COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) Series Aeroplanes
AD/BEECH 35/36 Fuel Selector Valve Disengagement
Warning Light
Applicability: Models 35, A35, B35 & C35 with S/Nos. D-1 to D-2900 fitted with fuel unit
10/72
assembly P/N 35-924065 modified by the installation of Beech Kit No. 35-5030S.
Note: Beech Kit No. 35-5030S is one method of complying with AD/BEECH 35/26.
Requirement: 1. Ensure that the lens assembly of the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light is placed into its MAXIMUM brilliance position. This may be performed by the pilot without the necessity for certification.
2. Replace the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light assembly MS 25041- 2, with a non-dimming light assembly such as MS 25041-6 or equivalent.
Compliance: For Para. 1 - Prior to each flight until incorporation of Para 2.
For Para. 2 - Within 100 hours time in service after 3 October 1972.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically within Part 39, establish safety protocols and standards for civil aviation in Australia. These regulations were enacted to ensure the safety of aircraft operations by setting out requirements for airworthiness and operational standards. One such regulation, AD/BEECH 35/36, targets the Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) Series Aeroplanes, addressing specific concerns related to the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light. The regulation was introduced to mitigate risks associated with the disengagement of the fuel selector valve, ensuring that pilots can operate the aircraft safely by providing clear and unambiguous warnings. This directive is enforced by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, with a clear policy objective to enhance aviation safety through precise and timely compliance with airworthiness directives.
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, enacted by the Parliament of Australia, aim to maintain and improve the safety of civil aviation. Regulation AD/BEECH 35/36 is a specific directive addressing the need to ensure that the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light on certain Beechcraft 35 models is functioning correctly. This requirement is designed to prevent potential operational hazards by ensuring that the warning light is highly visible and reliable. Compliance with this directive is mandatory, with specific timelines for implementing the required changes to the warning light assembly, thereby reinforcing the overarching policy objective of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 to safeguard air travel.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, mandates certain airworthiness directives for particular aircraft models to ensure safety and compliance with aviation standards. This legislative instrument applies to Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) series aeroplanes, namely models 35, A35, B35, and C35 with serial numbers D-1 to D-2900, which are equipped with a fuel unit 10/72 assembly P/N 35-924065 modified by the installation of Beech Kit No. 35-5030S. This directive applies on a national level, overseen by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and is crucial for all entities operating these specific aircraft within Australia’s jurisdiction. Compliance with these directives is mandatory, and failure to adhere to them may result in significant safety risks. The regulations allow for certain adjustments to be performed by the pilot without requiring additional certification, though specific component replacements must be carried out within stipulated timeframes to ensure continued airworthiness.
Key Provisions
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, under Part 39 - 105, specifically within the Schedule of Airworthiness Directives for Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) Series Aeroplanes, outlines certain requirements and compliance measures for the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light. Section AD/BEECH 35/36 mandates that owners and operators of affected models, namely the 35, A35, B35, and C35 with serial numbers D-1 to D-2900, ensure their fuel selector valve disengagement warning light assemblies meet specific criteria. These aircraft must have the fuel unit 10/72 assembly part number 35-924065 modified by the installation of Beech Kit No. 35-5030S, which complies with AD/BEECH 35/26.
The primary requirements outlined in the directive include two main actions. First, the lens assembly of the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light must be positioned to its maximum brilliance. This adjustment can be performed by the pilot without the need for certification, ensuring a straightforward process for compliance. Second, the existing fuel selector valve disengagement warning light assembly MS 25041-2 must be replaced with a non-dimming light assembly such as MS 25041-6 or an equivalent model. Compliance with these provisions is critical for maintaining the safety standards required by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).
Owners and operators of the specified Beechcraft 35 models are obligated to adhere to these provisions to ensure continued airworthiness. For the first requirement, the lens assembly must be adjusted to maximum brilliance before each flight until the second requirement is fulfilled. The second requirement, the replacement of the light assembly, must be completed within 100 hours of time in service after 3 October 1972. Failure to comply with these obligations may result in the aircraft being deemed non-airworthy, potentially leading to grounding and legal repercussions.
Violating the provisions of this directive can result in significant consequences. Although the specific penalties are not detailed in the legislative instrument, breaches of airworthiness directives generally carry severe penalties under the Civil Aviation Act 1988. These may include fines, suspension or revocation of the aircraft's certificate of airworthiness, and potential criminal charges if the breach leads to an accident or endangers public safety. The exact penalties would be determined based on the severity of the breach and the resulting impact on aviation safety.