AD/BELL 206/61 - Main Rotor Hub Yoke - Inspection and Rework

Overview

The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, enacted by the Australian Parliament, form the primary legislative framework governing civil aviation in Australia. Among the various parts and amendments, Part 39 - 105 Civil Aviation Safety Authority Schedule of Airworthiness Directives addresses specific safety concerns and mandates particular actions to ensure the airworthiness of aircraft. The document F2006B04516 pertains to the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 206 and Agusta Bell 206 Series Helicopters, specifically focusing on the main rotor hub yoke. This legislative instrument was introduced to address the problem of ensuring the continued safety and airworthiness of these helicopters by requiring inspections and, where necessary, rework of the main rotor hub yoke. The policy objective behind this directive is to prevent potential mechanical failures that could compromise flight safety.

Scope and Application

The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically PART 39 - 105, applies to all Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 206 and Agusta Bell 206 Series helicopters that are fitted with a main rotor hub yoke P/N 206-010-101-1, -5, -9, and -13. This regulation is applicable nationwide within the Commonwealth of Australia and falls under the purview of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). The regulation mandates a thorough inspection process at each daily or overnight inspection and requires rework of the main rotor hub yoke within certain timeframes. For aircraft adhering to ANO 100.5.1, the directive must be recorded on the maintenance release as maintenance required, and the inspection can be performed by the pilot in command without the need for certification. In other cases, certification by a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer is necessary. The rework directive requires action within 1200 hours of time in service, upon the removal of the main rotor hub for any reason, or by 31 December 1974, whichever comes first. This regulation is aligned with AD/Agusta 206/49 and is supplemented by the Bell SB 206-04-1-74-1, Rev. A document, with a corresponding Agusta SB No. BT206-84.

Key Provisions

The primary sections of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105 concerning the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Schedule of Airworthiness Directives, mandate detailed maintenance and inspection protocols for certain helicopter models. Section 10/74, which pertains to the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 206 and Agusta Bell 206 Series Helicopters, requires thorough inspections and rework of the main rotor hub yoke. This directive applies to all model 206 helicopters fitted with specific main rotor hub yoke parts numbers (206-010-101-1, -5, -9, and -13). The document referenced for compliance is Bell SB 206-04-1-74-1, Revision A, with Agusta SB No. BT206-84 also applicable. The obligations under these regulations are clear and stringent. The primary requirement is a mandatory daily or overnight inspection of the main rotor hub yoke as outlined in Part 1 of the directive. The pilot in command can perform this inspection if the aircraft is maintained under ANO 100.5.1, in which case no further certification is needed. Otherwise, a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer must perform and certify the inspection. The rework of the main rotor hub yoke, as stipulated in Part II, must occur within 1200 hours of the helicopter's time in service, at the next removal of the main rotor hub for any reason, or by 31 December 1974, whichever comes first. Failure to comply with the directives can lead to significant consequences. The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 establish penalties for non-compliance, including potential fines and other enforcement actions. Specifically, operators who fail to adhere to the mandated inspections and rework procedures risk civil penalties, which could include substantial fines. Additionally, non-compliance may result in the grounding of the aircraft, further impacting operational capabilities and potentially leading to more severe civil or criminal penalties depending on the extent of the breach and its implications on aviation safety.