The Queen v Chatha

In the case of The Queen v Chatha, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand considered various applications for the recusal of judges from the appeal proceedings. The appellant, Arshad Mahmood Chatha, sought the recusal of multiple judges on various grounds, including concerns about the assignment of High Court judges to the Court of Appeal and the timing of such assignments. The Court of Appeal, presided over by Glazebrook J, Rodney Hansen J, and Miller J, dismissed all the recusal applications and declined to make a declaration of inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

The Court found that the applications for recusal were without merit, as they were based on misunderstandings of the law and procedures relating to the assignment of judges to the Court of Appeal. The Court emphasized that the statutory provisions governing the assignment of High Court judges to the Court of Appeal, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Jessop v R, precluded any challenge to the authority of the judges involved in the appeal. Additionally, the Court found that the appellant's concerns about "natural justice" and the availability of review mechanisms for recusal decisions did not provide grounds for the recusal of the judges.

In the alternative, the appellant's counsel requested a declaration of inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Court declined to make such a declaration, finding that the request was made without proper notice and evidence from the Crown, and that it was unrelated to the substantive grounds of the appeal. Furthermore, the Court was not convinced that the arguments put forward by the appellant's counsel had any validity.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed all the applications for recusal and declined to make a declaration of inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Court emphasized that the applications were without merit and that responsible counsel would not have advocated for such applications. The Court warned that it is unlikely to extend the same level of indulgence to future applications made on the same grounds, and that the appellant's counsel may be at risk of a personal costs order if similar applications are made in future cases.