ZA v Director-General, Community Services Directorate

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory considered an application by a mother (ZA) seeking eight interlocutory orders in care and protection proceedings concerning her two young people. The orders sought included adding parties to the proceeding, various forms of contact between the mother and the young people, and a change in the young people's residence to South Australia pending the final resolution of separate Court of Appeal proceedings. The application also sought final relief to set aside previous Children's Court orders and return the young people to their mother and other family members.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether it possessed the power to grant the interlocutory orders sought, particularly in light of the specific provisions of the *Children and Young People Act 2008* (ACT) governing appeals in care and protection matters. The Court was required to determine if section 838 of the Act, which limits the Supreme Court's appellate powers to those that could have been made by the Children's Court, precluded the making of interim orders regarding contact. Additionally, the Court had to consider the Director-General's submission that existing final orders placed the discretion for contact arrangements solely with the Director-General, and whether section 433 of the Act, concerning interim care and protection orders, was applicable.

The Court reasoned that section 838 of the *Children and Young People Act 2008* significantly restricted the orders it could make on appeal, confining them to those the Children's Court could have made. It found that most of the orders sought by the appellant were substantive and permanent in nature, not designed to preserve the status quo, and therefore inappropriate for interlocutory relief. Regarding Order 2, which sought weekly one-hour video calls, the Director-General provided an undertaking to abide by the existing contact plan, which included audio-visual contact every second Sunday. The Court noted that the wishes of the young people, aged 13 and 14, were paramount and that one young person had refused contact with her mother, while the other preferred fortnightly contact. Given these circumstances and the Director-General's undertaking, the Court deemed it unnecessary to make a further order.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the application in proceeding. This outcome was based on the undertaking given by the Director-General to adhere to the contact plan, which included offering audio-visual contact between the mother and each young person every second Sunday evening. The Court concluded that the appellant would substantially achieve what was sought in Order 2, albeit on a more limited basis, and that making further interim orders was not appropriate given the young people's expressed wishes and the potential psychological impact.