The defender founded upon the fact that the road was made passable (by removing boulders, filling up marshy places, and the like) not only by tenants upon the estate but by some of the neighbouring farmers. No doubt the fact of a road being repaired by the public is generally evidence of a public right, but in this case I think it is not so. If the road was granted by Mr Kinloch merely as a concession to his own tenants it was very natural that the tenants and any neighbours who would get the benefit of the road should do what was necessary to render it capable of use. If on the other hand Mr Kinloch was in the position of admitting that for his own purposes he had obstructed and shut up a public right-of-way his obligation would have been to give as a substitute, not merely a line upon which a road might be formed, but a road as capable of being used as that which he had shut up.
Further, the history of the road from its opening in 1875 until this action was brought seems to me to be inconsistent with the idea that it was given as a substitute for an admitted right-of-way. The Mr Kinloch who was the proprietor of Altries and granted the road in 1875 died in 1879, leaving the estate to his testamentary trustees, and from the date of his death until this action was brought his son, the witness A. J. Kinloch, acted as factor to the trustees. Prior to 1879 the family had resided at Park, another estate belonging to Mr Kinloch, about four miles from Altries, but in 1880 his widow took up her residence at Altries House and Mr A. J. Kinloch lived with her. He continued to reside there until 1883. From that year until 1892 he lived first at Broughty Ferry and then at Liverpool, but he continued to act as factor upon the Altries estate and frequently visited it. In 1892 he took up his permanent residence at Altries House.
Mr A. J. Kinloch says that although he was aware that people used the road in question, and had previously crossed from the Ashentilly Road to the Netherley Road by Standingstones, he never heard it suggested that there was a right-of-way until the defender made an application to the Parish Council in 1899. I think that that statement is confirmed by what Mr A. J. Kinloch actually did. In 1898 (I do not consider it necessary to refer to one or two incidents which occurred prior to that year) Mr A. J. Kinloch planted part of the ground lying to the west of the School Belt. In order to enclose the new plantation he built a wall running west from the point B, at which point it was built up to and joined the wall (running north and south) of the School Belt. The result was that this new wall shut up the road for cart and horse traffic, but steps were put in for the use of foot-passengers. No suggestion was made against Mr Kinloch's honesty as a witness, and his evidence seems to me to be both frank and fair, and apart from that it is unlikely that, acting as he was as factor for a body of trustees, he should have done a thing so likely to bring trouble as the obstruction of a public right-of-way. I have therefore no hesitation in accepting his statement that he had no idea of the road being, or being claimed to be, a right-of-way. The road was, however, to his knowledge one which his father had more than twenty years earlier given his tenants permission to use, and he was aware that they and some of the neighbours had been at some labour and expense, both when permission to use the road was given and some years later, to put it into a condition capable of being used. That being so, Mr Kinloch's action in building a wall across the road at first sight appears rather high-handed, and somewhat like a breach of faith with the tenants. Unfortunately, that view was not put to him, but it seems to be plain enough from his evidence that his information and belief was that the road had fallen into disuse except for people going on foot to the Free Church and children going to the public school—a use for which he provided by putting steps into the wall; and what he did in 1904 (which I shall presently narrate) shows that he had no desire to deprive the tenants upon the estate of a road which was a convenience to them.
Whether the wall which was built across the road was intentionally interfered with or not is not very clear, but it blocked the road to cart traffic until 1904, when some of the tenants represented to Mr Kinloch that the road was a convenience to them as a way to the smithy and joiner's shop, and he at once made an opening in the wall in which he put a gate. He also put a gate at the point C where the road turned eastwards, having some years earlier put a fence on the north side of the road (that is, between it and the School Belt) at that part. The gates were fitted with padlocks and chains in case, Mr Kinloch says, they were left open and cattle got into the young plantation, and he gave keys to all the tenants on the estate who wanted them. At the same time, for the convenience of foot-passengers, he made wickets at the side of each gate. I may say here that after the gates had been in use for some time the padlocks were broken, and when
renewed the woodwork was sawn through. The result was that the present action was brought.
