Explanatory Statement
Issued by the Authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011
Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025
Autonomous sanctions are measures not involving the use of armed force which the Australian Government imposes as a matter of foreign policy in response to situations of international concern.
Section 10 of the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (the AS Act) provides that regulations may make provision relating to certain matters, including restriction or prevention of the supply, sale or transfer of goods or services. Before the Governor-General makes such regulations, the Minister must be satisfied that the proposed regulations will facilitate the conduct of Australia’s relations with other countries or with entities or persons outside Australia, or otherwise deal with matters, things or relationships outside Australia.
Subregulation 12(1) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (the AS Regulations) provides that a person contravenes the regulation if the person makes a sanctioned supply that is not an authorised supply. Subregulation 4(1) of the AS Regulations provides that a person makes a sanctioned supply if:
- the person supplies, sells or transfers goods to another person; and
- the goods are export sanctioned goods in relation to a country or part of a country; and
- as a direct or indirect result of the supply, sale or transfer the goods are transferred:
- to that country or part of a country; or
- for use in that country or part of a country; or
- for the benefit of that country or part of a country.
Subregulation 4(3) provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, designate goods as export sanctioned goods for a country or part of a country mentioned in the designation.
The purpose of the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025 (the Instrument) is to designate certain goods as export sanctioned goods for Iran.
Since 2006, Iran has been subject to sanctions over its nuclear programme. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) which contained measures to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missiles programmes.
On 20 July 2015, following an agreement from Iran to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the UNSC adopted Resolution 2231 (2015) which conditionally amended sanctions related to Iran, subject to confirmation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had made changes to its nuclear program. Australia implemented its obligations under this resolution through the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions–Iran) Regulation 2016 (the COTUNA Regulations).
The COTUNA Regulations provided amongst other things, that a person contravenes the regulations if the person makes a sanctioned supply of export sanctioned goods that is not an authorised supply. Export sanctioned goods under the COTUNA Regulations included:
- items, materials, equipment and technology usable for nuclear weapons;
- nuclear related dual-use items and technologies; and
- other goods that could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or the pursuit of activities about which the IAEA has expressed concern or identified as outstanding.
On 28 August 2025, the United Kingdom, France and Germany notified the UNSC of significant non-performance of Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA, resulting in the termination of the sanctions relief, and re-application of all the provisions of the earlier resolutions relating to the Iranian nuclear issue, in the same manner on 28 September 2025. As a result of the decision of the UNSC in paragraph 12 of Resolution 2231 (2015) and section 8 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (the COTUNA), the COTUNA Regulations have ceased to have effect.
Until new regulations are made under the COTUNA to give effect to paragraph 12 of Resolution 2231 (2015), the Instrument designates the same kinds of export sanctioned goods that were covered by the COTUNA Regulations. This will ensure that Australia is able to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of goods covered by Resolution 2231 (2015), in accordance with its international obligations.
Details of the Instrument are set out at Attachment A.
The Office of Impact Analysis has advised that an Impact Analysis is not required for instruments of this nature (OIA23-06254).
The Instrument is exempt from sunsetting under paragraph 54(2)(b) of the Legislation Act 2003 and table item 1 of section 11 of the Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulation 2015.
No public consultation was undertaken in relation to the Instrument under section 17 of the Legislation Act 2003 as it is intended to give effect to, and continue to implement Australia’s ongoing obligations to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of goods that would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, under international law. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade conducts regular outreach to the Australian business community to explain Australian sanctions laws implementing UNSC and autonomous sanctions.
A Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights of the Instrument prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 is set out at Attachment B.
Attachment A
Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025
Section 1
This section provides that the title of the instrument is the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025 (the Instrument).
Section 2
This section provides that the Instrument commences on the day after it is registered.
Section 3
This section provides that the Instrument is made under subregulation 4(3) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (the Regulations).
Section 4
This section defines words and expressions used in the Instrument. These definitions are largely consistent with those used in the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions — Iran) (Export Sanctioned Goods) List Determination 2016, which listed goods determined to be export sanctioned goods for the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions—Iran) Regulation 2016.
Section 5
This section sets out goods that are designated as export sanctioned goods for Iran. The effect of this section is that the supply, sale or transfer of such goods that directly or indirectly results in the goods being transferred to Iran, or for use in Iran, or for the benefit of Iran, is prohibited by regulation 12 of the Regulations, unless it is authorised by a permit granted under regulation 18 of the Regulations.
Paragraph (a) is the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as Information Circular document, INFCIRC/254/Rev.14/Part 1, as existing on the commencement of this instrument. The Annex to this document sets out items, materials, equipment and technology usable for nuclear weapons. In 2025, the document could be viewed on the IAEA’s website (https://www.iaea.org). Australia is required to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of these goods under Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1929 (2010) and 2231 (2015).
Paragraph (b) is the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, published by the IAEA as Information Circular document, INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 2, as existing on the commencement of this instrument. In 2025, the document could be viewed on the IAEA’s website (https://www.iaea.org). The Annex to this document sets out nuclear related dual-use items and technologies. Australia is required to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of these goods under Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2231 (2015).
