Wise Bros Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)

The Commissioner for Railways (NSW) brought an action against Wise Bros. Pty. Ltd., a flour milling company, seeking damages for fire damage to the Commissioner's property. The Commissioner's claim was based on three counts: negligence in the conduct of the company's business and the accumulation of inflammable material; negligence in a non-natural use of the land involving combustible matter and a lack of fire-fighting equipment; and a claim based on the non-natural use of the land. A fire had broken out on the company's premises, spreading to and damaging the Commissioner's adjacent railway property. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant company, but the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales granted a new trial. The defendant company appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the company's use of its land constituted a non-natural use, whether the rejection of expert evidence regarding fire precautions was lawful, and whether there was sufficient evidence of negligence to warrant a new trial. Specifically, the court had to consider the applicability of the rule in *Rylands v. Fletcher* and the common law principles of negligence in the context of a fire originating on industrial premises and spreading to adjoining property. The court also had to assess the admissibility of evidence concerning the necessary fire-fighting equipment for a flour mill.

The High Court held that the operation of a flour mill was not a non-natural use of land, thereby dismissing the claim based on strict liability under the third count. However, the court found that the rejection of expert evidence from a senior fire brigade officer regarding necessary fire precautions in a flour mill was an error, as this evidence was relevant to the negligence claims. The court reasoned that while the origin of the fire was unexplained, the presence of highly inflammable flour dust imposed a duty on the company to take reasonable precautions to prevent ignition and to suppress any fire that occurred. Therefore, the appeal was allowed in part, with the order for a new trial being limited to the first and second counts of the declaration, which alleged negligence.