McGrath v R

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, the case of McGrath v R (SC 30 & 32/2005 [2005] NZSC 50) involved the applicants, McGrath and F, who were charged with multiple sexual offences that allegedly occurred between 1968 and 1977. They sought a discharge under section 347 of the Crimes Act 1961 or an order declaring all evidence against them inadmissible due to alleged delays, abuse of process, and the risk of an unfair trial. The applicants' applications were initially heard by John Hansen J in the High Court, who dismissed the applications except in the case of one complainant. Subsequently, the applicants sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but their appeal was adjourned sine die following the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Bailey, which held that section 379A of the Crimes Act did not confer jurisdiction to appeal an order made in the High Court that refused to grant or grant a stay or discharge.

The legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the applicants could appeal directly to the Court from the High Court's orders, bypassing the Court of Appeal. The applicants argued that the leapfrog procedure was justified because they wished to challenge the correctness of the Court of Appeal's decision in Bailey, which stood in their way. The Court found that the applicants' applications to the High Court did not concern the admissibility of evidence as defined in section 344A of the Crimes Act. Instead, the applications were focused on preventing any evidence from being led against the applicants and were based on abuse of process and fair trial considerations. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the proposed pre-trial appeal because it was not authorised by section 379A(1)(aa) of the Crimes Act or any other statutory provision. The Court concluded that the proposed appeal was not authorised by any of the provisions set out in section 10 of the Supreme Court Act 2003, and therefore, the applications for leave to appeal were dismissed in each case.