Zimmermann, Lothar v Hodges, John

Case [1982] FCA 293


I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF

AUSTRALIA

)

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT

REGISTRY

)

No.

G122 o f

1 9 8 2

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BETWEEN :

LOTHAR ZIWERMANN and

BOGUSLAWA

ZIblblERMANN

Appl icants

AND :

J O H N

HODGES

Munster

for Immiara t ion and

E t h n i c A f f a i r s

Respondent

J U D G E MAJCCNG

ORDER:

FITZGERALD

J.

DATE OF ORDER:

13 DECEMBER 1982

WHERE MADE :

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.

The Minis te r

for

Immigra t ion

and

Ethnlc

Affa i r s

a .

make a dec i s ion

upon

t he

app l i ca t ion

con tamed

i n t h e a p p l i c a n t s ’

le t ter t o him

of

3 December

1982,

having regard

t o

t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h a t

le t ter

and

t h e a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d

i n these p roceed ings , w i th in

seven days.

2 .

P roceed ings

ad jou rned

gene ra l ly

t o

be

r e s to red

upon

s h o r t notice

a f t e r t h e

Minis ter’s

d e c l s i o n

has been

made.

3. Costs r e se rved .

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

No. G122 of 1982

GENERAL DIVISION

1

BETWEEN :

LOTHAR ZIMMERMANN and

BOGUSLAWA ZII’II%3RMANN

Applicants

AND :

JOHN HODGES

Mlnister for Immiqration and

-

Ethnic Affairs

Respondent

FITZGERALD J.

1982

DECEMBER

13

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

In the exceptional circumstances

of this matter

I propose to take an unusual course.

-

4 -

The applicants have contrlbuted to their present

predicament by entering Australia

on the basis on which

they did, by

not complying with restrictions imposed by

the law, and by their failure to take any step, even

though solicitors had been consulted, untll after

deportation orders had been made. The conduct

of the

applicants cannot however fully explain the intransigence

of the Department, which

I do not presently propose

to

canvass I n detail.

The applicants’ attempt

to have the deportatlon

orders set aside ralses questions

of some difficulty. The

ultimate decision as

to whether or not the appllcants

L .

should be deported or permitted to remain in Australia is,

of course, for the executive, not the court, which

is

concerned to ensure that the law is obeyed in the

decision making process. It is an arid exercise to

deal with such questions where,

as here, they are largely

academic.

Although I would be prepared, if necessary, to

hear further argument to the contrary, it is,

I think,

both correct and accepted by the applicants that there

would be no practical point in pursuing their attempt

to. have the existing deportation orders set aside if

the applications they have made by their solicitors'

letter of 3 December 1982 to the Minister are rejected

after due consideration. In so saying, I assume that

those who are advising the applicants have satisfied

tGemselves that the appropriate applications have been

made.

The only qualifications to that proposition

whxh

have occurred

to me relate to whether or not, if the

applicants are deported, their babies should be deported

also, and whether

or not, if the applicants are not to be

permitted to stay, they should be deported

or permitted

to depart voluntarily.

The Department

- and in so saying I include

the Minister - has refused to consider the applications

made by letter of

3 December 1982. I cannot understand

the reason for that attitude any more than

I can discover

3 .

any ~ustification

for it in law:

nor was counsel for

the respondents able to point

to any legal basis. It

was not, for example, submitted that the applications

do not relate

to matters committed

for decision

to the

Minister under

the Act.

These are circumstances

of genuine urgency about

this matter. There is little, if any, probabllity

of

my dealing wlth the applications to review the deportation

order with reasons,

or to provide my detailed reasons for

the orders which

I am about to make, in the lmmediate future.

In the meantime, the deportation orders stand

although they have been stayed, and the applicants cannot

work to support themselves and their bables. Their

situation is uncertain and generally unsatisfactory.

I have no doubt that the appropriate course in the

I .

circumstances is to order the relevant minister,

o

whom the letter of

3 December 1982 was directed, to

make the decisions necessitated by the applications contained in that letter. He wlll have available to him the contents of that letter and the affidavits flled In

court in these proceedings and that is all that the

applicants require

to be taken Into account in respect

of their applications.

In the circumstances, the decision should be

made withln seven days.

I accordingly further adjourn

I

.

4.

the proceedings generally wlth that

order, with

costs reserved. The matter can be restored on

short notice after the minister's decislon has been

made.

Details
AGLC
Zimmermann, Lothar v Hodges, John [1982] FCA 293
Case
[1982] FCA 293
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lothar Zimmermann and Boguslawa Zimmermann v John Hodges, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, was heard in the Federal Court of Australia's Queensland District Registry. The Zimmermanns, Australian residents, sought to challenge their deportation orders issued under the Migration Act. The respondents were the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, who was responsible for enforcing the deportation orders against the Zimmermanns.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Zimmermanns could successfully challenge their deportation orders and if the court could compel the Minister to reconsider their applications for a waiver of the deportation orders. The Zimmermanns argued that the Minister had not properly considered their applications, and the court needed to determine if it could intervene in the executive decision-making process to ensure the law was obeyed. The court also had to consider the implications of the Zimmermanns' conduct, including their failure to comply with the law and take timely action to address their immigration status.

The court found that while the Zimmermanns' conduct contributed to their predicament, the primary issue was the Minister's refusal to consider their applications. The court held that it was not the role of the judiciary to make the ultimate decision on deportation but rather to ensure that the law was followed in the decision-making process. The Zimmermanns had made new applications to the Minister, and the court concluded that there was no practical point in pursuing the challenge to the deportation orders if those applications were rejected. The court ordered the Minister to make a decision on the Zimmermanns' applications within seven days and stayed the deportation orders pending the Minister's decision. The proceedings were adjourned generally, to be restored upon short notice after the Minister's decision was made, with costs reserved.

This case highlights the limited role of the courts in reviewing executive decisions related to immigration and the importance of ensuring that decision-making processes are fair and lawful. The Zimmermanns' attempt to challenge their deportation orders was ultimately unsuccessful, but the court's intervention ensured that the Minister considered their applications and complied with the law in doing so.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.