Pacific Trawling Limited v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries HC Wellington CIV 2004-485-922
[2005] NZHC 1758
•13 May 2005
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2004-485-922
IN THE MATTER OF the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and the Goods & Services Tax 1985 BETWEEN
PACIFIC TRAWLING LIMITED
First Plaintiff
AND
FORTY SOUTH LIMITED
Second Plaintiff
AND
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FISHERIES
First Defendant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE
Second Defendant
Hearing:
2 May 2005
Appearances: R J Cullen for Plaintiffs
J H Coleman & M Deligannis for Defendants Judgment: 13 May 2005
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF MILLER J
Introduction
[1] The Crown regulates the commercial exploitation of fish species in New Zealand waters under what is known as the quota management system. The Ministry of Fisheries, which administers it, sets the total allowable catch for fish species subject to the system, in the interests of sustainable management of the resource.
PACIFIC TRAWLING LIMITED And Anor V THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FISHERIES And Anor HC WN CIV 2004-485-922 [13 May 2005]
[2] Under the quota management system, a commercial fisher may take and sell quota species only if it holds a valid fishing permit and a share of the total allowable commercial catch for the relevant species. The fisher’s share is called individual transferable quota.
[3] When first issued, quota is purchased from the Ministry, which also charges a fee for issuing a permit. In both cases, the Ministry accepts that it is making a taxable supply for purposes of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985. The Ministry is a registered person for GST purposes. When it issues a permit or supplies quota, the Ministry accordingly issues tax invoices to a fisher who is registered for GST and requests a tax invoice.
[4] When fishing for species for which it holds quota, a fisher frequently catches other quota species for which it does not hold quota. These fish are called by-catch. The Fisheries Act 1996 and its predecessor, the Fisheries Act 1983, both recognise that by-catch is inevitable, and seek to create incentives to minimise it and avoid wastage. That is done by requiring the fisher to land by-catch and allowing it to be processed and sold, but requiring the fisher to buy quota or make a ‘deemed value payment’ to the Ministry. Deemed values are set from time to time for each quota species. The Ministry seeks to set them at a level that makes by-catch unprofitable but creates an incentive, having caught by-catch, to land, process, and sell it. Adverse consequences follow should the fisher not make the deemed value payments, although the consequences differ under the 1983 and 1996 Acts.
[5] The issue in this case is whether the Ministry makes a taxable supply for GST purposes in return for deemed value payments. If so, it ought to issue GST invoices. It has refused to issue GST invoices to the plaintiffs under both the 1983 and 1996 Acts, instead labelling its deemed value invoices in various ways to make clear that they are not tax invoices. As a result, the plaintiffs say they cannot claim GST input tax credits.
[6] The plaintiffs seek declarations under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 that a deemed valued payment under the 1983 or 1996 Acts is made in consideration for a taxable supply.
The parties
[7] The plaintiffs are commercial fishers who have held fishing permits and fish lawfully against quota owned by other firms. They called on the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries in November 2000 to issue tax invoices in respect of their deemed value payments. The Chief Executive assesses the deemed value of by- catch and administers the quota management system. It seems the Commissioner of Inland Revenue is sued because the plaintiffs sought a binding ruling from him under s.91E of the Tax Administration Act 1994. They abandoned it when it became clear that the ruling, if issued, would have been unfavourable. The plaintiffs do not complain in this proceeding about anything the Commissioner has done. Their historic tax positions may alter if the Ministry is required to issue tax invoices, but this proceeding is not concerned with the extent, if any, to which that may occur. I emphasise this point because Mr Coleman indicated there may be a time bar affecting the extent to which prior years’ GST returns can be revisited.
The parties’ contentions
[8] For the plaintiffs, Mr Cullen argued that a taxable supply is made when something is supplied in consideration for payment. He characterised that which the Ministry supplies in return for deemed value payments in various ways; as the right to keep and sell the fish; as ‘authorisation’ of the fisher’s ownership of the fish; and as an entitlement to continue fishing without attracting prosecution (under the 1983 Act) or automatic suspension of a fishing permit (under the 1996 Act).
