespread. Reports relating to the situation for Shi’a Muslims generally in Pakistan indicate that the major threat to Shi’as in Pakistan (including Hazaras) comes from anti-Shia and militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Jundullah. Because they are ethnically distinct, Hazaras are readily identifiable as Shia Muslims and have been targeted by sectarian militants on this basis.[2]  A 2013 Jinnah Institute report states that a variety of militant groups, which the report claims are working together under the ‘umbrella’ of Al-Qaeda, are targeting Shia, and that their operations and capabilities stretch across Pakistan.[3] There is substantial evidence, referred to in the independent information before the Tribunal, of hundreds of members of the Hazara community in Quetta being killed in targeted killings, and many thousands being seriously injured. Reports also indicate that militants have attacked a variety of targets, including religious scholars, clerics, professionals, students, worship places, and vans carrying Shia passengers.

   [2] DFAT Thematic Report –Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, paragraph 4.16

   [3] Sajjad, S B 2013, ‘“Intent to Destroy”: Violence against Shias in Pakistan’, Extremism Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011-2012, Jinnah Institute, p.21 < Accessed 7 March 2014

7. In its most recent Thematic Reports on Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014 and Shias in Pakistan in 2015, DFAT assessed that there is high level of generalised violence in Balochistan and a low level of general law and order. Federal and provincial authorities do not exercise effective control outside of urban areas and cantonments, and there have been frequent attacks against the Hazara community in Balochistan, with most attacks on Shias in Balochistan being against the Hazara community.[4]  The 2014 HRW World Report reported, ‘at least two hundred Shias, mostly from the Hazara community’ were killed in and around Quetta in 2013.[5] The majority of those deaths (180) occurred in January and February 2013. A January 2014 Dawn report quotes the head of HRW in Pakistan, Ali Dayan Hasan, who states that Hazaras made up ‘a little under half’ of Shia killed in 2013.[6] Hasan provides the following assessment of the situation for Hazaras in Quetta:

   Hazaras live a ghetto existence, fearful of going about the normal business of life. Hazara religious pilgrims, students, shopkeepers, vegetable sellers, doctors and other professionals have been targeted leading to not just widespread fear but increasingly restricted movement leading to a ghettoization of community members, increasing economic hardship and curtailed access to education.[7] 

   [4] DFAT Thematic Report –Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, paragraphs 4.17-4.20; DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan 14 April 2015, paragraphs 4.24  

   [5] Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Pakistan, 21 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX 317224>

   [6] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’, Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [7] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’,  Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

8. Restricted movement and opportunities for employment and education were also themes in the 2013 Jinnah Institute Report.[8]  In March 2013 The Australian provided the following assessment regarding the effect of ethnic violence on the Hazara community:

   Quetta’s days as a safe haven are also over. Hazaras are fleeing the city in the face of almost daily killings by Sunni terrorists. The 500,000-strong Hazara community is confined to two suburbs, Mehr Abad and Hazara Town.[9]

   [8] Sajjad, S B 2013, ‘“Intent to Destroy”: Violence against Shias in Pakistan’, Extremism Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011-2012, Jinnah Institute, p.21 < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [9] Hodge, A 2013, ‘No place called home’, The Australian, 16 March < Accessed 30 April 2013

9. The Tribunal finds that the independent evidence is consistent with, and supports the applicant’s claims relating to targeted killings of Hazaras by militant groups and his fear of serious harm by these groups because he is a Shi’a Hazara.  On the basis of this extensive evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that the chance that the applicant would suffer serious harm on the basis of his ethnicity and religion in the reasonably foreseeable future in the event he returned to Quetta is real and not remote or far-fetched. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant’s race and religion would be the essential and significant reasons for the serious harm that he fears. 

   State Protection

10. Having found that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution were he to return home to Quetta, the Tribunal must now consider whether the Pakistani Government is able to provide adequate protection against that harm.  It has considered the independent information relating to this issue set out in Attachment B on state protection for Shi’as generally and in Balochistan. The Tribunal has taken into consideration DFAT’s assessment, in its most recent report there is a willingness by Pakistani authorities to protect Shi’a communities, however the report also acknowledges that authorities face capacity constraints:

    A lack of resources limits the federal and provincial governments’ ability to protect the Shia community at all times and in all places, given that the population is large and dispersed. Although Pakistani authorities have made efforts to capture and prosecute members of sectarian outfits, conviction rates remain low.[10] 

    [10] DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraphs 5.1-5.3

11. The HRW World Report 2014 – Pakistan provides the following assessment:

    There has been a breakdown of law enforcement in the face of politically motivated attacks particularly throughout the province of Balochistan and targeted killings in Karachi. The police and other security forces have been responsible for numerous abuses, including, torture and other ill-treatment of criminal suspects, extrajudicial killings, and unresolved enforced disappearances of terrorism suspects.[11]

    [11] Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Pakistan, 21 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX 317224>

12. After carefully reviewing the information, the Tribunal concludes that there is little effective state protection in Balochistan. The independent information indicates that there is not a functioning system of law and order that is supervised or controlled by the Pakistani Government in Balochistan or Quetta.  The locally administered police and security apparatus is said to be poorly trained and equipped, ‘ineffective and dysfunctional’ and ‘lawless and reckless’.  Given the long-standing nature and seriousness of the sectarian violence throughout the area, which the government is clearly struggling to contain, the Tribunal finds that the Pakistani Government does not provide the level of protection to the citizens of Balochistan that they are entitled to expect.[12]  Having considered the available evidence, the Tribunal finds that the level of protection available to the applicant from the Pakistani authorities in Balochistan is inadequate and, in the circumstances, his unwillingness to seek state protection is justified.  For these reasons, the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance he would suffer persecution for reasons of his race and religion if he returns to his home area of Balochistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

    Relocation

    [12] MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1

13. The Tribunal has also considered the possibility of whether the applicant could safely relocate to another area of Pakistan, such as Islamabad, Karachi or Lahore, to avoid the persecution he faces in Balochistan.  As the relevant law in Attachment A provides, the Tribunal must determine if there is an “appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution” throughout Pakistan, and, if not, whether it would be “reasonable”, in the sense of “practicable”, to expect the applicant to seek refuge in another part of the same country.  What is “reasonable” in this sense depends on the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact on him of relocation. 

14. The Tribunal notes that the delegate concluded that it would be safe, reasonable and practicable for the applicant to relocate to Karachi.  While acknowledging that violence occurs in Karachi, the delegate was of the view that the risk to the applicant of becoming a victim of harm was no greater than any other person, given the applicant’s profile and size of Karachi’s population. He did not accept that Hazara’s were targeted on account of their ethnicity in Karachi, despite several news reports of Hazaras killed in recent times.  However, after careful consideration of the independent information in Attachment B and below regarding Karachi, and other places in Pakistan, and taking into account the particular circumstances of the applicant, the Tribunal reaches a different conclusion on the issue of the reasonableness of relocation, for the reasons provided below. 

15. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines of May 2012 that a Shia applicant for protection cannot safely relocate to areas including FATA, Khyper Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan due to the fact that they are currently affected by sustained security and military counter-insurgency operations and retaliatory attacks.

16. The Tribunal has considered the view of DFAT in its most recent reports that freedom of movement is guaranteed by the Pakistani Constitution and given Pakistan’s size and diversity, in many cases there are options for members of religious minorities, including Shi’as, to be able to relocate to areas of relatively safety elsewhere in Pakistan. DFAT refers specifically to urban centres such as Lahore and Islamabad as being home to mixed ethnic and religious communities and offering greater opportunities for employment, access to services and a greater degree of state protection than other areas.[13]

    [13] DFAT, ‘Pakistan Country Information Report, 14 April 2015, paragraph 5.16, DFAT Thematic Report –Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, paragraphs 4.17-4.20; DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan 14 April 2015, paragraphs 4.24  

17. Other independent information referred to in Attachment 2 and below indicates that the Shi’a community in each of the major cities in Pakistan has in the recent past been subject to large-scale targeted attacks by armed Sunni insurgents.  In its May 2012 ‘Eligibility Guidelines’, UNHCR states that until the 1990s the majority of sectarian motivated attacks by Sunni Muslims on the Shi’a occurred in the Punjab, but that the violence had since spread to the rest of the country, with the majority of recent attacks inspired by al-Qaeda ideology.  UNHCR concluded that relocation is generally not available for those targeted by militia groups, given the wide geographic reach of some groups, and links with influential actors in the local and central administration, law enforcement and judiciary.  In 2012 the Asian Human Rights Commission reported that Shi’a’ are not safe in any major town in Pakistan.  The Tribunal considers significant that the UNHCR ‘Eligibility Guidelines’ state that law enforcement authorities are unable or unwilling to protect Shi’as, and that Sunni militant groups reportedly operate with impunity, including in areas where state authority is well-established, such as the Punjab and Karachi.  The Wall Street Journal said that Pakistan is in the midst of a “low grade war against its minority Shi’a population”.  The recent United States Department of State ‘International Religious Freedom Report’ stated that attacks, threats and violence by religious extremists occurred across the country, and attacks on houses of worship, religious gatherings and leaders resulted in hundreds of deaths.  It states that Pakistan is a country of concern and religious freedom there is exceedingly poor, with perpetrators of attacks on minorities rarely being brought to justice. 

18. The Tribunal considers that the highly volatile nature of the situation with regard to the actions of extremist groups and individuals in Pakistan makes it difficult to assess the risks that would be posed to the applicant upon his return to Pakistan. The Tribunal also considers that the difficulties in determining the risks are exacerbated by the focus of the independent evidence on the situation for Shias as a whole, of which Hazaras comprise only a very small minority. The reports are also lacking in relation to information on the ability of Hazaras to find employment, housing and access to welfare services. However, having considered the independent evidence, the Tribunal accepts the following. It accepts that the distinctive physical features of Hazaras increase the risk of a targeted attack[14], and social status in terms of education level and professional status can also increase their vulnerability.[15] The reports indicate that there are between 600,000 to one million Hazaras living in Pakistan, the largest Hazara community resides in Quetta, Balochistan, where the Tribunal has found above that the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution, and other communities are much smaller. The Jinnah Institute report, cited above, states that ‘small’ Hazara communities exist in Mach, Loralai, and Khuzdar in Balochistan, as well as Karachi, Hyderabad, Peshawar, and Parachinar.[16] The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines indicate that Shias, as the largest Muslim minority in Pakistan, are the target of violent attacks by Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout the country.[17]  In November 2012, the Pakistani Taliban is reported to have claimed responsibility for three separate bomb attacks targeting Shias within 24 hours in the cities of Karachi, Quetta and Rawalpindi.[18] 

    [14] Hazara Network 2011, Lashkar-E Jhangvi (Lej) Blamed For Killing Of Hazaras In Quetta, Pakistan, source: Central Asia Online, 23 July < Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2009, Pushed to the Wall: Report of the HRCP fact-finding mission to Balochistan 5-11 October, p.19 < Accessed 28 April 2011

    [16] Sajjad, S B 2013, ‘“Intent to Destroy”: Violence against Shias in Pakistan’, Extremism Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011-2012, Jinnah Institute, p.23 < United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2012, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan, HCR/EG/PAK/12/02, 14 May, pp.37-39 <

    [18] >

    With respect to Karachi, in January 2014 Human Rights Watch reported that, in response to sectarian attacks in Quetta, ‘many hundreds’ have migrated to Karachi[19] and approximately 15,000 Hazaras reside in Karachi. In March 2012, DFAT advised the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) that there are ‘two sizeable communities in Karachi (500-1000 families)’.[20] An October 2011 report in The News also states that ‘over 13,000 members of the [Hazara] community are living in Karachi’.[21] However, the reports also indicate that Hazaras in Karachi have been the subject of attacks, both targeted and random.[22] Food outlets in some of the areas in which Hazaras in Karachi reside have also been targeted in what police believe are sectarian attacks.[23] Information indicates that there has been an increase in Sunni/Shia sectarian violence in Karachi, most notably from 2009 onwards which has been characterised by a number of high profile bombings, as well as retaliatory killings of individuals from both communities. In a March 2012 report, DFAT reported that “[s]ectarian attacks on the Shia population in Karachi are relatively common, particularly during times of Shia festivals.”

    [19] Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Pakistan, 21 January < Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012, Pakistan: Hazaras in Pakistan, 1 & 9 March <CX 283938>

    [21] Ali, R 2011, ‘Hazaras not safe even in Karachi’, The News, source: Hazara News Pakistan, 7 October < DFAT Thematic Report: Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan (26 March 2014); ‘Sunday bloody Sunday: Four people gunned down, one chopped up’ 2012, Express Tribune, 14 May CISNET Pakistan CX287026; ‘Katchi community member killed’ 2012, The News, 19 February CISNET Pakistan CX281807.

    [23] ‘Targeted attacks: Police ask shops to close early for safety’ 2014, The Express Tribune, 20 February.

1. The information in relation to the situation in Lahore is somewhat mixed with some reports indicating that several Hazara artists have chosen to relocate to Lahore but other reports refer to continuing attacks against Shi’as in Lahore, with the Immigration Review Board of Canada commenting that the situation for Shia Muslims in Lahore is “extremely serious” and that there have been numerous killings.[24] There are also reports of large scale sectarian attacks in Lahore since 2009.[25] A March 2013 report by The Weekly Standard states that ‘prominent Hazara individuals have been assassinated in Karachi and Lahore’.[26]

   [24] Immigration and Review Board of Canada 2014, PAK 104713, 9 January.

