Perrott-Hunt v Johnston

The plaintiffs in Perrott-Hunt v Johnston sought to bring a claim against Bruce Johnson, a lawyer, as principal of Central Park Legal Limited. The plaintiffs sought to bring the claim under r 4.56 of the High Court Rules. The Court held that the plaintiffs were not adding Mr Johnson as a party to the proceeding. They were adding a further cause of action against him. The difference is that it is a cause of action for which he may be solely liable rather than shared liability with others. Accordingly, the Court was not going to consider the matter under r 4.56. Instead, the question really arose under r 7.77 of the High Court Rules. That allows a party to add further causes of action so long as they are not statute-barred. The Court held that the allegations against Mr Johnson in the tenth cause of action were clearly fresh and distinct from the causes of action in the earlier pleadings. Mr Johnson was sued as a principal of Central Park Legal Ltd, whereas earlier pleadings alleged liability for his conduct before he left Corban Revell. The earlier pleadings said nothing about the discharge of the second mortgage over the Edwin Freeman Place property or the events of October 2011. In short then, the new cause of action was essentially different from the earlier pleadings and was a fresh cause of action unrelated to the earlier claims against Mr Johnson. The Court held that the new cause of action was statute-barred. The time under s 11(1) of the Limitation Act for bringing a claim based on the discharge of the second mortgage ran for six years from 25 October 2011 to 24 October 2017. As six years had expired before the cause of action was pleaded on 12 June 2018, the claim was out of time under the primary period. The Court held that the suggestion that late knowledge did not become available until later did not have the required "air of reality" required under the test of Tipping J in Murray v Morell & Co Ltd. The Court held that the suggestion that the claim could be extended because of incapacity also did not have the required "air of reality". The Court held that no basis had been shown for an extension of time beyond the primary period under s 11(1) of the Limitation Act. Any suggestions of late knowledge and incapacity did not have the required air of reality to warrant extensions of time. The Court struck out the tenth cause of action in the third amended statement of claim and dismissed the application under s 45 of the Limitation Act 2010.