ZAGAR & HELLNER

In the matter of *Zagar & Hellner*, heard by McClelland J, the applicant sought to set aside a Domestic Relationship Agreement entered into by the parties on 7 October 2005. The respondent contended that the agreement was binding under section 90UJ of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) and argued that the applicant was precluded by principles of estoppel from seeking to have it set aside, asserting that a verbal agreement had preceded the executed document.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the executed Domestic Relationship Agreement constituted a binding financial agreement for the purposes of the *Family Law Act 1975*, whether the applicant was estopped from seeking to set aside the agreement, and whether the agreement should be set aside under subsections 90UM(1)(e) and 90UM(1)(h) on grounds of duress, undue influence, or unconscionable conduct. The Court was also required to determine whether the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing that the agreement was fair, just, and reasonable.

McClelland J found that the parties did not enter into an agreement until the execution of the Domestic Relationship Agreement, thereby rejecting the respondent's submission regarding a prior verbal agreement and the application of estoppel. The Court further determined that the respondent had procured the agreement through unconscionable conduct and had failed to discharge the onus of proving the agreement was fair, just, and reasonable. Consequently, the Court found that the agreement should be set aside.

The Court ordered that the Domestic Relationship Agreement dated 7 October 2005 be set aside pursuant to sections 90UM(1)(e) and 90UM(1)(h) of the *Family Law Act 1975*. Pending further order, existing consent orders made on 9 April 2014 concerning property were to continue in effect.