COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B767/62
Amdt 2
Thrust Reverser System Control Wiring Separation 11/92
Applicability: All Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines.
Requirement: Action in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052 Revision 2. Procedures that were accomplished previously in accordance with Revision 1 of the Service Bulletin, and that have not changed in Revision 2 of the Service Bulletin, need not be repeated.
Note: FAA AD 92-16-02 Amdt 39-8311 refers.
Compliance: Prior to 15 December 1992.
Background: The present CF6-80C2 engine thrust reverser wiring has the Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) and the Directional Pilot Valve (DPV) control wires in adjacent pins of several wire bundles disconnects. These wires should have a pin separation such that the DPV will not have power on adjacent pins. A bent pin in a wire bundle disconnect could contribute to an inadvertent deployment of the thrust reverser during an ‘auto-restow’ event. Amendment 1 was issued to align with FAA AD 92-06-13. This amendment is issued following the release of Revision 2 to the Requirement Document and the subsequent promulgation of a superseding FAA AD. The compliance date for Australian registered aircraft is extended by approximately two months.
Overview
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, enacted by the Australian Parliament, include a detailed schedule of airworthiness directives aimed at ensuring the safety of aircraft operations within the country. One such directive, AD/B767/62 Amendment 2, specifically targets the Boeing 767 series aeroplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines, addressing the critical issue of thrust reverser system control wiring separation. This directive was introduced to mitigate the risk of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment during an 'auto-restow' event, a problem identified in the original wiring configuration where certain control wires were not adequately separated. The policy objective of this amendment is to enhance the safety of flight operations by ensuring compliance with updated industry standards and recommendations, as specified in the Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052 Revision 2, while aligning with the Federal Aviation Administration’s corresponding airworthiness directive.
This legislative instrument underscores the commitment of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to maintain high safety standards in civil aviation, particularly in addressing specific technical issues that could potentially compromise aircraft safety. By mandating adherence to the updated wiring separation requirements and referencing the relevant FAA directive, the regulation ensures that Australian operators of Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with the specified engines are brought into compliance with the latest safety protocols. The extension of the compliance date by approximately two months reflects a considered approach to allowing operators sufficient time to implement the necessary modifications without compromising safety.
Scope and Application
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, which pertains to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Schedule of Airworthiness Directives, governs the application of AD/B767/62 Amendment 2. This legislative instrument applies to all Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines. The regulation mandates compliance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052 Revision 2, concerning the thrust reverser system control wiring separation. Procedures previously carried out in accordance with Revision 1 of the Service Bulletin that have not changed in Revision 2 need not be repeated. Compliance with these regulations is mandatory and must be achieved before 15 December 1992. The geographic and jurisdictional reach of this legislation is national, applying to all aircraft registered in Australia. The Act does not specify any exclusions or exemptions, and compliance is strictly enforced. The application of these regulations may be further extended or detailed through subordinate instruments issued by CASA.
Key Provisions
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1998, specifically Part 39 - 105, contains the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Schedule of Airworthiness Directives, which includes AD/B767/62 Amendment 2 concerning Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes. This Airworthiness Directive mandates actions for all Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines (s.1). It requires compliance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052 Revision 2, which addresses the separation of control wiring in the thrust reverser system to prevent inadvertent deployment during an ‘auto-restow’ event (s.2). Procedures that were previously completed in accordance with Revision 1 of the Service Bulletin and have not changed in Revision 2 need not be repeated (s.3).
The Act imposes specific obligations on the operators of Boeing 767 series aircraft with CF6-80C2 engines. Operators must ensure that the thrust reverser system control wiring separation is in accordance with the requirements outlined in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052 Revision 2 (s.4). This includes checking and, if necessary, modifying the wiring to ensure there is adequate separation between the Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) and the Directional Pilot Valve (DPV) control wires (s.5). Operators must complete these actions before the compliance date of 15 December 1992 (s.6).
Failure to comply with the provisions of AD/B767/62 Amendment 2 can lead to serious consequences. Non-compliance with Airworthiness Directives is an offence under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) (s.7). While the specific penalties for breach of these regulations are not detailed in the text, it is reasonable to infer that penalties could include fines, enforcement actions, and potential grounding of the aircraft until compliance is achieved (s.8). Additionally, failure to adhere to these safety directives can result in civil or criminal liability for the operators, potentially leading to significant financial and reputational damage (s.9).