Paragraph (c) refers to goods listed in Schedule 1 of the Instrument. Those goods are goods that Australia has determined would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or the pursuit of activities about which the IAEA has expressed concern or identified as outstanding. Australia is required to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of these goods under Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1929 (2010) and 2231 (2015).
Schedule 1 – List of Goods
Schedule 1 of the Instrument sets out goods that Australia has determined would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or the pursuit of activities about which the IAEA has expressed concern or identified as outstanding.
This includes certain goods that are, or relate to:
- nuclear materials, facilities and equipment;
- nuclear materials, chemicals, micro-organisms and toxins;
- materials processing;
- electronics;
- sensors and lasers;
- navigation and avionics; and
- technology required for the development, production or use any such items.
Australia has prohibited the supply, sale or transfer of these goods since 2008 under the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions–Iran) Regulations 2008 and the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions–Iran) Regulation 2016.
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011
Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025
This Disallowable Legislative Instrument is compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
Overview of the Disallowable Legislative Instrument
Autonomous sanctions are measures not involving the use of armed force which the Australian Government imposes as a matter of foreign policy in response to situations of international concern.
Section 10 of the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (the AS Act) provides that regulations may make provision relating to certain matters, including restriction or prevention of the supply, sale or transfer of goods or services. Before the Governor-General makes such regulations, the Minister must be satisfied that the proposed regulations will facilitate the conduct of Australia’s relations with other countries or with entities or persons outside Australia, or otherwise deal with matters, things or relationships outside Australia.
Subregulation 12(1) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (the AS Regulations) provides that a person contravenes the regulation if the person makes a sanctioned supply that is not an authorised supply. Subregulation 4(1) of the AS Regulations provides that a person makes a sanctioned supply if:
- the person supplies, sells or transfers goods to another person; and
- the goods are export sanctioned goods in relation to a country or part of a country; and
- as a direct or indirect result of the supply, sale or transfer the goods are transferred:
- to that country or part of a country; or
- for use in that country or part of a country; or
- for the benefit of that country or part of a country.
Subregulation 4(3) provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, designate goods as export sanctioned goods for a country or part of a country mentioned in the designation.
The purpose of the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods – Iran) Designation 2025 (the Instrument) is to designate certain goods as export sanctioned goods for Iran.
Since 2006, Iran has been subject to sanctions over its nuclear programme. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) which contained measures to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missiles programmes.
On 20 July 2015, following an agreement from Iran to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the UNSC adopted Resolution 2231 (2015) which conditionally amended sanctions related to Iran, subject to confirmation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had made changes to its nuclear program. Australia implemented its obligations under this resolution through the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions–Iran) Regulation 2016 (the COTUNA Regulations).
The COTUNA Regulations provided amongst other things, that a person contravenes the regulations if the person makes a sanctioned supply of export sanctioned goods that is not an authorised supply. Export sanctioned goods under the COTUNA Regulations included:
- items, materials, equipment and technology usable for nuclear weapons;
- nuclear related dual-use items and technologies; and
- other goods that could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or the pursuit of activities about which the IAEA has expressed concern or identified as outstanding.
On 28 August 2025, the United Kingdom, France and Germany notified the UNSC of significant non-performance of Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA, resulting in the termination of the sanctions relief, and re-application of all the provisions of the earlier resolutions relating to the Iranian nuclear issue, in the same manner on 28 September 2025. As a result of the decision of the UNSC in paragraph 12 of Resolution 2231 (2015) and section 8 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (the COTUNA), the COTUNA Regulations have ceased to have effect.
Until new regulations are made under the COTUNA to give effect to paragraph 12 of Resolution 2231 (2015), the Instrument designates the same kinds of export sanctioned goods that were covered by the COTUNA Regulations. This will ensure that Australia is able to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of goods covered by Resolution 2231 (2015), in accordance with its international obligations.
Human rights implications
The Instrument may engage the right to work in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Article 6 of the ICESCR recognises the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain their living by work which they freely choose or accept. The UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has stated that the right to work affirms the obligation of States parties to assure individuals their right to freely chosen or accepted work, including the right not to be deprived of work unfairly.
By designating goods as export sanctioned goods for Iran, persons are prohibited from supplying, selling or transferring the goods to another person, where a direct or indirect result of the supply, sale or transfer is that the goods are transferred to, for use in, or for the benefit of Iran. This may limit a person’s ability to engage in certain trades.
Permissible limitation
Article 4 of the ICESCR provides that the right is subject to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.
The relevant UNSC Resolutions relating to Iran’s nuclear programme respond to a situation of international concern. The possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program threatens the welfare of nation States, including Western democracies. The goods covered by the Instrument are goods that Australia, as well as likeminded jurisdictions, have determined could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as well as other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding, and are therefore targeted. To the extent that the Instrument engages a person’s right to work, that limitation is proportional to the objectives of the sanction, and justified.
Conclusion
The Instrument is compatible with human rights because to the extent that it may limit human rights, those limitations are reasonable, necessary and proportionate.