Young v RSPCA NSW (No. 2)

In the matter of Young v RSPCA NSW (No. 2), the plaintiff sought to bring claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation against various parties, including those who were alleged to have prosecuted the plaintiff for offences under the Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) in 2012, and against a broadcaster and Google Inc. The defendants applied for summary dismissal of all claims. The primary issues for the court to determine were whether the plaintiff's claims could proceed in light of the 2016 setting aside of the convictions under s 32 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), and if the pleadings were sufficient to warrant striking out some or all of the claims.

The court found that the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim could not proceed because the setting aside of the convictions did not constitute a termination in the plaintiff's favour, and thus did not meet the requirements for such a claim. The court also determined that the abuse of process claim could not proceed at that time because it was not clear when the cause of action accrued, but the plaintiff was granted leave to replead the claim. As for the defamation claims, the court held that the plaintiff could not establish publication by any defendant within the limitation period, and thus these claims were also struck out. The court further found that the broadcaster's fair report defence could not be determined at that stage, and that the plaintiff's defamation claims against Google Inc. were struck out on the principle of proportionality.

The court ordered that the claims against the first to third defendants for malicious prosecution and defamation were struck out and dismissed, while the abuse of process claim was struck out but with leave to replead by 3 February 2020. The plaintiff's defamation claims against the fourth and fifth defendants were also struck out and dismissed. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the application and proceedings for the fourth and fifth defendants, with liberty to apply. The remaining proceedings for abuse of process as between the plaintiff and the first to third defendants were stood over for further directions.