AD/B767/83 - Flight Station Window Latch

Overview

The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically under Part 39, address the safety requirements for maintaining aircraft airworthiness, with Schedule 105 focusing on directives related to the Boeing 767 series aeroplanes. This particular legislative instrument, AD/B767/83, was introduced to address issues concerning the flight station window latch on the Boeing 767 series, particularly affecting models with line numbers 1 through 114. The problem it was enacted to resolve involved instances where the flight crew experienced false "closed" indications for the number two flight station window, leading to rejected takeoffs and air turnbacks. The Federal Parliament enacted this regulation through the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, aiming to ensure the safety of air travel by mandating modifications to the latch hook installation as specified by Boeing Service Bulletin 767-56-0002. Compliance with this directive was required before 11 April 1997.

Scope and Application

The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105 concerning Airworthiness Directives, applies to Boeing 767 series aeroplanes with line numbers ranging from 1 through 114. This legislation mandates modifications to the latch hook installation for the number two flight station window frame, as per Boeing Service Bulletin 767-56-0002, to address reported issues of false “closed” indications that led to safety concerns during rejected takeoffs and air turnbacks. Compliance with this directive is required before 11 April 1997, with the directive referencing FAA AD 94-18-01 Amdt 39-9014 for further context. The application of this Act is geographically comprehensive, extending to all entities operating within the Commonwealth of Australia that possess or operate the specified Boeing 767 series aeroplanes. There are no stated exclusions or exemptions outlined in the directive, meaning all applicable aircraft must adhere to the mandated modifications to ensure continued airworthiness and safety in accordance with regulatory standards.

Key Provisions

The main operative sections of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, PART 39 - 105, specifically AD/B767/83, concern the modification of the latch hook installation for the number two flight station window frame on Boeing 767 series aeroplanes with line numbers 1 through 114. This requirement is laid out in section 39-105 and mandates that modifications must be made in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-56-0002. The directive references FAA AD 94-18-01 Amdt 39-9014, which provides additional context and details on the necessary changes. Compliance with these modifications is crucial to address the reported issues of false "closed" indications for the flight station window, which have led to operational disruptions such as rejected takeoffs and air turnbacks. The Act imposes several obligations on the parties involved, primarily focusing on the modification and compliance timeline. Operators of Boeing 767 series aeroplanes within the specified line numbers must ensure that the flight station window latch modifications are completed as per the Boeing Service Bulletin. The compliance deadline is set before 11 April 1997, meaning that operators must have completed the required modifications by this date to remain compliant with the regulatory requirements. Additionally, the operators must maintain records and documentation to demonstrate compliance with the directive, as stipulated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). Failure to comply with the provisions outlined in the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, PART 39 - 105, specifically AD/B767/83, can result in significant consequences. The Act does not explicitly state the penalties for non-compliance, but non-compliance with CASA directives can generally lead to enforcement actions, including fines, suspension of operations, or other regulatory sanctions. These consequences underscore the importance of adhering to the specified timelines and requirements to avoid potential legal and operational repercussions. Additionally, ongoing non-compliance could impact the airworthiness certification of the aircraft, potentially leading to grounding until the necessary modifications are implemented.