Colman v Attorney-General

In the case of Colman v Attorney-General, the applicant, John Colman, filed nine separate sets of proceedings against the Attorney-General in the District Court, stemming from an incident that occurred in December 2007. The proceedings sought relief under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in relation to events surrounding his arrest and subsequent prosecution and appeal. The District Court struck out all claims except for one relating to the arrest. The applicant’s appeal to the High Court was partially successful but ultimately unsuccessful, and further appeals to the Court of Appeal were also dismissed. Now, the applicant seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Supreme Court should grant leave to appeal against the High Court's decision, despite the jurisdictional limitations set out in the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Supreme Court had to determine if there were compelling or exceptional circumstances that warranted allowing a leap-frog appeal. Additionally, the court had to assess the merits of the applicant's claims, particularly whether they amounted to a collateral attack on previous judicial decisions or if they were reasonably arguable.

The Supreme Court held that there were no compelling or exceptional circumstances that justified allowing a leap-frog appeal. The court noted that the applicant's claims primarily focused on judicial conduct and challenged events that had already been judicially determined in previous proceedings. The court was not persuaded that there was an obvious error in the approach taken by the High Court and Court of Appeal. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the applicant's dissatisfaction with the costs awards made against him but emphasised that the costs rules typically follow the event. The applicant had not come close to persuading the Supreme Court to take the exceptional course of allowing a leap-frog appeal.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. This decision was based on the understanding that the applicant was not deprived of his day in court, as he was still entitled to go to trial on his complaints relating to the arrest and the failure to notify him of the laying of the second information. The court also noted that the applicant's unusual litigation strategy and the numerous allegations advanced had resulted in costs orders being made against him.