   [25] South Asian Terrorism Portal 2011, Punjab Assessment – 2011 <

   [26] Schwartz, S 2013, ‘Terror Against Hazara Muslim Minority in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan’, The Weekly Standard, 19 March <>

   The reports also indicate that Shias and Hazaras reside in Islamabad with sources estimating that some there are some 2000 Hazaras residing in Islamabad. While there have been no reported killings of Hazaras in Islamabad, in August 2013 there have been continued attacks against Shias in both Islamabad and Rawalpindi, although these are significantly less than those occurring in place such as Balochistan and the FATA. Some reports also indicate that Hazaras have migrated from Balochistan to Peshawar to avoid being targeted by religious extremists and have settled in Haji Town where Afghan Hazaras have settled. The reports also indicate, however, that there are a small number of approximately 5000 and as a result of their distinctive features they have had difficulties with landlords and have had problems with the authorities, police, difficulties in finding work and housing.

2. When the issue of relocation was discussed with the applicant at the hearing he stated that there was no part of Pakistan where he can be safe because of his physical appearance which is distinctively Hazara, and as a Hazara he will be identified as Shia.  He referred to an incident targeting Hazaras from Quetta that occurred days after he left Karachi in December 2013.  The applicant said he has never lived anywhere else in Pakistan other than Quetta.  He only went to Lahore and Karachi for business relating to obtaining his visa and his father accompanied him on both occasions.  He has never worked in Pakistan because he was a school student before he left. If he returned to Pakistan now he would have to return to study because he does not have any qualifications and he believes he will be targeted and vulnerable also as a Shi’a Hazara student.  The applicant’s representative submitted that the applicant is in a vulnerable mental state as a result of what he has witnessed in the past and in this context it would be very difficult for him to relocate to a new place by himself. He has no family members in any other place in Pakistan and as a Hazara he has a distinctive appearance which puts him at risk. 

3. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims about why he cannot relocate to another area in Pakistan.  The Tribunal accepts that there remains a considerable risk of violence to Shia Hazaras throughout Pakistan. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant would be recognised as a Hazara, and consequently a Shi’a, on the basis of his appearance, his language, his accent, his identity documents identifying him as being from Quetta and that he is likely to reside in a Hazara community, which is a visible minority group in Pakistan.

4. While the Tribunal acknowledges that the applicant is a young single male, with a good educational background and from a relatively wealthy family demonstrated by his family’s ability to support him to obtain a student visa for Australia, it also accepts that he has never worked in Pakistan, has only ever lived with his family in Quetta and he would be highly visible and vulnerable as a young Hazara male without family support.  The Tribunal accepts that were he to study, he would also be visible and vulnerable as a Hazara student.   

5. The Tribunal is satisfied, having regard to the above factors, that the applicant’s family background is likely to become known in Karachi and his family’s wealth and status would make him a target of abduction or extortion from Islamic terrorist groups who have an increasing presence in Karachi and are heavily involved in such activities, particularly against minority communities.[27] The Tribunal accepts the evidence indicates there is only a small Hazara presence in other Pakistani cities. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant has no family support in any of these places, he would be visible as a Shi’a Hazara, and his presence may attract the attention of Islamic terrorist groups or individual extremists in other parts of Pakistan where there are significantly smaller numbers of Shia communities and there is a real risk that he would suffer significant harm.

   [27] See for example, BBC News 2013, ‘How the Taliban gripped Karachi’, 21 March which discusses the prevalence of Taliban criminal groups and networks of extremists operating in Karachi. See also New York Times 2014, ‘Pakistan: Killings Rise in Karachi as Taliban Target Police’, 12 August and Issues Paper: Pakistan: Violence in Karachi, 15 July 2013.

6. The independent information clearly indicates that militant Sunni extremists are active throughout the country, with the apparent support of powerful groups within the various levels of the Pakistani government, which can reasonably be described as corrupt and fractured. The information before the Tribunal demonstrates that in the recent past a number of armed Sunni extremist groups have carried out a campaign of violence throughout the country against the Shi’a minority.  The available information does not indicate that the Pakistani government is capable or willing to counteract that campaign.  While security may be better in cities outside of Balochistan and the tribal areas, the Tribunal is not satisfied that a person with the applicant’s personal attributes and circumstances could safely relocate elsewhere in Pakistan and study or find employment and accommodation and practise his religion without attracting the adverse attention of religious extremists.  For all of these reasons, the Tribunal cannot confidently dismiss as remote the chance that the applicant would come to the adverse attention of extremist groups with views hostile to Shi’a Muslims.  Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, having carefully considered the evidence and information before it, the Tribunal is unable to make a finding that, in his particular circumstances, there is no appreciable risk of the applicant being harmed outside of the Balochistan because of his race and religion.   

   CONCLUSION

7. For the above reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by non-state actors, from which the state would not be able to protect him, if he returned to Pakistan now or in the foreseeable future, and that, in the circumstances, it would not be safe or reasonable for him to relocate to another part of the country.  The Tribunal considers that the persecution which he is at risk of suffering involves ‘serious harm’ as required by s.91R(1)(b) of the Act, in that it involves significant physical harassment or ill-treatment.  The Tribunal finds that his race and religion are the essential and significant reasons for his fear of persecution as required by s.91R(1)(a).  The Tribunal is satisfied that the persecution he is at risk of suffering involves systematic and discriminatory conduct, as required by s.91R(1)(c), in that it is deliberate or intentional and involves his selective harassment for a Convention reason.  

8. Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution if he returns to Pakistan now or in the foreseeable future. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and that he satisfies the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) for a Protection visa.

   DECISION

   The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

   Meena Sripathy
   Member

   
   

   ATTACHMENT A

   RELEVANT LAW

9. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

   Refugee criterion

10. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

11. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

    owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

12. Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.

13. There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.

14. Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.

15. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.

16. Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.

17. Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.

18. In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, in particular to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.

    State Protection

19. Harm from non-state agents may amount to persecution for a Convention reason if the motivation of the non-State actors is Convention-related, and the State is unable to provide adequate protection against the harm. Where the State is complicit in the sense that it encourages, condones or tolerates the harm, the attitude of the State is consistent with the possibility that there is persecution: MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1, per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ, at [23]. Where the State is willing but not able to provide protection, the fact that the authorities, including the police, and the courts, may not be able to provide an assurance of safety, so as to remove any reasonable basis for fear, does not justify an unwillingness to seek their protection: MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1, per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ, at [28]. In such cases, a person will not be a victim of persecution, unless it is concluded that the government would not or could not provide citizens in the position of the person with the level of protection which they were entitled to expect according to international standards: MIMA v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1, per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ, at [29]. Harm from non-State actors which is not motivated by a Convention reason may also amount to persecution for a Convention reason if the protection of the State is withheld or denied for a Convention reason.

