Wing v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation

In the matter of Wing v The Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the court was called upon to resolve a dispute concerning defamation, focusing on the justification defence and the specifics of the defamatory imputations. The central issue revolved around whether the imputation that the plaintiff was believed on reasonable grounds to be guilty could be a reasonable defence to an imputation that the plaintiff was guilty, and whether the defendant could rely on a less serious meaning as a defence to a more serious meaning, invoking the so-called Polly Peck and Hore-Lacy defences. Additionally, the court had to determine whether differently nuanced meanings could provide a defence of justification. The court further addressed the requirement of particulars of justification in defamation cases, particularly the necessity of these particulars to match the particularity of an indictment.

The respondents argued that the variant imputations, which indicated that there were reasonable grounds to believe the facts asserted in the plaintiff’s imputations, constituted a valid defence of justification under the Hore-Lacy principle. They contended that this defence was not merely an imputation of suspicion but rather of reasonable belief. They relied on several authorities to support their position, asserting that their defence could not be deemed obviously untenable or manifestly groundless. The court, however, disagreed with the respondents’ interpretation, finding that the case of Elliot was plainly wrong and inconsistent with established principles. The court emphasised that a report of an arrest and charge does not imply guilt and that the defamatory quality of published material must be determined by what is conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, not by their own beliefs or prejudices.

Ultimately, the court ruled that the respondents’ defence of justification, based on the variant imputations, was not tenable. The court struck out specific paragraphs and particulars of the defence, dismissed the respondents’ application to amend their defence, and ordered the respondents to pay the plaintiff's costs associated with the interlocutory application and the application to amend. This decision underscored the importance of clear and precise particulars in defamation cases and reinforced the principle that imputations of guilt require more than mere suspicion to be actionable.