PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE RULES 2025

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Issued by authority of the Attorney-General
in compliance with section 15J of the Legislation Act 2003

Purpose and operation of the Instrument

Authority

The Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2025 (the PID Rules) are made under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (the PID Act). Section 83 of the PID Act enables the Attorney‑General to make rules prescribing matters required or permitted by that Act to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to that Act.

The PID Rules are a legislative instrument for the purposes of the Legislation Act 2003 (Legislation Act), and accordingly, are subject to its disallowance and sunsetting provisions.

Overview of the PID Act

The PID Act establishes a framework for Commonwealth public officials to disclose allegations of misconduct in the Commonwealth public sector. Its objects are promoting the integrity and accountability of the Commonwealth public sector, encouraging and facilitating the making of public interest disclosures by public officials, supporting and protecting public officials from adverse consequences relating to disclosures, and ensuring the proper investigation of alleged misconduct in the Commonwealth public sector. The PID Act commenced on 15 January 2014 and applies to all Commonwealth entities and companies (as defined by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act)), as well as the High Court.

The PID Act enables current and former public officials to make disclosures about ‘disclosable conduct’ engaged in by an agency, by a public official in connection with their position as a public official, or by a contracted service provider for a Commonwealth contract, in connection with entering into, or giving effect to, that contract. A disclosure can be made anonymously and does not need to be in writing. ‘Disclosable conduct’ is defined broadly in section 29 of the PID Act and includes fraud, serious misconduct, corrupt conduct, contraventions of a law, and maladministration.

A range of protections and immunities are available to public officials who make a disclosure in accordance with the PID Act. This includes immunity from civil, criminal or administrative liability or contractual action for making a disclosure (with some exceptions). The PID Act also provides a right to apply to a federal court for compensation, injunction, reinstatement and other orders if a discloser suffers ‘reprisal’ action (or in the alternative, a right to remedies under the Fair Work Act 2009). The PID Act also makes it an offence for a person to take or threaten to take reprisal action against another person because of a disclosure (with a penalty of imprisonment for up to two years or 120 penalty units, or both).

There are a number of types of disclosures that can be made by a public official, including an ‘internal’, ‘external’, ‘emergency’, and ‘legal practitioner’ disclosure. Additionally, if a current or former public official makes a ‘NACC disclosure’ and that information tends to show, or the discloser believes it tends to show, disclosable conduct, then that ‘NACC disclosure’ is also a public interest disclosure. To make an ‘internal disclosure’ a public official must disclose information to an authorised officer or their supervisor that tends to show, or the discloser believes on reasonable grounds tends to show, ‘disclosable conduct’. In certain circumstances, disclosures can also be made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS). The circumstances in which a public official can make these different kinds of disclosures are set out in further detail in section 26 of the PID Act.

The PID Act also imposes obligations on various public officials to receive, allocate, investigate and make findings in respect of allegations of disclosable conduct. Authorised officers are responsible for receiving and allocating a disclosure for investigation. Generally, an authorised officer will allocate a disclosure to the agency to whom the disclosure relates (although this is not required). Principal officers (defined under the PID Act to include heads of Commonwealth entities), or their delegates, are responsible for investigating disclosures that have been allocated to their agency, preparing a report of the investigation and responding to any recommendations made in such a report.

The Commonwealth Ombudsman and the IGIS have oversight functions in relation to the PID Act. The IGIS’s oversight functions relate to the six intelligence agencies, as defined by the PID Act, while the Ombudsman’s oversight functions relate to all other agencies. The functions include receiving notifications and reports in relation to disclosures and investigations, reviewing and making recommendations in relation to the handling of disclosures, assisting agencies in relation to the operation of the Act and conducting educational and awareness programs.

The purpose of the PID Rules

The purpose of the PID Rules is to ensure that all Commonwealth statutory officeholders are within the framework of the PID Act (except for those statutory officeholders expressly excluded by subsections 69(2) and (4) of the Act). The PID Rules would achieve this by ensuring that all statutory officeholders ‘belong to’ an agency for the purposes of the PID Act, which in turn would make it possible to identify an ‘authorised internal recipient’ for disclosures about their conduct.

