EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Select Legislative Instrument 2007 No. 49
Issued by the authority of the Attorney-General
Criminal Code Act 1995
Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 5).
Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Act) provides that the Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters required or permitted by the Act to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to the Act. The Schedule to the Act sets out the Criminal Code (the Code).
Division 102 of the Code sets out the offences in relation to terrorist organisations, which are: directing the activities of a terrorist organisation; being a member of a terrorist organisation; recruiting persons to a terrorist organisation; receiving training from or providing training to a terrorist organisation; being an associate of and receiving funds from or making available funds, support or resources to a terrorist organisation.
Section 102.9 of the Code provides that section 15.4 (extended geographical jurisdiction - category D) applies to an offence against Division 102 of the Code. The effect of applying section 15.4 is that offences in Division 102 of the Code apply to conduct (or the results of such conduct) constituting the alleged offence whether or not the conduct (or the result) occurs in Australia.
‘Terrorist organisation’ is defined in subsection 102.1(1) of the Code as:
- an organisation directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act occurs) (paragraph (a)); or
- an organisation specified in the regulations (paragraph (b)).
The purpose of the Regulations is to amend the Criminal Code Regulations 2002 to specify Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) also known as Jhangvi Army, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar‑e-Jhangvie, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi, Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Laskar e Jahangvi and Laskar-e-Jhangvi; for the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Code.
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) was first listed as a terrorist organisation under the name Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) by the Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2003 (No. 8), which took effect from 11 April 2003. The organisation was re‑listed under the name of Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) by the Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2005
(No. 7), which took effect from 11 April 2005.
The Regulations enable the offence provisions in Division 102 of the Code to apply to persons with links to LeJ. Details of the proposed Regulations are set out in Attachment A.
Paragraph 102.1(2)(a) of the Code provides that before the Governor-General makes regulations specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Code, the Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).
In determining whether he is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, the Minister takes into consideration unclassified Statements of Reasons prepared by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as advice from the Australian Government Solicitor. The Statement of Reasons in respect of LeJ is at Attachment B.
Subsection 102.1(2A) of the Code provides that before the Governor-General makes a regulation specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Code, the Minister must arrange for the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives to be briefed in relation to the proposed Regulations.
Prior to making of the Regulations, consultations were held with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Government Solicitor. In addition, an offer for a briefing was extended to the Federal Leader of the Opposition and the State and Territory Attorneys-General were advised.
The Regulations are a legislative instrument for the purposes of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003.
The Regulations commenced on the day after they were registered on the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments.
Attachment A
Details of the Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 5)
Regulation 1- Name of Regulations
This regulation provides that the title of the Regulations is the Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 5).
Regulation 2 – Commencement
This regulation provides that the Regulations commence on the day after they are registered.
Regulation 3 – Amendment of Criminal Code Regulations 2002
This Regulation notes that Schedule 1 amends the Criminal Code Regulations 2002.
Schedule 1 – Amendments
Item [1] – Regulation 4L
This item provides that the existing regulation 4L, ‘Terrorist organisations – Lashkar-e Jhangvi’, is to be substituted with the new regulation 4L.
Subregulation 4L(1) provides that for paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Code), the organisation known as Lashkar-e Jhangvi is specified.
The effect of this subregulation is that Lashkar-e Jhangvi is specified as a terrorist organisation under subsection 102.1(1) of the Code.
Subregulation 4L(2) provides that for the purposes of subregulation (1),
Lashkar-e Jhangvi is also known by the following names:
(a) Jhangvi Army;
(b) Lashkare Jhangvi;
(c) Lashkar-e-Jhangvie;
(d) Lashkar-e-Jhangwi;
(e) Lashkar-e-Jhanvi;
(f) Lashkar-e Jhangvi;
(g) Lashkar-i-Jangvi;
(h) Lashkar-i-Jhangvi;
(i) Lashkar-i-Jhangwi;
(j) Lashkar e Jhangvi;
(k) Lashkar Jangvi;
(l) Lashkar Jhangvi;
(m) Laskar-e-Jhangvi; and
(n) Laskar e Jahangvi.
ATTACHMENT B
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)
(Also known as Jhangvi Army, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi, Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Laskar e Jahangvi and Laskar-e-Jhangvi).
The following information is based on publicly available details about Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ). These details have been corroborated by material from intelligence investigations into the activities of the LeJ. ASIO assesses that the details set out below are accurate and reliable.
LeJ is listed in the UN 1267 Committee’s consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Pakistan.
Current status of LeJ
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) is a Sunni Islamic terrorist group based in Pakistan. The group was formed in 1996 as a more militant splinter group of the radical sectarian organisation, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and follows the Deobandi tradition of Sunni Islam. Under the leadership of Riaz Basra, the LeJ quickly distinguished itself as the most violent and radical sectarian force in Pakistan.
