S and F v The Queen

The applicants, S and F, sought an order prohibiting the publication of their judgment and any part of the proceedings, including the result, in the news media or on the internet or other publicly available databases until the final disposition of the trial. They also requested permission for publication in law reports or law digests. The respondents were the Crown, represented by M D Downs. The case was heard by Blanchard, William Young, and Chambers JJ. The applicants argued that the suppression of the judgment would protect their right to a fair trial and prevent prejudice to the proceedings. The Crown opposed the application, arguing that there was no real risk of prejudice and that the applicants had not demonstrated that the prejudice substantially outweighed the public interest in open justice.

The court considered the principles governing the suppression of court proceedings and the balance between the right to a fair trial and the public interest in open justice. It noted that the suppression of proceedings is an exceptional measure and that the public interest in open justice is a fundamental principle of the common law. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated a real risk of prejudice to the proceedings that substantially outweighed the public interest in open justice. The court emphasised that the suppression of proceedings should be limited to cases where there is a real risk of substantial prejudice to the fairness of the trial. The court concluded that the applicants had not made out a case for the suppression of the proceedings.

The court denied the applicants' application for an order prohibiting the publication of the judgment and any part of the proceedings, including the result, in the news media or on the internet or other publicly available databases until the final disposition of the trial. The court also denied the applicants' request for permission to publish the proceedings in law reports or law digests. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated a real risk of prejudice to the proceedings that substantially outweighed the public interest in open justice. The court emphasised that the suppression of proceedings should be limited to cases where there is a real risk of substantial prejudice to the fairness of the trial. The court concluded that the applicants had not made out a case for the suppression of the proceedings.