The PID Rules would also establish the Inspector‑General of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF) as an agency for the purposes of the PID Act, to ensure the PID Act framework does not interfere with the statutory independence of the IGADF.

The PID Rules would also repeal the Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2019 (PID Rules 2019) as the instrument is no longer in force.

Significance of ‘belonging to’ an agency

A public official can only make an internal disclosure to their supervisor or an ‘authorised internal recipient’ (subsection 26(1)). The Act establishes a three-step process for determining who is an authorised recipient for a disclosure about the conduct of a public official:

1.        Section 34 provides that an authorised internal recipient can be determined with reference to the agency that the conduct disclosed ‘relates to’.
2.        Subsection 35(1) provides that the agency the conduct relates to can be established by determining which agency engaged in the disclosable conduct or, where the disclosure relates to the conduct of a public official rather than an agency, which agency the public official ‘belonged to’ at the time they engaged in the conduct.
3.        Subsection 69(1) provides a table of types of public officials and the agency to which they each belong.

If a public official does not ‘belong to’ an agency, then their conduct will not ‘relate to’ an agency for the purposes of subsection 35(1). This means that there is no ‘authorised internal recipient’ for a disclosure about the public official’s conduct as set out in section 34.

The absence of an ‘authorised internal recipient’ creates a practical barrier to making an internal disclosure. If a public official (the first public official) wants to make a disclosure about a second public official who does not ‘belong to’ an agency, the first public official will only be able to make the disclosure to their supervisor. If the second public official is the first public official’s supervisor, this may effectively prevent the first public official from making the disclosure at all.

Ensuring all statutory officeholders ‘belong to’ an agency

Statutory officeholders are defined in subsection 69(2) of the PID Act to be ‘an individual (other than an official of a registered industrial organisation) who holds or performs the duties of an office established by or under a law of the Commonwealth’, other than those Acts expressly excluded by paragraphs 69(2)(a)-(e). A statutory officeholder will ‘belong to’ an agency as set out in items 1-13 of the table in subsection 69(1) or in paragraphs (a)-(c) of item 14, according to which description matches their role first. Item 14 captures statutory officeholders who are deputies of the head of an agency (however described) (paragraph (a)) and those who perform the duties of their office as part of the duties of their employment as an officer of an agency (paragraph (b)). Paragraph (c) provides that for statutory officeholders who do not fall into these categories, the agency they belong to can be ascertained in accordance with the PID Rules.

A large number of officeholders are captured by paragraphs (a) and (b) in item 14 of the table in subsection 69(1), and so would not be affected by the PID Rules. Items 1-13 also capture a significant number of other categories of public officials, including statutory officeholders who are heads of an agency (item 4) or who perform duties for an agency (item 13). It is only if a statutory officeholder’s role is not adequately described by items 1‑13, or paragraphs (a)-(b) in item 14 of the table in subsection 69(1), that these PID Rules would apply.

Section 6 of the PID Rules provides that for the purposes of the table in subsection 69(1) of the PID Act, the agency to which a statutory officeholder belongs under paragraph (c) is the Department administered by the Minister responsible for administering the provision of the law by or under which the office is established.

Many statutory officeholders who are not heads of agencies exercise their role independently while operating within or supported by a Commonwealth entity and therefore would not fall within the category of public officials who perform duties for an agency (item 13 of the table in section 69(1)).

Usually, the staff assisting the statutory officeholder will be employees of the supporting Commonwealth entity, which would be the agency those employees ‘belong to’ for the purposes of the PID Act. Where the supporting Commonwealth entity is the relevant Department of State, section 6 of the Rules would operate to ensure that both the statutory officeholder and staff assisting the officeholder belong to the same agency. Where the supporting agency is another type of Commonwealth entity, the statutory officeholder would belong to a different entity than the staff assisting the officeholder. However, in these circumstances staff assisting the officeholder would be able to make an internal disclosure about the officeholder to either the Department the officeholder belongs to, the agency the staff member belongs to, or the Commonwealth Ombudsman (see item 1 of the table in section 34).