    Relocation

20. The focus of the Convention definition is not upon the protection that the country of nationality might be able to provide in some particular region, but upon a more general notion of protection by that country: Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 per Black CJ at 440-1. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, it may be reasonable for a person to relocate in the country of nationality or former habitual residence to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. Thus, a person will be excluded from refugee status if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, to expect him or her to seek refuge in another part of the same country. What is ‘reasonable’ in this sense must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation within his or her country. However, whether relocation is reasonable is not to be judged by considering whether the quality of life in the place of relocation meets the basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights. The Convention is concerned with persecution in the defined sense, and not with living conditions in a broader sense: SZATV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 18 and SZFDV v MIAC (2007) 233 CLR 51, per Gummow, Hayne & Crennan JJ, Callinan J agreeing.

21. Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

    Complementary protection criterion

22. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

23. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s.36(2A): s.5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s.5(1) of the Act.

24. There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s.36(2B) of the Act.

    Section 499 Ministerial Direction

25. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration –PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines – and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    ATTACHMENT B    Independent Country Information

    Shias in Pakistan

26. The US State Department reports that the US Government estimated the population of Pakistan at 193.2 million in July 2013 and that based on the most recent census, conducted in 1998, 95 per cent of the population are Muslims, 75 per cent of whom are listed officially as Sunni while the remaining 25 per cent are listed officially as Shia.[28]  On this basis there would be almost 46 million Shias in Pakistan. 

    [28] US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 in relation to Pakistan, Section I, Religious Demography.

27. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) states that Pakistan’s population is estimated to be between 180 and 200 million and that Shias are estimated to represent approximately 20 per cent of the population,[29] meaning that there are between 36 and 40 million Shias in Pakistan. 

    [29] DFAT Country Report - Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 2.4, and DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 2.5.

28. The greatest threat for Shias in Pakistan is in the form of targeting by militants or, at times, sectarian clashes in the community.[30] The US State Department refers to figures from the South Asia Terrorism Portal indicating that 504 Shias were killed and another 965 were injured in sectarian violence across Pakistan during 2013.[31]  DFATrefers to figures from the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) which relate to all sectarian violence, not just violence against Shia Muslims.  According to the PIPS there were 141 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan in 2014, 35 per cent fewer than the 220 incidents recorded in 2013.  Around 255 people were killed in these attacks, 63 per cent fewer than the 687 killed in 2013 and the lowest number since 2009.  More than half of the 141 incidents were attacks on the Shia community.[32]  According to The Shia Post (a pro-Shia news portal), at least 311 Shia Muslims were killed across Pakistan during 2014.[33]

    [30] DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 3.1

    [31] US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 in relation to Pakistan, Section II, Government Inaction.

    [32] DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2.

    [33] ‘311 Pakistani Shia Muslims Martyred in 2014’, The Shia Post, 1 January 2015, CISEC96CF1169.

1. Sectarian attacks have taken the form of attacks on Shia mosques or imambargahs, Shia religious processions and places where Shias gather such as markets and attacks on members of the Shia community.[34] 

   [34] See for example, ‘TTP claims attack on Rawalpindi imambargah, three killed’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 19 February 2015, CXBD6A0DE2245; Zahir Shah Sherazi, ’21 killed as Taliban storm Peshawar imambargah’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 14 February 2015, CXBD6A0DE2267; ‘Shikarpur imambargah bombing kills 61’, The Nation (Pakistan), 31 January 2015, CXBD6A0DE2395.  ‘Pakistan city tense after Ashura attack’, Reuters, 29 December 2009, CX238197; ‘Taliban bomber kills Pakistan Shia marchers’, BBC, 22 November 2012, CX299541

   Hazaras in Pakistan

2. According to DFAT, there are estimated to be between 600,000 and 900,000 Hazaras living in Pakistan—less than one per cent of the population. Most (up to 450,000) live in and around the city of Quetta in Balochistan Province, the largest city and the provincial capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan Province.  There are also small Hazara communities in the Kurram Agency of Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in large urban areas, including in Karachi (up to 15,000), Lahore, Multan, Islamabad and Peshawar. Within Quetta, Hazaras live predominantly within their own two communities—Hazara Town (also known as Brewery Road) and along Alamdar Road towards Mehrabad. These tend to be lower and middle-income areas on the outskirts of Quetta.[35]

   [35] DFAT Thematic Report –Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, paragraphs 2.9-2.11

3. DFAT’s assesses that the greatest threat for Shi’a Hazara in Pakistan is in the form of targeting by militants or, at times, sectarian clashes in the community.[36]

   [36] DFAT Thematic Report –Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 26 March 2014, paragraph 3.7

4. Regarding Balochistan, DFAT reports there is a high level of generalised violence in this province and a low level of general law and order. Federal and provincial authorities do not exercise effective control outside of urban areas and cantonments. Balochistan has experienced frequent terrorist attacks by militants and separatists. Most attacks on Shias in Balochistan have been against the Hazara community. There were 15 sectarian attacks in Balochistan in 2014 which killed 86 people although a number of these were Sunnis attacked and killed by Shia militants.  The Department has advised that as a result of these attacks Hazaras have retreated into two predominantly Hazara enclaves in Quetta where they enjoy a greater degree of security but that they are generally able to move about within Quetta during daylight hours.[37]

   [37] DFAT Thematic Report - Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan (26 March 2014), paragraphs 2.10-2.11, 4.17-4.19; DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 4.24.

5. The 2014 Human Rights Report Pakistan of the US Department of State reported the  following in respect of Hazaras:

   Members of the Hazara ethnic minority, who are Shia, continued to face discrimination and threats of violence in Quetta, Balochistan. According to press reports and other sources, they were unable to move freely outside of Quetta’s two Hazara-populated enclaves. Consumer goods in those enclaves were available only at inflated prices, and Hazaras reported an inability to find employment or pursue higher education. They also alleged government agencies discriminated against Hazaras in issuing identification cards and passports. To avoid sparking violent incidents, Shia religious processions were confined to the Hazara enclaves. Anti-Shia graffiti was common in Quetta. In March Ahle-Sunna-wa-Jamaat held a major rally in Quetta and another in October, in Islamabad, where large crowds chanted anti-Shia slogans.[38]

   [38] "Human Rights Report 2014 Pakistan", US Department of State, 25 June 2015, OG2B06FAF139, ​ <accessed 9 September 2015>

6. A January 2014 Dawn report quotes the head of HRW in Pakistan, Ali Dayan Hasan, who states that Hazaras made up ‘a little under half’ of Shias killed in 2013.[39] Hasan provides the following assessment of the situation for Hazaras in Quetta:

   Hazaras live a ghetto existence, fearful of going about the normal business of life. Hazara religious pilgrims, students, shopkeepers, vegetable sellers, doctors and other professionals have been targeted leading to not just widespread fear but increasingly restricted movement leading to a ghettoization of community members, increasing economic hardship and curtailed access to education.[40] 

   [39] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’, Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [40] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’,  Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

7. A research response prepared for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in January 2014 stated that attacks against Shias reportedly occurred in all regions of Pakistan but that sources indicated that they were particularly targeted in Quetta in Balochistan, in Karachi, in Gilgit Baltistan, in Parachinar in the Kurram Agency and in Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.[41] 

   [41] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Pakistan: How Shia Muslims differ from Sunnis; treatment of Shias, particularly in Lahore and Multan; government response to violence against Shia Muslims (2010-December 2013)’, 9 January 2014, PAK104713.E.

