COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
AD/BELL 222/24 Main Rotor Hydraulic Actuator Support 2/2001
DM
Applicability: Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters, with a main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number 222-040-125-001 installed.
Requirement: 1. a. Visually inspect the main rotor hydraulic actuator support for the presence of all dowel pins and for sealant between the support and the transmission. If any pin is missing, or if no sealant is visible, before further flight, remove the support and further inspect the support, transmission case, studs, and dowel pins in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5 through 7 of BHTC Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222-00-86, 222U-00-57, 230-00-18, or
430-00-17, as applicable, Repair or replace any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud, or dowel pin before further flight.
b. Verify the torque of the support attaching nuts. Upper nuts must not rotate at a torque less than 40 inch-pounds. Lower nuts must not rotate at a torque less than 90 inch-pounds
(i) If two or more upper nuts rotate at a torque less than 40 inch-pounds or two or more lower nuts rotate at a torque less than 90 inch-pounds, before further flight, remove the support and further inspect the support, transmission case, studs, and dowel pins in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions paragraph 5 through 7 of the applicable ASB. Repair or replace any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud, or dowel pin before further flight.
(ii) If less than two upper nuts rotate at a torque less than 40 inch-pounds or less than two lower nuts rotate at a torque of less than 90 inch pounds, before further flight, re-torque the upper nut to 50 to 70 inch-pounds plus tare and the lower nut to 100 to 140 inch-pounds plus tare.
2. After re-installing a support for any reason, verify the torque of the nuts in accordance with Requirement 1.
Note: Emergency FAA AD 2001-01-51 refers.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Compliance: 1. Within 25 hours time in service after 17 January 2001, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 12 months, whichever occurs first.
2. At not less than 20 hours time in service, nor more than 30 hours time in service. This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 17 January 2001.
Background: The FAA received a report of the failure of a main rotor hydraulic actuator support, resulting in an accident of a Model 222U helicopter.
David Alan Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 11 January 2001
The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 17 January 2001.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 (CAR 1998) were enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament to ensure the safety of civil aviation within Australia. In response to an incident where the failure of a main rotor hydraulic actuator support caused an accident, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/BELL 222/24 on 17 January 2001. This directive was created under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998 and applies to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters with a specific main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number installed. The directive mandates a visual inspection of the support for the presence of all dowel pins and sealant, as well as torque verification of the attaching nuts, with corrective actions required if any deficiencies are found. The policy objective is to rectify the unsafe condition identified in the accident report and prevent similar incidents by ensuring the continued airworthiness of the affected aircraft.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, includes an Airworthiness Directive (AD) issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) concerning Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters. This directive applies to Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters equipped with a main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number 222-040-125-001. The AD mandates specific actions to address safety issues identified with the main rotor hydraulic actuator support. The required actions include visual inspections to ensure the presence of all dowel pins and sealant, as well as verifying the torque of the support attaching nuts. If any deficiencies are found, the support must be removed, inspected, and repaired or replaced as necessary. The directive stipulates compliance intervals of within 25 hours of service after its effective date and at intervals not exceeding 600 hours or 12 months, whichever occurs first, with a specific re-inspection requirement between 20 and 30 hours of service after any reinstallation. The AD applies nationwide under the Commonwealth of Australia's jurisdiction, extending its reach to ensure the safety of aviation operations within the country.
Key Provisions
The Airworthiness Directive (AD) issued under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically in Part 39, mandates certain actions to address safety concerns related to the main rotor hydraulic actuator support in Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters. This directive applies to Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters equipped with a main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number 222-040-125-001. The AD requires a thorough inspection and corrective actions to be taken if any issues are found, to prevent potential unsafe conditions that could lead to accidents. The requirements include visually inspecting the support for the presence of all dowel pins and sealant, verifying the torque of the attaching nuts, and conducting further inspections if necessary, as detailed in the applicable Alert Service Bulletins (ASB). If unserviceable parts are found, they must be repaired or replaced before further flight.
The AD imposes specific obligations on the operators and maintenance personnel of the affected helicopters. Operators must ensure that the required inspections and actions are carried out by qualified personnel in accordance with the instructions provided. Maintenance personnel must adhere strictly to the AD's requirements, including the specified torque values for the support attaching nuts, and perform any necessary repairs or replacements. Additionally, operators must comply with the mandated inspection intervals: within 25 hours time in service after 17 January 2001, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 12 months, whichever occurs first.
Failure to comply with the AD could result in significant safety risks, including the potential for the main rotor hydraulic actuator support to fail, which could lead to a catastrophic accident. The AD itself does not specify penalties, but non-compliance with airworthiness directives under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 can result in severe consequences. These may include civil penalties, enforcement actions by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), and potential criminal charges if the non-compliance leads to an accident. The severity of the penalties can vary, but they may include fines and, in serious cases, imprisonment. It is crucial for operators and maintenance personnel to adhere strictly to the AD to ensure the continued airworthiness of the affected helicopters.