COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 Series Helicopters
AD/HU 369/96
Amdt 1
Engine Control and Warning Systems 6/99
DM
Applicability: Model 369E (serial numbers (S/N) 384E and subsequent), Model 369FF (S/N 076FF and subsequent), Model 500N and Model 600N series helicopters.
Requirement: 1. If not previously accomplished, carry out the following:
(a) Access relays K1, K2, K3, K5, K104, and K200 (relay part number (P/N) HS4240).
(b) Remove each relay specified in sub-paragraph (a) from its receptacle (P/N HS4256-1).
(c) Using a No. 60 drill bit or a 0.40 inch diameter wire as a gauge, attempt to insert the gauge into every contact socket of each relay receptacle, see Figure
- (To prevent damage to the receptacle and contact socket, ensure the gauge is inserted perpendicular to the face of the receptacle.) If the gauge can be inserted into the contact socket, the socket must be replaced with a new socket P/N 019-0075-002.
2. Inspect any replacement relay, P/N HS4240, in accordance with paragraph (c) of this Directive.
Note 1: FAA Priority Letter AD 99-08-07 refers.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Note 2: Boeing McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MDHS) Service Bulletin SB369E-090, SB369F-077, SB500N-017, SB600N-014 dated 6 July 1998 pertains to
this directive.
Compliance: 1. Prior to 17 May 1999.
2. Prior to fitting to an aircraft.
This Amendment becomes effective on 12 May 1999.
Background: The FAA has received a report of an incident involving a MDHS 600N helicopter where the engine control unit (ECU) fail light illuminated, even though the ECU continued to automatically control the engine. The helicopter manufacturer has also reported two additional similar incidents on other model 600N helicopters. The cause of the ECU malfunction indication was determined to be contact sockets of a relay receptacle that did not correctly fit the corresponding pins of a relay. This directive requires the inspection of the contact sockets of each affected relay receptacle to ensure that the sockets are the correct size.
Amendment 1 revises the list of affected aircraft and adds an initial inspection of the relays.
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 21 August 1998.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 were enacted to ensure the safety of civil aviation within Australia, providing a comprehensive framework governing aircraft operations, maintenance, and airworthiness. This legislation was introduced to address the need for stringent safety regulations to protect public safety and maintain the integrity of the civil aviation industry. The policy objective is to establish and enforce standards that ensure the highest level of safety in all aspects of civil aviation. This particular legislative instrument amends the schedule of airworthiness directives to address specific safety concerns identified by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), ensuring that all regulated aircraft meet the necessary safety standards. The amendment is aimed at rectifying identified issues to prevent potential hazards and maintain the airworthiness of affected aircraft.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39, which pertains to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's schedule of airworthiness directives, applies to certain helicopter models within Australia's airspace. This particular airworthiness directive, AD/HU 369/96 Amendment 1, is targeted at McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 Series helicopters, including models 369E, 369FF, 500N, and 600N. The directive mandates specific actions for these aircraft, such as accessing and inspecting certain relay components and ensuring that any replacement relay conforms to the specified standards. The directive is applicable to aircraft with specific serial numbers and requires compliance prior to 17 May 1999 or before the aircraft is fitted for use. This directive extends to all such helicopters operating under Australian jurisdiction and must be adhered to by operators, maintenance personnel, and other relevant entities within the aviation industry. The directive is subject to further refinement and detail through subordinate instruments, ensuring compliance with the overarching regulations.
Key Provisions
The primary operative sections of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, particularly Part 39 - 105, focus on Airworthiness Directives for specific helicopter models. Specifically, AD/HU 369/96 Amendment 1 targets McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 series helicopters, including models 369E, 369FF, 500N, and 600N. The directive mandates that certain relays and their contact sockets be inspected and, if necessary, replaced to ensure airworthiness. Section 1 of the directive requires the inspection and possible replacement of specific relays and their receptacles (sections 1(a) to 1(c)). These actions must be carried out if they have not already been completed, to ensure the safety and reliability of the engine control and warning systems.
The obligations imposed by this legislation are stringent and must be adhered to by the operators and maintainers of the affected helicopters. Operators must ensure that the specified relays and their contact sockets are inspected and any faulty sockets are replaced with new ones as per the directive (section 1(c)). Additionally, any replacement relays must be inspected in accordance with the directive (section 1(c)). Compliance with these requirements is mandatory, with a specific deadline of 17 May 1999 for all inspections and replacements to be completed (section Compliance 1). This ensures that any potential safety issues are identified and rectified before the aircraft are returned to service.
Failure to comply with these directives can lead to severe consequences. The regulations underscore the importance of adhering to these safety measures to prevent potential engine control malfunctions. While the specific civil or criminal penalties are not detailed in the text, non-compliance could result in significant penalties, including fines and potential grounding of the aircraft. The seriousness of the issue is highlighted by the background information, which notes that improper fitting of relay contact sockets has already led to incidents where the engine control unit fail light illuminated erroneously. Therefore, adherence to these directives is crucial to maintain the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft.