COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Aerospatiale (Socata) TB20 (Trinidad) Series Aeroplanes
AD/TB20/10 Nose Landing Gear Hydraulic Line 11/87
Applicability: To all model TB20 and TB21 aircraft with S/Nos up to and including 760. Aircraft S/Nos. 643, 644, 752 and 753 are excluded from the requirements of this AD.
Requirement: Relocate L/H nose gear undercarriage hydraulic pipe in accordance with Aerospatiale Socata SB No.34.
Note: Bureau veritas AD 87-117(A) refers.
Compliance: Next scheduled inspection for maintenance release issue after 30 October 1987.
Background: The manufacturer has reported chafing of the L.H. nose gear hydraulic line by the rudder control rod. If the chafed line developed a leak a situation could occur where aircraft had to land with its undercarriage not locked down.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, includes the Airworthiness Directive AD/TB20/10, which was enacted to address safety concerns regarding the nose landing gear hydraulic line of the Aerospatiale (Socata) TB20 (Trinidad) Series Aeroplanes. The directive was introduced to rectify an issue of chafing of the left-hand nose gear hydraulic line by the rudder control rod, which could potentially lead to a hydraulic leak. This problem, if unaddressed, could compromise the aircraft's ability to land with the undercarriage locked down, thereby posing a significant safety risk. The directive mandates the relocation of the hydraulic line as specified in Aerospatiale Socata Service Bulletin No.34, and references Bureau Veritas AD 87-117(A) for compliance. The objective of this legislation, enacted by the Australian Government, is to ensure the continued airworthiness of affected aircraft and to maintain high safety standards in civil aviation.
This legislation was enacted by the Australian Government, with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) being the relevant authority overseeing the implementation of the directive. The policy objective is clearly stated as ensuring that the affected aircraft continue to meet airworthiness standards, thereby protecting the safety of passengers and crew. Compliance with the directive is required at the next scheduled inspection for maintenance release issue after 30 October 1987. The exclusion of specific aircraft serial numbers (643, 644, 752, and 753) from the directive indicates a targeted approach to address the problem only in those aircraft where the issue has been identified.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically PART 39 - 105, pertains to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Schedule of Airworthiness Directives for the Aerospatiale (Socata) TB20 (Trinidad) series aeroplanes. This legislation applies to all model TB20 and TB21 aircraft with serial numbers up to and including 760. Notably, aircraft with serial numbers 643, 644, 752, and 753 are excluded from the requirements of this directive. The directive mandates the relocation of the left-hand nose gear undercarriage hydraulic pipe in accordance with Aerospatiale Socata Service Bulletin No. 34, with reference to Bureau Veritas AD 87-117(A). Compliance with this directive must be achieved by the next scheduled inspection for maintenance release following 30 October 1987, to address the issue of chafing of the left-hand nose gear hydraulic line by the rudder control rod, which could lead to potential safety hazards such as the aircraft landing with its undercarriage not locked down. The regulations are designed to ensure the continued airworthiness and safety of the specified aircraft within the Australian jurisdiction.
Key Provisions
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, Part 39, specifically section 105, details the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) Schedule of Airworthiness Directives for the Aerospatiale (Socata) TB20 (Trinidad) series aeroplanes. The relevant Airworthiness Directive (AD) in this instance is AD/TB20/10, which pertains to the nose landing gear hydraulic line (section 11/87). This directive applies to all model TB20 and TB21 aircraft with serial numbers (S/Nos) up to and including 760, with the exceptions of aircraft S/Nos 643, 644, 752, and 753. These specific aircraft are excluded from the requirements of this AD.
The key requirement of this AD is the relocation of the left-hand (L/H) nose gear undercarriage hydraulic pipe in accordance with Aerospatiale Socata Service Bulletin No. 34. This directive is cross-referenced with Bureau Veritas AD 87-117(A). The directive mandates compliance by scheduling the next inspection for maintenance release after 30 October 1987. This means that the required modifications must be completed, and the aircraft must pass inspection prior to this date to be compliant.
Under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, the AD imposes specific obligations on aircraft operators and maintenance personnel. They must ensure that the L/H nose gear undercarriage hydraulic pipe is relocated as per the manufacturer's instructions, which are detailed in Aerospatiale Socata Service Bulletin No. 34. This includes conducting a thorough inspection to confirm that the modifications have been correctly implemented and that there are no further issues with the hydraulic line. Operators must also maintain records of compliance and ensure that the aircraft is fit to fly, adhering to the mandated inspection schedule.
Failure to comply with the AD/TB20/10 can result in significant civil and criminal consequences. The regulations stipulate potential offences if an aircraft is operated without the required modifications or if the compliance deadline is missed. Civil penalties may include fines or other administrative sanctions imposed by CASA. Additionally, non-compliance could lead to criminal charges if the failure to adhere to the directive results in unsafe aircraft operation, potentially endangering lives. The maximum penalties for such offences are determined by the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and can include substantial fines and imprisonment for individuals found guilty of serious breaches.