(Note: The Attorney‑General’s Department has not identified any statutory officeholders that are supported by an intelligence agency but would belong to a Department of State as a result of the operation of section 6 of the Rules. If a public official wants to make a disclosure about conduct that relates to an intelligence agency, the disclosure could only be made to the intelligence agency or the IGIS (see item 2 of the table in section 34).)

Prescription of the Inspector-General of Australian Defence Forces as a prescribed authority

The PID Rules would also prescribe the IGADF as an agency for the purposes of the PID Act by prescribing the IGADF as a ‘prescribed authority’ for the purposes of paragraph 72(1)(f) of the Act. Paragraph 72(1)(f) provides that a prescribed authority includes the person holding, or performing the duties of, an office that is established by a law of the Commonwealth and is prescribed by the PID Rules.

The purpose of prescribing the IGADF as a prescribed authority, and therefore making it an agency for the purposes of the PID Act, is to prevent the operation of section 6 of the PID Rules from making the IGADF belong to the Department of Defence. The IGADF is appointed by the Australian Government to oversee the quality and fairness of Australia’s military justice system and is statutorily independent of the ADF chain-of-command. As the remit of the IGADF is independent and impartial oversight of significant aspects of the ADF, it would not be appropriate for the Department of Defence to be the agency to which the IGADF belongs for the purpose of the PID Act.

Prescribing the IGADF as an agency within the meaning of section 71 of the PID Act would enable public officials to make public interest disclosures about the conduct of the IGADF (both the statutory officeholder and the agency) to an authorised officer of the IGADF (i.e. a public official who belongs to the IGADF and has been appointed under section 36 of the PID Act), or to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (if the discloser believes on reasonable grounds that it would be appropriate for the disclosure to be investigated by the Ombudsman).

It would also subject the IGADF to oversight by the Commonwealth Ombudsman for the purposes of the PID Act, including to allow complaints to be made to the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act 1976 about the IGADF’s handling of a disclosure under the PID Act.

Repeal of Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2019

The PID Rules would also repeal the PID Rules 2019. This instrument is no longer in force as a result of amendments made to the PID Act by the Public Interest Disclosure Amendment (Review) Act 2023 (PID Amendment Act) on 1 July 2023.

The PID Rules 2019 were made to prescribe the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) as a prescribed authority and ensure ASIC was subject to the PID Act. This was necessary to ensure ASIC was an agency under the PID Act following the commencement of the Treasury Law Amendment (Enhancing ASIC’s Capabilities) Act 2018.

The PID Rules ceased to have effect on commencement of the PID Amendment Act, which repealed subparagraph 72(1)(p)(ii) – the subparagraph under which the PID Rules 2019 had been made. The PID Amendment Act also amended the definition of ‘agency’ in section 71 of the PID Act, with the effect that ASIC remains an agency for the purposes of the Act.

Consultation

Before the PID Rules were issued, the Attorney-General considered the general obligation to consult imposed by section 17 of the Legislation Act.

The Attorney-General’s Department consulted with all Commonwealth entities as defined by the PGPA Act, including the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the IGIS, which oversee the operation of the PID Act. The department also consulted with the Ombudsman, the Department of Defence and the Office of the IGADF in relation to section 7 of the PID Rules. No concerns were raised in respect of the final iteration of the PID Rules.

Regulation Impact Statement

The Office of Impact Analysis advised that detailed impact analysis is not required under the Australian Government’s Policy Impact Analysis Framework on the basis that the proposal is likely to impact an immaterial proportion of Australian businesses, community organisations or individuals (OIA25-09025).

Further information

Further details on the provisions of the PID Rules are provided in Attachment A.

Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights

The Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2025 (PID Rules) are compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

Background

The PID Rules would ensure that all Commonwealth statutory officeholders are within the framework of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act) (except for those officeholders expressly excluded by subsections 69(2) and (4) of the PID Act). The Rules would achieve this by ensuring that all applicable Commonwealth statutory officeholders ‘belong to’ an agency. If a statutory officeholder does not ‘belong to’ an agency, public officials can only make internal public interest disclosures about that person to their supervisor. The Rules would therefore enable public officials to make an internal public interest disclosure directly to an authorised officer about the conduct of any Commonwealth statutory officeholder.

Human rights implications

The Human Rights Compatibility Statement accompanying the Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 identified the following human rights as being engaged by the primary legislation, as enacted:

• the right to freedom of opinion and expression (articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR))
• the right to privacy (article 17 of the ICCPR)
• the right to work and rights in work (Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)), and
• the prohibition on retrospective criminal laws (article 15 of the ICCPR).

Further, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights considered the Bill engaged the right to be presumed innocent (Article 14(2) of the ICCPR). These rights were similarly identified in the Human Rights Compatibility Statement accompanying the Public Interest Disclosure Amendment (Review) Bill 2022.

The PID Rules broadly reengage these rights to the extent that they extend the application of the PID Act to additional public officials. In particular, for public officials in small offices who report directly to a statutory officeholder, it would not be practicable for them to make an internal public interest disclosure about their supervisor, to their supervisor. In that vein, the PID Rules are extending the protections provided by the PID Act to additional public officials. Where the operation of the PID Act affects the rights of people about whom disclosures are made, these Rules will cause the PID Act to have such an affect on additional statutory officeholders.

The prohibition on retrospective criminal laws is not engaged by the PID Rules as the Rules would not apply retrospectively, nor does the Act impose criminal liability for acts that were not criminal offences at the time they were committed.

Right to freedom of expression

The right to freedom of expression is contained in Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression and that this right includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, through any other media of their choice. This right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these should be provided by law and be necessary. Appropriate reasons for such restrictions include respecting the rights and reputation of others, and for the protection of national security, public order, public health and morals.

The PID Rules engage with the right to freedom of expression by expanding the reporting options for public officials who seek to make a disclosure under the PID Act about the conduct of a Commonwealth statutory officeholder. Generally, the PID Act provides for disclosures to be first made and investigated internally within Government – an ‘internal disclosure’. The PID Rules provide additional avenues for public officials to make an ‘internal disclosure’ about statutory officeholders who would not otherwise ‘belong to’ an agency under the PID Act. In this way, the Rules are promoting freedom of expression by providing the Acts protections to persons who make disclosures consistent with the PID Act in a broader range of circumstances, including:

• immunity from civil, criminal, administrative action or contractual action for making a disclosure (with some exceptions)
• a right to apply to a federal court for compensation, injunction, reinstatement and other orders if a discloser suffers ‘reprisal’ action, and
• provisions making it an offence for a person to take or threaten to take reprisal action, or to use or disclose the identity of a discloser subject to limited exceptions.

The freedom to disclose information about alleged wrongdoing in the public sector is, however, not unlimited under the Act. For example, an ‘external disclosure’ – that is, a disclosure outside of government to any person other than a foreign official – can only be made where certain criteria are satisfied, including that an internal disclosure has been made but the investigation is not completed in the prescribed time or the discloser believes on reasonable grounds that the investigation or response to the investigation is inadequate, and that external disclosure is, on balance, not contrary to the public interest. While ‘emergency’ and ‘legal practitioner’ disclosures can be made without an internal disclosure first being made, such disclosures may only be made in limited circumstances. In the case of an ‘emergency disclosure’ there must be a substantial and imminent danger to the health or safety of one or more persons or the environment and exceptional circumstances justifying the discloser’s failure to make an internal disclosure. In the case of a ‘legal practitioner’ disclosure, these may only be made to a lawyer.

Article 19(3) of the ICCPR provides that limitations on freedom of expression are permissible in certain circumstances. In general, the Act closely regulates the internal and external communication of information about disclosable conduct (including the identity of those alleged to have engaged in it), in order to protect personal information, and thus the right to privacy and reputation of a person under article 17 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the internal investigation of allegations of misconduct achieves the legitimate objective under paragraph 19(3)(a) of the ICCPR of preserving the rights and reputation of individuals who may be the subject of misconduct allegations that are later proven to be unfounded or false.

Right to privacy

Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy. The PID Rules interact with and promote the right to privacy insofar as they extend the full application of the PID Act to additional public officials. The PID Act engages with the right to privacy through section 20, which establishes criminal offences for the disclosure and use of information that could identify a person who made a disclosure, and paragraph 59(4)(b), which requires the principal officer of each agency to establish procedures that provide for the confidentiality of investigative processes.

