COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 Series Helicopters
AD/HU 369/48 Main Rotor Lead-Lag Bolts - Inspection
for Corrosion
Applicability: All model 369D and 369H series helicopters.
7/81
Requirement: In accordance with the procedures laid down in Section 7 of the applicable Basic H.M.I., inspect the inner bores of the lead-lag bolts for the presence of corrosion.
If corrosion is found, treat the bolts in accordance with the manufacturers instructions.
Compliance: Within 100 hours time in service after 31 July 1981, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 300 hours time in service.
Background: There has been one local occurrence of failure of a lead- lag bolt on a model 369H helicopter. The failure is believed to be due to hydrogen embrittlement induced from a corrosion reaction inside the lower bore of the bolt. There is no inspection of the lead-lag bolts listed in the H.M.I. inspection schedules.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, under Part 39 – 105, specifically addresses the safety and airworthiness of aircraft within Australia through a series of Airworthiness Directives. One such directive, AD/HU 369/48, pertains to McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 Series Helicopters, focusing on the inspection of main rotor lead-lag bolts for corrosion. This directive was enacted in response to a local occurrence of a lead-lag bolt failure on a model 369H helicopter, believed to be due to hydrogen embrittlement from a corrosion reaction. The policy objective of this directive is to enhance the safety and reliability of these helicopters by ensuring regular inspections and maintenance of critical components, thus preventing similar incidents in the future.
The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority, as the body responsible for enforcing these regulations, has mandated that inspections of the inner bores of the lead-lag bolts must be conducted according to the procedures outlined in Section 7 of the applicable Basic H.M.I. Compliance with this directive requires inspections within 100 hours of time in service after 31 July 1981, and subsequently at intervals not exceeding 300 hours of time in service. If corrosion is detected, the bolts must be treated in accordance with the manufacturers' instructions. This directive aims to mitigate the risk of lead-lag bolt failures by enforcing rigorous and regular inspections, thereby enhancing the overall safety standards in Australian civil aviation.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority Schedule of Airworthiness Directives under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 applies specifically to all model 369D and 369H series helicopters within the Commonwealth of Australia. This regulatory requirement mandates that the inner bores of the lead-lag bolts must be inspected for corrosion within 100 hours of time in service after 31 July 1981, and then at intervals not exceeding 300 hours of time in service. This directive aims to mitigate the risk of failure due to corrosion-induced hydrogen embrittlement, as evidenced by a local occurrence involving a model 369H helicopter. The specified inspection procedures are to be conducted in accordance with the applicable Basic H.M.I. (Helicopter Maintenance Instructions) and the manufacturers' instructions if corrosion is detected. The geographic reach of this regulation encompasses all civil aviation activities within Australia, overseen by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. There are no stated exclusions or exemptions within the directive itself; however, compliance is essential for maintaining the airworthiness of the specified helicopter models.
Key Provisions
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39, Section 105, introduces an Airworthiness Directive (AD) pertaining to McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) and Kawasaki 369 Series Helicopters (AD/HU 369/48). This directive mandates inspections for corrosion of the main rotor lead-lag bolts on all model 369D and 369H series helicopters. The directive requires that the inner bores of these bolts be inspected according to procedures outlined in Section 7 of the applicable Basic Helicopter Maintenance Instructions (H.M.I.) (Section 105). If corrosion is detected, the bolts must be treated following the manufacturers' instructions to prevent further degradation and ensure the continued airworthiness of the aircraft.
Compliance with this directive necessitates inspections within 100 hours of time in service following the issuance date of 31 July 1981, and subsequent inspections must occur at intervals not exceeding 300 hours of time in service (Section 105). This regular inspection regime is designed to prevent structural failure of the lead-lag bolts, which could compromise the safety of the helicopter. The directive underscores the importance of adhering to the specified inspection intervals to mitigate risks associated with corrosion and subsequent hydrogen embrittlement.
Entities governed by these regulations, including operators and maintenance providers of the specified helicopter models, must ensure that inspections are carried out as mandated. This involves following the prescribed procedures for inspecting the inner bores of the lead-lag bolts and applying the appropriate treatments if corrosion is identified. Failure to comply with these requirements could result in the aircraft being deemed unairworthy, potentially leading to operational suspensions or other regulatory actions. It is imperative for these parties to maintain thorough records of inspections and treatments to demonstrate compliance and ensure ongoing airworthiness.
Failure to comply with the directives outlined in Section 105 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 can result in significant consequences. Although the specific penalties for non-compliance are not detailed in the legislative instrument, regulatory breaches generally attract enforcement actions by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). Possible consequences include fines, enforcement notices, and potential criminal charges for serious breaches that endanger safety. The exact penalties would be determined based on the severity of the non-compliance and the risk posed to aviation safety. Thus, it is crucial for all parties involved to adhere strictly to the inspection and treatment requirements to avoid these adverse outcomes.