8. The PIPS Pakistan Security Report for 2013 states that, of the ‘208 recorded sectarian-related terrorist attacks’, more than half were against Shia.[42] The report also claims that militants attacked a variety of targets:

   The sectarian-related terrorist attacks hit diverse targets ranging from general adherents of a particular sect to religious scholars, clerics, professionals including doctors and lawyers, educationalists, worship places, including mosques and Imambargahs, madrassas, madrassa students and teachers, shrines, members and activists of sectarian and religious organizations, religious gatherings and processions including Moharram and Rabiul Awal processions, vans carrying Shia passengers, localities and residence areas of a certain sect, and others.[43]   

   [42] Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2014, Pakistan Security Report 2013, 4 January, p.25 <CIS 27132>

   [43] Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2014, Pakistan Security Report 2013, 4 January, p.10 <CIS 27132>

9. In March 2013 The Australian provided the following assessment regarding the effect of ethnic violence on the Hazara community:

   Quetta’s days as a safe haven are also over. Hazaras are fleeing the city in the face of almost daily killings by Sunni terrorists. The 500,000-strong Hazara community is confined to two suburbs, Mehr Abad and Hazara Town.[44]

   [44] Hodge, A 2013, ‘No place called home’, The Australian, 16 March < Accessed 30 April 2013

10. LeJ claimed responsibility for a series of bombings targeting Hazaras in Quetta in January 2013 that killed more than 90 people and the bombing of a Hazara market in Quetta that killed at least 84 people in February 2013. [45] After the February bomb attack, a LeJ spokesman claimed that ‘we have 20 more such vehicles which are packed with lethal explosives and ready to hit the enemy… We will continue to kill Shia Hazaras in their homes’.[46]

    [45] Amnesty International 2013, Pakistan: Authorities must do more to protect Hazara community from deadly attacks, UNHCR Refworld, 18 February < Accessed 27 February 2013

    [46] Tripathi, A 2013, ‘Pakistan: Targeting Hazaras – Analysis’, Eurasia Review, source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, 29 April < Accessed 23 July 2013

    State Protection for Shias generally

11. With regard to state protection, in its May 2012 ‘Eligibility Guidelines’, UNHCR stated:

    Law enforcement authorities are reportedly unable or unwilling to protect members of religious minorities, including Shias.  Sunni militant groups, such as the banned Lashkar-e Jhangvi, reportedly operated with impunity, including in areas where State authority is well established, such as Punjab province and Karachi.

    In light of the foregoing, UNHCR considers that members of the Shia community, particularly those in areas where Taliban-affiliated groups are active, such as the northwest of Pakistan and in urban centres, may, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion and/or (imputed) political opinion[47].

    [47] UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan (14 May 2012), p 40

12. In its Thematic Report on Shias in Pakistan DFAT says, in relation to state protection:

    Broadly DFAT assesses there is a willingness by Pakistani authorities to protect Shia communities.  During Muharram, provincial authorities and the Federal Ministry of Interior cooperate with local Shia communities to provide security for participants in Ashura processions. …..

    However, authorities face capacity constraints.  A lack of resources limits the federal and provincial governments’ ability to protect the Shia community at all times and in all places, given that the population is large and dispersed. Although Pakistani authorities have made efforts to capture and prosecute members of sectarian outfits, conviction rates remain low.

    Shia communities frequently make provisions for their own security, including fortification for Shia mosques and processions. This includes the establishment of self-protection ‘scout’ units and lines of security to search those attending Ashura processions.[48]

    [48] DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraphs 5.1-5.3

13. In its 2015 Country Report, DFAT assesses that state protection can be limited by a general lack of resources and, in some cases, political will. Militant attacks against police, security forces and the judiciary make it difficult for Pakistani governments to exercise effective control in some areas, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and remote areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.[49]

    [49] DFAT Country Report Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 5.1

14. Other reports concerning the willingness of the State to arrest LeJ members and prevent attacks provide contradictory information. In January 2014 Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that LeJ ‘operate with virtual impunity across Pakistan, as law enforcement officials either turn a blind-eye or appear helpless to prevent attacks’, while a 2013 HRW report claims that LeJ have, ‘historically had links with the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies’. The report provided the following general assessment of state protection:

    There has been a breakdown of law enforcement in the face of politically motivated attacks particularly throughout the province of Balochistan and targeted killings in Karachi. The police and other security forces have been responsible for numerous abuses, including, torture and other ill-treatment of criminal suspects, extrajudicial killings, and unresolved enforced disappearances of terrorism suspects. [50]

    [50] Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Pakistan, 21 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX 317224>

15. However, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies’ (PIPS) Pakistan Security Report for 2013 records the arrest of 80 LeJ militants in 2013.[51] Although reports of all 80 instances were not found, a non-exhaustive search via Google of LeJ militants being arrested indicated that police/security forces did act against LeJ in 2013, including the arrest of high-ranking LeJ officials.[52] A 26 January report in the Business Recorder, a Pakistan based financial newspaper, states that the government of Balochistan has decided ‘to launch an operation against banned outfit LeJ in Balochistan’; although at the time of writing the operation had not begun.[53]

    [51] Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2014, Pakistan Security Report 2013, 4 January, p.38 <CIS 27132>

    [52] ‘LeJ’s Karachi Chief Arrested’ 2013, The Express Tribune, 7 May < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX319276>; Khan, S 2013, ‘Major breakthrough: LeJ hit squad chief arrested, IB tells Nawaz’, The Express Tribune, 20 July < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX319266>; ‘Four LeJ ‘terrorists’ arrested in Karachi: Police chief’ 2013, The News International, 16 September < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX318967>; Bhatti, M W 2013, ‘LeJ militant among four arrested in Karachi’, The News International, 20 November < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX318890>  

    [53] Hussain, A 2014, ‘Action against LeJ in Balochistan: Punjab faces grim prospects’, Business Recorder, 26 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 

    State Protection in Balochistan/Quetta

16. State protection in Balochistan is multi-layered.  Levies forces are tribal based militias and undertake action in non-urban areas; the Balochistan police force (numbering about 32,000) is responsible for policing and making arrests in urban areas; and the Frontier Corps (FC), who act, in theory, on behalf of the federal Minister of Interior, provide general security and undertake actions against militant/insurgent groups.[54] In January 2013, in response to an attack against the Shia community in Quetta, the federal government imposed emergency orders in Balochistan, giving the FC roles and duties normally reserved for police, such as the right to arrest and detain suspects.[55] This situation lasted until March 2013.[56] However, according to a January 2014 ICG report, the FC has continued to enjoy expanded powers.[57]

    [54] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014

    [55] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014

    [56] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014

    [57] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014

17. The ICG report describes Balochistan’s policing system as ‘ineffective and dysfunctional’, providing the following information:

    At any given location, said a senior officer, “police jurisdiction doesn’t stretch beyond a 2 to 4km radius. Even in Quetta, we don’t have complete jurisdiction over the entire district”. As in the KPK F[rontier] R[egion]s, criminals and militants in Quetta evade the police by retreating to areas where the force has no jurisdictional control.