In the meantime, in 1899, the defender had written to the Parish Council complaining of the wall which had been built ‘across the public right-of-way near West School,’ and requesting that it should be removed at an early date, as it was ‘very inconvenient for myself and others in the neighbourhood when going to Stonehaven.”
When that letter first came before the Parish Council a committee was appointed to inquire into the matter. Mr Kinloch, who was chairman of the Council, was at that time from home, but he had returned when, and was present at, the meeting of the Council to which the committee made their report. The minute of the meeting bears that the committee reported that they had visited the road, and “Found the said road had a wall put across it about two years ago and steps for foot-passengers: Found the original road demolished: Found this road would save parties going to the southward about half-a-mile of the distance going round. From information gathered, the road in dispute had been opened in place of the old road about twenty-five years ago.”
I take it that what is there spoken of as the “original road” and the “old road” is the Standingstones Road.
The minute then proceeds—“The chairman stated that his late father had, on requisition, granted the use of this road to his tenants in 1876; and there was no claim or allusion made to its being a right-of-way at that date.” The Council then, “after a lengthy discussion,” resolved that they had not sufficient evidence to justify them in making a representation to the District Committee.
The defender challenged the statement said to have been made to the Council by Mr Kinloch that there had been no claim that the road was a right-of-way, and founded on the evidence given by several witnesses to the effect that when the present road was given in 1875, Grant, the ground-officer at Park, who also supervised the estate of Altries, and Troup, the resident ground-officer at Altries, admitted that the Standingstones Road was a right-of-way. The importance of that evidence is that the Mr Kinloch of that time, who granted the road, seems to have been represented, and to have allowed the matter to be arranged by Grant and Troup. Unfortunately no question was put to the witness Mr A. J. Kinloch in regard to the statement attributed to him in the minute, but he said quite distinctly that neither Grant nor Troup (both of whom are dead) ever suggested to him that there was or had been a right-of-way between the Ashentilly and the Netherley Roads.
I confess that I do not attach much weight to the evidence of what was said by Grant and Troup in regard to there being a right-of-way, not because I doubt the honesty of any of the witnesses, but for this reason. There is no doubt that from time immemorial people had made their way across the moor from the Ashentilly to the Netherley Road, and doubtless Grant and Troup, who were old men and had apparently lived all their lives in the district, were aware that that was the case, and admitted that it was so when the Standingstones Road was closed; and to the country people who were agitating for a road the admission that a road on one line or other had always been used might very naturally be taken as an admission of a public right-of-way. Further, I think that it is worthy of observation that when the wall was built across the present road in 1898 Troup never suggested to Mr Kinloch that he was obstructing a public right-of-way. Now Troup was the ground-officer and had been so in 1875, and he seems to have had a good deal to do with the opening of the new road in that year. Therefore if his understanding was that that road was a right-of-way which had been given as a substitute for a previous right-of-way, I think that he would have warned the factor that he might get the trustees into trouble if he obstructed the road.
I have now, I think, dealt with all the material circumstances bearing on the question whether the defender has established his claim to a right-of-way for all purposes. I am of opinion that he has not done so. In my judgment it is in the first place proved that a right-of-way had not been acquired over the Standingstones Road in 1875 when that road was shut up; and, in the second place, that it is not proved that the present road was given as a substitute for the Standingstones Road upon the footing and understanding that the latter road was a public right-of-way. On the contrary, I think that the fair inference from the evidence is that it was given by the then proprietor as a privilege for the convenience of his tenants. Accordingly I am of opinion that the Lord Ordinary was right in holding that a public right-of-way for cart traffic has not been established.
But the Lord Ordinary has also held that there is a public right-of-way for foot-passengers. I think that the same considerations which have led me to the conclusion that the public have not acquired a right-of-way for horses and carts apply equally to the case of foot-passengers, but as the Lord Ordinary is of a different opinion I think it right to consider separately how the case stands in regard to foot-passengers.
There is no doubt that the Standingstones Road was, probably during the whole period of its existence, regularly used by people going to the Free Church, and the existing road has been used in the same way and also by children going to the West School. There is also some evidence that children used the Standingstones Road for the purpose of attending a school in connection with the Free Church which seems to have at one time existed. But apart from that evidence as to the use of the roads, there is practically no evidence of use by foot-passengers. The main uses
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of the roads were, as I have already said, to reach the peat mosses and Crynoch Mill on the one side, and the smithy on the other. But that must have been almost entirely horse and cart traffic. No doubt a person might occasionally go on foot with a message to the smithy or the mill, but in the general case the errand to the smithy would be to get a horse shod or a plough or other farm implement repaired, and the usual object of going to a mill is either to take corn to be ground or to bring back meal. Accordingly, apart from the churchgoers and school children, almost the whole of the evidence is in regard to cart traffic, and although there are a good many general statements that people on foot used the roads, I think that it is plain that if the evidence in regard to cart traffic and to people going to church and school was left out of view, there would be no evidence remaining upon which it could be suggested that a claim to a public footpath could be sustained.
The Free Church appears to have been built, or the building of it to have been commenced, in 1844. The adherents of the Free Church in the district had great difficulty in obtaining a site for a church, and Mr Kinloch (the gentleman who granted the road in question in 1875), although he was not a Free Churchman, gave them a site apparently upon a lease from year to year at a rent of 1s. per annum. I understand that that is the title upon which the church is still held. Now Mr Kinloch having shown so much goodwill to the Free Church, it would have been very remarkable if he had ever thought of objecting to the families of his tenants or near neighbours who belonged to the Free Church taking a near cut across an open moor on Sundays, and I doubt very much whether that practice even if continued for forty years would in the circumstances have established a right-of-way. As it was, when the new road was opened in 1875 the churchgoers went by it, so that there is no road which they have used for forty years. In regard to children going to school, I do not think there is any evidence when the Free Church School was established, and I fancy it was discontinued when the West School was built, but the evidence in regard to the former school is very shadowy. The West School was built after the passing of the Education Act 1872, and the children went to it by the road in dispute. I rather think indeed they must have gone to school upon the line of that road before it was opened to cart traffic, because the witness Alexander Walker, who was a member of the first School Board, states very emphatically that permission was obtained for the children to go to school that way.
I am therefore of opinion that the pursuers are entitled to succeed. Their counsel, however, intimated that they did not ask that interdict should be granted but only decree of declarator.
The
Lord Justice-Clerk and
Lord Ardwall concurred.
The Court recalled the interlocutor reclaimed against, found and declared in terms of the declaratory conclusions of the summons, of consent dismissed the conclusions for interdict, and found the pursuers entitled to expenses.
The defender appealed to the House of Lords. His contention was—(1) That it was not necessary to prove prescriptive use of one particular line of road; where there was a partial deviation of a road possessed for a considerable number of years by the public on a possession claimed to be that of public right-of-way, and where the deviated road continued to be used substantially for the same purposes, and to serve the same public places, then the user had before and after the deviation and substitution was to be regarded as one continuous user for the purposes of prescriptive possession—
Hosier v. Hawthorne , March 19, 1884,
11 R. 766,
21 S.L.R. 631;
Cadell v. Stevenson , April 19, 1900,
8 S.L.T. 8;
Kinross County Council v. Archibald , December 15, 1899,
7 S.L.T. 305. (2) That the sufficiency of the amount of user was to be judged in relation to the situation and character of the road in question—
Macpherson v. Scottish Rights-of-Way Society , July 6, 1887,
14 R. 875,
24 S.L.R. 629. (3) That supposing it were necessary to prove prescriptive possession prior to the deviation, the long continuous use of the early road proved, going back as far as it was possible to prove anything by evidence, raised, in the entire absence of any evidence to the contrary effect, a presumption that it had continued for the prescriptive period—
