Wiupa and Kogoya (No. 2)

This matter concerned proceedings between Mr Wiupa (Husband) and Ms Kogoya (Wife) in the Family Court of Australia at Melbourne. The dispute involved allegations of violence by both parties against each other, and specifically, allegations of abuse of the children by the father, placing the case within the Magellan list. The parties had lived together in West Papua and had twins born in April 2003. Both were involved in political activism in West Papua and arrived in Australia in 2006, initially interstate before relocating to Melbourne on temporary protection visas.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the proceedings should be transferred from the Melbourne Registry to the Brisbane Registry, and the arrangements for the independent representation of the children. The mother sought the transfer to Brisbane, where she and the children resided, arguing the balance of convenience favoured that location for the preparation of a Family Report and the continuation of proceedings under the Magellan list. The father opposed the transfer, while the Independent Children's Lawyer initially supported the preparation of a Family Report in Melbourne but did not seek an immediate return order for the mother.

Justice Brown determined that the balance of convenience favoured the transfer of the proceedings to Brisbane. The Court reasoned that while the father and his witnesses were in Melbourne, the mother and children were resident in Brisbane, and many potential witnesses were government or medical staff who would likely give evidence by video. The Court also ordered that the children, M and J, be independently represented by a lawyer, requesting Queensland Legal Aid to arrange this representation and Victoria Legal Aid to liaise as necessary. Further orders were made regarding the filing of an address for service by the independent children's lawyer, the provision of documents to that lawyer, and the preparation of a Family Report in the Brisbane Registry. The Court also certified that the matter reasonably required the attendance of counsel.