    The flow of information and different chains of authority also undermine coordination between the law enforcement agencies and foster mutual mistrust. Moreover, the police often violate their jurisdictional authority by pursuing and apprehending criminals in the [levies] areas, thereby creating procedural problems for the courts. A trial court judge said “the moment an accused says that he was caught from an area outside of the police’s jurisdiction, the courts set him free”[58]     

    [58] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014; for an extensive analysis of the parallel policing system in Balochistan please see pages 126-136 of: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2012, Policing in Pakistan: An Overview of Institutions, Challenges, and Debates, 8 October < Accessed 7 March 2014

18. In May 2012 a team of researchers with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) undertook a fact-finding mission in Balochistan. The researchers held meetings with a wide range of stakeholders. The researchers noted that respondents complained that the state was unable and unwilling to provide protection:

    There were complaints of the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect the lives of religious minorities as well as members of some Muslim sects from sectarian killings…The continued persecution of Hazaras was as ruthless as it was unprecedented. The people the mission met said that if the authorities had the commitment to stop the killings or punish those responsible the killings could not have expanded in the manner that they had. Questions were raised about the absence of ability or willingness on the part of the government to protect the people from faith-based violence as well as its lack of priorities. Heightened threats, including kidnapping for ransom, had forced Hazara, non-Muslims, settlers and wealthy people to migrate to other parts of the country, and even abroad.[59]    

    [59] Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2012, Hopes, Fears and Alienation in Balochistan, p.45 < Accessed 7 March 2014

19. There are numerous news reports which indicate that police and FC personnel have acted against anti-Shia militants. According to a June 2013 Dawn report, FC personnel, and members of the Anti-Terrorism Taskforce, killed two LeJ members in the Kharotabad area of Quetta while undertaking a raid on a suspected LeJ safe-house.[60] According to a February 2013 report by The Express Tribune, two LeJ members were killed and four arrested during a raid in Quetta. The raid was in response to a terrorist incident in which 89 Shia, mostly Hazara, were killed.[61] The report states that a further 170 ‘suspects’ were also arrested.[62]  A January 2013 report by The Nation states that, in response to an attack on Shia in the district of Mastung, the government of Balochistan ‘decided to launch action against militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’, resulting in the arrest of 25 ‘suspects’.[63] The action was taken after members of the Hazara community had staged protests.[64]   

    [60] Shah, S A 2013, ‘Militants blow themselves up in Quetta; 16 security men injured’, 6 June < Accessed 7 March 2014;  

    [61] ‘2 LeJ members killed, 4 arrested in Quetta’ 2013, Dawn, 22 February < Accessed 7 March 2014;  

    [62] ‘2 LeJ members killed, 4 arrested in Quetta’ 2013, Dawn, 22 February < Accessed 7 March 2014

    [63] ‘Balochistan suspends Iran pilgrimage route’ 2013, The Nation, 25 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX318887>

    [64] ‘Balochistan suspends Iran pilgrimage route’ 2013, The Nation, 25 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX318887>

1. There are also reports which accuse the security forces in Balochistan of committing a range of abuses[65]. The head of HRW in Pakistan, Ali Dayan Hasan, provided the following comments in a January 2014 interview with the Pakistan newspaper Dawn when asked about the Hazara community’s relationship with the FC in Balochistan:

   While there is no formal policy of tolerance for extremist elements such as the LJ at work, it is not possible to say yet with any certainty that there are no extremist sympathisers within lead law enforcement and security agencies. The matter is further complicated because elements from the security apparatus can be complicit in extremist attacks or turn a blind eye to them not out of conviction but also out of fear.[66]   

   [65]Grare, F 2014, ‘Balochistan: The State versus the Nation’, The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April, p.18 < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CIS 27105>; Gannon, K 2012, ‘Pakistan Shiites face rising militants attacks’, Associated Press (AP), 11 September < jWPKrpSXl4Yy2C9Zw?docId=dde6320b868746338996dc2df8fe8f63> Accessed 12 September 2012; International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, pp.16-17 < Accessed 7 March 2014; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2009, Pushed to the Wall: Report of the HRCP fact-finding mission to Balochistan 5-11 October, p.18< Accessed 28 April 2011     

   [66] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’, Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

2. The 2014 ICG report claims that the differentiated roles and responsibilities of the various security forces in Balochistan has led to, inter alia, low conviction rates.[67]

   [67] International Crisis Group 2014, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 January, p.23 < Accessed 7 March 2014

   Internal Relocation

3. With regard to internal flight or relocation, the UNHCR stated in its May 2012 ‘Eligibility Guidelines’:

   In the context of Pakistan, an IFA/IRA will generally not be available in areas of FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Balochistan province, which are currently affected by sustained security and military counter-insurgency operations and retaliatory militant attacks. The availability of an IFA/IRA outside these areas needs to be assessed individually, on the basis of the framework detailed in these Guidelines. Areas considered relatively stable may, nevertheless, be inaccessible in instances where access roads to and from such areas are considered insecure.

   Given the wide geographic reach of some armed militant groups, a viable IFA/IRA will generally not be available to individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups.[68]

   [68] UNHRC Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan p 42

4. DFAT in its most recent reports advises that freedom of movement throughout Pakistan is guaranteed by the Constitution, and in many cases there are options available for members of most ethnic and religious minorities, including Shias, to be able to relocate to areas of relative safety elsewhere in Pakistan. It has said that large urban centres such as Lahore and Islamabad are home to mixed ethnic and religious communities and offer greater opportunities for employment, access to services and a higher level of state protection. While the cost of living, particularly for housing, is higher in larger cities but that this cost can be offset by higher wages paid in these areas, particularly for those with relevant skills such as foreign language or computer skills.[69]

   Karachi

   [69] DFAT Country Report - Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraphs 5.14, 5.16 and 5.19; DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 5.4. 

