Goffe v R

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Joseph Te Ahu Goffe, the appellant, appealed against the decisions of Judge McKegg and Judge Zohrab, seeking leave to appeal their rulings on the admissibility of evidence related to his charge of wilfully attempting to pervert the course of justice. The Crown opposed the grant of leave on the merits of the appeal. The appellant argued that the letters authored by his co-accused, William Shane McKay, were inadmissible. He also argued that the conviction of his co-accused was inadmissible. The Court had to decide whether the evidence of Mr McKay’s conviction and the letters were admissible against the appellant.

The Court found that the evidence of Mr McKay’s conviction was admissible under s 49 of the Evidence Act 2006. The Court considered the policy reasons for admitting convictions, including saving time and expense and making available highly probative evidence. The Court held that the evidence of the conviction was relevant to the authorship of the first letter and Mr McKay’s purpose in writing the letter. The Court found that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value. The Court also found that the first letter was admissible as it was not strictly a hearsay statement, and the content of the letter was more in the nature of “verbal acts” rather than hearsay. The Court concluded that the content of the first letter was admissible against the appellant. However, the Court found that the second letter was not admissible as it was written outside the period alleged for the offending and was not in furtherance of the conspiracy as charged.

The Court granted leave to appeal. The appeal against the decision of Judge Zohrab was dismissed. The appeal against the decision of Judge McKegg was allowed in part. The first letter was admissible. The content of the second letter was not.