LeJ is based primarily in the Punjab and Balochistan regions of Pakistan, and the port city of Karachi. It is responsible for numerous targeted killings and massacres. The group has targeted for assassination, not only opposing Shiite activists, but prominent Shiite officials, professionals and businessmen. It has assassinated Iranian nationals in Pakistan and was involved, along with the Jaish e-Mohammad (JeM), in the abduction and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in January 2002. It has also instigated attacks, including small-arms attacks and suicide bombings, on Shiite mosques and processions, and Christian churches resulting in the random killing of hundreds of people.
While sectarian attacks remain LeJ’s primary driving force, elements within LeJ have broadened the group’s focus to include the targeting of members of the Pakistani State and the Western presence in Pakistan. As members of a previously unknown group “Jundallah,” LeJ trained members were among a number of militants drawn from several Pakistani extremist groups responsible for the twin
car-bomb attack near the US Consulate in Karachi on 26 May 2004. On
9 June 2004, the same terrorist cell was involved in a terrorist attack against a heavily-armed military convoy carrying Karachi’s military commander resulting in seven deaths. More recently the LeJ was linked to the 2 March 2006 suicide car bombing on the US Consulate in Karachi that killed a US diplomat.
LeJ derive a considerable portion of funding from wealthy benefactors in Karachi. Extortion from Shia banks and businesses is another significant means by which the LeJ raises finances for terrorist operations.
Pakistani government security crackdowns since late 2001 have had some success, but the group continues to recruit new members to replace those arrested or killed. Over half of Pakistan’s madrassas (religious schools) are Deobandi run and they provide a fertile pool of manpower susceptible to LeJ recruitment.
The present status of LeJ training facilities is not known. LeJ training camps in Afghanistan were destroyed by the United States and their training facilities in Pakistan have been disrupted by local police. Being part of a broader Deobandi movement, however, the LeJ can rely on the assistance of other militant Deobandi groups including its parent the SSP, JeM, the Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA - also known as Harakat ul-Mujahideen or HuM) and Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI).
The LeJ has an extremely close relationship with the Taliban and confirmed links with al-Qa'ida. LeJ operatives are thought to have received training from al-Qa’ida.
Objectives
The LeJ’s ultimate objective is the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan based on a radical interpretation of Sharia law, through the use of violence. Part of a broader Sunni extremist movement, LeJ’s membership harbour an intense hatred of all foreign, or non-Islamic influences. The group is also fervently anti-Shia and aim to have them declared a non-Muslim minority.
Leadership and membership
Muhammad Ajmal (aka Akram Lahori) is reportedly the present leader of the LeJ. Ajmal succeeded Riaz Basra following Basra’s death in May 2002 as a result of a shootout with Pakistani police. Ajmal is himself in custody following his arrest in June 2002 for his alleged involvement in 38 cases of sectarian killings. Although Ajmal is officially considered the head of LeJ, Mufti Eid Mohammed is now believed to lead the organisation and operational command is understood to have passed to minor figures.
LeJ is estimated to have 300 active members. The LeJ maintains a multi-cellular structure, made up of loosely co-ordinated regional sub-units further divided into several small cells that operate independently of one another.
LeJ engagement in terrorist activities
The LeJ has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks, including targeted assassinations and suicide bombings against, Shia, Christian, Western and government targets.
Recent terrorist attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to, the LeJ have included:
- January 2005: the attack on Shiite religious leader, Syed Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, in Gilgit, resulting in three deaths
- 28 September 2005: Two LeJ leaders arrested for planning the 27 and 30 May 2005 suicide bomb attacks on a Shiite mosque in Karachi and the Bari Imam shrine in Islamabad which killed a total of twenty-four people
- 2 March 2006: suicide car bombing on the US Consulate in Karachi killing a US Diplomat
- 11 April 2006: suspected involvement in the bomb attack on Shiite worshippers at Nishtar Park in Karachi killing more than sixty people
- 14 July 2006: suicide bomb attack on Shiite cleric, Allama Hassan Turabi, in Karachi which also killed Turabi’s nephew, and injured three security guards; and
- 1 January 2007: Pakistani Intelligence agencies claim uncovered documentary evidence indicates LeJ plan to accelerate their targeting of Shiite mosques and prominent Shiite leaders and scholars.
Conclusion
The Criminal Code provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied that:
(i) the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or
(ii) the organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).
On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses that LeJ is directly preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts. It is submitted that the acts attributable to LeJ are terrorist acts as they:
(i) are done with the intention of advancing a political cause, namely, the establishment of a Islamic state in Pakistan
(ii) are intended to coerce or influence by intimidation the government of foreign countries, including Pakistan and/or intimidate sections of the public; and
(iii) constitute acts which cause serious physical harm to persons, including death, as well as serious damage to property.
This assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources.