Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations (Amendment)

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Legislation au F1996B02073 Regulations Not in force Legislative Instrument

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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

STATUTORY RULES 1990 No. 298

Issued by the authority of the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (SAFEGUARDS) ACT 1987

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (SAFEGUARDS) REGULATIONS (AMENDMENT)

The purpose of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (the Act) is to give legislative effect to Australia’s international nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

Part II of the Act provides for the control of nuclear material and associated items by means of a system of permits.

Section 74 of the Act provides that the Governor-General may make regulations for the purposes of the Act.

Section 4 of the Act defines a “prescribed international agreement” to mean an agreement between Australia and a foreign country, a group of countries or an international organisation, that is either listed in Schedule S to the Act or prescribed by regulations under the Act.

Paragraph 9(c) of the Act provides that Part II of the Act applies to all nuclear material except for nuclear material which has been exempted by regulation.

The proposed Regulations amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations by prescribing international agreements between Australia and three other countries and a relevant international body, for the purposes of the Act; they also exempt certain nuclear material for the purposes of Part II of the Act. Details of the amendments follow:

Proposed regulation 1 is a formal provision.

Proposed regulations 2 and 4 insert new regulation 2A and a Schedule into the Regulations, consistent with the definition of “prescribed international agreement” in the Act. The Schedule, which augments the list of agreements contained in Schedule S to the Act, sets out the formal titles and the dates of signature of Australia’s agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Switzerland, Egypt and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proposed Regulation 3 adds paragraph (g) to existing sub-regulation 3(1) and has the effect that Pan II of the Act does not apply to depleted uranium if it is not subject to a prescribed international agreement, and has been used in the manufacture or assembly of an object that is not being used in nuclear activities. As a consequence, the provisions of the Act which relate to the control of nuclear material would not apply to depleted uranium which is not currently subject to nuclear safeguards obligations and which is not significant from a nuclear non-proliferation perspective.

Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of the enrichment of uranium. In DU the proportion of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is typically around 0.20%, compared with 0.71% in natural uranium. Depleted uranium has a very much lower commercial and strategic value than natural uranium. DU has limited uses, and most DU is presently stored at enrichment plants virtually as a waste product. As it is denser than lead, DU is used in certain non-nuclear applications such as radiation shielding, ship ballast and counterweights in aircraft control systems.

Overview

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 was enacted to provide legislative effect to Australia's international obligations regarding nuclear non-proliferation. This Act was passed by the Australian Parliament to ensure that Australia adheres to its commitments under various international agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The policy objective of the Act is to establish a regulatory framework that controls nuclear material and associated items through a system of permits, ensuring that Australia's nuclear activities are conducted in a manner that safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Act allows the Governor-General to make regulations to implement its provisions, including specifying which international agreements and nuclear materials are subject to its controls. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations (Amendment) Statutory Rules 1990 No. 298 were introduced to update the regulatory framework under the Act by prescribing specific international agreements and exempting certain nuclear materials from the Act's control provisions. These amendments were made to align the regulations with Australia's current international commitments and to fine-tune the application of the Act's controls. For instance, the amendments include agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Switzerland, Egypt, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they exempt certain types of depleted uranium from the Act's control provisions, recognising that such material is of low proliferation risk and has limited uses. These changes were authorised by the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, reflecting the ongoing commitment to updating Australia's legislative framework to meet international non-proliferation standards.

Scope and Application

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 applies to the control of nuclear material and associated items in Australia, ensuring compliance with the nation's international non-proliferation obligations. This legislation specifically targets entities and individuals involved in the handling of nuclear material, mandating a system of permits to regulate such activities. The Act applies to all nuclear material, except for those that are exempted by regulation, thus excluding certain materials from the stringent controls otherwise applicable. The geographic reach of the Act is national, applying uniformly across Australia. Additionally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations (Amendment) further refine the application of the Act by prescribing specific international agreements that influence the regulation of nuclear material. These amendments also exempt certain nuclear materials, such as depleted uranium not subject to a prescribed international agreement and not used in nuclear activities, from the scope of Part II of the Act. This exclusion is based on the low proliferation risk associated with such materials. The amendments extend the application of the Act through subordinate instruments, ensuring that the legislative framework adapts to Australia's evolving international commitments and technological advancements.

Key Provisions

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, as amended by the proposed regulations, primarily focuses on the control of nuclear material through a permit system, as stipulated in Part II of the Act (section 74). This system is designed to enforce Australia's international commitments to nuclear non-proliferation. The Act defines "prescribed international agreement" in section 4 and applies its provisions to all nuclear material, except for those specifically exempted by regulation (section 9(c)). The proposed amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Regulations introduce new regulations to formally list certain international agreements that are relevant for the purposes of the Act. Specifically, regulation 2A and the accompanying Schedule include agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Switzerland, Egypt, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These amendments are intended to clarify and expand the list of agreements already contained in Schedule S to the Act, ensuring that Australia's obligations under these agreements are adequately reflected in domestic law. In addition to listing new agreements, the proposed regulations also exempt certain types of nuclear material from the control provisions of Part II of the Act. Regulation 3 adds a new paragraph (g) to sub-regulation 3(1), which exempts depleted uranium from the permit requirements if it is not subject to a prescribed international agreement and has been used in the manufacture or assembly of an object that is not being used in nuclear activities. This exemption is based on the limited proliferation risk posed by depleted uranium, which has a significantly lower proportion of fissile material compared to natural uranium. Failure to comply with the requirements of the Act or the regulations may result in legal consequences. While the proposed amendments do not introduce new offences, they do refine the scope of the permit system and the types of material subject to regulatory control. The Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties for breaches, which can include substantial fines and imprisonment, depending on the severity and intent of the offence. These penalties are intended to ensure that the provisions of the Act are strictly adhered to, thereby upholding Australia's international non-proliferation commitments.

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