Harvie v. Rodgers , July 8, 1828,
3 W. & S. 251;
Cuthbertson v. Young , December 20, 1851,
14 D. 300, February 24, 1854,
1 Macq. 455;
Mann v. Brodie , May 4, 1885,
12 R. (H.L.) 52, at p. 61,
22 S.L.R. 730.
The pursuers (respondents) contended—(1) That the defender was not entitled to any presumption in favour of the public character of any user prior to the period when it might be established by him, and, so established, the use must be for forty years —
Elgin Magistrates v. Robertson , January 17, 1862,
24 D. 301. (2) That the user proved was attributable to tolerance—
Mann v. Brodie ,
cit. sup . at p. 58;
Jenkins v. Murray , July 12, 1866,
4 Macph. 1046,
2 S.L.R. 190;
Macintosh v. Moir , February 28, 1871,
9 Macph. 574,
8 S.L.R. 382.
Lord Chancellor —In this case I think there is no real question of law, although I must observe that if the argument or rather the suggestion of the learned counsel for the respondents were to prevail it would be very difficult to establish any right-of-way in Scotland at all. These questions before us are merely questions of fact—of fact pure and simple. Perhaps there has been a good deal of feeling about this case, but there is very little pecuniary interest at stake, and it is lamentable to see so much expense wasted upon so small a subject.
In these circumstances, after a long and patient hearing, the Lord Ordinary found
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that a right-of-way was established for foot passengers. The Second Division reversed this finding. They examined for themselves apparently the evidence on paper, and they disbelieved a witness to whom his opponents themselves appear to have given complete credit at the trial.
Then this case is brought here, and your Lordships are invited to a similar dissection of the paper evidence, and to decide whether this or that witness is to be accepted.
Now your Lordships have very frequently drawn attention to the exceptional value of the opinion of the Judge of First Instance where the decision rests upon oral evidence. It is absolutely necessary, no doubt, not to admit finality for any decision of a Judge of First Instance, and it is impossible to define or even to outline the circumstances in which his opinion on such matters ought to be overruled, but there is such infinite variety of circumstances for consideration which must or may arise, and it may be that there has been misapprehension or that there has been miscarriage at the trial. But this House and other Courts of Appeal have always to remember that the Judge of First Instance has had the opportunity of watching the demeanour of witnesses—that he observes as we cannot observe the drift and conduct of the case; and also that he has impressed upon him by hearing every word the scope and nature of the evidence in a way that is denied to any Court of Appeal. Even the most minute study by a Court of Appeal fails to produce the same vivid appreciation of what the witnesses say or what they omit to say.
All this is particularly applicable in a case where a mass of rather tedious witnesses referring to details and maps, some of them old, and most of them speaking to small facts as to which the test of memory is important, have appeared before the Judge of First Instance.
Under these conditions your Lordships are confronted with a choice between the opinion of Lord Salvesen and the opinion of the Second Division upon these questions of pure fact. Having heard the evidence sifted for nearly two days I myself very distinctly prefer the conclusions of Lord Salvesen on their own merits even if I had to judge of it upon paper, and indeed it seems to me that the pursuers' witnesses largely admitted the defender's case, and the defender's case on paper appears to me to have been unusually strong. In any case, however, when it is considered what advantages Lord Salvesen had in forming his opinion, in my view there are overwhelming grounds for supporting his decree. It seems to me quite possible that there may have been an old right-of-way shifted for common convenience more than once as the moorland became cultivated. It is enough, however, to say that free and unchallenged use for more than the necessary period has been established, if you accumulate as you are entitled to do the user of the earlier with that of the substituted way.
We have no right to set ourselves to pick to pieces first one and then another piece of evidence on the footing that the evidence is not to be considered collectively and cumulatively. To my mind the weight is overwhelming in favour of Lord Salvesen's view. If indeed Lord Salvesen had found in favour of a way for wheel traffic as well as for foot traffic I should have supported him, and so far as I can see on paper I would have preferred this conclusion, but with the disadvantages under which I labour I do not feel myself at liberty to find that as a fact in view of the contrary opinion of Lord Salvesen, confirmed by the Second Division.
I should therefore advise your Lordships to reverse the decision of the Second Division.
Lord Atkinson —I concur.
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline—The language of the judgment just delivered by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack exactly expresses the opinion I have formed.