The Queen v Raymond Denis Hickey

The Queen appealed against the sentence imposed on Raymond Denis Hickey, who had been found guilty of obtaining a document with intent to defraud and using a document with intent to defraud under Section 229A of the Crimes Act 1961. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on 6 December 2001. The appeal was against the sentence imposed by the District Court, which was eight months imprisonment on the first count and six months on the second, both to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeal quashed the sentences and substituted a sentence of five months periodic detention, taking into account that the appellant had already served 21 days in prison.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the sentencing judge had properly applied the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, whether the sentencing judge had taken into account irrelevant matters, whether the lapse of time between the trial and sentencing had been considered, whether the comparative sentence imposed on the co-offender had been taken into account, and whether the effect of the sentence on third parties had been given due weight. The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had taken into account irrelevant matters and in particular matters in respect of which the appellant had been acquitted.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's dishonesty was adequately marked by a term of periodic detention, which, allowing for time already spent in prison, was set at five months. The Court of Appeal quashed the sentences of imprisonment and substituted a sentence of five months periodic detention.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that the sentencing judge properly applies the relevant legislation and takes into account only relevant matters when imposing a sentence. It also demonstrates that the Court of Appeal will intervene where the sentence imposed is inappropriate, even if the offending was serious. In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the appellant's dishonesty was adequately marked by a term of periodic detention, and that a prison term was not appropriate.