The offences in section 20 of the PID Act apply to the disclosure or use of information that is obtained by an individual in that person’s capacity as a public official and is likely to enable the identification of the individual who made a public interest disclosure. These offences carry a maximum penalty of up to six months imprisonment, or 30 penalty units, or both. Subsection 20(3) provides limited exceptions to this offence, including disclosure or use of identifying information for the purpose of the PID Act. These offences ensure that the personal information of public officials who make public interest disclosures is protected, and that such information is only revealed under limited circumstances permitted by the Act.

To the extent that the offence in section 20 of the PID Act contains exceptions that permit the disclosure or use of identifying information, these limitations on the right to privacy are not arbitrary. These exceptions are narrowly confined and clearly established by law. The exceptions also achieve the legitimate objective of ensuring that relevant information can be shared to promote the objects of the PID Act and enable staff to perform functions under the PID Act.

The offence provisions are complemented by the obligation placed on principal officers by paragraph 59(4)(b) to establish procedures that provide for the confidentiality of investigative processes. By providing for such confidentiality, these procedures protect not only the privacy of public officials who disclose misconduct, but also the privacy and reputation of individuals who may be the subject of misconduct allegations that are later proven to be unfounded or false.

Accordingly, extending the application of the PID Act through the PID Rules promotes the right to privacy. Where the PID Act imposes limits on the right to privacy, these limitations are prescribed by law, and represent a reasonable and proportionate means of achieving the legitimate objectives of the PID Act.

Right to work and rights in work

The right to work, the rights in work and the right to enjoy safe and healthy working conditions are contained in Articles 6(1) and 7 of the ICESCR. These rights encompass the right not to be unjustly deprived of work, or be subject to unfair dismissal. The PID Act contains provisions that protect individuals who make public interest disclosures from reprisals, including workplace reprisals. The PID Act prohibits the dismissal of an employee, alteration of an employee’s position to his or her detriment, or discrimination between an employee and other employees, in relation to the making of a public interest disclosure. The PID Act also provides remedies if any of these reprisals occur, including reinstatement of a terminated employee.

Accordingly, the PID Rules, through extending application of the PID Act to ensure that public officials can make internal public interest disclosures concerning the conduct of statutory officeholders directly to authorised officers, promotes rights to work, the rights in work and promote a safe and healthy working environment.

Right to the presumption of innocence

Article 14(2) of the ICCPR provides that anyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. It imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving a criminal charge and guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The PID Act limits the right to the presumption of innocence under article 14(2) of the ICCPR by placing a reversed evidential burden on:

• applicants seeking immunity under section 10 of the PID Act, with respect to pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the claim for immunity is made out, and
• defendants with respect to the exception to the reprisal offences in subsection 19(4) of the Act and the exceptions to the offences for the disclosure use of identifying information in subsection 20(3) of the Act.

Reversing the evidential burden in this way may limit article 14(2), as it places the burden of proving the application of the immunity in section 10 on the applicant, and the application of the defences in subsections 19(4) and 20(3), on the defendant. However, the reversed evidential burden is:

• necessary to achieve the legitimate objective of ensuring the provisions can operate as intended, to ensure disclosures are made in accordance with the Act and to protect disclosers, respectively
• reasonable in the circumstances, given the information that would support the respective claims would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the applicant or defendant, respectively
• proportionate because, consistent with section 13.3 of the Criminal Code 1995, this burden requires the defendant to adduce or point to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that a particular matter exists or does not exist. In respect of immunity claims under section 10, if the applicant discharges an evidential burden, the respondent bears the onus of proving that the claim is not made out on the balance of probabilities. In respect of the offence provisions in sections 19 and 20, if the defendant discharges an evidential burden, the prosecution will be required to disprove those matters beyond reasonable doubt.

To the extent that the PID Rules bring additional people within scope of the immunities or the offence provisions of the Act, the reversed evidential burden is reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances.

Conclusion

The PID Rules are compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights Act. To the extent there are any limitations on the rights and freedoms identified above, these restrictions achieve a legitimate objective and do so in a manner that is reasonable and proportionate.

