COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Gulfstream (Grumman) G1159 and G-IV Series Aeroplanes
AD/G1159/35 Takeoff Warning System 5/90
Applicability: All model GII and GIIB series aircraft.
Requirement: Carry out a functional check of the take off warning system in accordance with Gulfstream Aerospace Customer Bulletin No 388 amendment 1 or later revision.
Note: FAA AD 90-02-05 also refers.
Compliance: Within 25 hours time in service after 17 May 1990, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 150 hours time in service.
Background: This AD is issued as a result of a recent report of an inoperative take off warning system which if not detected and corrected could result in the aircraft taking off in an unsafe configuration.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically within Part 39 - 105, includes an Airworthiness Directive (AD) for Gulfstream (Grumman) G1159 and G-IV series aeroplanes, which was enacted to ensure the safety and airworthiness of these aircraft. The directive, AD/G1159/35, addresses the problem of an inoperative takeoff warning system, which, if left undetected, could lead to potentially unsafe flight conditions. This AD was established by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and mandates a functional check of the takeoff warning system in accordance with Gulfstream Aerospace Customer Bulletin No 388 amendment 1 or later revisions, with compliance required within 25 hours of service after 17 May 1990, and at intervals not exceeding 150 hours thereafter. The overarching policy objective is to mitigate the risk of aircraft taking off in an unsafe configuration by ensuring the reliability of critical safety systems.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, mandates the applicability of Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for certain aircraft models, including the Gulfstream (Grumman) G1159 and G-IV series aeroplanes. The AD/G1159/35 focuses on the take off warning system, requiring operators of all model GII and GIIB series aircraft to conduct a functional check of this system in accordance with Gulfstream Aerospace Customer Bulletin No 388 amendment 1 or later revisions, as referenced in FAA AD 90-02-05. The directive applies to any person or entity operating these aircraft within the Commonwealth of Australia, ensuring that the take off warning system is checked within 25 hours of time in service following 17 May 1990, and subsequently at intervals not exceeding 150 hours of time in service. The regulation aims to prevent the risk of the aircraft taking off in an unsafe configuration due to an inoperative take off warning system.
Key Provisions
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically in Part 39 - 105 under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Schedule of Airworthiness Directives, includes a directive concerning Gulfstream (Grumman) G1159 and G-IV Series Aeroplanes. The directive, AD/G1159/35, mandates a functional check of the take off warning system for all model GII and GIIB series aircraft (Section 5/90). This requirement is to be carried out in accordance with Gulfstream Aerospace Customer Bulletin No 388 amendment 1 or any subsequent revisions (Section 5/90). The directive also references FAA AD 90-02-05 for additional guidance.
These regulations impose obligations on the operators and maintainers of the affected aircraft. Specifically, they must ensure that the functional check of the take off warning system is completed within 25 hours time in service after the directive's effective date of 17 May 1990. Subsequent to this initial check, the system must be checked at intervals not exceeding 150 hours time in service (Section 5/90). This ongoing maintenance requirement ensures that the aircraft remains airworthy and that the take off warning system is operational, thus preventing potential safety hazards during takeoff.
Failure to comply with these provisions may result in serious safety risks. The directive was issued following a report of an inoperative take off warning system, highlighting the potential consequences of non-compliance, such as the aircraft taking off in an unsafe configuration (Section 5/90). While the specific penalties for non-compliance are not detailed in this excerpt, it is reasonable to infer that significant civil or criminal consequences could arise, particularly if such non-compliance led to an aviation incident or accident. The exact nature and severity of these penalties would depend on the regulatory framework governing aviation safety at the time.