5. A January 2013 report by The Friday Times states that there are 15,000 Hazaras in Karachi, citing the Hazara ‘community’ as its source, while a January 2014 HRW report states that, in response to sectarian attacks in Quetta, ‘many hundreds’ have migrated to Karachi.[70] This migration is confirmed by The Friday Times report cited above, which also states that ‘the situation in Karachi is no better’ than Quetta.[71]  Hazaras reside in various parts of Karachi, but seem to have concentrations in and around Gulshan-Iqbal Town, particularly Hussain Hazara Goth.[72] The latter reportedly houses the main Imambargah for the community.[73]

   [70] Chishti, A K 2013, ‘Where do we go?’, The Friday Times, 18-24 January, Vol. 24, No.49 < Accessed 7 March 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014, World Report 2014 – Pakistan, 21 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX 317224>

   [71] Chishti, A K 2013, ‘Where do we go?’, The Friday Times, 18-24 January, Vol. 24, No.49 < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [72] Ali, R 2011, ‘Hazaras not safe even in Karachi’, The News, source: Hazara News Pakistan, 7 October < Accessed 14 March 2012

   [73] Ali, R 2011, ‘Hazaras not safe even in Karachi’, The News, source: Hazara News Pakistan, 7 October < Accessed 14 March 2012; Hazara, L A 2010, ‘Oath Taking Ceremony Of Hazara Moghul Yekjehti Forum (Registered), Pakistan’, Hazara Nation, 15 December < Accessed 24 May 2011 <CX318990>; ‘Target Killing of Hazaras in Karachi’ 2010, Hazara People, 5 November < Accessed 20 May 2011. Hazara People describes itself as ‘an online community for Hazara people to defend Hazara’s rights’: <

6. Reports were found indicating that Hazaras have been targeted in some of the above locations,[74] while a 20 February 2014 report in The Express Tribune states that food outlets in Gulshan-Iqbal Town have recently been targeted in what police believe are sectarian attacks.[75] One such attack in January 2014 involved the killing of three Hazara Shia.[76] In its report of the incident The Express Tribune noted that Gulshan-Iqbal Town ‘has become notorious for targeted killings as several cases have occurred in the past’.[77] In 2011 police arrested a TTP commander who had taken up ‘residency in Gulshan-e-Iqbal’, indicating that anti-Shia groups have had a presence in the area.[78]  

   [74] ‘Pakistan: SSP Terrorists Killed Shiite Man in Karachi’ 2013, ABNA, 3 September < Accessed 7 March 2014; ‘Wahabi militants kill 3 Shiites in Karachi’ 2013, The Shia Post, 3 September < Accessed 7 March 2014; Ali, R 2011, ‘Hazaras not safe even in Karachi’, The News, source: Hazara News Pakistan, 7 October < Accessed 14 March 2012; ‘TWO Hazaras amongst twelve people killed in separate incidents in Karach’ 2013, Hazaras in Karachi, 30 December < Accessed 7 March 2014; ‘One Hazara shot by terrorists on University Road in Karachi’ 2013, Hazara Net, 22 November < Accessed 7 March 2014 

   [75] ‘Targeted attacks: Police ask shops to close early for safety’ 2014, The Express Tribune, 20 February < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [76] ‘Second terrorist attack in a week on Hazaras in Karachi: 3 murdered, 2 in critical condition’ 2014, Hazara Net, 8 January < Accessed 7 March 2014

   [77] ‘Cycle of violence: Target killings claim five lives’ 2014, The Express Tribune, 5 January < Accessed 7 March 2014 <CX318938>

   [78] ‘TTP commander arrested in Karachi’ 2011, Dawn, 24 September < Accessed 7 March 2014

7. The ICG reports that since 2007, SSP, LeJ, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) have all openly held public meetings in Karachi. Another anti-Shia group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), runs a large madrassah in the suburb of Ehsanabad; it was at this madrasa that Daniel Pearl’s kidnappers were arrested. The ICG reports that due to threats against the Shia Imam Bara (mosque) made by Sunni Imams from nearby mosques, the former president of the Imam Bara turned it ‘into a fortress, with armed guards on the rooftop during Friday prayers’.[79]

   [79]   International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report N°164, 13 March, p.10.

8. A March 2010 report, The Open City: Social Networks and Violence in Karachi, states that ‘[a]fter a lull of some two years, a Shia religious processions were bombed in December 2009 and February 2010, claiming over sixty lives’.[80] The renowned Pakistan scholar, Pervez Hoodbhoy wrote in The Express Tribune in March 2012 that ‘Karachi’s Shia neighbourhoods are visibly barricaded and fortified’.[81]

   [80]   Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.7

   [81]   Hoodbhoy, P. 2012, ‘Run for your life’, The Express Tribune, 4 March and Multan

100.   A research response prepared for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in January 2014 (addressing the situation of Shias in both Lahore and Multan) likewise stated that sources indicated that Lahore had a large Shia community.  However, it said that:

According to the editorial team of the South Asia Studies Project of MEMRI [Middle East Media Research Institute], the situation for Shia Muslims in Lahore and Multan is "extremely serious" (MEMRI 17 Dec. 2013). The same source stated that there have been "numerous killings" of Shia in these cities and that "[l]ike elsewhere in Pakistan, Shia Muslims are being systematically targeted and shot dead by Sunni militants who do not consider them as Muslims" (ibid.). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a representative from the Jinnah Institute stated that, while there is less violence against Shia in these areas by comparison to Quetta and Karachi, both Lahore and Multan are affected by "a new level of extremism in Punjab province" (Jinnah Institute 16 Dec. 2013). He said that there have been violent attacks and targeted killings in both cities (ibid.). He described Lahore as a "new flashpoint" for sectarian violence against Shia and noted an increase in the number of Shia being targeted there (ibid.). The AHRC [Asian Human Rights Commission] representative said that the situation in Lahore and Multan is "no different" than other areas of Pakistan in terms of the lack of safety and protection for Shia (17 Dec. 2013).

The representative of the HRCP [Human Rights Commission of Pakistan], while corroborating that there have been targeted killings against Shia in Lahore and Multan, expressed the opinion that the problem is not "severe" for Shia in these cities (HRCP 13 Dec. 2013). Similarly, the PhD candidate [at McGill University] described Lahore and Multan as "relatively more educated cities" and said that they do not have the same level of "sectarian violence or hatred" as other "remote" areas of Pakistan (PhD Candidate 11 Dec. 2013). He expressed the opinion that while there may be "sectarian tensions" in Lahore and Multan, that sectarian violence and extremism is not part of the beliefs of mainstream society in these cities (ibid.).’[82]

[82] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Pakistan: How Shia Muslims differ from Sunnis; treatment of Shias, particularly in Lahore and Multan; government response to violence against Shia Muslims (2010-December 2013)’, 9 January 2014, PAK104713.E.

101.   The research response refers to various incidents of violence against Shias in Lahore between 2010 and 2013.  While Lahore had remained free of the sort of terrorist bombings which had occurred in other major cities for some years, on 6 July 2013 at least five people were killed and 50 others were injured in a bomb blast in the old Anarkali area and on 9 October 2013 a further bomb blast in the same area killed one person and injured at least a dozen others.[83]  On 17 February 2015 at least five people were killed in a suicide bomb attack outside a police compound in Empress Road and on 15 March 2015 at least 15 people were killed and nearly 80 were injured in suicide bomb attacks on two churches in Lahore.[84]

[83] ‘Blast in Lahore’s old Anarkali area kills five, 50 injured’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 7 July 2013, CX310931; ‘Blast kills one at Lahore Anarkali market’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 10 October 2013, CX316577.

[84] ‘Pakistan Taliban suicide bombing in Lahore leaves several dead’, Guardian (Unlimited) (UK), 17 February 2015, CXBD6A0DE2650; ‘15 killed in Taliban attack on Lahore churches’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 16 March 2015, CXBD6A0DE2952; ‘Churches bombed in Lahore; 15 killed’, Daily Times -Pakistan, 16 March 2015, CXBD6A0DE2936.

102.   In March 2012 DFAT advised that there is a ‘much smaller’ Hazara community in Lahore than Karachi, and that ‘some Hazaras’ have migrated to there from Quetta.[85] This migration, which seems to be small, is confirmed by a March 2013 report in The Express Tribune, which details the decision of ‘several’ Hazara artists who have chosen to relocate to Lahore from Quetta.[86] Safety and economic opportunity reportedly attracted those who were interviewed, with one of the artists stating that it is ‘freer, safer and economically viable in Lahore’.[87] The report suggests, but does not explicitly state, that this may, in part, be caused by the lack of an historical presence in Lahore.

[85] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012, Pakistan: Hazaras in Pakistan, 1 & 9 March <CX 283938>

[86] Malik, S 2013, ‘Hazara genocide: ‘We cannot keep the fear of our families out of our work’, The Express Tribune, 10 March < Accessed 7 March 2014

[87] Malik, S 2013, ‘Hazara genocide: ‘We cannot keep the fear of our families out of our work’, The Express Tribune, 10 March < Accessed 7 March 2014

Islamabad/Rawalpindi

103.   DFAT’s most recent advice in respect of Islamabad is that the population had grown to almost two million according to a housing survey conducted in 2011 and it had a relatively high population of internal migrants, many from conflict-affected areas in the FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.  It said that there were Shia communities, including Turi Shias, in Koh-i-Noor and Golra Sharif near the Islamabad Motorway Link Road and in small towns such as Taxila, Bhara Kahu, Bani Gala and Bari Imam near Islamabad.[88]  In earlier advice DFAT said that many Shias (including Pashtuns and Hazaras) had settled in Islamabad and were comparatively safe.  It said that it had not been able to obtain any information to confirm that Pashtun or Hazara Shias experienced particular difficulty in obtaining accommodation because of their religion in Islamabad.[89]

[88] DFAT Country Report - Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 5.18; DFAT Thematic Report - Shias in Pakistan (14 April 2015), paragraph 5.5.

[89] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Update on situation in Pakistan’, 31 May 2013, CX308568.

104.   Though DFAT refers in its reports to additional security measures put in place in Islamabad to counter insurgent attacks, there have been a number of such incidents including the attack on an imambargah in February 2015, a gun and bomb attack on a court in the city’s F-8 area in which at least 11 people including a judge were killed and 29 others wounded on 3 March 2014 and a bomb explosion at Islamabad’s vegetable market on 9 April 2014 which killed at least 24 people and injured more than 115 people.[90]

[90] ‘Judge, 10 others killed in Islamabad blasts, firing’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 4 March 2014, CX1B9ECAB9298; ‘Baloch separatists claim Islamabad terror attack; 24 killed’, Dawn News Group - Pakistan, 9 April 2014, CX319826; ‘Spiral of violence: Terror revisits capital’, The Express Tribune (Pakistan), 10 April 2014, CX319815.

Peshawar

105.   According to a November 2011 Al Jazeera report, Hazaras have been migrating from Balochistan to Peshawar to avoid being targeted by religious extremists and states that ‘trade seems to be thriving for many members of the small community’.[91]

[91] ‘Hazara community finds safe haven in Peshawar’ 2011, Al Jazeera, 12 November < Accessed 7 March 2014; also ‘Genocide of Hazaras in Balochistan forced dozens to flee’ 2011, Hazara People International Network, 10 October < Accessed 7 March 2014

106.   A 2002 report, published by the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, states that there are three ‘known Hazara neighbourhoods’ in Peshawar, Sikander Town, Gharib Abad, and Haji Town and that the number of Hazara families living in Peshawar was, at that time, 5,000.[92] According to this report, Hazaras have, owing to fear of being targeted on account of their distinctive features, tended to avoid refugee settlements, and instead found accommodation in urban areas of the city.[93] The report claims, based on interviews with local Hazaras, that this can cause problems for Hazaras, as they are forced to deal with, predominately, Pashtun landlords.

[92] Punjani, S 2002, ‘How Ethno-Religious Identity Influences the Living Conditions of Hazara and Pashtun Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan’, Working Paper 14, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August, pp.5, 13 < Accessed 7 March 2014 

[93] Punjani, S 2002, ‘How Ethno-Religious Identity Influences the Living Conditions of Hazara and Pashtun Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan’, Working Paper 14, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August, p.12 < Accessed 7 March 2014 

Reasons Hazaras are Targetted

107.   Reports differ in ascribing reasons for the targeting of Hazara. While a combination of ethnic and religious discrimination is noted by some reports, others were found which deny the ethnic nature of the discrimination, and instead insist that Hazara are targeted for being Shia, i.e. they are victims of sectarianism. A report was also found which argues that, in addition to ethnic/religious identity, social status drives the targeting of Hazara, as the latter are often relatively well educated and have professional careers.[94]  

[94] Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2009, Pushed to the Wall: Report of the HRCP fact-finding mission to Balochistan 5-11 October, p.19 < Accessed 28 April 2011

108.   A number of reports suggest that physical appearance contributes to the likelihood of attack. Abdul Khaliq, head of the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP), told Central Asia Online in July 2011 that Hazaras constitute an easy target for LeJ and other anti-Shia groups due to their distinct physical appearance: ‘[o]ur people happen to be an easier target ... because of our distinct Mongolian features’.[95]

[95] ‘Lashkar-E Jhangvi (Lej) Blamed For Killing Of Hazaras In Quetta, Pakistan’ 2011, Central Asia Online, source: Hazara Network, 23 July < Accessed 14 March 2012. Hazara Network is a Hazara news and social networking site. See: <

109.   In an interview with the newspaper Dawn in January 2014, the head of HRW in Pakistan, Ali Dayan Hasan, provides the following opinion on why Hazara are targeted:

Hazaras are generally unarmed, easily identifiable and utterly helpless – in short, easy to kill. Of course, they are being targeted as part a broader exercise in targeting all Pakistani Shias but it is equally true that the Hazara suffer from double jeopardy – being ethnically distinct in addition to being Shia.[96]   

[96] Syed, M 2014, ‘Pakistan: A State of Siege’,  Dawn, 27 January < Accessed 7 March 2014