Wright v Attorney-General (Tas)

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The appellant, the widow of Keith Simpson Wright, brought an action under the Fatal Accidents Act following the death of her husband in a collision between a car and a truck driven by one Lee. The appellant alleged that the Crown, represented by the Attorney-General for Tasmania, was liable for Lee's negligence, claiming Lee was a servant of the Crown. The Crown contended that Lee was an independent contractor.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Lee, the owner-driver of the truck hired for road construction work by the Tasmanian Public Works Department, was an employee (servant) of the Crown or an independent contractor. This determination was crucial for establishing the Crown's vicarious liability for the fatal accident caused by Lee's negligent driving. A secondary issue, which the court ultimately did not need to decide, concerned whether the Crown could be liable for negligence in the execution of the road construction work itself, irrespective of Lee's employment status.

The Court reasoned that the terms of the engagement and the degree of control exercised were determinative. The evidence indicated that Lee, as the owner of the truck, was responsible for its maintenance, petrol, and oil. He was paid an hourly rate for the hire of the truck, adjusted by a mileage allowance, rather than a wage. Crucially, Lee had the right to substitute his own driver and was paid for the use of the vehicle, not for his personal labour. While the foreman directed what was to be transported and where, the driver was generally left to choose the route. The Court applied the principles established in *Humberstone v. Northern Timber Mills*, emphasizing that the contract's essence was the provision of mechanical traction and the use of the truck, rather than the personal labour and skill of the driver subject to detailed command. The Court found that the control exercised by the department was directed towards achieving a result, not controlling the manner of driving.

The High Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, holding that Lee was an independent contractor and not a servant of the Crown. Consequently, the Crown was not vicariously liable for Lee's negligent driving. The Court found that the accident was solely caused by Lee's negligence and that the road construction itself did not present a danger that the Crown had failed to mitigate.