[9] For the defendants, Mr Coleman responded that deemed value payments do not confer property rights since the fisher retains ownership of the fish throughout. They are not fees for services since no services are supplied, nor payments for statutory privileges. If anything, they are statutory demands analogous to levies. Lastly, imposition of GST would give rise to practical difficulties.
The Goods & Services Tax Act 1985
[10]Section 8(1) of the GST Act is the charging provision. It provides:
Subject to this Act, a tax, to be known as goods and services tax, shall be charged in accordance with the provisions of this Act at the rate of [12.5 percent] on the supply (but not including an exempt supply) in New Zealand of goods and services, on or after the 1st day of October 1986, by a registered person in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity carried on by that person, by reference to the value of that supply.
[11] ‘Goods’ means “all kinds of personal or real property, but does not include choses in action or money”. ‘Services’ means “anything which is not goods or money”. The term ‘supply’ includes all forms of supply but there are deeming provisions which capture certain transactions or define when supply is deemed to have taken place. In Databank Systems Limited v CIR (1987) 9 NZTC 6,213, 6,223, Davison CJ held that ‘supply’ means ‘to furnish with or provide’.
[12] The value of goods or services is established by reference to the value of the consideration for them. ‘Consideration’ in relation to the supply of goods and services to any person “includes any payment made or any act or forbearance, whether or not voluntary, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of any goods and services, whether by that person or by any other person …”.
[13] A supplier’s obligation to provide the recipient of a taxable supply under s.8 with a tax invoice containing prescribed particulars is found in s.24(1), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a supplier, being a registered person, making a taxable supply to a recipient, being a registered person, shall, at the request of the recipient, provide that recipient, within 28 days of the making of that request, with a tax invoice containing such particulars as are specified in this section.
[14] In Turakina Maori Girls College Board v CIR (1993) 15 NZTC 10,032, 10,035, the Court of Appeal held that ‘[i]n essence, the supply of anything for a consideration is taxable unless it is an “exempt supply”.
[15] So the Act’s coverage is comprehensive. Nonetheless, it attaches to transactions, and not to receipts or turnover. There must be a nexus between the payment and the goods or service in consideration for which it is paid.
[16] Accordingly, the question in any given case is whether the supplier is supplying something in consideration for the payment. There must be an element of reciprocity: CIR v NZ Refining Co Ltd (1997) 18 NZTC 13,187, 13,193; Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,075. In the latter decision, Blanchard J held that:
The tax being one on transactions, it is necessary to pay close attention to the legal nature of what has been done.
[17]To that task I now turn.
The deemed value payment regime
[18] The deemed value payment regime was introduced in 1990. When speaking to the Fisheries Amendment Bill on its second reading, the Minister of Fisheries explained:
One of the major changes proposed by the Bill that has also been extended by the select committee relates to the problem of by-catch. That has been one of the greatest problems facing the administration of fisheries. No fisherman can ever guarantee that quota will be held for all fish that end up in the net. In order to conserve fish stocks, strong incentives to fish in such a way as to limit that by-catch need to apply, while recognising that it is a practical reality. The Bill as introduced provided for fishers to keep and process that by-catch, but required the payment of a deemed value to remove the economic incentive to overfish. By-catches are, however, not bad per se. They are bad only if they result in overfishing of the total allowable catch. The Bill recognised that matter on its introduction by providing that fishers could retrospectively acquire quota to cover their overfishing. That has been extended by the select committee to provide for end of year balancing. That will enhance the effectiveness of the Fisheries Act as an economic tool for the conservation of fisheries. (6 March 1990) 505 NZPD 382
The Fisheries Act 1983
[19] The 1983 Act provided that no person could take any quota fish for sale except under the authority of quota: s.28ZA. It prohibited dumping of any fish of
legal size that was subject to the quota management system. Accordingly, by-catch had to be landed.
[20] Having landed the fish, the fisher had three options. It could buy or lease quota, or arrange to count it against unused quota of another fisher, provided that was done within 15 days after the end of the month in which the fish were taken. It could surrender the fish to the Crown under s.105A(1)(c)(ii). Or it could pay the deemed value.