Attachment A

NOTES ON SECTIONS

Section 1 – Name

This section provides that the title of the instrument is the Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2025 (PID Rules).

Section 2 – Commencement

This section provides that the PID Rules commence on the day after the instrument is registered.

Section 3 –Authority

This section provides that the authority for making the instrument is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act).

Section 4 – Schedules

This section provides that each instrument that is specified in a Schedule to the PID Rules is amended or repealed as set out in the applicable items in that Schedule. It also provides that any other item in a Schedule to this instrument has effect according to its terms.

Section 5 – Definitions

This section provides that any reference to Act in the instrument is a reference to the PID Act.

Section 6 – Public officials  

This section provides that for the purposes of the table in subsection 69(1) of the PID Act, the agency to which a statutory officeholder belongs under that paragraph is the Department administered by the Minister responsible for administering the provision of the law by or under which the office is established.

The effect of this section is that a statutory officeholder not otherwise ‘belonging to’ an agency by virtue of the categories in items 1-13 of the table in subsection 69(1) of the PID Act, would ‘belong to’ the Department that is administered by the Minister who also administers the provision or legislation that establishes their office.

To provide an illustrative example of the operation of the proposed draft PID Rules, consider the hypothetical example of the Chair of the ‘Australian Quokka Promotion Commission’ (AQPC):

Section 7 – Prescribed authority—Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force

This section prescribes the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF) referred to in section 110B of the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act) as a prescribed authority for the purposes of the PID Act.

The effect of this section would be that:

• the person appointed to the office of the IGADF (under section 110E of the Defence Act) or appointed to act as the IGADF (under section 110N of the Defence Act) would be a prescribed authority for the purposes of paragraph 72(1)(f) of the PID Act and therefore an agency in accordance with the definition provided at paragraph 71(1)(b)
• the person appointed to the office of the IGADF or appointed to act as the IGADF would be the principal officer of that agency in accordance with item 9 of the table at subsection 73(1) of the PID Act
• as the principal officer of the agency, the IGADF or acting IGADF would belong to the agency in accordance with items 4 and 7 of the table at subsection 69(1) of the PID Act
• staff made available to assist the IGADF (under subsection 110O(1) of the Defence Act) would belong to the agency in accordance with item 2 of the table at subsection 69(1) of the PID Act.

As principal officer of the agency, the IGADF would have obligations under the PID Act, including to receive, allocate and investigate disclosures in accordance with Part 3 of the PID Act, and to:

• facilitate public interest disclosures, including by appointing sufficient authorised officers to ensure that they are readily accessible by public officials who belong to the agency
• establish procedures for dealing with disclosures relating to the agency
• respond to recommendations in investigation reports that relate to the agency
• provide training and education to public officials that belong to the agency
• take reasonable steps to protect public officials who belong to the agency from reprisal in relation to a public interest disclosure, and
• provide information and assistance to the Commonwealth Ombudsman to assist the Ombudsman to prepare its annual report on the operation of the PID Act.

The IGADF would be able to appoint public officials who belong to the agency as authorised officers under section 36 of the PID Act and delegate any or all of the principal officer’s functions or powers under the Act to a public official who belongs to the agency under section 77 of the PID Act.

By prescribing the IGADF as an agency for the purposes of the PID Act, the conduct of the IGADF (both the individual holding the statutory office and the agency, as defined by the PID Act) would relate to the agency, the IGADF.

Schedule 1 – Repeals

Schedule 1 would repeal the Public Interest Disclosure Rules 2019 (PID Rules 2019), as this instrument ceased to have effect on 1 July 2023.

The PID Rules 2019 prescribed the Australian Securities Investments Commission as a prescribed authority for the purposes of subparagraph 72(1)(p)(ii) of the PID Act. Subparagraph 72(1)(p)(ii) was repealed on commencement of item 90 of the Public Interest Disclosure Amendment (Review) Act 2023 on 1 July 2023. This was the only provision in the PID Rules 2019, and therefore the Rules are obsolete and have ceased. As the general rule-making power at section 83 of the PID Act, under which the Rules were made, remains in force, the PID Rules 2019 must be expressly repealed or would otherwise sunset on 21 April 2030.