Williams v Macharg

The case of Williams v Macharg involved a dispute over the calculation of a superannuation allowance for James Leslie Williams, a former draftsman employed by the Government of New South Wales. Williams claimed his pension had been calculated incorrectly due to the omission of two periods of his service. The appellant, representing the Government, argued that one of these periods was temporary and therefore not eligible for inclusion in the pension calculation, and further contended that Williams was not entitled to any pension at all. The matter proceeded from the District Court to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and then by special leave to the High Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent's employment during certain periods constituted "service" within the meaning of the Civil Service Act 1884 (NSW), and whether his appointment was permanent or temporary. Specifically, the court had to determine if a period of employment from 1868 to 1869, where the respondent was paid a daily rate and described as a "temporary draftsman," qualified as service for pension purposes. Additionally, the court considered whether a later appointment in 1883, initially described as temporary but subsequently gazetted as permanent, was indeed a permanent appointment.

The High Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that the respondent was an "officer" within the meaning of the Civil Service Act 1884 from the commencement of his employment in 1868. The court reasoned that the nature of the work was continuous and necessary for the department's ordinary operations, rather than casual or to meet a temporary emergency. The description of "temporary draftsman" and the daily payment method did not, in the circumstances, negate the permanent nature of the employment. The court also found that the notification in the Government Gazette regarding the 1883 appointment, coupled with the fact that deductions for superannuation were made from his salary, provided sufficient evidence of a permanent appointment, creating a presumption that any prior temporary status had been confirmed. The court further clarified that for the purpose of calculating pensionable service, periods of service before the Act could be added to periods after the Act, even if separated by an interval, and that such prior service need not strictly meet the definition of "officer" under the Act, provided it was continuous and regular government service. The court disapproved of the ratio decidendi in *Hales v. Millard* to the extent it was inconsistent with this approach.