[21]Deemed values were set under s.28ZD, which provided so far as relevant:
(1) Subject to section 28ZG of this Act, a commercial fisherman who, on or after the 1st day of October 1990, at a time when the fisherman has a current right to take any species or class of fish subject to a quota management system, takes any fish subject to a quota management system without the authority of or in excess of any amount authorised to be taken under the appropriate quota,—
(a) Shall, unless the fisherman has returned the fish to the sea where such a return is required by subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 28ZB of this Act, include any fish so taken in the returns for the appropriate period required to be made by the fisherman under this Act; and
(b) Shall, unless the fisherman—
(i) Has returned the fish to the sea in circumstances in which such a return is required by subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 28ZB of this Act; or
(ii) Has notified the taking of the fish to a Registrar and surrendered and disposed of the fish in the manner specified in section 105A(1)(c)(ii) of this Act; or
(iii) Has, not later than 15 days after the end of the calendar month in which the fish were taken, bought, leased, or arranged quota in the manner specified in subparagraph (i) or subparagraph (ii) of section 105A(2)(e) of this Act,—
pay to the Crown, within 20 days of demand being made by notice in writing given by an employee of the Ministry, the deemed value of the fish assessed by the Director-General in accordance with section 28ZE of this Act.
(2) Any amount required to be paid under subsection (1) of this section in respect of the deemed value of any fish shall be payable whether or not the commercial fisherman committed an offence in respect of the fish.
[22] Deemed value payments were assessed under s.28ZE having regard to the market value of the fish, any proceeds or benefit that any person might receive in respect of the fish, the need to eliminate any economic incentive to take, process or sell the fish, and the need to provide an incentive for fishers to land fish taken without authority.
[23] As amended in 1995, the 1983 Act further provided that deemed value payments were held by the Crown on trust for the fisher. The payments would be repaid to the extent that the fisher obtained quota, or use of quota. At the end of each year there was an accounting, and the balance of any deemed value payments outstanding ceased to be held on trust: s.28ZF.
[24] It was an offence to possess or sell fish in contravention of the Act. Section 97(1) provided:
Every person commits an offence who buys, sells, or has in possession any fish, aquatic life, or seaweed taken in New Zealand fisheries waters in contravention of this Act, or any regulation made or notice given under this Act.
[25] But s.105A provided a defence for a fisher who could prove that it did not intend to take the fish, that they were taken as an inevitable consequence of the lawful taking of other fish, that the fisher had reported the taking in its returns to the Ministry, and that the fisher had surrendered the fish to the Crown, acquired quota, or paid the deemed value of the fish. Deemed value payments were payable under s.28ZD(2) whether or not an offence had been committed.
[26] Under s.107I, amounts payable to the Crown or the Ministry were deemed to be statutory debts. That term was defined in s.13A of the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries Act 1953 as any “fee, charge, or levy …”
The Fisheries Act 1996
[27] The 1996 Act took effect from 1 October 2001. Among other things, it was intended to simplify the quota management system by introducing a single generic catching right called annual catch entitlements (‘ACE’). However, it continued the
deemed value payment regime. For my purposes, counsel agreed the distinctions between quota and ACE are not material.
[28] Under s.74, no fisher may take certain species without holding a minimum ACE. Fish caught at sea may not be returned or abandoned, with certain exceptions. The Minister must set deemed values under s.75, which is similar in its effect to the former s.28ZE. One of the relevant considerations is the need to provide an incentive for commercial fishers to hold sufficient ACE to cover their likely total catches.
[29] The Ministry reconciles catches against ACE monthly, and requires payment of interim deemed values if the catch exceeds ACE. Interim deemed values paid are remitted to the extent that subsequent catches are less than ACE. The fisher may meet a demand for payment by paying, or by acquiring ACE. There is no longer an option of surrendering the fish to the Crown. Payments are held in trust pending an annual reconciliation following which any net deemed value payment is no longer held in trust.
[30] Under s.79, the fisher’s permit is automatically suspended where the total amount of deemed values payable exceeds $1,000 and has not been paid within the prescribed time. The consequence is that the fisher may not fish until the permit is reinstated, although it may still trade its ACE. Section 79 provides so far as relevant:
(1) If the total amount of deemed values owed by any commercial fisher exceeds $1,000 and has not been satisfied within the time limit specified in section 76(5), the current fishing permit of the commercial fisher and any person included with the commercial fisher under subsection (5), and any permit subsequently issued to the commercial fisher or included person, are, on the expiration of that time limit, to be treated as being suspended until the total amount of all outstanding deemed values owed by the commercial fisher is $1,000 or less.
