Serafin v Malkiewicz

This case involved an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal in relation to a libel claim. The claimant sued the defendants for libel in respect of an article which they published about him in a Polish newspaper. The claimant's case was heard by Mr Justice Jay in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court. The claimant appeared in person before the judge, supported by a McKenzie friend. The defendants were represented by leading counsel. The claimant alleged that the words of the article had 13 defamatory meanings. The judge found that the claimant's cause of action had been rejected in relation to all the meanings apart from five of them. The judge then turned to address a further defence raised by the defendants in relation to all 13 meanings. This was the defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. The judge found that the defence had been established in relation to all the allegations and thus, relevantly, to the five meanings of them which had until that stage survived as actionable. The claimant appealed against the judge's decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held, first, that the judge had been wrong to uphold the defence under section 4. It held, second, that on the evidence before him he had not been entitled to find that one of the meanings was substantially true and so it set that finding aside. It proceeded to uphold the claimant's contention that it would not have been open to the judge to find that his reputation had been sufficiently "shot to pieces" by reference only to the other imputations shown to have been substantially true. It then concluded that the claimant was entitled to damages in respect of all the meanings encompassed within his claim. The Court of Appeal then addressed the claimant's third ground of appeal, namely that the judge's conduct of the hearing had been unfair to him. It concluded that the judge not only seriously transgressed the core principle that a judge remains neutral during the evidence but he also acted in a manner which was, at times, manifestly unfair and hostile to the claimant. The Court of Appeal concluded that the nature, tenor and frequency of the judge's interventions were such as to render the trial unfair. The Court of Appeal's order was to allow the appeal, to set aside the judge's orders and to remit the matter for an assessment of the quantum of the claimant's damages only, by a judge of the Media and Communications List other than the judge. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court against that order. The Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the unfair trial, the only proper order was for a retrial. The Supreme Court noted that there may be advantages to the parties in narrowing the issues prior to any retrial but that was for the parties to decide. The Supreme Court also observed that the Court of Appeal's analysis of the defence of public interest under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 had contained some unfortunate statements of principle and that, insofar as they were valid, the Supreme Court would declare them.