Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd RGC Mineral Sands Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd

Case [1997] FCA 1335


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 215 of 1994

BETWEEN:

WIMMERA INDUSTRIAL MINERALS PTY LTD (ACN 004 302 130)
APPLICANT

AND:

RGC MINERAL SANDS LIMITED (ACN 008 763 666)
FIRST RESPONDENT

RGC MINERAL SANDS LIMITED
CROSS-CLAIMANT

WIMMERA INDUSTRIAL MINERALS PTY LTD
FIRST CROSS-CLAIMANT

THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
SECOND CROSS-RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

17 SEPTEMBER 1997

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

EX‑TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I uphold the applicant’s refusal to produce the documents globally identified by Mr Catterns. As to those said to be related to par 3.3 of Mr Hamer’s first affidavit and par 7 of Mr Munt’s affidavit, s 122(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 does not apply. Neither paragraph amounts to a consent by the applicant to evidence being given of the privileged communications. Section 122(2) does not apply. Neither paragraph sets out the substance or effect of the communications.

Section 126, which was relied on by the respondent, does not apply for want of any primary document the production of which may pick up other documents. See Towney v The Minister for Land and Water Conservation, unreported, 23 July 1997.

On the assumption that the principle in Thomason v Campbelltown Municipal Council (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 at 358‑359 is a free‑standing principle that has survived the enactment of the Evidence Act, it does not apply to the present case.  The nature of the legal advice sought and given here is not an issue, in the sense in which the word “issue” is used in that case.
Paragraph 4.1 of Mr Hamer’s affidavit is different.  The substance of the advice given by Mr Hamer is there disclosed, but there is no document in the list provided by Mr Catterns which fits the description in the opening words of that paragraph ‑ “shortly after the 14th of October 1994”.

The request for the production of the documents on Mr Catterns’ list should not have been saved up until yesterday.  Conformably with at least the spirit of my earlier orders, interlocutory skirmishes about documents and privilege should have been sorted out before the hearing of the amendment motion.  That was the point of the earlier orders.  The parties were before Northrop J on a discovery/privilege issue last week.  The matter could and should have been raised then.  Instead, the efficient flow of the amendment motion has been interrupted, and scarce court time devoted to that application has been lost.

I certify that this and the preceding page are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Sundberg

Associate:

Dated:            17 September 1997

Counsel for the Applicant: A C Archibald QC, J McL Emmerson QC and P W Collinson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks
Counsel for the Respondent: D Catterns QC and A J Ryan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Allen Allen & Hemsley
Details
AGLC
Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd RGC Mineral Sands Ltd v Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1335
Case
[1997] FCA 1335
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with resolving a dispute over the production of certain documents and the application of legal professional privilege. The applicant, Wimmera Industrial Minerals, sought to prevent the disclosure of specific documents, which the respondent, RGC Mineral Sands, argued should be made available. The Commissioner of Patents was also involved as a cross-respondent in the proceedings. The case was presided over by Sundberg J, and the judgment was delivered on 17 September 1997.

The central legal issues before the court revolved around the interpretation and application of sections 122 and 126 of the Evidence Act 1995, as well as the broader principle of legal professional privilege as established in the case of Thomason v Campbelltown Municipal Council. Specifically, the court had to determine whether certain communications between the applicant and its legal representatives were protected by privilege and thus exempt from disclosure. Additionally, the court considered whether the principle from Thomason v Campbelltown Municipal Council could be invoked to protect the documents in question.

In delivering the judgment, Sundberg J found that sections 122 and 126 of the Evidence Act 1995 did not apply to the circumstances presented. The court held that the relevant affidavits did not constitute a consent to the disclosure of privileged communications, nor did they set out the substance or effect of such communications. Furthermore, the court concluded that the principle from Thomason v Campbelltown Municipal Council did not apply as the nature of the legal advice sought and given did not align with the issues presented in that case. Consequently, the court upheld the applicant's refusal to produce the documents globally identified by the respondent's legal representatives.

Sundberg J also expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of the application to produce the documents, noting that it should have been resolved prior to the hearing of the amendment motion. The court highlighted that the delay had disrupted the efficient flow of the proceedings and wasted valuable court time. As a result of the court's reasoning, the application for the production of the documents was dismissed, and the applicant's refusal to disclose them was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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