…
(3) A fishing permit suspended under this section does not authorise any person to take any fish, aquatic life, or seaweed under the authority of that permit, but all other provisions of this Act continue to apply as if the fishing permit had not been suspended.
What goods or services, if any, does the Ministry supply in return for deemed value payments?
Ownership of by-catch
[31] At common law, wild fish become the property of the person who took or killed them, provided they were taken with lawful authority: Attorney-General for British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada [1914] AC 153, 168-170; Fitzgerald v Firbank [1897] 2 Ch 96, 101.
[32] Mr Coleman contended that the Fisheries Act 1983 presumed ownership of fish, including by-catch, remained with the fisher whether or not deemed value payments were made. I accept that submission. The Act does not assert underlying Crown property in fish, in contrast to s.57 of the Wildlife Act 1953 which deals generally speaking with wild animals. Rather, s.105A provided that the fisher might surrender ownership of by-catch to the Crown, or buy quota, or pay the deemed values. The provisions dealing with the setting of deemed values assume that the fisher will sell the fish and keep the proceeds. And s.99 provided, until its repeal on 1 October 1996, that ownership of fish taken was deemed to be with the owner of the vessel subject to any agreement to the contrary.
[33] I also accept Mr Coleman’s submission that the 1996 Act proceeds on the same premise. Section 75, dealing with deemed values, assumes that the fisher will sell by-catch and keep the proceeds. Sections 252(3) and 255A to 225E provide for forfeiture of fish to the Crown in certain circumstances, including conviction for taking fish other than under the authority of a fishing permit.
[34] Accordingly, the 1983 and 1996 Acts do not confer ownership of fish, whether caught under the authority of quota or as by-catch. Rather, they presume that the fisher already owns the fish.
If not ownership, what rights does the fisheries legislation confer?
[35] The position at common law was that the public have a right to take fish. That right, which is of ancient origin, depended on no proprietary title. In Attorney-
General for British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada (above) at 169-70, the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, held:
… the subjects of the Crown are entitled as of right not only to navigate but to fish in the high seas and tidal waters alike. The legal character of this right is not easy to define. It is probably a right enjoyed so far as the high seas are concerned by common practice from time immemorial, and it was probably in very early times extended by the subject without challenge to the foreshore and tidal waters which were continuous with the ocean, if, indeed, it did not in fact take risk in them. The right into which this practice has crystallised resembles in some respects the right to navigate the seas or the right to use a navigable river as a highway, and its origin is not more obscure than that of these rights of navigation. Findings its subjects exercising this right as from immemorial antiquity the Crown as parens patriae no doubt regarded itself bound to protect the subject in exercising it, and the origin and extent of the right as legally cognisable are probably attributable to that protection, a protection which gradually came to be recognised as establishing a legal right enforceable in the Courts …
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Malcolmson v O’Dea (10 HLC 593), it has been unquestioned law that since Magna Charta no new exclusive fishery could be created by Royal grant in tidal waters, and that no public right of fishing in such waters, then existing, can be taken away without competent legislation.
[36] The Crown may legislate to control or remove the exercise of the common law right to take fish. The fisheries legislation does so in the interests of sustainable management of the resource. It has been held that a statutory right to exploit such a resource to a limited extent is analogous to a profit à prendre. In Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314, 335, Brennan J held:
When a natural resource is limited so that it is liable to damage, exhaustion or destruction by uncontrolled exploitation by the public, a statute which prohibits the public from exercising a common law right to exploit the resource and confers statutory rights on licensees to exploit the resource to a limited extent confers on those licensees a privilege analogous to a profit à prendre in or over the property of another. A limited natural resource which is otherwise available for exploitation by the public can be said truly to be public property whether or not the Crown has the radical or freehold title to the resource. A fee paid to obtain such a privilege is analogous to the price of a profit à prendre; it is a charge for the acquisition of a right akin to property. Such a fee may be distinguished from a fee exacted for a licence merely to do some act which is otherwise prohibited (for example, a fee for a licence to sell liquor) where there is no resource to which a right of access is obtained by payment of the fee.
[37] The Ministry issues permits and quota or ACE. It treats the issue of permits and quota or ACE from by-catch as taxable supplies for GST purposes. Mr Coleman
sought to distinguish quota or ACE from by-catch by arguing that the former are a species of property created under the Act. He cited Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (In Liquidation) [1999] 4 All ER 684, in which it was held that a statutory right may constitute property where there is a statutory framework conferring an entitlement on a qualifying person (although the grant may be discretionary), the exemption etc must be transferable, and the exemption etc will have value.
[38] I accept that quota or ACE is property in this sense. In particular, it can be traded and it is unquestionably valuable. However, its value in the hands of the holder depends on what it represents; a right to take a quantity of fish. That is what the Act confers when the Ministry sells quota, and that is the taxable supply. In the same way, a fishing permit is a taxable supply because it confers on the holder a right to fish in exchange for the prescribed fee.
Rights acquired in return for deemed value payments
[39] What right, if any, did the 1983 Act confer in return for deemed value payments? The answer is that it conferred a right to possess and sell the by-catch that was the subject of the deemed value payment. Section 97 established a prohibition on selling or possessing fish except under the authority of the Act. In my view, s.105A(2) then authorised the taking and sale of by-catch under certain conditions, one of which was the payment of deemed values. It did so by creating a defence to a prosecution for taking fish without authority where the by-catch was taken unintentionally and as an inevitable consequence of the lawful taking of other quota species, and had been reported, and the deemed values had been paid or quota purchased. Only if all of those conditions were satisfied was the possession and sale of by-catch lawful.
[40] I do not think it matters that the authority thus conferred took the form of a statutory defence to a charge of taking fish without authority rather than a positive entitlement to take by-catch. The logical inference is that the drafter took that approach because by-catch is regarded as both undesirable and inevitable, while the fisher’s need for authority to take it arises only after it has been taken. The offence of fishing without authority was one of strict liability under s.105. Accordingly, the
drafter placed the onus on the fisher to establish the defence. The substance of the matter, however, is that a fisher who complied with s.105A(2) was indeed authorised, albeit retrospectively, to take and sell the fish. That conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the regime which was to encourage fishers to declare by-catch and avoid wastage.
[41] I conclude that under the 1983 Act, payment of deemed values was a necessary but not sufficient condition for authorising what would otherwise be the unauthorised possession and sale of by-catch, where the fisher did not elect to surrender the fish to the Crown. It follows that something was indeed supplied in consideration for the payment, in the form of authority to keep and sell the by-catch covered by the payment where the fisher could also prove that it was genuine by- catch.
[42] Mr Coleman resisted this conclusion, arguing that deemed value payments cannot be regarded as an ex post facto acquisition of the right to take fish. The fisher could purchase quota under the 1983 Act after taking the by-catch. And to treat payment of deemed values as analogous to buying quota undermines the quota management system because it subverts the need to hold quota in the first place.
[43] The short answer to these submissions is that the mechanism the 1983 Act used to control genuine by-catch – that is, fish caught unintentionally while fishing lawfully for other species - is the requirement that the fisher surrender the fish, or buy quota, or pay deemed values. There ought to be no incentive to take by-catch and pay deemed values, in lieu of purchasing quota, if deemed values are set at the appropriate level.
[44] The mechanism used in the 1996 Act is quite different, but in my view it too confers a right in return for payment of deemed values. There is a general prohibition on taking fish except under the authority of a current fishing permit: s.89(1). It is an offence to buy, sell, or possess fish in contravention of the Act:
s.232. And it is an offence to knowingly take, possess or sell fish in contravention of the Act: s.233. Section s.79 provides for suspension of the fisher’s permit if it or its associated persons do not pay deemed values. Section 79(1) says that the permit is
“treated as being suspended”, and s.79(3) goes on to make it clear that a suspended fishing permit does not authorise any person to take fish under the authority of that permit. The consequence is that it is unlawful to take quota species while the fisher’s permit is suspended for non-payment of deemed values.
[45] In the result, what the fisher who has taken by-catch secures under the 1996 Act, in return for deemed value payments, is the continued right to use its fishing permit. That is a different right from the right to sell the by-catch that was the subject of deemed value payments under the 1983 Act, but it is a right nonetheless obtained in return for payment of deemed values.
[46] I record that no point was taken that the supply was not by a registered person, in this case the Ministry. In particular, there was no suggestion that the right is provided by operation of law rather than by anything done by the Ministry. The Crown regulates the resource but it is the Ministry which administers the quota management system and issues invoices for deemed values.
[47] In the result, I find that a service, as defined in the GST Act, is supplied when a commercial fisher makes a deemed value payment under the 1983 or 1996 Acts.
Is a deemed value payment a levy or a penalty?
[48] Mr Coleman argued that deemed value payments are analogous to a levy or penalty. He referred to Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v Crystal Dairy Ltd [1933] AC 168, 175, in which it was held that an imposition is a tax or levy if it is compulsory, is for public purposes, and is enforceable by law. It was irrelevant that the fisher might act in a way that avoided deemed value payments, by purchasing quota.
[49] However, Mr Coleman also accepted that nothing in the GST Act expressly excludes fines, levies or penalties from GST. They are excluded because they are not a taxable supply, in which a good or service is provided in consideration for payment. Accordingly, this is simply another way of arguing that nothing is provided in return for deemed value payments. I have already rejected that
submission. Nor do I accept that deemed value payments are compulsory. The two Fisheries Acts look at the matter from the perspective of the fisher who has taken by- catch. At that point, the fisher has the choice of buying quota or paying deemed values. Only if the fisher fails to buy quota within the prescribed time are the deemed value payments compulsory. Under the 1983 Act, the fisher could also surrender the fish.
[50] I also note that in Pacific Trawling Limited v Chief Executive of Ministry of Fisheries (HC Nap. CP 17/99, 28 July 2000) Doogue J held that deemed value payments under the 1983 Act were not penalties for purposes of the Limitation Act. He characterised (at [60]) deemed value payments as “not in essence a penalty but a payment other than for quota for the by-catch kept”. That case did not deal with GST, but I agree with what I take to be Doogue J’s conclusion that deemed value payments under the 1983 Act are made in consideration for rights in respect of by- catch.
[51] Nor does the fact that deemed value payments are deemed to be statutory debts assist the defendants. Section 107I was a deeming provision directed to recovery of deemed value payments. As such, it says little if anything about their character for GST purposes.
Practical considerations
[52] Mr Coleman contended that imposing GST would be difficult because of the way in which deemed value liabilities are balanced throughout the year, with liability finally crystallising at year’s end and money paid being held on trust in the meantime. He referred to Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust (above).
[53] However, the only specific difficulty pointed to was a need to value quota, where the fisher buys quota to offset deemed value payments. I accept Mr Cullen’s submission that no such need to value arises. Deemed value payments are based on a quantity of fish taken. Quota or ACE is also denominated by quantity. When it comes to crediting deemed value payments, the Ministry is indifferent to the price
the fisher must pay to procure the requisite amount of quota. It will credit only the deemed value of that quantity.
[54] Nor does the fact that deemed value payments are held in trust assist the Ministry. The GST Act applies comprehensively to transactions involving consideration given for goods or services, and does not exempt such transactions where they involve trustees. The Chatham Islands Enterprise Trust case established that the Trust supplied no service to the Crown in return for the Crown settling money on it for the people of the Chatham Islands. That settlement was in no way comparable to deemed value payments.
Result
[55] The plaintiffs have succeeded. There will be a declaration that a deemed value payment under the 1983 and 1996 Acts is made in consideration for a taxable supply.
[56]The plaintiffs are entitled to costs on a 2B basis.
Delivered at 3.30 pm this 13th day of May 2005.
F Miller J
Solicitors:
Sainsbury Logan & Williams, Napier for Plaintiff Crown Law Office, Wellington for Defendants
Pacific Trawling Limited v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries HC Wellington CIV 2004-485-922 [2005] NZHC 1758
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